

**SHRI RAGHAVENDRA
HIS LIFE AND WORKS**

Vol. V

PARIMALA

Vol. III

Digitized by srujanika@gmail.com

By

G. B. JOSHI


Editor, By G. B. JOSHI M.A., B.T.

August 1975

Digitized by srujanika@gmail.com

PARIMALA

VOL. III



10280

Published by the Author

1975 1st edition 1000 copies

Price Rs. 15/-

10281

10282

10283

(All Rights Reserved by the Author)

Copies available with

G. B. Joshi
Extension, GADAG (Karnataka)

*Printed at
New Gadag Printery*

यत्करोषि यदशनासि यज्जुहोषि ददासियत् ।

यत्पश्यसि कौतेय तत्कुरुत्वमदर्पणम् ॥ (गीता)

TO

SHRI MALLAPPA SHINDE

FOR HIS GENEROUS AID

CONTENTS

	Page
Preface
I Adhaya, III Pada	1
,, IV Pada	15
SarvaShabda Samanvaya	15-43
Modes of meaning	44-55
Brahman the material cause	56
The world is unreal	78
Sakshi	92
II Adhyaya I Pada	118
Pramana Vichara	154
Memory	160
Inference	177
Kathalakshana	192
Brahma the cause of the world	224
The identity of Jeeva and	
Brahma	239
Brahma, the dependent cause	250
The Jeeva's freedom of will	260
God's motive in creation	268
II Adhyaya II Pada	281
Charvaka, Logical Positivist	316
Another school of Sankhya	321
Vaisheshika system of	
philosophy	324

Sougata or Boudha system	400
Jaina System	429
Shaiva, Pashupata and Other		
such schools	436
II Adhyaya III Pada	442
II Adhyaya IV Pada	463
III Adhyaya I Pada	464
III Adhyaya II Pada	467
Validity	470
Vyapti and inference	472
Bimba and Pratibimba	486
III Adhyaya III Pada	490
Bhakti	496
Moksha	499
Gradation of souls	504
III Adhyaya IV Pada	507
Karma	512
Gradation of souls in Moskha	516
IV Adhyaya I Pada	537
IV Adhyaya II Pada	541
IV Adhyaya III Pada	549
IV Adhyaya IV Pada	549

PREFACE

This Magnum opus of Shri Raghavendra has reached its end, in this volume and we have breathed out a sigh of relief. All Indologists who want to study Nyaya Sudha of Jaya treetha, the Prince of commentators, do find Parimala of Shri Raghavendra indispensable for its elucidation which is the fruit of close study, and comprehensive digest. Raghavendra is a gem among intellectuals, with comprehensive understanding noble appreciation, impartial assessment, logical argumentation, deep study, vast reading which are the indelible marks of his achievements left in all his works.

Shri Raghavendra is labouring under a disadvantage. His efforts being strictly limited to elucidation of the original, his work is bound to be a collection of disconnected notes without any continuity running through them. To make it an enjoyable reading we borrowed the current of thought of the original Sudha, and even referred to the Anuvyakhyana of the Acharya. Yet each comment is a unit, small or great, bristling with sharp points of attack, behind a thick defensive shield of thought and ideas of infallible veracity. References are rich in it. The opponent though unwilling to be convinced yet bends before the weighty arguments. These notes seem to be an

endless series of mountainous waves rising on the vast ocean of Nyaya Sudha as ebullitions of with thoughts scintillating with the sunshne of divine Grace.

While understanding and expressing those thoughts in English, I had the experience of a deep meditative absorption and the enjoyment of the greatest delight in my life. When he offers notes for our guidance Shri Raghavendra has before him a common reader equipped with ordinary means of understanding. Hence he takes care to see that the reader does not take the wrong track. We may gather here for the convenient appraisal of a critic different ways he adopts to be a useful guide to the student of Sudha.

He supplies us with clear cut definitions distinctive and significant in nature, so that they become helpful to distinguish them from similar words of different shades of meaning. Here for example in III 3-1 सर्ववेदांतप्रत्यय (comprehensive knowledge out of the study of all vedas) is found essential for upasana. In this context in Sudha are introduced अध्यनश्चारणमनन्: which must be clearly understood in their distinct nature. So Raghavendra defines them basing them on their primary and fundamental characteristics. Adhyayana is defined as गृहच्चारणानुच्चारणेतस्वधीनोच्चारणक्रमतयावर्णरीश

हणम् “Memorising a group of letters in the same order as he has made them his own repeating after Guru has recited them. So Adhyayana is restricted to mere memorisation of lines of Veda closely repeating after Guru's recitation without any reference to its meaning. Then Shravana is defined as उपदेशबलेनोत्पन्नवाक्यार्थज्ञानं understanding the syntactical meaning of a sentence after proper instruction (by the Guru) of it.” So this is clearly different from Adhyayana. Then Manana is defined as ज्ञातेऽर्थेयुक्त्यनुसंधानम् Applying reason to what has been understood. Thus the first is retention, the second is comprehension and the third is reasoning or ratiocination. These definitions speak for themselves for clarity of expression beauty of style and for fulfilling the purpose for which they are created.

He offers us references from other shastras so that the expressions become rich with suggestion. In III 4-5 the परिसंख्यान्याय is used. Raghavendra quotes Jaimini Sutra I-2 the last Adhikarana for this reference. Then the meaning of the Sutra is given. While rituals are performed certain Mantras are recited. Are those Mantras to be understood in their meaning and thus are they to fulfil a present purpose or are those Mantras not meant to be understood

in their meaning and they conduce only to produce a fruit far away in future ? It is settled that the Mantras are to be understood in their meaning. A long discussion is given and then a judgement is given using the परिसंख्यान्याय. In certain context it is said ‘that the ropes of both horses and asses are to be taken’ Then another Mantra prohibits the rope of an ass and so only the rope of a horse is to be taken. All this is possible by परिसंख्यान्याय. which means the rule of exclusion.

3) Bhagavendra gives grammatical derivation to justify the meaning in which the word is used or to justify the usage of a particular phrase which seems to be wrongly used.

In the 3rd Adhyaya 3rd Pada and 16th Adhikarana the usage before ज्ञानसूर्यं कृते is found Grammar enjoiced Ablative case before कृते. So it should be ज्ञानसूर्यर् कृते पृथग्विनानानामितुर्तीया But ine अन्यतरस्यां either तुर्तीया or पंचमी is enjoined still पृथक् and others should be taken separately and before them Accusitive is enjoined. And then usages are quoted. विनावात्विनावष्टविद्वतप्रपतनविना So also as this is an usage by a great poet (ज्ञानसूर्यकृते) this is also justified. कृते is a synonim of पृथक्, वना and अंतरेण.

4) Some popular phrases are explained by giving their original meanings. गुडजिह्विका is such a phrase. Raghavendra explains this as गुरुपूक्तजिह्विका एवं गुडजिह्विका Then he explains it as बालानांकटवादिग्रासयितुं अस्य व्यादानार्थं जिह्वायां गुडंयथास्थापयंतितथा This is somewhat like sugar-coating of a bitter pill. For this is placing a piece of Jaugary on the tongue of a young kid in order that he might swallow some thing bitter without complaining.

5) His greatest service to exegetic interpretation is to be found in bringing about reconciliation between conflicting elements, in shastric judgements.

The context is to ascertain the comparative values of ज्ञान and कर्म in respect of the final release or मोक्ष. The objector's view is that knowledge is not an independent means of swarga and other values in life, but Karma is such a means. Karma does the work and knowledge only gives final touches to the work of Karma. Then the Sidhanta side is that knowledge alone independently contrives to secure Swarga, and other pleasures.

Now how to reconcile Jaimini's opinion with that of Badarayana. Raghavendra makes this point clear. Jaimini's view considers the case of

human beings only, who again are of three types, highest indifferent, and lowest. That Karma with the aid of knowledge is the means of securing Heaven and other pleasures, is the opinion true in the case of highest men. The middle or indifferent are taken into consideration when it is said that mere Karma can secure Heaven and others. Knowledge is useful to secure some fruit other than Moksha. The lowest class thinks imperceptible things alone are secured by knowledge and not perceptible things. Jaimini thus thinks of human beings only. But Badarayan thinks that generally knowledge secures all desired objects. He does not consider knowledge as belonging to this or that one. Hence there is no conflict between Badarayana and Jaimini.

6) In the same manner he spares no pains in explaining illustrations. A topic arises in which कृत and अकृत should be taken to mean vaidies who propound Khanda or Akhanda as in कृतः प्रविशति Kunta means sword and being insentient cannot of its own accord enter into (the gate). So Kunta means kuntadharinah, those who carry the sword^s by secondary denotation. In the same manner by this sort of secondary denotation Khanda and Akhanda mean Khandavadi and Akhandavadi.

7) Meemansa words and principles are very

clearly explained. भावना is explained as आंतरादन्धः प्रयत्नविरोषः some, other than internal, effort स्वर्गकामोद्यजेत्, the root यज् means याग and the termination means भावना. The root यज् being verb transitive, which is the object of भावना (or भाव्य)? Is it स्वर्गभावयेत् or उत्पादयेत् or यागं भावयेत्? objection side is that भावना being terminaion is usually construed with its Prakriti which is याग. But swarga is a separate word which is related to भावना after the syntactical construction is understood and hence is construed with भावना after a long time. So भावना is construed with याग. How clearly the whole thing is presented.

Modern notes-makers and guide-producers should take a clue from him in this art of notes writing ; For his method is highly beneficial to students in secular and literary field. Ragha-vendra's intelligent and superb notes and explanations on very terse philosophical literature are endowed with lucidity of expression, cogency of argument, flights of imagination and more than these rich touches of inner light and deep experiences, so that not merely are they treated preferentially in literary in and philosophical field but they are considered as having spiritual efficacy and grace of beatitude.

It is a pleasure to read Sudha with the guidance of Parimala and even a cursory reading of these notes as given here will convince a casual reader of their value of enlightened guidance.

Thus in these five volumes we have already treated life of Raghavendra.

- 1 Geeta vivrithi.
- 2 Mahabharata Tatparya Nirnaya Bhava Sangraha.
- 3 Pramana padhati Bhavadeepa,
- 4 and Parimala.

Vol VI of about 600pp, that is yet to come comprises Bhashya of Shri Madhva and Raghavendra's Bhava Deepa, Tattva Manjari, Nyaya Muktavali, Tantra Deepika and Prakasha.

Craving the indulgence of the readers we state that we hope to bring out VI volume in due course.



I cannot but thank all those that have contributed to the success of this work directly, or indirectly. I must thank first those who have helped me by giving concrete suggestions in the preparation of the work. Next, my thanks are due to Shr^o Mallappa Shinde, but for whose help, the book would not have been published. By the time we undertook the work the paper scarcity had scared away many publishers from book publishing. But my young friend Mr. M. S. Hombali came forward to help me to bring out the publication in time. With Herculean efforts he worked against odds and finished the work in time. I heartily thank him though formal thanks giving is only a poor return to strenuous struggle in a spirit of dedication. Last but not the least is to offer my humble prayer to Him who reached out his helping hand, through all these persons to lift me up when I had fallen down in despair.

Erretta

Incorrect	Correct	Page	Line
अवर	अवरत्व	17	4
Derecms	Dreams	81	16
Exietence	Existence	250	20
Sourgat	Sougata	400	12
Doctorines	Doctrines	432	12
Raghavendras	Raghavendra	468	3
Hared	Hatred	521	1
Myeyes	My eyes	529	11
Eexhaust	Exhaust	543	2

Shri Raghavendra—his Life and Work

VOL. V

PARIMALA — A GLOSS ON SUDHA

PADA III

To distinguish the subject matter of this pada from that of the previous and forth-coming Padas, Acharya mentions the special contribution of this Pada. There is one class of words which mean both Vishnu and other things than Vishnu, which are classed as Ubhayatra Prasidha — Not only the distinguishing quality of the subject matter but the unique and unified or integrated quality of the topic of this Pada. What integrated topic is, is already dealt with in अंतराधिकरण according to the dictum of Jaimini.

So the words which primarily mean by connotational power Vishnu and (appear to mean) other things of the world are shown here to have the form of a name and a sign (adjective) and to connote in a super primary way Vishnu alone. This is the topic of this Pada, which justifies its distinct purpose from the previous as well as forth coming Padas. So in this pada it is shown that the concerned shruti has its import in Brahma as it does go against the reason mentioned (स्वशब्दात्) or the vedic words show by primary connotational power, Vishnu alone and

not any one else. Besides it is shown that there are no such words as would distinctly connote Rudra and others like भस्मघर, उग्र, संसारि and others.

Now in the sutra नानुमानं अतच्छब्दात् the word अतच्छब्दात् has been explained in the Bhashya as mentioned above. The negative particle अ (the original अ॒) has been shown to have two meanings: 1) शाद्वं न भुक्ते इति अथाद्बोली. One who does not eat food offered to the manes (शाद्व). Here the negative is used in the sense of 'contradicting one after its due introduction' (प्रसङ्ग्य प्रतिषेधः). 2) घटादन्यः अवटः, here the second meaning is पर्युदासः which means, negative particle confutes syntactical reference to the next following word. In the first instance (प्रसङ्ग्यप्रतिषेधः) the negative seeks contact with the verb; while in second the negative seeks contact with the following word (पर्युदास). According to the first meaning (तत् शब्दो नास्ति इति): Here न॑ having exhausted its power of reference by contacting with the verb अस्ति, does not extend it to तच्छब्द, which, hence loses its capacity to be compounded with the negative particle. For only a word that has capacity in the form of expectancy of reference to other word is compounded with the other word (समर्थयोः समासः). Now अ has no expectancy of reference to तच्छब्द. Hence these two cannot be compounded.

This objection is met with by two different replies. 1) One is छंदो विषये दृष्टानुविधिः छंदसि The rule follows the usage in veda. Hence though the word is incapable of being compounded, it is compounded. But this rule is neither sutra nor vartika on sutra. Nor still it is in the form of syllogistic reasoning. But it is the saying of Bhashya Kara in the context of वृद्धिरावेच्. Besides in Kaiyata it is said इष्ठिरेव इथम् it is desirable. And just as the इष्ठिः of vartikakara is decisive so is the इष्ठिः (acceptance) of Bhashyakara also decisive.

The second one is:— अकर्तरिच कारके ज्ञापकात् there is one usage प्रास्यति तं which means ‘He throws it’ from this we get प्रासः which means ‘throwing’. In order to get the form प्रासः from the root प्रास् to throw this sutra ‘अकर्तरीच कारके संज्ञायाम्’ enjoins the termination चञ् to the root form, when it signifies or does not signify by convention the meaning of Karaka or government or relation (between the noun and the verb) except that of कर्ता or agent. Now what is the meaning of अकर्तरि or the negative particle in it? Is it प्रसज्य प्रतिषेध or पर्युदास? If it means पर्युदास or differentiation as in घटादप्य अघटः one different from the pot, then अकर्तरि means Karaka different from karta. This differentiation carries with it the condition of similarity with the

कर्ता or agent. Thus when we intend a relation different from that of agent it involves also similarity with the agent. Hence we can only accept a Karaka that is different from, and at the same time similar to कर्ता or agent. So the word कारक in अकर्तृत्वं कारके is redundant.

But Panini himself in his sutra uses कारके, and hence it is to be supposed that the negative particle in अकर्तृत्वं does not mean पर्युदास or differentiation. Instead only प्रसञ्ज्यप्रतिषेध is the meaning (contradicting one that is duly introduced). So in order to suggest that inspite of प्रसञ्ज्यप्रतिषेध, the नन् can be compounded, the word कारक is used.

In Bhashya the negative particle in अकर्तृत्वं is accepted as पर्युदास and then explained. But in वाचिक, प्रसञ्ज्यप्रतिषेध is chosen and hence Jayathertha chooses this alternative.

Even Bhashyakara in the context of explaining समर्थः पदविधिः in सुडनपुंसकस्य there is negative particle which means प्रसञ्ज्यप्रतिषेध. This is illustrated with examples like असूयः पश्यान्निमुखानि. Thus the sutra समर्थः पदविधिः should be quoted here as evidence,

Now अतच्छद्वात् is explained as an Avyayibhava samasa. अर्थाभावेयदव्यम् is a part of a sutra and means that an indeclinable meaning the ‘ absence of a

thing' is compounded with a noun which is capable of being compounded. This is an Avyayibhava samasa. The example is संक्षिकाणां अभावः निर्भेदिकम्. Thus अतच्छब्द is to be dissolved as अतच्छब्दस्य अभावः अतच्छब्दम्. The negative particle meaning the absence of a thing is compounded with the next word into an Avyayeebhav, samasa. By the sutra अव्ययीभावश्च the Avyayeebhava is possible and then the termination सुप् is dropped. अम् is added on to it except when there is the termination of the ablative. So now it should be अतच्छब्दम्, and not अतच्छब्दात्. But as already stated, before the ablative अम् is not affixed. Hence अतच्छब्दात् is a correct usage. Thus Chandrika justifies this usage as found in the Bhashya of Madhva.

In the Sutra नानुमानमतच्छब्दात्; that (तत्) is not the one that is inferred (Shiva and others); but it is Brahman; For in that context we do not find any qualities common to Shiva and others.

If then अतत् means ब्रह्म or आत्मन् then आत्मशब्दात् is the reason which is the repetition of स्वशब्दात्. But repetition with a purposeful objective is no defect of composition.

In भूमासंप्रसादात् the one denoted by the word Bhuma is Vishnu; for this Bhuma is said to be happiness par excellence. Veda declares that he

is at the head of all gods beginning from Nama and ending with Prana. Raghavendra mentions that Chandrika explains why Sutrakara uses a derivative word which means, Happiness, after going through the process of derivation in preference to the word सुख् which directly means happiness.

This derivative word 'samprasada' peace means the result of perfect happiness which proves that his happiness is unmixed with even the tinge of misery. Hence samprasada, instead of sukha is used.

That which is mentioned in veda by the word Akshara is also Brahman; For it is said to be the support of Jagat or world. There is another reason adduced to prove that Akshara is no other than Brahman. For in Akshara we do not find grossness (स्थैर्यम्) and qualities usually to be found in material things. But this Akshara is said to be non-gross which means it is Anu or minute or subtle, the shruti on the other hand, posits that it is Ananu or one different from Anu and hence it is gross. So one thing cannot both be gross and non-gross.

One way of reconciling this contradiction is to consider them in their relative significance.

For instance a thing of middle size when compared with a thing of greater size is small and when compared with a thing of smaller size, is great. Thus smallness and greatness though contradictory and irreconcilable are yet found reconciling in one object.

But this sort of reconciliation does not hold good in Brahman. If such a reconciliation is forced in Brahman, Brahman will be reduced to the plight of a pot which equally entertains smallness and greatness in a relative sense. Besides a pot or such material thing has one thing greater than itself and has another thing smaller than itself. But Brahman has nothing greater than, or smaller than Brahman. Hence smallness and greatness in Brahman cannot be reconciled presuming these two contradictory terms as under different contexts of two smaller and greater things than Brahman. Thus non-grossness may mean, as already said, subtleness. Or it may simply mean the absence of grossness. If this second alternative is accepted Brahman will be reduced to mere negation or emptiness; or some colourless or characterless thing. This is an anathema to Vedantins like Badarayana who severely refute it and say that Brahman is full of positive qualities like form and attributes.

Thus it is ordained by the vedas that Brahman alone is the abode of contradictory attributes like greatness of magnitude and littleness of magnitude. But this will not lead to self contradiction because these Anutva and Mahatva are not found together in Brahman as mutually exclusive or contradictory terms. They are not considered as incompatible terms; but are considered as Co-existing in Brahman. Shri Madhva uses the word Govinda in the place of Brahman.

Shri Raghavendra explains Govinda that is used in the place of Brahman. This smallness and greatness are found in Hari as co-existing. And an evidence to corroborate the truth of this fact is shown by the use of the word Govinda. Here direct perception of Yashoda is called for evidence. In Bhagavata Yashoda sees the vision of the whole universe in the mouth of her Tiny Child. In the same manner Arjuna sees the vision of all pervading Brahman.

The holy implication is this; Gopika tied Govinda by a tether to the mortor. The story in the Bhagavata is very interesting and highly conclusive. For Yashoda tried with a tether; but it fell short of the waist of Govinda only by an inch. She used hundreds of tethers; still the gap

could not be filled up and Yashoda could not tie the rope round his waist. But at last a small rope was sufficient to go round Govinda's waist. Here we see one action of not being successful in tying him by hundreds of ropes; and there we also see him being tied with a single short rope. These two actions lead us to the following inferential conclusions—“Vishnu is small; for he is tied with small rope round his waist, like a small calf”. This is one conclusion and another is — “Vishnu is great; for he is not tied by hundreds of ropes like a mountain.”

Now this inference of greatness and smallness in Krishna is refuted by the inference— Krishna cannot have these two contrary qualities. For he is material substance. But the universal rule that substance has no two contrary qualities is found violated in Akasha which is both small and great, though it is a material substance. Hence ‘Krishna is both great and small, is an inference which comes out unscathed by any contradictions or refutations.

In order to ridicule this conclusion if any one goes to the length of saying that any thing like pot may be said to consist of opposite qualities. And then on the plea that these qualities

are naturally found inhering in that thing, you can easily justify their co-existence. But truth is not so light as to be wafted in the air like chaff. If you are to admit two contrary and incompatible qualities in a thing they must be warranted by sound instruments of knowledge. If thus they are found, then you try to justify them by finding reasons for their co-existence. Things created by the figment of imagination need no justification.

If truth and verity are to be proved by merely the nature of things, then reconciliation of statements has no role to play in removing contradictions. For instance there are statements like 'Reality is void of attributes and full of attributes' 'Reality is active and it is passive' 'world is real and it is unreal' usually these contrary statements are reconciled by stating that the subject or import of each statement is different. The thing attributeless is one while the thing that is full of attributes is another. Instead if reconciliation is sought by stating that it is the nature of the thing to have opposite qualities, then you need not run to reconciliation of statements.

This objection is waved by stating that the nature is settled by settling the subject or import

of a statement first. Hence reconciliation of statements have a place in finding out truth or verity.

Here in the third pada of the first Adhyaya it is said that there are fourteen Adhikaranas. But the topics dealt with, arguments of the opponents and arguments of siddhanta are only stated to be twelve. Now there cannot be an Adhikarana without subject matter and the arguments of opponents and siddhanta argument.

But this inconsistency is apparent for there are two Adhikaranas which do not deal with the topic of the Adhikarana which is samanvaya. In one there is the discussion about the eligibility of gods to be initiated in the study of the vedas and the second deals with the topic that those who are excluded from the first three varnas have no eligibility to study the vedas.

Then how to show contextual connection of these two topics with the common topic of the Pada ? That connection is of two types:- one is 'inclusive' and another is 'Successive' or 'Sequential'. We cannot show inclusive connection of these two Adhikaranas with the topic of the Pada Samanvaya. We must only seek sequential conne-

ction. For the question of vedic eligibility may come after Samanvaya.

But sequential connection is of six kinds; Now Raghavendra defines each one of these to facilitate the critical examination of the connection of the two topics with main topic of the pada. Prasanga is defined as 'That recollected thing which cannot be set aside indifferently', has a Prasanga Connection with the reminder. This is illustrated by an example from Brahma sutra. In the Second Adhyaya there is an Adhikarana called Jna and topic is whether Jna or Jeeva is of the size of atom or is it pervasive. This Jeeva or soul is atom like; For expulsion from body and coming and going are done by the supreme soul. Here the thing reminded is thought of subordination of everything to the Lord'. Hence it is called Prasanga.

Now the second is Upodghata (introduction). Introduction is a thought which leads us to the topic on hand. The example is the first sutra where study in the form of hearing and thinking is considered prerequisite to the present thesis which is in mind as a topic to be discussed. This is corroborated in Chandrika as "The first sutra is considered as an introduction to the whole thesis."

The third is अयसरप्राप्ति or well timed action when a certain thing is told after telling all that must be told. For example the first five Adhikaranas treat all the topics that are essential and then begins The Adhyaya from आत्मदम्योभ्यासात्.

The fourth one is the connection of cause or reason for the topic to be discussed. When the समन्वय सूत्र (तत्त्वसम्बन्धात्) posits by the higher primary connotation, Brahma is proved to be the import of all shastras, then the coming Sutras may rise to prove its statement. Thus समन्वयसूत्र affords reason for the coming ईक्षतिनय.

The fifth is कार्यत्व संगति or the connection of effect. Just as when the first Adhyaya propounds the theory of Samanvaya, then the Second Adhyaya is justified in removing the objections raised against it. Again 'the eater or Consumer is Vishnu' is the reason for the result that the two dwellers in the Cave of the heart are both the forms of Vishnu. For the general idea is the cause for the particular idea, and hence the particular idea is the result of the general idea.

The sixth is connection of having one and the same work. If both the Adnikaranas (former and latter) have a common work then we have this connection. Just as the samanvaya sutra along with the former Sutra, Shastrayonitwa, has

the Common work of deciding that Vishnu alone is the source of the whole Cosmos. In the same way the Jijnasa sutra along with the coming Janmadi Sutra has the common work of deciding that one should take to earnest study of Brahma.

Of these six, here there is the connection of Prasanga. Because the eligibility of gods in the study of the Vedas and the non-eligibility of Shudras are discussed here being reminded by the general eligibility of all men to study the Vedas in the previous sutra, which makes the Prasanga very strong. For if we do not accept eligibility of the gods to study vedas, Then the statement that 'Viswedevas serve Him or Vishnu', will not be consistent and meaningful. Only with the eligibility of gods the statement will be valid and Vishnu will be one fit to be worshipped by gods. Hence ultimately the attribute of being worshipped by all gods is being shown as fully applicable to Vishnu alone. So Samanvaya is shown in the long run of विश्वेदेवोपास्यत्वं in Vishnu. Hence then is the connectioa of Antarbhava also.

PADA IV

Now in this Pada words that are used to denote only other Things than Vishnu, are shown to connote Vishnu alone, on the strength of a statement in Bhashya or by the principle of elimination. For the words to be proved to apply to Vishnu are 1) Words famous to mean other things than vishnu. 2)Words formed to mean both Vishnu and other things. 3) and words famous to mean other things only. As the first two varieties are already dealt with in their proper contexts, the remaining (परिशेष) is the topic of of This Pada.

Here first the topic that is taken for discussion is this. In certain branches of Katha it is stated ‘महतः परं अव्यक्तं अव्यक्तात् पुरुषः परः’ ‘जीवा एव तु दुःखिनः’. The words like अव्यक्त and महत् and जीव show the very things they mean and not Vishnu. For अव्यक्त is said to be subordinate to Purusha and जीव is said to be miserable. So if अव्यक्त and जीव refer to Vishnu, then Vishnu would be subordinate to Purusha and he would be ‘miserable’ दुःखी.

Wherever there is scope for misinterpretation, Raghavendra steps in and averts it, by sound direction. Here is अव्यक्त शब्दं परं ज्ञात्वा दुःखी difficult

to be construed. So he dissolves it as Bahuvrihi compound as अव्यक्तं शब्दं वस्य तत्. Then the construction is simple and the meaning is clear. Brahma the Greatest has the word अव्यक्त to refer it.'

Now that if अव्यक्त is made to refer to Brahma, he will be contextually reduced to the status of subordinate to Purush, is no dodge running against samanvaya of अव्यक्त in Brahma. For this dodge runs counter to the statements in shruti and smriti. Besides the word दुःखी and others are not to be construed with the person, only on account of its possession(दुःखी means one having or possessing misery) It may also mean one who has mastery over misery—which meaning fits in with Vishnu. Common usage warrants such a use. A king is said to be defeated on account of the defeat of his servants.

Thus the possessive termination मत्रै is used in the sense of possessor, or the supporter. (स्वामित्व, आधयत्व) Practice and rule admit both the senses, as in दुःखी and राजापराजयी. There the word दुःखी also can be applied to Brahman in the sense of 'one having full control over misery'.

Thus the objection that if अव्यक्त is applied to Brahman according to the usage of the learned then it will be subordinate to purusha, (अवरत्व) is easily waved because Brahma may be called अवर

in the sense that Prakriti or Primordial matter, that is (अत्तर), subordinate to Purush, is subordinate to Brahma. Though Brahma itself is not अत्तर, it has mastery over (अत्तर), that is Prakriti.

If thus argued, the opponent may easily show the opposition of Pramanas like the Vedas. For Jivas alone are called दुखिनः; so Brahma cannot be दुखिनः.

To this objection the rejoinder is Brahma also is दुखिन् in its another sense. Brahma does not posses दुख. But the possessive termination इन् only means तत् अस्य अस्ति that there is relationship between दुख and Brahman. When दुख refers to Brahman the relationship is not inherence as in the case of जीव; it is mastery or full control in the case of Brahman.

In order to justify the validity of the statement that all words connote in the highest sense Brahman, दुखी also must be proved to have its connotational reference to Brahman. The only way to do so is as shown above.

That may be as in the case of राद्धत termination like इन्. But how to explain it in the case of कृदत्त termination as in the case of अद्य or in words of common usage as अत्तर ?

Now बद्ध is derived from the root बृ॒श् and the त्, termination of the Past passive participle. Now how to explain बद्ध with reference to Brahman? Again how to explain the form of a full-fledged verb with reference to Brahman as in “others will be tied down to the womb”?

In the case of बद्ध ‘भावकर्मणोः कृतप्रत्ययविद्यान्तात्’ बद्ध means either a substantive like bondage (भाव) or an object of bondage (कर्म). Here the second meaning is accepted. (कर्म) In This object of bondage we must determine the relationship between object and bondage. For the relationship warranted by Grammar is only general and unparticularised. Hence the relationship may be of ‘mastery’: So बद्ध with reference to Brahman means one who has mastery over bondage or bound Jeevas.

In the case of verbal form like प्रपद्यते there is the root and the termination. The root प्रपद् means योनिप्रतिपत्ति or Getting (a place in) the womb or bondage. The termination means कर्तुंच् and this agency is in the context of bondage; hence the verb means ‘One who is an agent in getting a place in the womb’. Hari plays the part of an agent in according a place for जीव in the womb of the mother. or Hari has mastery over the Jeevas in getting a place in the womb for them.

Thus there is no objection in using these words अवर and अवर with reference to Brahman. अवर also is explained in the same manner as in the case of the other two.

Now when अवर is used verbally in a sentence then we can show its application to Brahman also, by etymological derivation and application of grammar rules; but अवरत्व is not there in verbal presence but it is implied in the statement. Then how to convert that lower implication into higher one, so as to suit its usage with reference to Brahman ?

The statement referred to is अव्यक्तात् पुरुषःपरः here अवरत्व is inferred by presumption or Artha-patti. If अव्यक्त is Brahman he will be subordinate to Purusha. The ablative used is meaningless without its being अवर or Subordinate.

This presumed अवरत्व should now be explained with reference to Brahman. The explanation is as follows :— The statement is अव्यक्तात् पुरुषः परः Purusha is Superior to Avyakta. The meaning of the Ablative after अव्यक्त is the limit or object (अवधि) compared with which Purusha is superior. So अव्यक्त has अवधि not as it would inherit it or contain it, but as it would express mastery over it. Therefore there is no objection for presuming

अव्यक्त to be the object of comparison with पर which is superior and hence it may also inhere inferiority. But when अव्यक्त is used with reference to Brahman, that inferiority due to its being the object of comparison with the Superior Purusha is directly under the control of Brahman as in the case of another real inferior object. Hence consistently you can use अव्यक्त to connote Brahman.

But this method of connotative interpretation is archaic and out-moded. Words in Krit Tadhita and Samasa should be used in connotations warranted by usage only. Krit and Tadhita are used to show relationship of inherence or Support and not that of mastery or full control, in practice. Hence depending upon this out-moded method you cannot show the Samanvaya of all words in Brahman.

Just as Krit and Tadhita termination connote the relationship of Support or recipient primarily so also they connote primarily mastery or full control. The Sutra तदस्यास्तीति, is interpreted as तद् अस्मिन् अस्ति and अस्मिन् shows recipient; So also it is said to be अस्यास्ति and अस्य shows mastery. Hence you cannot object to all words signifying the meaning of Brahman in the highest sense.

For just as common meaning is the primary meaning, so also this esoteric highest sense of words too viz Brahman, is equally primary meaning.

If on the other hand full control or freedom is not recognised as the reason for usage then you cannot justify the usage of राजा जये the king is victorious; For the King has not won victory; he is called 'victorious' only because he has full control over those who have won victory for him. Hence we must recognise full mastery as a criterion of usage.

You cannot even higgle about meaning being primary, another meaning being secondary. For there are no reasons to decide which one of these two is primary and which one secondary.

Again frequency in usage is not the Cause of its being primary; because often words are used in secondary meaning. "Bedsteads weep" is often used; still it is secondary in sense; while even when a word is newly used in its etymological meaning it is still primary: So all words are frequently used to connote things of the world, still that worldly meaning cannot be primary; while the esoteric meaning of all the words is strictly restricted to learned circle. Still that meaning

is primary. It is through ignorance that people use words in their worldly sense; For people do not know that every word has the higher meaning of Brahma and that is the chief meaning.

Now again if Mastery or liberty is the criteria of usage, as explained so far, when the servant is bound or when he dies let it be told that the king died or is bound. (भूत्ये बद्धे पृतेवः राजाबद्धः मृतेवा) But such usage is not found. Hence mastery or liberty cannot be the Criterion of usage; this is the objection.

A word is used in its meaning if the word possesses the reason for that usage (प्रवृत्तिनिमित्त). As there is no such usage as राजाबद्धः therefore Liberty is not the reason for such usage. Now again which is predominant: usage or the property or reason which determines the application or usage? First usage and then search for its reason? or First reason and following it the usage?

For this we must see whether the usage is primary and paramount. If it is secondary, usage follows the reason. If it is primary, reason is but the group of properties; while in former case it is only a part of that group.

Raghavendra suggests a rule in conformity with all these observations to guide us through

these complications. That sense which is signified by the word and in which the word is often used, is the most predominant of all the senses of the word.

Now the context is only of the primary connotation, For the interpretation of words like जीवी, बद्ध and अवर is on hand; All these are applied to Souls or Jeevas. Still in the highest sense they are applied to Brahman. So have only primary mode of interpretation; the relation is ‘mastery’ and not ‘in herence’ and hence ‘mastery is the chief reason for the usage’

While the Secondary interpretation is going on, the reason for usage is the connection of the primary meaning or the similarity with the primary meaning. Hence it is only a part of the properties that constitute the reason.

Raghavendra gives a very lucid and crystal clear explanation here. सिंह is used with reference to चंत्र (चंत्रः सिंहः) Here सिंहः is used in a secondry sense (brave). But these is no usage like सिंहः शार्दूलः though शार्दूल is a legendary animal similar to सिंह. So if the reason for usage is merely similarity with the primary meaning then सिंहः शार्दूलः would have been good usage. But such usage is not warranted by Grammar practice. So simi

larity with the primary meaning constitutes a part of, and not the whole of properties.

In the same manner the word औपगव denotes the issue of उपगु (a cowherd) which constitutes the reason for usage. For the sutra तस्य क्षमत्य enjoins the termination अण्. Hence the issue of उपगु is the property which constitutes the reason of the usage. If this is not so औपगव might not be used in the same context with reference to the issue of उपगु. The example of the word सिंह not being used to refer to शार्दूल illustrates this case. But there are no such instances of औपगव not being used in some cases of the issue of उपगु. Therefore the reason for the usage constitutes the property of the word.

Now what is the source or origin of usage or प्रयोगः. Is it the inherent power in the word ? Or is it grammar which constitutes the origin to determine the inherent power? In the former case the charge that 'king is bound' shall have to be used, will no longer be undesirable. For the words 'king is bound' have the inherent verbal power to express the meaning of 'king is bound'. The Second alternative also does not stand. For the whole problem is thrashed out thus by Jayateertha.

We do admit that 'mastery or control' is the reason of the usage. Then let there be the usage of 'King is bound' when his servant is bound. There is no such usage; because there is some hindrance to such usage. A man who knows the art of interpretation entertains a doubt whether this usage is due to the fact that his servant is bound or the king himself is bound. As the prerequisites like completion of sense, compatibility and Juxta position are to be found in both the contexts the statement yields good meaning in both the contexts. Hence the doubt; and hence the absence of such usage. But this absence of usage does not necessitate 'Mastery' to forfeit its claim to be the cause of this usage. For fear of doubt cannot stop usage being operated.

Here Jayateerth gives an illustration from Grammar; and Raghavendra explains that example. This example is to illustrate the fact that mere fear of doubt will not deter the usage. To seek brevity of expression Panini has intelligently grouped the letters of the alphabet with a sign-letter at the end. For instance अऽण्; here अ॒ means all letters between अ and ण inclusive of अ. But in such grouping the final sign-letter ण is used twice (लण् also). So अ॒ means the group consisting of अ, इ, उ or with the ण in लण् all letters of alphabet.

There is a sutra अ॒ उद्दित्सवर्णस्य and there is the doubt whether अ॒ means only अङ्ग or all letters of alphabet. Mahabhashyakar while elucidating this sutra of Panini warns us that this fear of doubt does not invalidate the sutra; It leaves scope to the commentator to explain what अ॒ means in a particular context; and the sutra proceeds to operate, without any deterrent. The commentator tells us that except in the Sutra अ॒ उद्दित्सवर्णस्य in all other cases अ॒ should not be taken from the last अ॒.

Now Raghavendra rounds up the whole discussion in his masterly way. If 'mastery' is the reason of usage then let there be the usage of राजाबद्धः when really the servent is bound. There is no such sage, yet you cannot conclude that 'maetery' is not, hence, the reason of usage. For there is another reason for the absence of usage. There is one hindrance for its usage. And when there is no such hindrance we find the usage of बद्ध and others.

Another thing, we must observe is that, when a दोष or bad quality like बद्ध is predicated then only you press for 'mastery' to forfeit its claim of being the reason of usage. Even when we show that the real reason for the absence of usage is some hindrance, if you press for mastery to lose its elam, then even when we attribute some good

quality like (victory) let there be no such usage as राजाज्यो as 'Mastery' according to your contention is not the reason for usage. But there is such usage in the predication of good quality.

Hence we conclude that the cause of absence of usage of बद्ध is hindrance. And in the absence of this hindrance there is the usage of attributes being predicated only if they are good.

Acharya, to come to the topic on hand, tells us that it is an undisputed opinion that 'Mastery' is the chief reason of usage when respectable persons are referred to,

Now all words are made to apply to Vishnu in their highest reference. And the chief reason for this application or usage is 'mastery' we must bear in mind that Vishnu is immune from defects and that learned men of god-vision never doubt the absence of defects in Vishnu. Hence full mastery of Vishnu over all is the reason of the usage even in the case of words having bad senses. The words like तुःस्ति बद्ध and others of the type are made to apply to Vishnu without vitiating his nature of immaculate purity. Vishnu is completely and constantly of holy and auspicious nature. Therefore all words of impure and unholy connotation for the reason of his full mastery over

all, may enter into him in the highest significance. But the worldly things being of mixed nature give scope for doubt whether वद्ध is used on account of the वद्ध in the servant or master. But there is no such scope for doubt in the case of Vishnu as he is decidedly known to be वैष्णव or immune from all वैष्णव। All words connoting defects raise him with ennobling merits when applied to him. Hence अव्यक्त can be very well made to apply to Vishnu without the least hesitation.

सर्वसम्बन्ध or the application of all words—both sacred and secular to Brahman is easily said, but it is very difficult to maintain it confronting all situations which are the drastic consequences of this commitment. There are statements in Veda like ‘One desirous of heaven should perform the sacrifice of ज्योतिष्ठोम। In spring and spring one should perform sacrifice. Now how: to interpret these statements so as to mean exclusively Brahman or Vishnu?

The opponent means to say that this is not possible. For if at all such injunctions mean Brahma, it must be either the sense of words or the import of the sentence. It is not the import of the sentence. For the sentence is accepted to mean the desirability of the perfor-

mance of Jyotistoma-Yaga. The other alternative of words yielding the sense of Brahma is also not possible. For the word signifies a sense either through the mode of convention (संवेद) or derivation व्याख्या. Interpretation by convention lands Brahman into the same category of insensible and destructible things like Jotistoma. Besides a word like Vasanta cannot have two conventional meanings. Moreover what is the purpose of significance of these words to be Brahman by convention? The main purpose of सर्वसम्बन्ध is to prove that Brahman is full of suspicious qualities. Only derivation will reveal these qualities and not convention. Hence convention defeats the purpose; If thus you run to derivation, you are interpreting a word to mean Brahman through a lower mode of interpretation; For derivation is inferior to convention. Thus your ambition of interpreting the word through the main mode is defeated.

Besides many more difficulties stand before us in bewildering number and force. Both the stem-word and termination cannot have the same meaning of Brahma. The rituals will be baseless and so on and so forth. Hence the assertion that all words mean Brahman is unwarranted injudicious, harmful and undesirable.

As a rejoinder to this objection, the sutrakara accepts that words yield the meaning of Brahma through the mode of derivation (ज्योति). The word ज्योति is derived from जि which means 'born' and ओति 'that has entered into'. 'All things born get entrance into Hari who has the form suitable to impel us into activity. So he is ए. This is ज्योतिष or Brahman.

This field of derivation is a fertile field for the crop of grammatical elucidation and Raghavendra finds himself in his own element and makes a rich display of grammatical application and calls forth into service the whole range of grammar literature. We were very easily tempted to place before the reader the bumper Crop of Grammatical erudition; but the limitation of time and space does not permit us to have that pleasure. Most reluctantly we skip over it as it will not be of any interest to the general reader.

Acharya begins this grammatical derivation and Jayateertha adds more details. But Raghavendra gives an exhaustive application of grammatical rules marshalling them into service from the whole range of that literature. Some times he even goes to establish coherency and

consistency removing the apparent conflicts in different books on grammar.

Thus all the hymns in the four vedas can be interpreted to mean Brahma in the highest and chief mode of interpretation. All the words—whether nouns or adjectives or verbs or any part of speech can be derived to mean a noun in the vocative case. So that the whole veda is a prayer addressed to Paramatman.

All words are derived; they are all in the vocative case. Hence there is no scope for the verb to function with reference to which all other words in the sentence adjust their inflexion. when the words are derived these objects of action, instrument of action do not come into existence at all. therefore Samanvaya need not be charged with the offence of giving no scope to inflexions in enriching the meaning of sentences. For they are not existing at all.

All words—letters that go to form them, and even the accents—have been derived to show different meanings which constitute the sense of innumerable qualities of Brahman. So the whole of Karma kanda has been shown to express the essential qualities of Brahman, and a Samanvaya has been successfully instituted, through the

interpretations of words. Now even if samanvaya is sought through the import of the sentence, there is no harm. The objection that the ritualistic functions will be baseless; For the very vēdas which support them are made to describe Brahman, is also answered.

For the Karma kanda does not stop at describing the rituals which yield short lived and insignificant fruits, but they find their fulfilment in the acquisition of Knowledge of Brahman. There is an example which illustrates the truth of this statement. Even in this Karma Kanda there are sentences which describe the post of sacrifice खादिरो यूपोभवति । यूपं छिनति । यूपंतक्षति । and so on. Yupa is made of Khadira tree. That post is cut and is polished. And these sentences have the purpose of proving the desirability of performing the sacrifice of Jyotistama. So also the whole of Karma Kanda describes the Karmas or rituals for the sake of Knowledge of Brahman which we get when we interpret the same Karma Kanda by the method of Samanvaya.

Samanvaya through the import of a sentence is prescribed for the Commonly man who is uninitiated. For these cannot get knowledge of Brahman through the difficult process of deriva-

tion of words. It is said in Veda "who knows the derivation of words in the Vedas ?" The reply is शः (means) Brahma alone knows it.

But this leads to another difficulty. How is it that one word शः gives two meanings even when used once? The answer is that even a word once used is able to give two meanings through a technical process known as Tantra. If by repetition one word is to yield two meanings it must be warranted by an unequivocal evidence. That evidence is of the type of presumption (अन्यथा अनुपत्ति). Brahma alone knows the derivative method of interpretation of Veda' and in another "The syntactical relation is known to all" are the two evidences which are at daggers drawn unless they are reconciled as done above. The nature of logical conflict of these two Shrutiies necessitating reconciliation is the evidence known as presumption.

Another difficulty is if such derivative method exclusively Known to Brahma is to be recognised as a method of interpretation, it is an artificial and not universal relationship between the word and its meaning and in the derivative method of interpretation that is the exclusive method known to Brahma, this universal relation is elbowed out of the way.

But this objection is explained thus : The relation between the word and its meaning, though one man's possession yet it is a thing eternally existing. And Brahma (creator) is initiated into it everytime before creation by Vishnu. So it is not the creation of Brahma's imagination but that which was existing but in a potential condition, has now become real.

Besides the whole of the derivative method is only Known to Brahma (the creator); while a part is Known to Vamadev and many others. These words like वामदेव and सूर्य signify in the derivative sense Parabrahma who is the Immanent in them (अहमनः अभयम्). Thus the Knowledge of derivative method is wholly Known to Brahma (the creator) partially to Vamadeva and Surya still less to others through the grace of Vamadev and others. Hence the derivative method is not exclusive and personal but universal and impersonal. Thus the objection of exclusiveness in derivative method is waved out.

In the coming Adhikarana the following types of words are shown to signify Brahman in the derivative sense. 1) words that come in conflict with the Sovereignty of Brahman. 2) words other than those that are already interpreted and those that would be interpreted 3) words

that connote plenty 4) words denoting things which are the effects of one and causes of another. 5) words of feminine gender and 6) words expressive of negation or absence.

Raghavendra does not allow us to accept an unwarranted or unauthorised meaning of a compound word. So he gives dissolution of compounds and seeks conformity with the total meaning विरोधि सर्वबाहुल्यकारण स्त्री निषेधिताप् is the compound word. Here every word is supposed to be इन्द्रियत and then dissolved as one Dwandva compound. Or विरोधि, बाहुल्य निषेधः च, विरोधिनिषेधाः Dwandva and then एते अस्य अस्ति इति विरोधिनिषेधिनः one कृदंत.

Whatever in the statement of Acharya is found ambiguous Jayateertha explains: That there are Seven Adhikaranas in this Pada, is Known from Bhashya and the commentary on it. But Anuvyakhyana mentions only six topics as the subject-matter of Adhikaranas.

Now Jayateertha fills up the gap by saying that सर्व or all, includes the topic of Samakarshadhi karana. The purpose of that Adhikarana is to remove the doubt raised by Jyotiradhikarana. This statement requires explanation and Raghavendra is ready with that. In Jyotiradhikarana there is a sutra known as कल्पनोपदेशात्

which shows that the mode of Convention (रूप) which is established after consulting the vedas, glossary of difficult words, and its explanatory commentary and grammar, denotes also a thing different from the high mode of derivation. Thus these two meanings are accepted and hence, inspite of the fact that all words are derived to show that Brahman is their sense, the rituals and sequence are not expelled and derivation also has not lost its prestige.

But this is not fair. For just as the word अक्ष yields many meanings, through equally important modes of interpretation, so also all words shall have to signify both sacred and secular senses —Brahman and otherthings—through equally important modes of interpretation. But this runs counter to what the Sutrakara has accepted. In तत्समन्वयात् तु meaning अवधारण or exclusiveness precludes the possibility of both the modes being of the same stature. The higher derivative and esoteric mode signified Brahman alone and not any other meaning.

This is the objection on Jyotiradhikarana that it is not in the fitness of things to have admitted convention (रूप) as the mode of interpretation in the case of other senses. The Sama-

Karshadhikarana tells us that वै or convention is operating in both the interpretation of Brahma. Rudhi is operating with greater intensity than in the interpretation of others.

In Chandrika however it is argued that the fifth Adhikarana, like the second, refers to all words. So the fifth need not have a separate argumentation from that of the second. Only the argumentations are different; hence there is the arrangement of a different Adhikarana.

The topic of SamaKarshadhikarana is the interpretation of a sentence. So long all words were interpreted to mean Brahman. Now the interpretational operation gets back from Brahman and through the interpretation of sentences engages itself in other secular things; so that the words deal in secular meanings.

Now the question is whether this interpretation of sentence is an accepted mode of interpretation of Badarayana:

It is argued that vedic knowledge is essential for realising Moksha. But interpretation of veda through the mode of derivation of words is beyond the reach of ordinary common men. Hence they develop an aversion towards Moksha, and cease to make an attempt for it. None but

a fool attempts to eat up the air exhaustively. Sutrakara himself condemns the indifference and aversion of these laymen towards Moksha; and substitutes for the difficult mode, an easy mode of interpretation of the import of the sentence. Badarayana expresses his own opinion as the opinions of Jaimini and others.

Here we see Vedavya's generosity well attested. For the whole of the metaphysical Knowledge belongs to Vedavyasa, and Jaimini and others, are his devoted disciples specialising in some part of metaphysics. In his unlimited love of his disciple Vedavyasa cherishes a desire that his disciples should become famous. Hence certain tenets apparently conflicting with each other; yet really consistent parts of the whole are associated with each one of them, though in their whole they all reconcile in the large metaphysical conception of Vedavyasa.

Now This Vakyavaya is said to be of three kinds:— 1) According to Jaimini words naturally engaged in conveying the meaning of Brahman are brought back to convey the meaning of things of the world in order that one should be detached from them (Karma, gods, sacrifice etc.) and be strongly attached to the Knowledge of

Brahman. 2) According to Asma-rathyā the Vaidika words convey the meaning of worldly things in order that one may get the means of acquiring the Knowledge of Brahma. Karma performed leads to the Knowledge of Brahma. 3) Kashakristna thinks that the world is embeded in Brahman. In order to realise that Brahman is the substratum for all, we must know all i. e. Karma gods and others.

But these three opinions are not conflicting. These three views are expressed so as to suit aspirants of different spiritual standards. The first is for the man of the lowest standard of realisation and second is for the middle class of people and the third is for the men of the highest realisation.

So long all words through the mode of derivation (योगवृत्ति) are shown to convey (which is the highest mode of interpretation) the meaning of Brahman. In this context we naturally enter into the field of interpretation and recognise its different modes and their status in the world of word-symbolism and their means and methods of interpretation,

Formerly it was objected that if words do not signify other meanings than Vishnu then all

communication and performance of daily Karmas would be completely stopped. To this objection Badarayana replies that these other purposes of verbal communication are recognised and conventionally words convey various other meanings also so as to suit the various purposes. Yet all words depending upon the strength of express statements mean Vishnu in conformity with the convention of various other meanings.

But if the convention of various other meanings conflicts with the conveyance of the highest meaning of Paramatman, other meanings are rejected to those words to enable them to signify Paramatman with all their power of expressing highest sense. A clear verdict is given in the case of such semantic conflicts that the chief meaning of each word is Paramatman and on the basis of and at the sufferance of this fact semantics deals with the various other meanings of words either through the mode of convention or derivation.

Hence the mode of interpretation which signifies Paramatman in the case of all words is the highest chief mode; while in the case of other meanings it is only the chief mode of interpretation, or Secondary or subordinate mode. Thus words have three modes of signification,

In case of secular interpretation of words we have modes :- 1) Derivation or yoga. 2) Convention or Rudhi 3) Derivation-cum-convention, yoga rudhi. In the same manner while interpreting words in the sacred sense of Hari we may have corresponding higher modes of interpretation as Maha yoga or Higher derivation Maha rudhi or higher convention and Mahayoga rudhi or higher derivation-cum-convention. But Maharudhi is not recognised as an esoteric and higher mode of interpretation. For the convention of the learned is always through derivation.

So now the higher derivation is that which connotes the unlimited quantity of the property of a thing which is the cause for the usage of the word to signify that thing, which possesses that property. This is one variety of Mahayoga. Another variety is that which connotes undisputed authority over that property of a thing which is the cause for the usage of the word to signify that thing which possesses that property.

On the whole if along with the unlimited property that is the cause of the usage, there is also frequency of usage, it is something additional to make it Mahayoga. Thus unlimited property with the frequency of usage is the cause

for the chief higher mode of interpretation. But this qualified condition is not accepted merely for the sake of establishing the chief higher mode of interpretation; but also for the sake of establishing a new joint mode of convention cum derivation.

But this new mode— a hybrid of two modes yoga and Rudhi—should not be objected to on the ground that Yoga and Rudhi being different in nature cannot combine to form a new mode. For Yoga is the mode which interprets the different parts of the word; while Rudhi interprets the word as a whole. Hence the new mode cannot be a combination of such conflicting modes.

This objection is not sound because in the interpretation of certain words we actually see these two conflicting modes operating conjointly to yield the meaning. For instance in the interpretation of the word पंकज to mean lotus both Yoga and Rudhi are found operating. Part by Part (पंक and ज) interpreting this word by the mode of yoga we arrive at the meaning ‘born in the mud’ But ‘born in the mud’ may be anything. Even a frog may be called पंकज. Then Rudhi comes to the help of Yoga and interprets the whole and it means Lotusness and

thus limits पंकज to पद्म or lotus. Thus both the modes together harmoniously work through these two properties in पंकज as the two meanings of सेन्धव (salt and horse) have two different modes working without conflict. So both the effects are produced by joint co-operation of the two causes. It is no use going in for a new mode of interpretation. For it is a longer route to cover.

Hence only at the end of Anandamayadhi-karana it is stated that where there is frequency of usage there is convention or Rudhi and hence in पंकज this concomitance is violated; For there is frequency of usage yet there is no Sadhya or Rudhi; For there is Yoga Rudhi. But this violence or व्याभिचार is avoided by stating that Yoga Rudhi is not a new mode of interpretation; but it is combination of Yoga and Rudhi. Hence in Pankaja there is Rudhi also; so there is no Vyabhichara.

This togetherness of Yoga and Rudhi is mutually dependent. Yoga independent of Rudhi cannot do any thing; Rudhi independent of Yoga is of no use. For Pankaja should express the meaning Padma or lotus, and 'born in mud' through the mode of (Derivation-cum-convention) Yoga Rudhi. So, mere Rudhi without the help of

Yoga cannot express the meaning of 'born in mud'. Hence Rudhi in collaboration with Yoga alone expresses the required meaning. In the same manner the word Narayana to be interpreted by Yoga Rudhi expresses the meaning of 'Vishnu' who is 'the receptacle of auspicious qualities' which is derived from the component parts of the word. So if the word Narayana merely denotes Vishnu by convention without the help of derivation or Yoga which alone supplies the property of being receptacle of auspicious qualities, we do not get the required meaning. So we must accept Rudhi accompanied with Yoga. So it is ultimately decided that this new or third mode is a combination of the two that are mutually dependent.

Now crops up the main question- "How do all words connote Vishnu chiefly? Or what is the mode of interpretation which we should apply to all words in order that they connote Vishnu chiefly? The answer is that all words must be interpreted through both the modes viz (1) Maha Yoga Rudhi and Maha Yoga. In the case of words like Narayana the mode of Maha yoga Rudhi is in operation. In the case of words like Indra only Maha yoga is in operation. For the convention of the learned has not been accepted in the case of

words like Indra. Besides the chief main mode of interpretation is in operation while conveying Vishnu— which means that in Vishnu there is unlimited advance of the property that is cause of verbal operation and also frequency of usage.

Here arises a doubt. Why this extra ordinary mode of interpretation should be accepted in the case of words to convey the meaning of Vishnu? Why should not the ordinary modes be allowed to operate to convey the meaning of Vishnu? To this the reply is that Maha yoga is a mode which needs unlimited causal property but has no frequency of usage. But Maha yoga rudhi is that mode which collaborates with Maha yoga and yet conveys the integrated meaning (अखं बृत्ति). Thus you find some thing extraordinary in the modal operation while conveying Vishnu, quite distinct from common modal operation. In the ordinary operation of modes we do not find the necessity of the unlimited nature of the property that is the cause of usage.

Raghavendra now goes from the sacred Mode of interpretation to secular mode of interpretation. The chief mode of interpretation is that which depends upon the inherent (Shakti) power of the word. This chief mode is of three types : (1)Derivation (पोष), convention (रुद्धि) and Derivation cum

covention (योग शब्द). Yoga is the derived meaning and hence it is distinct from convention. This Yoga is a mode and mode is an interpretatory method (अर्थप्रतिपादकत्वम्). This method of Yoga is called derivative because it interprets the word depending upon the inherent power not of the whole word but of its each component part, to convey the meaning instances of Krit Tadhita and samasa are given to illustrate derivation. Kumbhakara (कुंभकार) is an instance of krit. औपात्र is an instance of Tadhita and राजपुरुष is an instance of samasa or compound.

Raghavendra shows how कुंभकार is derived. (कुंभं करोति इति) Kumbha is the pot which is the object or Karma. The root Kri (कृ) and the termination अण् under goes vridhi and with the termination सु becomes कुंभकारः उपगोः अपत्यं Here before the word उपगोः the termination अण् is added on the strength of the sutra तस्यापत्यं. Then the beginning उ undergoes vridhi by तद्वितेषु अचां आदेः and the ending उ undergoes Guna and the case ending at the end of the part is dropped and with termination सु the form औपगवः is ready. Similarly राजःपुरुषः is the dissolution and the case ending after राजन् is dropped and with the termination सु we have the form राजपुरुषः

But it is objected that this sort of derivational interpretation is only for the purpose of understanding, otherwise these words also should be considered to belong to the category of convention in mode of interpretation. For the parts together convey nothing more nor less than what the whole mean in the primary way. This is borne out by the statement that 'All these words are conventional in meaning like the words Trees and others'.

But this objection is not sound. For there will be no reason then if the meaning is changed by the removal and insertion of the parts. If Raja and Purusha denote one thing; in the place of Raja if Amatya is inserted it means another thing. So is the case with Kumbhakara.

Now Acharya defines Rudhi or Convention. That mode of interpretation which depends only on the frequency of usage, being integral in nature is Rudhi or convention. The power which inheres in the integrated meaning is convention no doubt. But frequency of usage is its peculiar characteristic. The whole thing means that the mode, not depending upon the senses of component parts, having similarity with primary sense and not relating to primary sense is the convention.

So far the primary way of interpretation was considered, which was independent and direct in its connotation. Now the dependent ways of interpretation which are indirect in this denotation, like Gaunee and Lakshana are considered.

Gaunee is subsidiary mode; while Lakshana is secondary. Now the subsidiary mode is that which is found when the word used in some other meaning than the primary one, depending up on the similarity etc; while the secondary mode depends upon the relation it bears to the primary meaning.

'Manavaka is a lion' is an instance of Gaunee mode of interpretation. Now primary meaning of the word lion is 'Lionness.' By Gaunee Vritte 'Lion means 'Similar to Lion'. Thus that is subordinate mode of interpretation in which the primary meaning is not accepted but something other than it and similar to it is accepted.

Then the secondary mode also is taken up for discussion, as both of them come under one category namely dependent mode of interpretation. Here also something other than primary is accepted as meaning. But that is only related to the primary meaning. 'The hut is in the Ganga'. 'The primary meaning is the current of Ganga. The bank is connected with the

Current. So Gaṅga Secondarily means 'the bank of the Ganga'.

In the definition of Gaunee "something other than primary" describes its nature but does not constitute its essential part. Raghavendra warns us not to be over-enthusiastic about allotting propriety to every word or phrase. In that strain some have said that even primary interpretation depends upon similarity. To distinguish Gaunee from primary "Some thing other than primary" is hence inserted in the definition of Gaunee.

But this contention of some is not true. For similarity by mere existence does not constitute the course of primary interpretation. But similarity qualifies 'Cowness' to be the real cause of primary interpretation. By itself similarity has no part to play in primary interpretation. Otherwise just as in 'Chaitra is a lion' the meaning is 'Chaitra is similar to a lion' so also in 'This is a cow' (in primary interpretation) the meaning should have been 'This is similar to a cow'. Hence in primary interpretation similarity plays no role in constituting a cause. But it makes cowness efficient to become a cause. Seeing a body like that of a cow one calls it a cow, because it has similar cowness. Hence in some books the

definition of Gaunee mode is only the mode in which there is similarity to the primary meaning and 'Something other than primary meaning' is not at all mentioned:

Now Lakshana or Secondary mode of interpretation is said to be a mode in which the meaning is settled to be something connected with primary meaning; while subordinate is that which is settled to be something similar to primary. Both these modes depend upon the inapplicability of primary meaning and have some definite purpose, in view.

Thus Kavyaprakasha mentions three causes of secondary mode of interpretation : 1) one is inapplicability of primary meaning, 2) another is its connection and 3) the third is convention or purpose. The third is illustrated by two examples: One is अंचाक्षोऽस्ति. The bedsteads cry or weep. Here bedsteads conventionally mean 'Children in the bed' by secondary mode of interpretation. But in गंगायूषः Ganga means the bank of the Ganga and Ganga is used in this secondary sense for the purpose showing nearness and holy nature in the घोषः or huts. That super-imposed (not natural) function of the word which expresses the non-primary sense is called the secondary

mode of interpretation. This super-imposition of the function of the word, means the concealment of the primary meaning and signifying some other meaning.

In the case of subordinate mode of interpretation if one agrees to the three requisits the second requisite, connection with primary means similarity to the primary meaning.

As shown above convention cannot constitute a cause for dependent interpretation. Hence convention is not included. Only three causes as inapplicability of primary sense, its connections and purpose constitute causes for dependent interpretation.

Really speaking connection with the primary meaning is the real cause for secondary mode. The other two are to be rejected. First the inapplicability of primary meaning is ascertained only after the primary meaning is applied. Hence the inapplicability of primary meaning is not the cause for the function of a word to express the dependent meaning. But the knowledge of the inapplicability of the primary meaning is the cause of understanding the dependent meaning. Therefore the word, inorder to express the secondary meaning does not require the help of

inapplicability of primary meaning. Nor does the user of the word require it for using it. But the knower needs the inapplicability of the primary meaning for knowing dependent meaning.

Purpose is said to be the second cause of secondary meaning. This too does not hold good. Purpose in no way plays its role in the function of the word to express the dependent meaning. The user and the knower both consult each other about the purpose of using the word in its dependent meaning while the independent meaning is at their disposal.

Raghavendra now settles an order of preference among the different modes of interpretation. The original statement is "If there is the inapplicability of the primary or independent meaning, then there is the chance of the applicability of the dependent meaning. Now several modes are brought into play, clashing against each other. Hence an order of preference is to be settled. When the primary is not applicable dependent (Secondary or subordinate उपाधि or गौणी) should be applied. This has been interpreted as when the highest primary meaning is impossible ordinary primary should be accepted. When ordinary

primary is impossible then Subordinate or Gaunee should be accepted. When Gaunee is impossible Then Secondary or Lakshana should be accepted.

This order of preference is entirely based upon a rational basis of nearness or poroximity and distance of meaning to the mode. For the highest primary is nearer to the Knowledge of meaning than the primary. It is said Gaunee is nearer to the Knowledge of the meaning than Lakshana. Hence Lakshana is said to be the lowest mode possible.

At this stage a simple objection is raised. In the expression गंगायां शोषः the word गंगायां without the help of any dependent Vrittis or modes, in the primary mode only, may be derived by certain rules of Grammar to mean गंगासंबंधिनी in the direct mode of interpretation. So why should we go in for the dependent modes ? हुरोत्तमी stands a Good example to illustrate the truth of this statement. Just as this word by the application of certain rules of Grammar means a kind of fruit, so also गंगायां without using any secondary mode of interpretation, merely by the application of rules of Grammar means 'Pertaining to Ganga'. Then why go in for this subordinate or secondary mode of interpretation ?

If so by the primary mode of interpretation itself Ganga means both Ganga and its bank. As soon as the word is uttered both the meanings loom large in consciousness. Then there will be no succession as is experienced. First one will be conscious of the primary meaning 'Ganga' then when it is found in-applicable 'its bank' will flash upon our mind. Hence the subordinate and secondary modes must be accepted in order to keep true to our own experience.

Again between derivational mode and conventional mode the objector says convention is stronger than derivation in the interpretation of words. Hence it is argued that by derivation if you show particular word to convey the meaning of Paramatman that is not the Chief meaning of the word.

The rejoinder to this question is that the convention of the ignorant cannot be as strong as the derivation of the learned. Here it is the derivation of the learned that interprets the word to mean Paramatman. Hence yoga or derivation in the Case of Paramatman is stronger; besides it collaborated with the Convention of the learned also. For convention is nothing but frequent use and the learned are shown to make verbal references to Paramatman in the case of such

hymns as शतसि which are shown to refer to Paramatman through derivative explanation. Vedas corroborate the fact that all vedas sing the names of Vishnu.

Thus it is proved that the import of the sentence and the meaning of the word refer to Parabrahma. When every syllable and word is proved to refer to Vishnu what of the import of a sentence ! Badarayana expresses all this in the Sutra - 'उपक्रमात्'.

But this is objected to in the next Anumanika Adhikarana, by others. For this Adhikarana is differently interpreted and construed by them. They say that this fourth Pada is devoted to the contradiction of the theory that Pradhana or Prakriti is expressible in word. If this were the topic of the 4th Pada of the First Adhyaya then this topic of the Pada runs counter to the general trend of the topic of the Adhyaya. There is consensus of opinion that the first Adhyaya is devoted to the topic that all words refer to Vishnu in the highest mode of interpretation. This inexpressibility of word is not consistant with universality of reference of words to Vishnu. (सर्वसमव्य).

Therefore the contention of others that the topic of this fourth Pada is different from what has been stated is not logically sound.

In one of the following Adhikaranas (Prakri-tyadadhikarana) there is a Sutra (प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञा दृष्टां तानुपरोधात्). Others contend that this Adhikarana tells us that Brahman is the material cause of the world. The context also requires this topic. For in the second Sutra it is asserted that Brahman is the Cause of the world. Naturally a doubt arises whether the cause is material and agential or merely agential. For Bhamatikara also keeps the alternatives in this manner. To show that Brahman is a material cause in addition to cause of agency others adduce a number of reasons. Of these one is the use of the ablative (यतो वा इमानि मृतानि जायते) Here यतः is in the ablative case; Others who quote this? explain the grammatical rule thus. (जनिकर्तुः प्रकृतिः) That which is going to come into existence will have the material cause called Apadana (technically). The relationship of Apadana is shown by the ablative case. This is the interpretation of the sutra according to others. But commentaries like Vritti and Manjari say that the word प्रकृति in the rule means only causee in general and not any cause in particular (like material cause). Had it been so, the statement 'Joy or delight is caused at (the arrival of) the son, would have been absurd. For son cannot be the material cause

of joy, just as earth is the material cause of pot.

Raghavendra is never tired of explaining rules of grammar. The compound जनिकर्त्तः is dissolved as जने: कर्ता, जनिकर्त्ता as Genative Tat purusha. But the sutra कार्तेरिच does not allow it to be षट् or genitive. Yet this prohibitory sutra is irregular in operation and hence Manjari has explained it as षट्ठ.

Really speaking Brahman is called Prakriti not because he is material cause but because he is immune from change or mutability. Brahman is immutable and continuously the same. Therefore he is said to be the uncaused cause. To prove his immutability first mutability is shown to be of two types : Change in the substance or Change in the quality. ‘Endless changelessness’ is the negation of the first type and the second type is negated by saying that he is continuously the same.

Raghavendra cites positive examples of both the types of mutability. The instance of change in the substance is that of earth being changed into a pot. The instance for the second type of change in quality is the change of the green colour of the unripe jujube fruit into yellow or brown when ripe.

This fact of Brahman being changeless is known from the sources of Shruti and Puranas.

Change in Brahman is against reason. Change is विशेषाप्ति and विशेष परिवर्तनम्. The first type of change is that the substance remaining the same only one of the qualities undergoes change. The second is the change of the nature of the substance itself. Both these types are dependent on outside factors. Each one of the two is to be subdivided into change that is obliterated again (unstable) and change that remains to the end (stable). Thus there are four varieties in all. But in the original AnuVyakhana only two have been mentioned leaving the other two to the imagination of the reader. Otherwise if only two were meant Shri Madhva would have mentioned विशेष परिवर्तन as the opposite of विशेषाप्ति and not अनिवर्त्य अन्यथाभाव. The instance quoted of milk turned into curds being an instance of अनिवर्त्य विशेषपरिवर्त्य would have been incongruent with the alternative mentioned. All this goes to prove that change is of four types विशेषाप्ति, विशेषपरिवर्त्त, अनिवर्त्य अन्यथाभाव, निवर्त्य अन्यथाभाव. In a sentence where division is mentioned of one thing into two exhaustive species, there must be opposition or mutual exclusiveness between the two; otherwise the sentence is an absurd statement.

Besides all varieties of changes are to be rejected in Brahman. Hence if only two varieties are mentioned the rejection of these two would be meant and the remaining two are easily suspected to be found in Brahman.

We vehemently reject all sort of deformity in Brahman; because change in its wake brings dependence. Dependence again entails the existence of a thing other than Brahman which is an anathema to Advaitin. If such an existence is accepted then Brahman's dependence cannot be avoided. Hence Brahman cannot undergo change of his own accord.

The Advaitin is obdurate and sticks to his argument inspite of logical discomfiture. He pleads that Brahman is to be apprehended through Shruti alone and hence no inference or reasoning is tolerated in respect of apprehension of Brahman. He further strengthens his point by saying that the monopoly of the Vedas as an instrument of the knowledge of Brahman is universally accepted by all Vaidikas.

The claims of Revelation and Reasoning are moot points to be decided and clearly dictated. The claims of Reasoning to be the instrument of knowledge of Brahmans are summarily rejected.

Revelation or Shruti alone can deliver the goods. But if Shrutis themselves are not decided on a certain point of the contradicting statements, we do not find an all agreed import (in the case of change in Brahman). Hence Reasoning or inference can enter into the field of discussion about change in Brahma. Considering all these points it is concluded that Brahman does not undergo any change in a general sense.

But there are certain Sutras like प्रकृतिश्च which apparently state that Brahman is the material cause of the universe. Some like Ramanuja and others, accepted this apparent meaning in a hurry and are then faced by the stupendous difficulties so long discussed. So they try to adjust their statement to the exigencies of the context and in a compromising spirit state that Prakriti is the efficient cause and it is the body of Brahman. Hence no objection can be raised against this modified statement.

To this Shri Madhva replies that such a material cause is not a bit more than what a father is to the son—an agent cause, which we have already admitted in the case of Brahman. So though Brahman is the cause of creation he is not subjected to modification or change.

If further it is persisted that every father and mother and even the spider also undergo modification and hence Brahman cannot be free from change if accepted as cause (material) of the threads it produces out of its body. The meaning is it is only the insentient part of the spider namely its body is the material cause of the threads and not the sentient Chetana. So also the body of Brahman which is Prakriti—it is not the original body of Brahman—is the cause of the universe and not the Chetana Brahman and Chetana in both the cases does not undergo modification.

Now the illustration may be made clear
The Father is the cause of the son, means the food eaten by the father builds his body. This becomes the material cause of the building of the Son's body. This we do not grudge at all; For in Mahapralaya Brahman swallows the whole work of महृत् which in its turn becomes the material Cause of the world and not Brahman. This is stated in the sutra शरीरस्त्रियस्ते:

Thus on the strength of the evidences of revealed vedas and the Puranas and Reasoning, Brahman is Known to be immutable and unchangable. So he cannot be the material

Cause of the world. He can only be the agent cause.

Hence it is concluded that the insentient can never be the product of the sentient; and the reverse also is true that the sentient equally can never be the product of insentient.

Now it is objected that pots and such other things also are the products of Brahman. But pots are known to be insentient and yet the followers of Nyaya school accept these as products of Atma, a chetana. But we admit that pleasure and pain are material in product; and they are the products not of Atma but of mind or Antah karana; and the followers of Nyaya accept this theory.

Cause and effect are the same in nature. For no one finds that the curds, the effect of milk is different from that milk. Hence it is argued that the world is not caused by Brahman as it is seen distinctly different from Brahman, who is Omniscient. The attribute of omniscience averts the logical falacy of 'Non existence of the reason or Hetu in Paksha. Brahma is different from the world because he is all-knowing. And the vedas declare that Brahman is all knowing (यःसर्वज्ञः सर्ववित्) while the world is known to be

not the effect of Knowledge and hence it is inferred that the world has no Knowledge. Hence one is different from the other.

But in the Sutra न विलक्षणत्वात् , तथा त्वंच शब्दात् the Purva Pakshin doubts that Brahman and the world being different from each other, cannot be related as (material) cause and effect. Then it is concluded that they are not unrelated though they are one and the same. For even things like hair and nail, quite different from sentient man grow from him. In the same manner from insentient cowdung come out scorpions and other insects.

But this objection is baseless; for nails and hair grow out of physical body and not from sentient man; and scorpions get their physical bodies from insentient cowdung. Hence the rule that insentient objects are never the products of sentient beings stand good.

Again it is objected that Brahman and the world are similar from the point of view of existence; for both exist and therefore they may have a causal relationship. But if identity is sought on such slender grounds for causality, then iron and gold shall have to be one; for both of them exist; and existence is common to them both.

But because gold is not found in iron, iron is not the product of gold. In the same manner, because Brahman is not found to follow in the world, the world is not considered to be the product of Brahman;

The Parinamavadins contend that the cause itself is modified into an effect. So that nature of the cause which is invariably found in it, is found in the effect. Otherwise the statement that the cause is modified into effect is meaningless. If the invariable nature of the cause does not descend into the effect you cannot assert that the cause has descended into the effect. The intrinsic nature of gold does not consist of mere existence. It is made up of some thing more than mere existence.

In the same manner the nature of Brahman is not mere existence. But consists of bliss and knowledge. And this essential nature does not run into the world; and hence the world cannot be called the effect of Brahman.

But curds which has discontinued the sweetness which is invariable nature of milk and yet is called the product of milk. Hence the world also not inhering bliss and Consciousness of Brahman can still be the effect of Brahman.

If Adwaitin persists in his opinion, he shall have to abandon his principle of Satkarya vada,

which takes for granted continuity of cause even in the effect. Hence he will be forced to say that sourness in the curds is something which was not existing in milk.

But if to save his theory from contradiction he accepts sweetness which is the nature of milk, in curds, he will be contradicting one's experience. How to get rid of this contradiction ?' Or how to explain the absence of the nature of sweetness in curds ?

Hence if Brahman is the material cause of the world merely on the slender ground of existence as a point of similarity between Brahman and the world, we shall be reduced to the absurd position of declaring gold to be the material cause of iron or tin; for they have both existence as common quality between them. Thus this is only a contingent reduction to absurdity when illegitimate argument like the one above, is persisted; and not an accepted principle.

To get over this logical impasse Brahman is accepted as having two forms : one is the form which is essentially infinite bliss and consciousness; and the other is 'being' in essence. Brahman in the form of bliss and consciousness is the instrumental cause; while the same Brahman in the form of Being is the material cause of this world.

Now that form or part of Brahman which does not undergo Change is really our God or Iswara, or Brahman. Again if Brahman is the assembly of distinct qualities like, being, consciousness, and bliss, he cannot be the material cause of this world.

Three alternatives arise out of the statement that Brahman is the material cause of the world. The first alternative is that the accepted meaning of Brahman to be the material cause of the world consisting of Being and consciousness and bliss, has only being under operation to produce the world. Hence the part of being alone, is the material cause. The second and the third alternative is that Being, which is substratum for qualities like numerical multiplicity, and contact is the material cause.

If on other hand it is argued that in the material cause namely Brahman or in the being which is the support for multiplicity and contact there are the powers of being the material cause; and they are also found in Brahman; and hence Brahman is said to be the material cause of the world, the argument is not sound.

For this is not possible; for powers that inhere in the material cause or in the support

of qualities are not found in the product or in the qualities. For the quality of being, an upadana cannot be found in upadeya; nor the quality of being 'the Support of qualities' can be found in the quality.

Now Advaitin contends that the previous argument runs directly against the famous statements in upanishads: आत्मानः आकाशः संभूतः 'Akasha or the sky is born of the soul' and others. Grammar lays down the ablative before the material cause. This is corroborated by the examples as 'From Cowdung Scorpions are born.'

But this contention is not reasonable. For the sutra जनिकर्तुः प्रकृतिः does not lay down the use of ablative. Even if it lays down the use of ablative, the ablative is not used in the sense of material cause.

Let the ablative be used in the sense of उपादान as laid down in grammar and अपादान means 'removal' or coming out from a thing. And उपादान is a particular type of अपादान. Hence Ablative may show the particular type of अपादान. Though from general we can not always go to one particular exactly, yet as the ablative is associated with जनि (birth) even the general अपादान too becomes limited to one of its variety उपादान. So Panchami, that is ordained to show Apadana, shows Upadana.

But this contention is not sound. For a kind of grass, is said to grow from horn which was said to be its material cause (Upadana). But really the grass only comes out of the horn and it is not material production of shringa or horn. (It is only its Apadana).

For the Sutra quoted from Panini (जतिकर्तुं प्रकृतिः) only means 'that, which is said to be the material cause, out of which a certain thing comes is the thing called अपादनं and is the cause for the thing produced, and is the meaning of that Ablative.

The whole thing is clearly explained. The phenomenon chosen is the growth of a kind of grass out of the hollow horn. Some part of the horn is utilised as material for the growth of grass. Some other part of the horn is only used as a limit out of which the grass comes. If there were no part of the horn out of which the grass has come, there would not have been the other part which is the material cause of the grass.

But a bean is fully utilised while sprouting out. No part remains there. Hence there would then be no ablative used. This objection is not true to fact. For the husk remains after the seed is used for sprouting, and that husk serves the purpose of अवधि or limit, out of which the

sprout comes. That is अपादन which justifies ablative.

Even if ablative is used in the sense of Upadana, or material cause, the quotation 'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते' (of whom all these beings are born) does not uphold the idea of Brahman being the material cause of the world. For यतः (of whom) has the termination त्स् which may have many other meanings than the material cause. Besides त्स् is used in many other cases and it is not restricted to ablative only. Ablative is enjoined to convey the sense of manifestation' as in हिमवतः गंगा प्रभवति (The Ganga is first seen in the Himalaya).

Again Brahman is not the material cause of the world, undergoing change. For the world is seen different from Brahman. But this rule is violated in the instance of Shara and Shringa. For though Shringa is the material cause of Shara it is found different from Shringa.

Really speaking there is no violation of the rule that the state of being the material cause entails difference between the two, For of Shara, Shringa is not the material cause; but it is only a limit out of which Shara grows(Apadana Karana). Hence they are distinctly found, there is violation

of the rule. Because they are not related as material cause and effect; but Shringa is only something like a limit out of which the grass comes. Shara is not without material cause; a part of horn is turned into that grass. Another part remains unaffected only pushing forth grass out of its limits. This unaffected Shringa is the instance for Brahman being the unaffected cause of the world.

Then the question arises as to how to explain the causal relationship between cow-dung and scorpions. Even there the cowdung is only the Apadana Karana i. e. the scorpions come out of cow-dung. Still a part of cowdung goes to form their bodies.

So in establishing causality between these two, we must remember that the word scorpion conveys the idea of its physical body as well as its consciousness or Chetana. In the production of the physical body, the cowdung in part is the material cause of its body and in part it is something out of which it emerges. While its Chetana is only manifested and insentient cowdung is only an instrumental cause for this manifestation.

Some of the evidences produced by the Adwaitin are also denied. The Shruti “सञ्चयच्चा

भूत्" is quoted saying that "Brahman attains the state of satya which is Viswa consisting of Murtta or material or having form and Amurtta incorporeal or formless". But the Shruti quoted above does not warrant this meaning. For the cosmos was created by Brahman before Brahman assumed the form of Satya.

The real meaning of this Shruti is that before Brahman created the Viswa or world, these qualities सत् and व्यत् are attributed to him. It is not the world that becomes सत् and व्यत्.

But the world inheres these qualities. For it is called सत् and व्यत्. Now because these qualities are found in Brahman, if Brahman is called सत् and व्यत्, automatically Brahman gets the state of this world, inevitably. Yet because the qualities सत् and व्यत् which are different from the state of the world, belong to Brahman, Brahman is called सत् because he is superior to all. He is called व्यत् because he is all pervasive.

Therefore Ramapati or Narayana who is immutable and unchangeable and who is fully and perfectly free, is the only agent and instrument of all activities. He alone is described by words in feminine gender like प्रकृति and others. For he is the creator of the whole of creation, though he remains unaffected through out the process of

creation: His unlimited and full freedom enables Him to remain unaffected even when engaged in the stupendous task of cosmic creation. Hence Prakriti and other such feminine words are fully significant in connoting Paramatman with unequalled powers.

words fulfil their function of connotation signifying Brahman alone; because he is able to assume innumerable forms from his essential form that he may enter into his created forms to actuate them into life substantiating activities. So these controlling and actuating forms of him are exhibited that he might Create this world of rich variety, and fulfil their life mission.

In साक्षात्त्व उभया द्वानात् Adwaitin contends that Brahman is both an agent or instrumental cause and material cause. The previous discussion settles this question finally. For the example of a spider unequivocally determines that Brahman is not the material cause. The spider is not the material out of which the threads are woven. It is the food, the spider eats, that is used for producing threads. So also Brahman allows Prakriti to turn into world forms, Keeping his essence unaffected.

Now the theory of illusion is refuted. Brahman is said to be the material cause of the world. But the material cause does not undergo change. Brahman is only the locus (अधिष्ठान) of the illusion of the world which is false and which is the production of nescience (अविद्या). But this cannot be justified. Brahman cannot be the locus of the illusion of the world. The cause for this illusion is nescience or Avidya. one (Brahma) not foregoing his nature of knowledge, bliss and existence, appears (quite different from its nature) false, manifold (as earth, water, fire and other elemental forms). This is called illusion or Vivarta. A rope keeping its ropeness appears as Snake quite different from its nature. This illusion is appearance without changing its reality. while in mutation or modification nature or reality itself is changed. So appearance or illusion does not run counter to Shruti's stating, immutability or unchangeableness. The locus of this illusion or manifold appearance is called upadana or its material cause.

Now this explanation does not stand the test of verity or truth. The Adwaitins state that Ajnana is of two kinds; 1) Maya and 2) Avidya Maya misleads others while Avidya misleads that in which it rests. Some of the Adwaitins think

that Brahma himself under the influence of his I^Avidya appears to himself like the cosmos just like dreams. But other Mayavadins think that Brahman is the original or Bimba and under the influence of Maya, Brahma himself constitutes the cause. While the souls individually are affected by Avidya. Still others think that Brahman himself reflected in Ne-science (called Avidya constitutes the Cause for the cosmic creation. But the old school does not admit of reflection. Many more think that the souls themselves under the influence of Avidya see Brahma in the form of manifold world.

This theory of world illusion is differently explained by different Advaitins. Disregarding all these inner details, the world illusion theory is made to melt down to two alternatives. If it is Brahman who suffers from this world illusion, he has forfeited his omniscience. For illusion pre-supposes ignorance which categorically disproves perfect and fulfilled knowledge. Knowledge (omniscience) in Brahman. If this omniscience is not to be found in Brahman, it cannot be expected to be found in ordinary souls. Insentient matter can never claim to possess knowledge, much less all-knowledge. Hence runs vedic statement "who is omniscient and all knowing"

and will be proved to be a hollow statement. This absurdity if still persisted leads to ridiculous by silly nonsense. For Advaitin contends that even that all-knowledge is a product of Ignorance or nescience. But knowledge and ignorance are never compatible. They are the well known instances of incompatibility. If such incompatibility is found between Knowledge and ignorance, erroneous Knowledge of silver in the shell will not be sublated by the real Knowledge of shell.

If on the other hand (the second alternative) it is contended that the world illusion is entertained by the soul different from Brahman, then difference between Brahman and Jiva will be eternal. For, one who is the Support of nescience cannot be the object of nescience. Hence the difference between Jeeva and Brahma tends to be natural and eternal.

But it is again objected that only insentient and material world is illusory and appears to be so with the locus of Brahman. For soul or sentient being is real as its difference from Brahman is eternal. (This is not an alternative put forth by Mayavadin; yet in the context of the topic of world illusion, it is better to exhaust all alternatives).

The insentient world cannot entertain world illusion. (Already it is proved that Brahman Cannot be the support of illusion nor जीव can entertain such an illusion. Then the world other than sentient or Chetana must have entertained this cosmic illusion) For that which is not embodied cannot know anything which had no senses. Therefore one shall have to admit that a thing, without senses, and without a body that is the support of senses, does not entertain any illusion. Hence they are real things; So not only the souls; but also things bereft of senses are real and so the body also is real.

Advaitin thinks that certain things without body and senses comprehend other things and still they are real. So the Advaitin may consistently contend that world may still continue to be illusory and unreal.

But the direct and independent inword sense is called Sakshi. Advaitin has stated that this Sakshi, which is consciousness itself limited by the functionary form of Amtak karana or the unlimited and pure consciousness, comprehends such things as pleasure and pain or the shell silver. This Sakshi has no body and other senses. Still they are considered as unreal.

This argument of Advaitin does not stand the test of consistency. For by him Sakshi is not supposed to comprehend the mundane world. If the ordinary mundane world were to be cognised by Sakshi then its erroneous Knowledge is coexisting with its Sound Knowledge also, which is impossible.

Besides bodies and senses are produced by their own causes. Hence they are not unreal objects seen through erroneous knowledge. For the self is known as the seer and senses are his instruments in his comprehension and body is the support for those senses and they constitute the natural causes of the body and the senses. So these things solidly based upon varified causes and serving real purpose in these bodily activities need not be taken as merely imaginary and unreal. And there is no more mundane world than the things named above, as the objects of senses also constitute real world supplying real objects to these real senses and sound body.

The contention that the soul is the support of nescience also is condemned hereby. For it was told in Sudha that nescience can not find a support with the soul as would be dealt within the Prakriti Adhikarana. Now in the Prakriti

Adhikaran it is fully dealt with showing most irrevocable fallacies in the arguments of Advaitin. For there is first the fallacy known as mutual dependence. After logically proving and justifying the existence of Nescience, the soul, depending upon its valid existence, has a place under the sun warranted by evidences. And nescience has no footing till it is firmly established in Jeeva or soul. This is an instance of mutual dependence. Still stronger and more subtle is the fallacy known as Chakrika or circular argumentation.

When Nescience is proved to be really existing then the difference between the soul and Brahman is proved. When this difference is proved to exist then play of nescience creates false relations like difference and Jeeva or soul conceived to be existing only under the influence of Avidya comes to play his unreal role; and gives support to nescience. This is Chakraka or moving in a vicious circle.

Thus Advaitin yields to the force of infallible arguments and admits some sort of reality to the mundane world.

He called this empirical truth, which is considered competitive with its illusory and unreal

nature. So long it was proved that one whose truth is sublated can not serve any purpose. Hence the Shruti also (नहनानास्ति किचन) whose services are requisitioned to prove the unreal nature of the cosmic creation, can not be accepted to prove the false nature of all without any restriction. Now it is agreed that unsublated truth alone qualifies a thing to serve some fruitful purpose and that Shruti also is unsublated. With this supposition Advaitin mobilises his scattered truths to make a last effort to give a crushing defeat to the realists.

So phenomenal existence though illusory has some relative truth called empirical truth (व्यावहारिक सत्य). Therefore the Shruti coming under the category of mundane existence has this relative truth. Hence it has the power to yield some sensible meaning and to establish the illusory nature of this world:

But all this is only a figment of a fevered brain Advaitins can not declare openly that the mundane world is phenomenal in the nature of truth. For empirical truth is only co-extensive with uncontradicted nature of truth. Hence if the Advaitin accepts phonomenality of the existence he must be ready also to accept its infallability. If that is accepted the Shruti

नहनानास्तिकिञ्चित् is thrown over board. Because it is the serious contention of Advaiti that the Shruti quoted before, would prove worldly existence not to be real.

So the argument is in the form of undesirable imposition (अनिष्टापादन) of some truth. If the mundane existence is accepted as uncontradicted truth, the Shruti नेहनानास्ति is thrown over board though it has been hugged to the bosom so long. For Advaitin has agreed that the said Shruti clearly states, that the mundane world has only empirical reality and not transcendental reality.

But there is no invariable concomitance between usefulness or pragmatic utility and its infallible nature. That which is irrefutable in its truth is found pragmatically useful. Advaitin maintains that even things of refutable truth like the shell-silver which is the object of illusion serves the purpose of some sort of dealing like rememberence or recognition and verbal use.

But mere use of a thing in words is no pragmatic utility. No one has prepared bangle and other things out of illusory silver perceived in a piece of conch-shell. But here we mean by utility some pragmatic use or utilization of a thing and not mere verbal use of it.

Hence the rule is confirmed that a thing to be utilized for some practical purpose is required to be irrefutably real. But the Advaitin can not acquiesce in the irrefutably true nature of the world. For the world is going to be sublated by the realization of oneness of Brahman, in his philosophy.

To this the Advaitin objects on the ground that dream is false and yet it causes real discharge of semen at the end of sexual intercourse with a lady in a dream. Hence even false dreams fulfil the purpose of sexual pleasure causing real sexual satisfaction at the end. Hence it is not necessary to tag अर्चक्रियाकारित्व (serving real purpose) to अवाध्यत्व (uncontradicted reality).

But this is a specious argument as dreams are not false but real to the realist Madhva. Because dreams are products of mental impressions left on the mind by experience. Madhva closely follows Sutrakara who avowedly declares the reality of dream-creations. No doubt in some books dreams are said to be illusory and false. For the thing and animal seen in dreamland are real; and yet they belong to the dreamland. To identify them with the things and persons of the wakeful world is erroneous. For they are proved

false when we wake up. So what is false in dream is the dreamer's identity with a wakeful man, identity of dreamthings with wakeful things or thinking of dream-things as produced by things of the outside world.

Shri Raghavendra notes a subtle distinction here. The things of dream are considered real not because their causes could be traced, but because they are not contradicted. Besides Hari Himself is the creator of the dreams out of real mental impressions. This is the opinion of Badarayana the composer of Brahmasutras.

Just as there is some cause for the production of dreams so also it may be conceived that for the idea of identity with outside things also there may be some cause. Hence along with dream objects, their identity with outside things also might be real and not illusory. In order to avert such undesirable impositions, it is said (as stated above) that the reality of a thing or entity depends upon its uncontradicted nature. Dream objects are not contradicted and hence they are real and their identity with outside things is contradicted in wakeful state and hence it is unreal.

That even the illusion of a snake in a rope though unreal produces real fear and trembling,

is not an instance to break the rule of absence of contradiction as precondition for causal efficiency (अव्यक्तिगताकारस्त्र). For here also the uncontradicted and hence real cognition of the illusion is the cause of fear and trembling. That knowledge of snake illusion always states that his knowledge of snake illusion is a real experience.

Raghavendra here enters into a discussion which needs close knowledge of psychological operations like cognition and its function. Here one analyses this experience of fear and knows it to be from the cognition of snake. Is it mere cognition that creates fear or is it the cognition qualified by its object that creates fear? Is it the unqualified cognition that creates fear then let the cognition of pot also like the cognition of snake create fear. If it is qualified cognition that creates fear then let even the cognition of rope also, as the cognition of snake create fear.

Some one tries to explain away this difficulty by stating that cognitions, like pot cognition and snake cognition, are distinguished one from the other by the qualifying objects like pot and snake. Thus they serve to distinguish one cognition from the other by their respective association with cognition.

But this is unacceptable; for snake and pot help their respective cognitions to be different from each other. This quality of distinguishing one from other is not producing cognition apprehending difference. But it is becoming an object of cognition which produces another cognition apprehending difference from others. This explanation does not lead us further than the former difficulty. So, we must agree that it is not mere object which distinguishes the associated cognition from another cognition. But rather it is some quality in the cognition apart from its object which distinguishes one from the other cognition. Otherwise if this function of distinguishing one cognition from another is tagged on to the object, the objection that false snake entering into real activity stands unsolved. So we recognise some intrinsic quality of cognition which distinguishes one cognition, from other. That is the quality of reality in cognition, which distinguishes it from other cognitions.

Now all this explanation is true only so far as Cognition of real snake is concerned. But we are now discussing cognition of a false Snake in a rope. The causal efficiency in cognition cannot be defended in a cognition which has no intrinsic quality of its own, but only depends upon entirely on its object. That special quality

which inheres in cognition is produced by real causal materials in cognition of a real snake, and by unreal causal materials in the cognition of a false snake. But that is immaterial.

Thus we come to a valid conclusion that where the Causal efficiency is ascertained it is not unreal; and where there is unreality or illusion there is no causal efficiency. Thus we find a general invariable concomitance which suffers from no break or Violation.

Advaitin still unvanquished yet fully discomfitted pushes forth an objection. He says that causal efficiency pertaining to Brahman is not intrinsic but it is extraneous. For it is found in him due to the contact of Maya. This Causal efficiency of Brahman must have been observed. For the definition of Brahman includes that causal efficiency. The next question is how is it observed. For Perception and inference are found inefficient in this respect. Therefore only Shruti must have come forward to tell us about Brahman's efficiency in creation and other activities, it must be real and not false. For shruti gives us Valid Knowledge when it is not contradicted by other instruments of Knowledge.

Brahman's activity whether natural or extraneous if warranted by Shruti is accepted as

valid when not contradicted. For shruti is endowed with Self-validity; and does not wait for verification, for its validity, If Shruti depends upon other evidences for its validity, other evidences require still more evidences to prove their validity ending in endless regress.

Some Shruti denies Brahman this capacity of causal efficiency no doubt. But if we rely upon this Shruti we shall have to deny the validity of other Shruties which state that Brahman is the creator of this world. For invalidity is nothing more than the falsity of a thing propounded. All this forces us to reject all evidences which deny causal efficiency to Brahman. Thus it is irrefutably proved that a thing of disproved veracity can not claim causal efficiency.

Now Advaitin comes to concede that unsublated thing alone can have causal efficiency and that the world also is unsublated. He says that the world is not absolutely unsublated; but it is so before the realisation of the identity of soul and Brahman. Therefore Shruti also, included in the world, has relative existence and hence gets the capacity to become an instrument.

But there is no compromise in truth. Shidhanti never comes to an agreement on the topic of relative existence of the world in general

and of the Shruti in particular. For an evidence relatively true can prove nothing. This has been sufficiently thrashed out before. The statement that conveys the falsity of the world must itself be false. For the meaning of the Shruti (नेतृत्वात्मास्ति किञ्चन) that the world is false is not Brahman or his nature; and hence that meaning or sense being conditioned must be proved false at the last stage. Thus the Shruti that conveys the meaning which is ultimately going to be sublated is false and can not be an evidence.

Then Sidhanti gives him a crushing blow. The Advaitin calmly replies that he has never accepted a real thing or evidence to have the capacity of proving any thing. When Shidhanti reminds him of his having accepted Sakshi as a direct observant of things; and Sakshi is real, Advaiti contends that Sakshi is some how considered as an instrument of knowledge in cognising pleasure and pain. But it can not aspire to perceive and cognise the world. For the world when perceived becomes the object of knowledge which is the modification of changing mind (वृत्तिज्ञान) through the senses. If it is accepted as being directly grasped by Sakshi without the help of sense-contact, even the blind, the deaf, who have no senses but Sakshi would be

at par in grasping the world with persons gifted with senses. Hence the Advaitin has denied all phenomena of cognition with instruments of knowledge. When necessary he reluctantly accepts the system of perception as accepted by others. Hence he grumbles when certain system of perception which he has not accepted is made the target of criticism. Hence the Sidhani can not in all fairness arraign him before the bar of world opinion.

To this objection Sidhanti corners him by putting him on the horns of dilemma. If he has accepted any thing, so far so good; if he has not accepted any thing; he has also not accepted that he has not accepted anything. Hence he will be forced to be dumb and silent at any accusation. Such disabled and disqualified person can not enter into polemic discussion.

Advaitin, in all solemnity, declares that he does not dabble with philosophy by entering into polemic quibbling. Rather he would confide in Brahman, immutable and infinite bliss of all consciousness unmarred by attributes and activities of any kind. And he would argue with those who vainly contend with others hurling their missiles of dialectic arguments with the hollow pretension of determining the nature of Reality, and

admonish them that it is not philosophically wise to confute and refute others who do not like to enter into the rings of polemical dispute.

But all this is on the part of Advaitin a futile attempt to hide his weakness in system building. If he were to teach us philosophical wisdom he must prove to us the hollowness of our thought-process. For this he shall have to adopt a logical course of reasoning adopting a system of proofs. Hence a basic system of correct logical process which warrants a right conclusion must be adopted. Hence it is a vain attempt to seek protection behind philosophical non-interference and logical non-violence.

When cornered thus Advaitin obdurately contends that he would fight in the dialectical duel with the weapons borrowed from his opponent's polemical system. In order to prove the illogical nature of our thought process, he must have understood the contention of the opponent in order to contradict him. Some times in logical disputes in which the only aim of one is to snub the other no understanding is essential. But the Advaitin cannot avoid his disciples to whom he shall have to be honest and sincere and keep up his philosophical integrity. For all this

a valid thought process of his own with the ramification of Proofs and rules of thought is quite essential. No system is built discarding the thought process of its own. So the Advaitin who has no accepted thought process of his own is only trying to fool others by his naive indifference to Systematic argumentation by playing a blind man's buff.

Instruments of Knowledge are accepted to procure validity of Knowledge. Valid knowledge is the aim of all philosophical investigation. That which is grasped in valid knowledge is the thing to be realised. So there is nothing derogatory in accepting some epistemological system in which instruments of Knowledge and their validity is accepted. Hence Advaitin cannot avoid the truth or otherwise of instruments of knowledge. And once mundane and manifold existence is accepted as illusory he cannot but have false instruments of knowledge which do not yield any valid knowledge. Hence it is clear that the Advaitin enters into a metaphysical blind alley; so he will not be able to prove the illusory nature of the world. It is not now necessary to accept the theory that on the locus of Brahman the world appears as an illusion just as silver appears on the locus of Conch shell.



Now begins the interpretation of Veda which proves the truth of the existence of the world. Shri Raghavendra quotes Shrutis as suggested in Anuvyakhyana. विश्वं सत्यं मधवाना युवोरिदापश्चन् प्रसिद्धंति वृत्तं वां. This and other Shrutis prove the reality of the world in clear terms.

But the Advaitin says that the statements in Shruti intend to convey only relative existence of the world; or they do not intend to stress the reality of the world. Hence they cannot prove the ultimate reality of the world.

This is not fair. For there is no reason to restrict or to suppress the meaning of सत्य or real in the shruti. Advaitin says that the knowledge of the absolute reality of the world does not conduce to the realisation of higher values in life. (पुरुषार्थः) like धर्म or अर्थ or काम or मोक्ष. Then it is possible that the Knowledge of the ultimate reality of the world is not a cause of the realisation of Moksha. Or perhaps it directly contradicts the path of Moksha. To the first the reply is that the Knowledge of the greatness of Paramatman suggested by being the creator of the real world is the direct cause to the realisation of Moksha. To the second the reply is in the form of an argument which affects the opponent

in the same manner. For the Purushartha comprises the realisation of unity or identity (of the spirit) which can be realised by the Knowledge of Atma who has no second (world). Hence the Knowledge of the real world runs counter to this realization.

If the Advaitin argues like this, then in the same manner the Knowledge of the real Brahman runs counter to the realisation of Moksha (Bandhas) in the form of attainment of Shunya through meditation of Shunya.

Besides Sakshi perceives not only internal pleasure and pain; but external जग्न sky and other things.

Evidences from Sacred text and inferential arguments were marshalled to prove the reality of the world. Now the Services of Perception also are requisitioned. In Jijnasadbikarana already the unfailing instrumentality of the inward eye or Sakshi in the context of experience of pleasure and pain was declared to be essential. Pleasure and pain are inward things; outward things also like the sky and direction like the East are apprehended by sakshi.

Now it is said that Perception is of two kinds 1) one is physical and another is 2)

Spiritual and is of the essence of soul. The physical senses are contacted with outward things and this Sakshi (directly perceiving) can grasp inward things like pleasure and pain. But sakshi has access to outward things also. For when physical senses apprehend outward physical objects the validity of such apprehension and through it the reality of those things apprehended, both inward and outward, are grasped by Sakshi.

Some say that the sky is visible to the eye; because they see it after they see with their eyes a bird flying in the sky. But the sky has no quality in it required to be visible to the eyes. For visibility requires grossness. (and not subtle like atom) along with manifest form, which is not found in the sky. First sakshi apprehends the sky then it comes in contact with something visible and hence, the sky also is said to be visible to the eye. Fragrance of the sandal wood is Known through the nose; yet when we see a piece of Sandal wood we Know the fragrance also; so we say fragrance was visible though it was smelt with the nose.

Others say that the perception of the sky is really the perception of a portion of light to which the sky is the abode. this idea too is not correct.

This is the theory of Tarkikas. The whole is perceived as residing in the Part. But this is not usual. For no one gets the idea of a body seeing only hand, a part of it. Besides we cannot have such perceptions as "No light here, but a त्रियक (a molecule of three couples of atoms) of light. For this triad is made up of three molecules, each of two atoms". Here where there is the perception of light, there cannot be the perception of the absence of light; In the part of light, the absence of the whole of light is not to be found as the whole itself is found in it (according to their theory). In the same manner the molecule of two atoms (invisible) being the part of the group of three atoms is referred to as "here" and it is part and the triad is found in it; So the perception of its absence is not possible. Thus these two perceptions are not possible. Hence the theory is untenable.

But if the group of two atoms is invisible, it may be perceived by other senses. Thus the two perceptions may be maintained valid. Then why not say that the perception 'here the bird is flying' cognises the sky? Thereby popular experience also is explained.

Still it is maintained that the sky is cognised by inference. But the inferential sign or the

syllogistic reason is not to be found. Without this no inference is possible. Hence it is said that the sky is cognised by sakshi.

The protagonist of the theory of inference puts his cards on the table, with a clear analysis of the cognition of the sky. Raghavendra presents his theory in an acceptable form. His method is a -general inference and then by elimination theory arrives at the particular conclusion of the sky being cognised by inference. By disproving this theory, the theory of cognition or perception by Sakshi is confirmed.

The following is the process of logical inference to prove that the sky is inferable. Sound is recognised as the characteristic quality of the sky. Now this sound is perceptible and it is the characteristic quality; because "it is a universal (जन्म) being cognisable by perception to one ordinary physical sense of common men".

Raghavendra now gives a logical justification for the use of every word in the hetu (beginning from because). This is the reason (हेतु) to prove that Sound is the characteristic quality.

If a property satisfies all conditions mentioned in the Hetu, then only it is raised to the status of 'a quality' in its technical sense. Mere

cognisibility is too broad and includes the sky that is 'not quality'. Hence 'by perception' is added. Now the sky is not cognisable by perception. Hence it is not quality. But cognisable by perception or perceptibility is to be found in pots and pans. But they are not qualities. To remove this violation of concomitance of Hetu and Sadhya, we add 'one' (sense) to [cognisibility]. Now pots and pans are not cognisable with one sense. Hence it does not matter if they are not 'quality'. But the soul is cognisable with one sense; yet it is not 'guna'. It must be cognisable to one physical sense. Soul is not accessible to physical sense. Adepts in Yoga apprehend Atma and the sky with their physical senses also. Therefore the cognition is of an ordinary man and not an extra-ordinary Yogi.

Thus when sound is proved to be a quality it must accept some substance for its resting place. A general substance is proved in which sound inheres.

Now the principle of elimination operates. This substance is not one of the four tangible substances; because sound is not the peculiar quality of a substance perceptible by touch. Because it is perceptible and it is not born of a causal quality. A causal quality is that which is

produced by the quality that inheres in the material cause. For instance the रूप or form of pot is produced by the रूप of earth or क्षात्र (Two halves of the pot) which is the material cause of pot. Hence रूप is कारणगुणवृद्धक; but शब्द is a quality not produced by its prototype in the material cause.

Then the discussion enters into technical details of Nyaya theory of Characteristic quality and substance. Shri Raghavendra also enthusiastically explains that theory in all its details. For fear of tiring out the patience of the general reader, I skip over that portion and follow the general trend of thought.

Thus the Tarkika comes to the conclusion that the sky is known through inference. An inference is based upon the invariable concomitance of हेतु and साध्य. To those who are ignorant of this general Vyapti, the sky will not be known. The born dumb or deaf who do not know this invariable concomitance, having no facilities to infer the sky will have no idea of the sky. And hence they have no perception like "here there is no light".

So long it was shown how the cognition of that Akasha which has the characteristic quality of sound and which is popularly known as sky

cannot be explained. Now it is going to be proved that the conception of general sky cannot be proved to be the result of inference.

The word शब्द is ambiguous in meaning. Is it in the form of letters or indistinct sound ? The first is not required here; because sound in the form of letters is no quality. If on the strength of the inference already stated you are going to prove that it is quality, then Atma is cognised by one sense and so also the letters which are 'substance' yet they are perceptible by physical senses. So the हेतु leads us to a substance; and not to quality. Hence it serves no purpose.

Against this objection is argued that if sound or शब्द is substance and not quality it may not be cognised by the physical senses. For a substance without parts is not perceptible by physical senses. But this is not cogent argument; For if partless substance like Atma is considered fit to be perceptible by senses why should this not be perceptible by physical senses ?

Now the second alternative is शब्द to be indistinct sound; then it is easy to prove that it has some general substance to resort to. But no particular sky is proved. If शब्द is some sound it fits in, to be the quality of earth also.

Now there are two theories regarding transformation in an earthen pot when burnt in the Kiln. One theory is that when fire burns the pot, there is activity in the atoms or parts and the contact of a Part and a part is destroyed and then the whole is destroyed. Then the activity in the atoms regenerates contact between them and right from twin atoms to the last formation of group, the whole is revived. And a burnt pot comes into existence in the place of unburnt pot. This is the theory known as Peelupakavada. The other theory is Pitharapakavada. This theory does not recognise the destruction of the pot, nor of the form. Yet another form comes into existence. Both these theories are accepted by the Tarkikas. Now take Pilupakvada; and you find transformation of form due to contact with fire. But in Pitharapakavada you find in the रूप or form of the pot, the whole of the हृतु intact. For it is perceptible to the eye and it is not a product of the रूप in the earth or कपाल. As the रूप is changed, though the pot is there, it is not lasting as long as the substance lasts. Yet the sadhya—(न स्पर्शद्विशेषगुणः) is not there; because the रूप of the pot is the विशेषगुण of tangible substances like pot. So concomitance is violated.

Thus the discussion enters into the labyrinth

of subtleties of thought, and niceties of expression, for which logicians have earned notoriety. The Sidhantin at last concedes his point that the existence of the sky having the characteristic quality of sound is proved by inference. Yet the unmanifest or the elementary sky is cognised only by Sakshi or internal eye. No other instrument proves the existence of this kind of sky. The two kinds of Akasha are fully treated in विष्वदधिकरण. This elemental sky when divided is called 'directions'; and these are not different substances, and they will be treated in their respective places.

Even if Sakshi is agreed to apprehend the sky and others, still they cannot be recognised as being not contradicted in the past or present or future or as being real. For even conch-shell-silver though visible (for some time) is found sublated later on.

So Shri Madhva says that, that which is cognised by sakshi is never sublated. For sakshi is eternally certified to be immune from any sort of blemish or defect.

Here you may appreciate Raghavendra's skill of supplying synonyms or explanations for words used in the text. 'As a general rule

knowledge carries its own validity'. 'As a general rule' means "As a result of intrinsic power in the cause". Validity of knowledge is born out of the same source of as that of knowledge itself. It has power to produce validity by its inborn power. No extraneous factor is necessary to produce validity. The whole theory of self-validity is epitomised in the explanation of one word 'आवृत्तिक' as a general rule'.

In the same manner दोषापबादात् is explained as 'Invalidity is born out of the power of the defects which is transferred to the sources of knowledge. Here is also the theory of extraneous Invalidity अप्राभाष्य परतः:

Thus validity is generally carried with knowledge and invalidity creeps into it due to defects from outside overpowering the sources of knowledge. If invalidity also is natural with sakshi then even in the State af Mukti, the soul or Sakshi which is eternal shall have to suffer from erroneous knowledge.

Now the validity of Sakshi as an instrument of Knowledge is apprehended by sakshi itself. Sakshi also cognises that the sky and others are never proved false (in the past, present and future). But the question arises 'what sense apprehends Time?' It is Sakshi alone that apprehends time.

Here again a number of words are beautifully annotated upon. In the course of observing effects of aging in order to infer their cause as time (old age), certain facts are presented as data—‘ वलीपलितकार्कश्यादिना कालसंबंधे अनुमिते ’, when the relationship of time is inferred by the facts of वलीपलित and कार्कश्य and others. Here these three words are commented upon by Raghavendra. वली and पलित are associated with oldage and कार्कश्य is associated with youth.

Now वली is explained as लंबमानवर्मवत्वं उच्यते skin hanging loose from the body. The dictionary meaning of वली is ‘fold or wrinkle on the skin’: but वली especially on the upper part of belly of the females is considered as mark of beauty (वलिन्नयं आरभारबाला कुमरसंभव). So Raghavendra explains the word as loosely hanging skin which is the sign of oldage. Then पलितेति शुक्लकेऽत्वं gray hair which is also the sign of oldage (पलितं मुङ्डं—च—पंजरिका). कार्कश्यं अलंबमान चर्मोपेत सर्वाविथवदेहकृत्वम्. The state of having the body whose limbs are all tightly covered with skin. Raghavendra in order to make the meaning clear, adds—यौवनावस्था इति. The state of youth.

Here doubt is raised. These signs of oldage directly allow us to infer time associated with them. Then why should Prashastapada introduce

six signs of inference without any particular use ? The answer is, no doubt one entering into the field knows the associated time directly from the signs. Here inference is used for oneself. But inference is also for others. Though he himself knows the time directly yet while informing a man who doubts the time, priority and posteriority (पूर्व and अप्तुर्व) and other six signs are introduced in order to convince him with their respective causes. Hence Prashastapada's Bhashya is justified. But this argument is refuted in order to show that time cannot be inferred.

Now the evil effects of time on the body are due to the contact of time with the body. So time is inferred by the presence of these evil effects. If the time inferred is long period and this long period is conditional (उपाधिनिषिद्धि) as in the system of Nyaya, it is possible to have those conditions at one and the same time. Hence the association of long time can be found at one and the same time when the evil effects are not there on the body. Hence the concomitance is violated. So time cannot be inferred.

Another process of inference of time is very ingeniously presented here. If after the birth of a man many courses of the sun are made, then

there is in his body 'priority'; If a few courses are traced by the sun after one is born, there is 'posteriority'. 'Simultaneousness' in a body with another, means the birth of one in the same moment of the motion of the sun as the birth of the other(body). Non-simaltaneousness of the two men means that one man is born in a course of the sun different from the course the other man is born. Now time is to be inferred from the apprehensions of these things. Thus the apprehension of the body as qualified by the attribute of having lasted through many courses of the sun is the apprehension of priority. In similar manner these apprehensions of different concepts of time like posteriority, simultaneousness and non-simultaneousness and others are to be formed. Then begins the inference of time.

The movements of the sun in the sky are marks in the apprehensions as attributes of the body on the earth. The attributes lead to the idea of the movements made by the sun which on their part leads us to the absolute idea of time, by the law of association. The association may be indirect between the movements of the sun and the body. The body on the earth is contacted with 'some substance' which is in contact with the orb of the sun in which the movements inhere. This 'some substance' is time which is inferred.

This theory also is not tenable. For the rule or Vyapti of inference is again violated in the conception of Abhav or negation where natural relationship works out and not indirect relationship. For even the natural contact like संयोग leads us to a complex conception (having qualified object.)

Now let us come to the point at issue. Let us admit a substance which joins together the sun's movements and the body. But this substance need not be a new substance called time. It may be even Earth which is already admitted as a substance. You can just conceive a number of atoms which connect together the sun and the body.

It is now proved that Time is known by Sakshi and not by inference. In the same manner the directions that are divisions of unmanifest sky also are known by Sakshi.

But Naiyayika now objects that the sky which had the Characteristic quality of sound may not be able to transfer the activities of the sun to the body on earth. But directions are bereft of characteristic quality and are pervasive. Why should they not be able to transfer the activities of the sun to the body on the earth ?

Besides the body in the distance is known as पर (distant) and the body near is known as अपर. Both these cognitions bring the contact of distant space to the body and the contact of near space to the body as their attributes. These cognitions of पर and अपर are different from those which are produced by Time. Now contact or संयोग is attributively apprehended in these two conceptions. Directions serve the purpose of bringing about the contact resulting in the cognition of परत्व and अपरत्व.

But in both the cognitions (of परत्व and अपरत्व of Time and space) directions alone serve the purpose of transferring the quality of संयोग and activity to the body on the earth. The distinction of cognitions (of time and space) are due to the auxiliary causes like संयोग and क्रिया. This is recommended; because it achieves brevity.

The concept of directions is thus explained. From a certain point the solid body which is near the rising mountain is called the east; in the same manner from a point if the solid body is in contact with the setting mountain it is called the west. Nearness or proximity is that which has a little contact with the body close to the sun. That which gets the first contact of the sun is

is the east. That which gets the last touch of the sun is west. When matters stand thus, we do require a pervasive substance which would transfer the Sun-contact to bodies on the earth. Otherwise we do not get cognitions with attributes of eastern and western directions. Atma and Akasha are substances characterised by characteristic qualities. Time only transforms the activities of the sun to the body on the earth. So none of these can transform the sun-contact to the body on earth. Therefore a substance of great extension different from these should be conceived as a liaison-agent to contact the sun and to transfer that sun-contact to bodies on the earth. This substance is 'direction'.

But this also should be refuted in the same manner in which the inference of Time was refuted. Many more types of inferences also are brought for scrutiny and were found as unsatisfactory.

Therefore it is proved that the sky, time and directions are cognised by sakshi, that faultless and pure instrument of knowledge and hence they are real and can never be contradicted. Hence the whole world, grasped by Sakshi, stands unsublated. For its validity is guaranteed by

Sakshi. All perceptions by faultless senses are warranted as valid by sakshi.

Sakshi is an invaluable gift to mankind. For it assures valid knowledge to mankind. Some are directly apprehended by it like space, time, mind, soul, pleasure and pain etc. Other things are known to us by their respective instruments of knowledge, like perception, inference, and verbal testimony. Knowledge presents its objects both positive and negative as real; not as unreal nor indifferent in nature.

At this stage an objection is raised. वटः अस्ति 'a pot exists' is thus an instance of tautology. For the word pot implies its existence and hence 'exists' is a boring repetition. And then वटः नास्ति is an instance of contradiction. For वटः means the existing pot and then to deny its existence is self contradiction.

This objection is not sound. For the वटः no doubt posits a pot whose reality is never jeopardised. But such a pot should establish its relation with particular space and particular time and for this we use the verb अस्ति and others. This spatial and temporal reference is not implied in the use of mere वटः. In some places mere assertion of pot implies its negation also, which

is set aside by the use of वस्ति after that. But this is not the right sort of reply. For reality means its universality (both in time and space) is taken for granted. यत् सत्, तत् सदासर्वत्र सदैव). For रूप is never changed into गंध. Therefore tautology and self contradiction recur unchallenged.

But calm consideration convinces us that a substance existing does not exist in all places and at all times. Hence tautology and self contradiction need not even peep here.

Now correspondance (यापार्थम्) is accepted as validity, which is known by the same instruments which create knowledge. Hence साक्षी apprehends knowledge and its validity and while apprehending its object, apprehends it as real and its reality never to be denied. So, the world apprehended by Sakshi, or testifying consciousness, apprehends it as of undeniable reality.

Now Sakshi apprehending knowledge apprehends it as valid if it is faultless; but if faulty it is invalid. Now when it apprehends world it also testifies the validity by the presence of corroborations from similar and different types of means of proofs and absence of disagreement from similar and different types of means of proofs. So even after great investigation Sakshi finds no

faults in the cognitions and hence determines its validity. But while it apprehends silver in conch shell it suspends the judgement when fault is not recognised and determines invalidity after the fault is recognised. In real experience as soon as conch-shell-silver is presented to the eye it is cognised as real. But this is not sakshi-cognition, it is only mental cognition and mind is liable to be soiled with defects.

But if Sakshi thus depends upon elaborate testification whose validity again is to be verified leads to an endless regress. To avoid all this, following closely the steps of experience it is accepted that Sakshi alone without corroboration from testification apprehends the validity of knowledge as well as knowledge.

It is only when some doubt is entertained that we begin the investigation and not always. Therefore where there is the possibility of some fault there the doubt arises and investigation is needed and not always. Not always a doubt arises.

A person comes and tells us there is water near by; but we doubt his honesty and hence doubt the validity of his words. We go a distance and see water. Still we do not believe our eyes. We go and touch water. The tactile perception

too is not relied on as there can be such a touch without its being water. So we drink it and quenching our thirst we feel pleasure. No further doubt arises because pleasure is Sakshi-cognition.

This should not lead us to think that Sakshi too is not independent in apprehending validity of knowledge. But if sakshi has innate power to cognise validity as it has power to cognise knowledge there should be no delay in determining validity. This objection is removed by stating that Sakshi is endowed with two powers; one is to cognise knowledge and another to cognise its validity. Though the power cognising knowledge is functioning and cognises knowledge, the other power is obstructed by impurities in mind and till they are cleared the power to cognise validity is obstructed. When testification clears these impurities the native power of Sakshi works its way through and cognises validity. But if no such two different powers are conceived and sakshi works as one integrated whole, then in respect of knowledge-cognition it is free and functions; but in respect of validity-cognition it is impeded in its functioning by defects of the mind. When they are removed the natural power of Sakshi works as usual.

If Sakshi does not cognise validity of knowledge which is never going to be sublated, then why should not Brahman also be sublated without any cause as the world is sublated ? Brahman is not suspected of sublation because he is known as 'Existence' knowlege, infinity' from Shruti. He is neither nescience nor its production. No illusion is possible without locus and there is no sublation coming sine die; Without Brahman the world illusion cannot be accounted for.

But all this depends upon the power of Sakshi apprehending the validity of all these evidences about the absolute (reality which is never contradicted). If Sakhi has not that unfailing power of cognising absolute validity of Shurties propounding Brahman beyond sublation then easily Brahman also is suspected of uncertainty, and liable to sublation.

Hence Advaitin must admit the invincible power of Sakshi which apprehends the certainty of validity of Vedic Testimonies which unequivocally propound the certinty and infallible truth of Brahman and thus save him from sublation or destruction, then why not concede the same certainty to the world which is cognised by perception of unchallengeable veracity and the whole validity is apprehended by the same Sakshi.

On this, again a doubt is entertained that perception is not a knowledge of certainty; but its validity is questioned. For the perception of the world is like the perception of silver in the conch-shell. It is the theory of illusion accepted by Advaitins that nescience in Chaitanya, conditioned by conch-shell, the locus of illusion is disturbed by the modification of Antahkarana which has assumed the form of conchshell, coming in contact with the eye, and is changed into silver, and silver illusion. Hence we find, in the illusion of conch-shell silver, the hand of Avidya or nescience.

It has been already shown that Avidya is a square peg in a round hole. For it is not consistant with Advitavada. For it does not find any place to stay in. Brahman is not ready to sacrifice and surrender his omniscience in order to welcome Nescience. Nor can Avidya seek shelter with Jeeva; For the existence of Jeeva requires first the existence of Avidya.

Now certain shrutis that were considered to support the theory of illusion are explained to prove that no such support is to be found from them.

One is the oft quoted, and apparently supporting Shruti:

प्रयंचो यदि विद्धेत निरतेत न सशयः
 जायामात्रं इदंद्वैतं अद्वैतं परमार्थं ॥ १ ॥
 चिकल्पो यिनिवतेत कलिपतो यदिकेनचित्
 उपदेशादर्थं बादो जाते द्वैतं च विद्यते ॥ २ ॥

you must read this in the context of अनादिमायथासुष्टो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते. And you must also remember that there are यदि (if) and निरतेत a verb in the potential mood. And अनादि (beginningless) also deserves attention in the interpretation of the whole verse. It will be shown that if these two verses are interpreted to mean the illusion of the world, the words shown will be ill-fitted with it. If world were to be illusion then the verse would have been used in the indicative mood and not potential mood. This subjunctive mood beginning with 'if' implies an undesirable imposition 'Had there been no fire on the mountain there would have been no smoke there'. This is an instance of Reductio ad Absurdum. The sentence with if ends in implying that the world does not perish.

Now in order to interpret it properly the verb विद् is shown to have the meaning of 'to be born or to be produced' In Reductio ad absurdum we do require a general invariable concomitance. Such an invariable rule obtains itself between production and destruction and not mere existence

So the verb विद् does not mean -"to be or to exist" but it means 'to be produced'.

Now Prapancha or world means the group of five fold distinctions (1) between soul and God; (2) between matter and God (3) between soul and soul (4) between matter and matter. (5) between matter and soul) This sort of world is never born; it is eternal and beginningless. Hence it is never destroyed. It is a world of distinctions that is referred to in this verse (प्रयंचो विद्विच्छेत्). The group of five is of the peculiar type, (प्र) because its knowledge leads to Moksha. Hence, that गः or भेदः is not found is only to be found in a fool's dictionary.

Now the system of Bheda therefore is recognised by Hari in his supreme vision (माया). The highest meaning of the Vedas is Hari while Lakshmi is the middle most meaning and the lowest is Brahma and others. Hence the Parmarth or the highest meaning is Advaita (or unsurpassed by any body or Vishnu).

Jeeva over-powered by the beginningless sankalpa or desire of ShriHari sleeps i. e. (Jeeva) becomes enmeshed in the worldly knowledge and loses contact with Hari; and by his own desire

he becomes disentangled and knows through the shastras ShriHari of supreme power. He sees clearly the world of fine distinctions and there wakes up and gets rid of all sheaths and has a direct vision of Hari.

Thus the good and the wise put forth this system following the direction shown by the vedas.

Now another Shruti which is allied with the idea is cited in order to summon them to put forth their theories of illusion and modification or mutation. ज्ञत तपादेशमप्रक्षयः येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवति अस्मतं सतं अविज्ञातम्. This is quoted while elucidating प्रतिज्ञा दृष्टिंतानुपरोधात्. The world is but the modified form of Brahman and hence world and Brahman are not different, one from the other. Hence when Brahma the (material) cause is known, all its modification or productions are known. To convince the truth of this, some instances are given. This is the contention of Ramanuja; according to him Brahman is the material cause of the world.

But the Advaitin is an illusionist, His theory is to know many from the knowledge of one, Many instances are given. The one is Paramartha or unquestionably true, and it is the lump of earth from the knowledge of which all productions

of earth like earthen pots and pans are known. The productions are merely modifications and they are not real and existing independently of the material cause, earth. These productions are real only in name. The only thing real is मृद् or earth. Modification is something that undergoes mutation while the names are symbolic. वाचरंभणं 'use in words' means भिष्या false or unreal. But this meaning is not warranted by convention.

Thus throughly investigating the interpretation and systemetisation of Advaitavada we stop for fear of prolixity and not that the defects of it have come to an end.

END OF 1st ADHYAYA

II ADHYAYA

I salute that Narashinha at the remembrance
of whose feet all worldly calamities come to an
end, and who dispels, like, the sun the shadows
of darkness cast by ill-baked systems.

This Second Adhyaya also consists of four Padas and is a logical consequent on the first Adhyaya. At the end of the first Adhyaya, Shri Madhva in Anuvyakhyana says- "Vishnu of the essence of infinite perfect qualities creates the world like a father, at ease, at his own sweet will". Brahman as the agent Cause of world is already introduced to us in the first Adhyaya as one full of most auspicious qualities. Hence he should have been continued. Instead, Brahman is here praised as 'untouched by impure smell of Nescience'. This is no inconsistency; for in every Adhikarana Brahman is said to possess a particular quality. That means, by implication, he has not that defect which is opposite to that quality. Hence the continuity of that topic is logically consistent. For instance Brahman was praised as omniscient and as opposed to this quality there is nescience. Hence Brahman is consistently

declared to be immune from demerits like Avidya and others. The very etymological meaning of Brahman in the sutra is fullness of perfect qualities and immunity from defects.

Now to come to the point that Brahman is said to be the Cause of the universe; and hence it must be quite different from sentient and insentient world. And it cannot be a soul. Otherwise he would not have been omniscient and omnipotent. It is already shown that the whole of the Shastras made up of letters, words and sentences are shown to connote, in the highest primary sense, Brahman, the cause of the world. Even the whole sentence has Brahman for its import. Now the Second Adhyaya gathers the threads of the first Adhyaya and shows that there are no evidences which deny the statements of the first Adhyaya. And hence the connection between the first and the second is Causal. In the Second Adhyaya all objections to the greatest harmonization(सम्बन्ध)achieved in the first Adhyaya, are replied in the Second Adhyaya. Hence the first Adhyaya is the 'Cause' and the second is the 'effect'.

As for the distinct arrangement of the four Padas of this II Adhyaya, in the first pada all

objections based on rational grounds are satisfactorily waved. In the second pada all objections based on the different systems of philosophy are considered. In the third, those based on vedic texts are replied and in the fourth those based on sacred texts which also appeal to reason are taken for satisfactory reply.

Then in the first Pada the Adhikaranas, ten in number are included which have their distinct doubt, reply, and the rationale. But these topics of the Adhikaranas are mentioned in detail in Nyayavivarana. Hence they are briefly mentioned here.

Now in the first Adhikarana the Samanvaya of the first Adhyaya is challenged because there is the opposition from the smritis. But samanvaya is sought and determined by shruties which stand higher in authority than Smritis, which are lower in rank and which follow those higher authorities implicitly.

Here begins the discussion about the relative strength of shruties and smritis, as evidences. The contention of the Purvapakshi is that strength and weakness in evidences should be settled by their merit and not on the ground of being smriti and shruti. Now smriti commands greater

strength of validity, being the compositions of the most reliable men.

A topic from Meemansa is quoted to prove the superiority of Shruti over smriti in point of authority. औदृशर्ते स्पृष्ट्वा उद्यापेत is from shruti and is pitted against smriti quotation औदृशरीस्त्वा वेष्टितव्य. It is settled in Meemansa that here smriti is set aside being opposed by shruti.

The Shruti statement means- "A pillar made of a figtree as high as the master of the ceremony should be fixed in the south western direction of the Hall. The Udgata should touch it and sing in the higher pitch. The smriti statement on the other hand enjoins- "The pillar should be covered by enfolding the pillar with the cloth"; Thus covered the pillar cannot be touched. Hence there is opposition between the two statements. Being opposed by Shruti, Smriti dwindles into insignificance and invalidity. This is the conclusion of Prabhakaras. Bhattas think that Smriti should adjust its meaning to the necessities of Shruti and cover the pillar leaving a few inches space for touching. Hence smriti is a valid statement. But in Prabhakara view or Guru Mata Smriti is invalid. In this connection Jaimini sutra is quoted in approval of this

opinion. विरोध when smriti is confronted with Shrutis, they all lose their value as instruments of knowledge. But according to the previous Smrityadhibarana, when a smriti can be inferred to trace itself to original shruti why deny it, its due validity? But Inference only operates to trace the original shruti when there is no opposition from shruti. Therefore such Smritis eclipsed by shruties are expelled from the group of respectable evidences. This is all the argument of the PurvaPakshi.

When he is confronted with an argument that Vedas should be interpreted on the strength of canons of interpretation and not based on the trend of Smritis; most probably the Purvapakshin says that these canons of interpretation should follow the trend of Smritis while interpreting shruties. Chandrika thus helps us to know what the heart of the opponent is.

The Purvapakshin further argues that these composers of smritis are the most reliable because they are endowed with stirring qualities which go to characterise them as best fitted to deal with such subjects.

They are known to be omniscient and are endowed with great knowledge in respect of the

subject they treat, absence of desire to deceive, agile and active senses and great eagerness to teach. Deceiving tendency is the effect of selfishness and hatred. When the cause is absent automatically the effect also is absent.

Raghavendra explains the terms used here. Now ज्ञान means, विवक्षित वाक्यार्थज्ञान knowledge of the statements which he wishes to explain. The reliable expositor of shastra must have sound knowledge of that shastra. इच्छा, वाक्य प्रयोगेच्छा desire to explain by using statements. This desire must be sincere and eager. If one is forced to explain shastra, the reliable man may not show the best part of himself. This desire is nothing but aptitude in the Apta. Then there is the likelihood of misinterpretation. Another qualification of the Apta is his effort (श्रद्धा) which will help him to explain well. Next qualification is he is required to have strength and skill of the parts of the body employed in giving utterance to the expressions. This is करणपादव which Raghavendra explains as; Some letters like अ and कर्म are born in the कंठ or throat; इ and चर्म are produced in palate तालू. These are the करणs employed in utterance. These must be strong and in working order.

Raghavendra explains अविप्रलिप्सा. The forest dwellers and backward tribes try to deceive

travellers by misguiding them. The reliable Aptas should not entertain such low dispositions.

Thus the Purvapakshin contends, armed with evidences that the composers of शैव and other shastras are most reliable and hence their opposition is worth considering when deciding that Brahman is the cause of the world, on the strength of the shrutis. For Smritis stand for Rudra or other agents than Brahman as the cause of the world.

The Sidhanti now crosses swords with the opponents without overriding the rules of chivalrous fighting. He sets aside the evidence of shruti. He chooses the same kind of weapon as that of his antagonist and challenges him on the same ground. If he has Smritis to prove the Supremacy of Rudra and others, there are other smritis like Panchratra and others whose authors like Hari, Manu, and others are equally reliable. Thus there is equal opposition between the two groups of Smritis (सत्प्रतिपक्षता). For here the argument put forth by opponent is counterbalanced by an equally strong argument.

Even when both the sides are equal they cannot contradict each other. And those that are contradictory like the cognition of silver in

shell and that of shell are not equal. पटः शुक्लः, पटः दीर्घः are two cognitions equal but they do not contradict each other.

The सिद्धिंति says that when both Smritis are equally weighted Smriti which is based on original evidence is said to be stronger evidence than the other which has no support of the original. Pancharatra and others are clearly supported by the vedas while Shaivagamas have no such corroboration from the vedic Literature.

Besides the authors of shaivagamas cannot claim infallible reliability or Aptatwa. For the validity of knowledge and absence of desire to deceive others and others are very difficult to be proved. Merely the fact that they become ready to discourse to the audience does not prove their extraordinary eligibility to do so.

Then goes on a very hot discussion about the reliability of the Shaiva Agamas. But the sidhanti, though the opposition is very strong wins the ground point by point.

For instance the question of absence of desire to deceive is the cardinal point in Aptatva or reliability of the Author. But the authors of Shaiva and other Agamas cannot be ascertained to have this sterling quality. To this the opponent

says that they must have some purpose to gain in deceiving others. No one indulges in disseminating wantonly for no purpose. These smritikaras have no such evil purpose to gain. They only intend to disseminate their doctrines.

But this rule is not always true. There are confirmed deceives who are known to deceive the public merely for the pleasure of deceiving others. We do not include this group with these Confirmed deceivers. But they may deceive others deceiving themselves first by thinking what is useless to be useful.

If one of them is endowed with power of discrimination which dispels this self-deception, others cannot be ascertained to be scrupulously discriminate in their behaviour. Some purposely want to sidetrack the evil minded. Others also may claim this quality.

Again it is argued that due to corroboration from other sources, such nefarious intentions cannot be attributed to this group of smritikaras. What are those corroborations from ? They cannot be perceptions. Because the subject matter of those Smritis is something beyond five sensos (It is the cause of certain and the ultimate destiny of man which lies beyond the bounds of

this universe). Inference cannot operate being clogged with logical fallacies like Vyabhichara. Revealed vedas do not go to their help. To call forth works written by their own protagonists is of little help.

Thus goes on this interesting discussion. Thus the opponent's smriti group, lacking original support and having doubtful reliability cannot rise to the elevation of standard system of thought.

But the group of Pancharatra and other smritis being composed by Narayan and Manu and others have the corroboration of the self-revealed vedas. Hence they can claim superiority over the first group.

Now the opponent objects to the very validity of the vedas or shrutis; because they do not carry with them the personal qualities of the author (as they are authorless); hence they cannot claim any validity in their exposition. But the opponent forgets that the very fact of being authorless carries the weight of absence of demerits of the author. So the authority of shruti cannot be questioned. Besides they being meaningful sentences and having all the merits of good sentences convey their own validity of their meaning.

Another factor we must remember. The Smritis and Itihasas and Puranas elucidate the meaning of the vedas. So vitally they are inter-related. But this does not lead to mutual dependence, as the vedas wait for the smritis to elucidate them and smritis wait for meaning of the vedas to validate them. For the vedas express their meaning independently of smritis depending upon the canons of interpretation like उपक्रम and उपसंहार and others. Then they convey the meaning that Vishnu alone is the cause of the creation. Smritis get corroboration from these original authorities.

The whole argument clinched into succinct form runs like this— It is only the हृति, that is known to us, that leads us to inference. Now Pancharatra and other smritis are valid because they actuate us to fruitful activity. For those who practice the method laid down by it, invariably get the fruit promised by it. But it is very difficult to ascertain the invariability of concomitance of हृति and सत्य through data collected. In many instances the concomitance is found violated. If at all, there is co-existence found of the two, it is only an accident. We cannot even say that failure in getting fruit is due to inefficiency in its performance. For we are not

sure whether the failure in getting fruit is due to our fault or its getting is only an accident. Thus the validity of पञ्चरात्रागम and others is a moot point.

Here Raghavendra explains the phrase काकतालीयता used to mean 'accident or chance'. काकागमनसचये एव ताल पतनं यथा तथा। Just at the moment when the crow comes to the tree the tada falls down. Its explanation is काकापमन तालफलपतनयोः यथायाद् चिक्कत्वं तथा तु अस्य. Just as it is merely a chance and there is nothing preordained that the crow should cause the falling of the tada fruit, so also the performance of Vaidika karma and the coming of the wealth might be merely an accident; hence we cannot settle its validity.

So is the case with the Shaivagama. Thus they are similar and are sailing in the same boat. But the Shaivagama once declares that the fruits to be obtained are common and the methods are easy; and again they declare that the fruits are uncommon and methods are very difficult to follow. Hence there is inconsistency and self-contradiction in the statements.

Hence the shaivagamas work under many disabilities while Pancheratragama relying with much benefit on the vedas commands validity and respect.

न विलक्षणत्वात् अस्य तथा त्वंच शब्दात्

The Boudhas are trying to disprove the validity of the vedas. On the validity of the vedas depends the question of the cause of creation. Vishnu cannot be the cause of creation, because the vedas which propound this theory are invalid as their assurances of promise fail to come out to be true. Thus by failure of assurance some part of vedas are proved to be invalid. The parts also are easily affected with this disease of invalidity. Besides the vedas being revealed are authorless and hence they might not have been composed intentionally. Just as unintentional foot marks of ants though resembling letters have no intelligent meaning as they are unintentional, so also vedic composition being authorless has no intelligent meaning; and hence they are not valid. What of the smritis which are affected with many defects ? They can never rise to be valid composition.

When such a doubt is raised Sutrakara meets it with strong arguments.

Acharya in his words tells us that vedic evidence is unique and stands un-challanged. For they are authorless and hence they cannot have any faults which follow the human composition. They are eternal and they never lose their

power of intelligibility. Hence their validity stands supreme and unaffected. The vedas have expressibility and hence have validity depending upon expressibility and stand very high in our estimation. Even the opponent appreciates this validity of the vedas as instruments of knowledge. Instruments are valid when they properly convey knowledge. The vedas are good conveyors of knowledge. If statements were to be invalid, they will be so, due to their mis-carriage of meaning. But these appear in that state on account of personal faults. Vedas being eternal and authorless are free from author's faults and hence are naturally valid.

If one questions the very eternity of the vedas, and if he be a believer in the vedas, to him the evidences of the Shrutis might be quoted.

Another may object to its validity on the ground that it is not composed by one with an intelligent purpose like the letters formed by the foot prints of ants. This instance of the letters formed by the foot prints of ants, is an ill conceived instance. For the concomitance is not invariable. Besides it does not confront the meaning of the vedas.

Thus if you infer that the Veda is not means of knowledge, because it is not purposefully com-

posed, still it is valid like the story of destruction of many crows by one owl which taught a significant and real lesson to Aswathaman that he would be able to kill many. So also authorless Veda not pretending to claim any purpose for its composition becomes a valid conveyance of truth.

Another argument is put forth to disprove the invalidity of the veda, thus; The Veda is not invalid as it is not contradicted by any other means of knowledge, like perception. The find inference to prove the invalidity of veda is disabled by उपास्ति. For in the perception we that there is no contradiction of other evidences, co-existing with invalidity. Now उपास्ति is contradiction by other evidences. That instrument which has no correspondence is contradicted by other evidences. This is concomitance of साध्य and उपास्ति. Now we must show that it is not found with साधन. This can be shown in shruti. For shruti is a means of knowledge yet there is no contradiction of other evidences.

As there is no contradiction from other evidences, there is validity in shruti as an instrument of knowledge. Thus there will be different arguments to prove validity in the form of 'correspondence' to truth. 1) Vedas are not

invalid as they are not contradicted by other evidences and the instance is perception. 2) Vedas are valid for they are conveying meaning and at the same time they are not contradicted by other evidences; and the instance is perception. 3) Veda is Agama; for it is a sentence and at the same time not contradicted by other evidences; like an accepted instance.

Now the Sidhanti puts forth the three inferences in a different form:—

1) Shruti is not a congenial conveyance of experience; for it is verbal testimony and yet is not purposeful composition (being authorless).

2) Shruti is not Agama (आत्मा) for it is not one different from word.

3) Shruti is not an instrument of knowledge for it does not convey meaning.

For all these three, ‘contradiction by other evidences’ is उपाधि.

Raghavendra explains the attributes of the हेतु. The हेतु is बोधकत्वे सति प्रभाण विरुद्धत्वात्. Here the attribute is बोधकत्वेसति. In a pot there is no contradiction by other evidences; yet there is no अथात्वं nor correspondence. Hence the concomitance is violated. Therefore the attributes बोधकत्वं and

the other two are used. For pot is not वेदक nor means of conveyance of knowledge; nor is it a means of knowledge nor is it a sentence.

Once the validity of the Vedas is accepted it is not a difficult job to convince the validity of the Smriti and Itihasa and Purana. For all these get the benefit of validity from the originals on which they are based. Those works are said to have borrowed their validity from the originals which have been composed after understanding or studying the originals. But the Lord Narayana need not wait to understand and then to write the works. He being all knowing may write his works without going through them. But still the works composed follow the originals in their contents.

Hence as there is similarity of thought and content between the original veda and the works, these derived get validity. Because there is no contradiction from any source. Then why run to the original for validity; you may directly assert their validity as those who convey knowledge sweep all contradictions before them. But sometimes when certain assertions prove abortive, the fact that these works are based on the original vedas, saves them from the calamity of contradiction and keeps them safe with validity.

श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्.

Independently inference cannot venture to confront the vedas or derived work in matters beyond senses. For inference cannot enter into the forbidden ground and defy the authority and validity, of those works. The eye cannot deny what touch has perceived but inference cannot be summarily dispensed with. For when one shruti runs Counter to another shruti, there is right scope for inference to interfere and settle the claims of the disputants.

Even the opposition from perception and Agama too cannot invalidate shruti or veda directly; but only if that is proved to be superior evidence on which this has been based. For perception or Agama is inferior in strength to the vedas; so if they differ from vedas they are contradicted by the stronger in evidence. But they prove to be of equal strength and they simply incapacitate vedas to convey the meaning by creating hindrance of opposition and cannot create certainty of invalidity. But if they prove to be basic evidence on which the vedas depend, they never prove the invalidity of ill-correspondance with truth but coax the vedas to give up the apparent meaning for a better suited meaning. For the vedas being untouched by defects and

being authorless stand unimpeachable and infallible, and they are never utterly invalidated. The Vedas finding themselves confronted with their basic evidence, of superior strength and unequivocally opposite in meaning, condescend to change their apparent meaning for a better suited one, in all their imperial glory of supreme validity. Perception and Agama often enjoy the privilege of being the basic evidences of superior strength to Vedas; but inference rarely enjoys that superiority. In their undisputed field of operation the Vedas themselves become basic evidence of superior strength to perception and inference which will bend their unwilling knees before the imperial majesty of unquestioned authority of the Vedas.

If the Vedas, as in some places, convey two meanings, one warranted by logical reasoning and another not favoured by logicality the logical one is preferred to the illogical one.

Raghavendra enters into this controversy of comparative strength of Revelation and Reasoning, and presents the whole case before us for a critical understanding. On the basis of Anuvyakhyan he analyses the body of reasoning. The backbone of reasoning is Vyapti or invariable concomitance.

This vyapti is derived from three sources; perception, inference, and verbal testimony. This has been treated in Vaisheshika Naya in greater detail. Now Raghavendra explains and illustrates these kinds of vyaptis. The first one is the concomitance of Smoke and fire derived from perception. 'Brahmin should not be killed' is a conclusion arrived at by the Agama. For this is based upon the Agama statement. An inference like the following— "A living body has a soul; for it has life" has only a negative concomitance based on inference only. "that which has no life has no soul".

Of these three that inference which is based on perception and verbal testimony is the stronger; for that which is based on inference must ultimately be based either on perception or on verbal testimony; otherwise that inference based on inference ultimately will be baseless.

No doubt the discussion on the instruments of knowledge is a topic confined to Logic and not to philosophy (नीतिशास्त्र) yet in वैशेषिकशास्त्र when there is dispute about the nature, number, object, and purpose of evidences or means of knowledge, such discussion is legitimately included even in philosophy in order that the students might follow the subject intelligently.

Hence Madhva defines 'the means of knowledge'. (प्रमाण) But some object to the definition of Pramana as a satisfactory definition is very difficult to arrive at. It is a very lengthy discussion. Raghavendra while commenting on Nyaya Sudha, enters into it and explicitly explains Jayateertha what is implicitly mentioned there in.

In order to give an instance of Raghavendra's way of elucidation of very complex topics in Sudha we have chosen one, as limited space does not allow us to acquaint the reader with the whole of his elucidation.

The context is the utility of the definition of the means of knowledge or Pramana. There is keen difference of opinion regarding the प्रयोजन or purpose of such a definition. Madhva has defined प्रमाण as पथार्थम्. "That which helps us to grasp the object of knowledge as it is".

Then what is the purpose of such definition ? 'To know the symbol which closely follows the object' is the purpose of such definition. Thus Raghavendra explains 'अन्वर्थ संज्ञा ज्ञापनम्'. A definition is respected when it has some use. Then the definition of Pratyaksha is taken up as an example. Now the derivation of प्रत्यक्ष is given.

'the sense with contact' is perception. The qualified object is known after the pure object is known. Hence in the commentary of Jayateerth on Tattva Nirnaya it is stated as 'the sense inclined towards the object'. Following this explanation प्रत्यक्ष is dissolved as 'प्रतिस्थितं च तरङ्गं च प्रत्यक्षं'. The meaning is "the sense in contact with the object". is perception. Thus the name closely follows the meaning.

Here Raghavendra is richly profuse in his notes. They are highly enlightning as they are very critical and scholarly elucidations of the original.

The purpose of definition is 1) to recognise the thing to be defined as different from similar things. 2) or in order to show the indicator of qualities like प्रमाणत्व that we may know it. 3) or for the use of it (in sentences) 4) or to determine the reason for the use of प्रमाण in the meaning required 5) or to serve any other purpose.

The first alternative is accepted. Similarity is to be based on the quality of ज्ञनत्व (knowledge-ness) or ज्ञनसाधनत्व (means to knowledge). Knowledge and means to knowledge, are similar to Pramana; and pot and such other things are dissimilar to Pramana. By defining the लक्षण, the

author wants to show that वैश्य is different from knowledge and means to knowledge, and it is also different from dissimilar things like pot and other things.

Suppose we define a cow as having a dew-lap and other things. Then knowing this definition, when he sees an animal of this description, he finds it to be not a horse nor a pot.

Really speaking, the person who defines for another, wants the knowlegde of a thing different from the thing defined, in a thing other than defined. But the person for whom it is defined does not need it. The definition itself does not differentiate the undefined from the defined. But the knowledge of the undefined(different from the defined) is the purpose of the definition. The person for whom the definition is given should know only the meaning of the definition. This analysis of the definition is highly enlightning.

A dull man is not eligible to know the definition and its implications. But a man who has been informed through direct instruction, of the word and the reference to its meaning, feels the need of the definition for independent dealings.

A reasonable doubt arises here. A teacher has two persons before him waiting for his expression. There is a man who does not agree with him. He is an opponent bent on contradict-

ing the teacher. Then there is the student or disciple who humbly sits at his feet and listens to him. Therefore the teacher, need not give the definitions to these opponents who never confide in him. so the definition is given through instruction by the Guru to the student who implicitly believes in the Guru. No, this is not the real position. If the student alone requires the definition to improve his knowledge, the teacher should use only the statement of the proposition to be proved; an assertion without any reason. For he has implicit faith in his Guru. If the opponent says that the definition alone is sufficient for the disciple while reasons and other necessary things are meant for the disputant, even this is not satisfactory. For mere definition amounts to supply of meaning which work is undertaken by Dictionaries, Grammar and others.

A conclusive reply to this opposition and counter opposition is given here. The definition well understood leads to fructification. This understanding of the definition takes place by perception and other means of knowledge. These definitions like यथार्थ प्रमाण or सात्त्वादिमात् गीः do not express definitions. Had that been so, the definitions, being understood by other means, would have been redundant. But to him who under-

stands this definition from other sources and does not know that this is useful and required for the sake of understanding the innate power of a word being the cause of using the word. this sentence सास्त्रादिचानगौः is used.

For example one knows that the particular body before him is a cow by the express advice of an elderly person. and then knows that the word गो means it. Then the first man is eager to know whether this particular body alone is cow or other bodies also are there to be called by this word cow. The elderly man instead of telling at the sight of every cow that it is cow (for it is an endless bore) uses a sentence expressive of a general concomitance namely 'that body is the meaning of the word गो which has dewlap and other things.' This sentence alone does not inform the man of the Vyapti. But from the use made by another he comes to know this. But if the man does not know the Vyapti, he becomes eager to know it and this sentence tells him of Vyapti. Then he remembers the Vyapti and whenever he sees an animal with a dewlap and other things he infers that that body is the meaning of the word गो or there may be many other ways of knowing the meaning of the word गो,

Here a doubt arises. 'This body should be called a cow because it has cowness' this is how the word comes to be used. Now does he not know how to use the word cow or does he know ? In the first alternative when he does not know the use of the word cow how will he know it from inference also ? Does one ignorant of fire know the Vyapti in which it is involved ? If he knows fire then why should be try to know it from inference? As it is an attempt to know what is already known it is a futile attempt.

The discussion splits into many alternatives and enters into deeper layers of the subject of semantics, and gets subtler. Raghavendra follows the argument closely and adds his crisp and intelligent notes so that we may follow these arguments with better understanding.

Now the form of the inference is this:— This body is to be called a cow; because it has dewlap and other essential characteristics. What is the root of cause for this inference ? Is it the negative fact that the word cow is not used in bodies not having dewlap and otherthings? Or is it the positive fact that all bodies having the charactaristic quality of dewlap and others are called cows ? of these two usages one positive and another nagative which one actuates man to use

that inference? In the negative usage it reaches excesses leading us to the margin of absurdity. Even the non use of cow in the meaningless word like Jabagadadasha must be also an incentive to the use of the inference. If on the other hand you add an adjective to the Hetu and say "Cow not being used in non cows which are known to be meaningful." But Jabagadadasha has no meaning in general; while other words have their own meaning and yet they have no meaning of cow. This distinction is there. Hence there is no absurd excess. Still the word hare-horn is not used in the sense of cow. This is not the cause of inference. But harehorn is something not existing and cow has a meaning that is existing. Hence the difference. Even then the word cow referring to a particular cow having the name of Saraswati, not used in other cows may prove an incentive to the use of inference.

Now in the second positive alternative the cowness is there yet cow is to be used as referring to all cows. And cow is not to be used in non cows. Hence with the reason of having cowness or dewlap and other things we want to show that a particular body is to be called a cow.

Then the whole argument melts down to this that a body having no cowness should not

be called a cow; and equally well a body having cowness should be called a cow. He who knows this, is told the definition. Such a man, as uses other words, uses also the word cow by positive and negative reference. He does not need a fullfledged inference. To this objection a rejoinder is given. In both the alternatives through the instruction of the elderly person he knows that the cow with cowness is called a cow and through inference he comes to know that in other cases of cows also the word cow is used.

Then in the second alternative (the word cow with cowness is used to denote a cow) the absurd excess that was charged against this view is to be attributed either to the instructor or instructed. The instructed does not know the Vyapti; viz Jabagadadasha is called by the word Jabagadadasha on account of its definition. But he knows the Vyapti viz; the cow is called a cow on account of its definition. Because the instructor (the elderly person) has advised the instructed. Nor the second is objectionable, for through the elderly person the other man, has understood the Vyapti.

Now the whole argument may be thus summed up. It is confirmed that the main

cause of inference that the cow is called cow on account of its cowness is not the fact that cow is not used in non cows. If that be so, the inference might be charged with the fallacy already mentioned But the main reason is the knowledge of Vyapti. (the use of the word cow with cowness) and is already known; but he does not know the Vyapti viz the use of swastimati (a name of a cow) with cowness. Therefore there is no logical excess.

Now another question had been raised. Why treat this subject of semantics in a philosophical treatise? The reply is that it is never undertaken that a subject treated else where will not be treated here. We are careful to see that there is no overlapping of different branches of knowledge. Foreign subjects are treated here when a doubt arises with the textual topic on account of this alien subject. Or when a special purpose is served by a reference to such out side topics. There is no scope for wanton encroachment on Subjects of other branches of knowledge.

Now a doubt has been raised that there is promiscuity between the Koshas and Vyakaranas on one side and the present philosophical treatise on the other side. But the subject and the

object are different. Hence there cannot be any promiscuity of subjects. The main subject of this shastra is Lord Narayana and the motive is the realisation of Moksha. While the Koshas and Vyakarana treat only words; and their purpose is correct use of words or at the most 'Heaven'. Hence no promiscuity can be doubted.

Here the opponent should be made aware that he should not throw stones at others being himself in a glass house. His theory of Adhyasa is the target of keen criticism. For the very attack he makes against others recoils on him like a boom rang. He defines 'Adhyasa' as a piece of memory in which something seen before (in some place) appears in another place; and he incorporates such and other definitions in his shastra. The Sutrakara in his sutra जन्माद्यस्य यत्; gives his own definitions. Now it must be told whether these very objections apply to those or not. He cannot deny those objections; for there is similarity of circumstances. Hence you must candidly confess that those objections which you have raised also apply to you. Such objection-ridden attacks cannot take us a long way in attaining clarity of thought.

If a defective definition is accepted as a workable definition; then the howlings of the

head strong, shall have to be accepted as means of verbal dealings. There is no other cause for their ineligibility for conveyance of thought than irrationality. Before the visual realisation of Brahman if the vauntings of the arrogant are proved false they are put in the illusionary status. But if after realisation, a certain thing is proved false it is higher in status and accepted as practically or empirically true. This arrangement in the order of truth by the Advaitin will be rejected. For this irrationality is neither realisation of Brahman nor is it the sublation:

Now the definitions given by advaitin are equally defective. Sudhakara feels the heaviness of the chain of arguments he has drawn so far and therefore he stops here fearing prolixity.

Again the means of knowledge is defined—“Means of knowing a thing as it is”. Raghavendra analyses the contents of the word यथार्थ. This is an abstract noun from यथार्थ, which means “not transgressing the limits of the object”. This is the characteristic quality of an instrument of knowledge. And it is also the definition of an instrument of knowledge.

Now यथा is used in meanings like योग्यता, वीक्षा, पदार्थनितिवृत्ति, and सादृश्य. Here it is used in the

meaning of पदार्थानतिकृति not transgressing the limits of the object. In this meaning it forms an Avyayeebhava compound. Hence Jayateertha tells us that अर्थं नातिकृते हति पदार्थः But else where in मंदारनंजरी on उपाधिखण्डन, पदा is taken in the meaning of सावृत्य or similarity and says पदार्थ means 'having a similar object'. It is dissolved as Bahuvrihi Compound, and means "Knowledge which is similar to its object". The explanation of Jayateertha as अर्थं अनतिकृत्यवर्तते is to be accepted as the final stage of explanation. Similarity is accepted between knowledge and its object with a view to stress the fact that similarity is established between them on the basis of the common quality of truth or existence, found in both knowledge and its object. For knowledge, to be valid must be similar to its object in point of truth or being.

We know the thing to be defined (लक्ष्य) and the definition (लक्षण) when we define means of knowledge as पदार्थ as we define a cow as सास्त्रादिमान्. But you should not go to the length of saying that here also लक्ष्य is different from लक्षण as in the definition of a cow to be सास्त्रादिमान्. But this should not be. Hence here it is defined as 'पदार्थमेवमानत्वं' both to be one and not different like सास्त्रादिमत्व and गोत्व.

We must note that a definition is the characteristic quality of the thing to be defined (लक्ष्य) and लक्षण are all those which are eligible to be called by one word and those which are to be distinctly known as different from others.

Only after knowing the definition one knows the thing defined. Hence the knowledge of लक्ष्य depends upon the knowledge of लक्षण. Definition is given so as to fulfil its double purpose of usage and distinction.

But if the characteristic quality were to be the definition then a quality not existing in all the individuals of the class also shall have to be 'definition'. For non pervasiveness of quality is as much a defect of definition as over pervasiveness (अतिव्याप्ति) and असंभव. The definition is used as an inferential sign or हेतु. But to be a हेतु does not require its pervasiveness. It is enough if हेतु is less pervasive than the Sadhya. Smoke which is found only where fire is, is not found in all places where fire exists. Where smoke is, there fire is; but where fire is there smoke need not exist. Still the smoke must be found in instances where fire is. Otherwise there will be no concomitance; Without concomitance inference is prematurely stopped in its function.

For when the means are denied, the end also will be detained. Therefore the definition should be found in all the things to be defined. And that is the characteristic quality of it.

It was our ambition to define शे in such a manner that it will be found in all cows characterised by cowness. This is the characteristic quality of a cow. Finding that other definitions are not to be found in other objects of definition, the definition like 'having verigated colour' being a quality to be found in a few objects only, it is declared that Less pervasiveness is really a drawback in definition'. Hence quality of less pervasiveness cannot be a satisfactory definition.

But really speaking even qualities residing in a small number of objects to be defined, are called forth to describe a thing, which they do satisfactorily, and hence form workable definitions as they do the work of distinguishing their own substances from other objects. Hence these defective definitions also were accepted as (workable) hypothetical definitions. So Kanada defines a substance as having activity and qualities. Now a substance is first defined as 'qualifiedness'; Why again it should be defined as 'activity' (क्रियावत्तम्)? Is it because one that is partially

pervasive is not a good definition? But it is argued that 'activity' is not a definition of a substance but is mentioned there as another quality of substance. Kiranavalikara justifies the mention of activity in the case of substance to prove the inclusiveness of mind and wind which are not perceptible, in substance, on the ground of activity; and not to show that it is another definition of substance. But these justifications are set aside as not being sound; and the first explanation is not satisfactory.

Hence partially pervasive definitions are found defective only when the definer intends to include all members in things to be defined.

Now begins the discussion about the meaning of 'validity of प्रमाण'. Some think that knowledge in abstract is Pramana and has validity. While others think that the instruments of knowledge are valid. The truth is that both abstract knowledge and its means are signified as प्रमाण on account of different etymological derivations. प्रभीयते इति प्रमाणं इति भावकरणयोः प्रमाणम् one derivation is instrumental in nature (प्रभीयते अनेत) as it means that sound knowledge is got by this means. Another is abstract in nature and means a thing is known as it is by knowledge. These are not

the only derivations. It is also enjoined in the case of support (अधिकरण) in the sutra of Panini—‘भावे लुट्करणाधिकरणयोद्दत्तं’. But usage does not warrant this meaning of support; and कृत्, तद्वित्, and समाप्तं are entirely dependent on usage; and there is no usage to show that Pramana is the support of Prama. Now ल्युट् is only a कृत् termination. Hence प्रमाण is कृद्यत् and depends on usage for its derivation.

But it is objected that there is usage in the meaning of ‘Support’ also as in ‘विप्रा प्रमाणं’ (The Brahmins are the evidence). Here the word विप्राः is in the nominative case and hence its कारक or meaning of the case is कर्ता. So the Brahmins are the originators of प्रमा or knowledge; and not the अधिकरण or support of knowledge. (अधिकरण is a different karaka from कर्ता).

Again it is doubted that Brahmins being the support of knowledge may have the meaning of ‘support’ or अधिकरण. Technically अधिकरण is not the support of क्रिया or activity. अधिकरणकारक is that which is the support of the activity of holding (धारणा) of the cases and the object of going (कर्म). Therefore validity belongs to their statements or their knowledge; and figuratively it is attributed to Brahmins formally.

Now if knowledge and means to knowledge are both termed as प्रमाण, then is validity, which is nothing but correspondence, of one kind only or is it different in both ? The first alternative runs counter to siddhanta in which knowledge in abstract is said to be केवलप्रमाण and means to knowledge is termed as अनुप्रमाण If the second alternative is accepted, then each variety being limited to one kind only, we cannot have a common definition of Pramana applicable to both.

To this objection Acharya passes his verdict that तत्सूक्ष्यं ज्ञानशब्दयोः validity chiefly belongs to knowledge and word. Secondarily it belongs to means of knowledge, like perception and inference.

Now we turn to the main question of the meaning of यापार्थ or correspondence, which is termed as validity (प्रामाण्य). The constituent parts of यापार्थ are यथा and अर्थ. यथा has been credited with four meanings. Intrinsic merit (योग्यता) Repetition (विचारा), Not in excess of the thing (पदार्थं अनतिवृत्तिं) and similarity or Resemblance. The word अर्थ is used in five meanings like अभिव्येष subject matter धन wealth, वस्तु thing, प्रयोजन purpose and निवृत्ति Abstaining. The opposition makes a good case out of this material against the Sidhanti.

The word यथा might not have been used in the sense of similarity. For while enjoining an

Avyayeebhava compound it is stated that यथा should be used in a sense different from similarity. No other compound can be used here because there is not the necessary eligibility for the words to enter into other compounds. Other meanings of यथा also are not suitable. Therefore यथा must have been used in the sense of पदार्थ अन्तिवृत्ति not in excess of the thing or in short 'as the thing is'. And अयं should be taken in the meaning of वस्तु. So, the whole thing amounts to the definition 'that which does not misrepresent its object of knowledge is Pramana.'

पथावस्थितज्ञेयविषयिकारित्वम् but this definition is affected with the logical fallacy of mutual dependance, though it is free from over pervasiveness. The fallacy is thus explained. First we must know the nature of Pramana. Through the knowledge of Pramana we know 'the object of knowledge'. After knowing this 'object of knowledge' we come to know the nature of the knowledge. Thus there is mutual dependence. This is also another fallacy known as 'self dependence'. For in order to know what Pramana is we must know the thing related to it (object). Hence there is self dependence.

Sidhanti explains away these two fallacies. What is briefly put by Jayateertha, Raghavendra

puts it clearly, so as to be understood easily. The word स्वं in the definition of Pramana ‘प्रायावस्थिततत्त्वेय विषयकारित्वम्’ is Pramana. So we conceive Pramana generally as either knowledge or means to knowledge and not Pramana as Pramana in general. Therefore there is no mutual dependence or self-dependence.

Now how to ascertain the truth of knowledge originated from the study of Vedanta ? If the truth of knowledge is to be ascertained by the truth of the object of the knowledge and that again by the truth of knowlege, the question arises as to what kind of knowledge. Not all knowledge can assure the truth of the object; but only valid knowledge. But what is valid knowledge ? This very knowledge or a different one— Thus easily, this leads us on to Infinite Regress.

All such objections are easily set aside when we adopt our definition of Pramana. Now as said before प्रायावस्थ्य is validity or Pramanya. Correspondence is प्रायावस्थ्य. And this प्रायावस्थ्य is chiefly to be found in word and knowledge.

But as regards knowledge Pramana is of two types, one is Kevala or abstract while the other is Karana Pramana or instrumental. But in word there is only instrumental validity.

The quality of being the object of knowledge (ज्ञेयता) is to be found in the object of knowledge.

This ज्ञेयता is secondary in the object of word. Therefore प्राप्तार्थ or correspondence is chiefly to be found in knowledge only and in word it is secondary. Now this ज्ञेयता is called अर्थता with some definite object. This word is derived from the root गृ to go and the termination ता, (plus the termination of the abstract noun ता) and अर्थता is formed. Thus derived अर्थता means 'Being the object of motion'. This object (of motion) is the object of our mental activity which is village (and other places). But in the present case गति means knowledge and not motion. (Those that means motion mean knowledge). Therefore अर्थता is said to be ज्ञेयता.

Now this अर्थता or validity is not of the same degree in knowledge and word. In knowledge it is of supreme validity. But among the instruments of knowledge the word has chief validity. Hence both are announced as chiefly valid. By word it is meant Veda. Because the Meemansa wants to declare the importance of Veda as the instrument of knowledge.

Because validity chiefly belongs to Vedas, therefore its scrutiny has attained importance. Otherwise what is the use of critical study of the useless Vedas?

What is this chiefness in knowledge and among the instruments in word? The chiefness really belongs to the object of knowledge. This chiefness and secondariness of the object of knowledge lend their colour to knowledge and word.

Therefore knowledge is Pramana (abstract); while Perception inference and testimony are Pramana (instruments).

It is not formally that the means of knowledge are called valid because knowledge is valid and is generated by those means. Rather Pramanya is to be found in both of them. Thus, knowledge is valid because it apprehends the object of knowledge as it is. And the instruments also cognise the same object of knowledge. Thus by generating knowledge in the instruments through that knowledge we apprehend the object of knowledge. Knowledge lends cognisibility to it only because it conditions knowledge. But the instruments do so through knowledge which they create. This is the only difference which creates a different category namely Anupramana in Pramana.

Now this is the all— comprehensive meaning. Pramana in general is that which implicitly follows

the object. It is of two kinds: one is abstract and another is instrumental. Abstract knowledge is that which is in accordance with its object; and means of such knowledge is Anupramana. Abstract knowledge is of two kinds again; one is consciousness in essence and the other is mental modification. This first type is again of three kinds, best, indifferent, and worst. Best knowledge is really valid while indifferent is of the mixed kind and the worst is erroneous. The modified type is again of three kinds being created by perception, inference, and verbal testimony. And instrumental Pramana is of three kinds— senses, inferential sign, and composition.

Even then this definition of Pramana is found to cover wrongly an accidentally right knowledge. It is यथार्थ because it is correct. Still it is not Pramana,

Raghavendra explains काकतालैय in a different manner here. काक means काकामन (the coming of a crow). ताल means तालपतन (the falling of Tala fruit); काकामनस्वि तालपतनस्वि, काकातालं काकतालस्वि काकतालियम्. The form is arrived at by the termination of the स enjoined when इव is used in the sense of similarity; ultimately it means— “which is like the coming of the crow and falling of the Tala fruit”. It is like an incident in which unluckily when a

crow comes to a Tala fruit that is ripe it falls down without the crow being the cause of it, sheerly by chance; So also without the real cause, cognition just by chance turns out to be true and valid.

Then an instance of such a cognition of accidental validity is cited. One holding five cowries in his closed hand asks another to tell him how many cowries he has in his hand. The other man casually tells him that he has five and thus it comes out to be true. For casual truth the instance cited is—अजाकृपाणीथन्याप.

So the definition of प्रमाण is to be found in some thing which is not प्रमाण. This is saved from this fallacy through a critical scrutiny of the whole process of knowledge. For the person who replies the question is in doubt about the number. Hence his Cognition is of the nature of doubt and hence it need not be प्रमाण. So there is no fear of over pervasiveness.

No doubt there is a part of cognition referring to the number '5' which is correct. So the cognition of five and the means to that cognition seem to be प्रमाण. The speaker in a bold surmise has hit the right answer. It is only a doubt of one alternative. Hence his is not प्रमाण, otherwise even deceivers shall have to be called authentic sources of information.

Or this difficulty may be avoided by qualifying Sadhana with the adjective 'pure' (निर्दोष). It ultimately means that cognition generated by an instrument devoid of defect is validity or प्रायास्य. Now in this definition if निर्दोष is used प्रायास्य is not necessary or cognition born of pure instruments is प्रायास्य. Thus the real nature of valid cognition is mentioned here.

This sort of validity is to be found both in memory and repetition also. Because validity means that which is according to the object of knowledge. That is why Shri Madhva has discarded other definitions given by other schools. For thereby he includes Memory and Repetitions among valid pieces of knowledge.

Even then it is objected that memory will not be valid knowledge as validity thus defined is not to be found in memory. Thus a doubt is raised by तार्किक. His point is that the thing remembered is not the same now as it was before. In the present the former state of the remembered thing has disappeared. Memory does not revive the old state that has perished. But memory does know that the past state of things has already passed. This does not amount to meta-physical heresy. But Tarkika does not agree with this.

He contends that there is no such experience which would recognise that the past state is a past thing.

Then Sidhanti asks him how to distinguish as one valid and the other invalid between a valid experience and memory both of which have the same object? The Naiyayika says that at the time of experience it finds the thing in that state only. But, in memory, the thing is not in its state. Hence the Naiyayika contends that the distinction between experience and memory can be maintained. But Sidhanti differs from him and argues that the form of memory is that formerly it was in that condition or state. And let this knowledge (memory) on this account be valid. If that be so, suppose a pot which has been turned into red was formerly black. It is apprehended as black again. Is that apprehension valid? The Naiyayika contends thus. Therefore the memory is invalid.

But this contention is not right. For Naiyayika has already accepted the validity of memory. And now to disown it is to be guilty of apostasy (Apasidhanta). For It is abandoning one's own accepted principle. The Naiyayikas accepted the validity of memory. Now he has

defined Pramana as means to knowledge and then knowledge has been qualified by यथार्थ or valid to rob the definition of its pervasiveness, as it covers also Doubt. Then again fearing that it included the cause of Smriti also, Upalabdhi is further explained as Experience and not as knowledge in general, by Vachaspati. Thus we come to know that memory is accepted as a valid form of knowledge. Had memory been invalid there was no necessity of including it in valid knowledge. All this is corroborated by the Naiyayika definition of Pramana as (सम्यवनुभवसाधनं) means of valid experience.

Besides what harm is there if memory and repetition are accepted as valid ? For it cannot be said that all memories and repetitions are useless. Besides utility and validity do not go together. For a blade of grass of undoubted existence assures apparently no service to us. And memory and repetitions do serve some purpose by affording pleasure or pain.

The opponent argues that Smriti is not valid because it cognises what is already apprehended. So is Repetition. He cites a negative instance of perception. Again that is Pramana which creates a quality called ज्ञातता which is nothing but mani-

festation or प्राकृत्य in the object of knowledge, as the perception does. Memory does not create such ज्ञातता in the object. For it is the product of अनुभव or experience.

This is not accepted. For the genesis of ज्ञातता is figment of a fertile brain. So, giving up the chase of ज्ञातता if a new definition is given as— “That is Pramana which apprehends an object (as it is) not formerly known”. Here ‘not formerly known’ is an unnecessary addition. No doubt it excludes thereby Smriti from Pramana. But no where it is seen that परिच्छेदकारी alone is प्रमाण or that which creates manifestation in the object is Pramana. For the invariable concomitance between the two is seen by mere co-existence accompanied by विपक्षेशाधक. All the three are shown to be impossible.

If the known is to be known again it is like grinding the flour which is already grinded. And hence such knowledge is not recognised as Pramana. This is the contention of the Meemansaka. But Sidhanti analyses this contention and splits it into exhaustive alternatives. What is the meaning of पिण्डपेषण? Does it mean that another knowledge is not produced in the object already known, or it is futile attempt; or it does

not produce any new result or it produces undesirable fruit. And all these alternatives are met with a square refusal.

Thus enunciating a general definition the different kinds of particular Pramanas are taken for consideration. Now perception is taken up for discussion. So its definition is given. That which is produced or manifested by a blemishless sense is perception. A blemish is that which hinders the production of knowledge or perverts its production. There is good reason why 'produce' and 'manifest' are both used. For perception includes the perception of God which is never produced as it is eternal but is manifested. God's knowledge too is super-senseous and included in perception.

If this is so, then even Parameshwara might be subjected to sorrow and happiness. But really speaking pleasure and pain are not merely due to perception of objects; but there are other things like religious merit and other imperceptible factors which constitute the cause of happiness and misery. Because God is beyond those religious merit and demerit; he is not punished with pleasure and pain.

In Brahma Tarka it is said that perception is produced by the sense free from defects. Here

the qualified is given more importance than the qualification. But where qualification is given importance the definition would be "knowledge born of contact of pure and defectless sense and the object." Here there is another advantage over the first definition. In the first definition there was scope both for production and manifestation in knowledge. But here production only has scope. This being only created perception, there is no question of including God's perception which is uncreated and eternal & only manifested.

Here Nirdosha means यथार्थ and उद्भव means intuitional vision as well as sensual perception. Thus in this interpretation there is a definition of प्रत्यक्ष or perception which is common to both human and divine perception. In this context निर्दोष means यथार्थ. This is the definition of knowledge or perception in abstract. By adding यतः and तत् to this definition you will get the definition of instrumental perception. Intuitional vision only shows— The word साक्षन् means (यथार्थी परोक्षज्ञानसाधन) विजेत् or शत्पादक it will be applicable to both human perception and divine perception.

Now the validity of the knowledge is accepted as cognised by Sakshi. For Sakshi is known to be self-luminous; and apprehends its validity itself. Therefore there is no infinite Regress. If so then

there need be no ascertainment of the absence of contradictory evidence. But when there is the necessity of test the absence of contradictory evidence must be ascertained. Now the test consists of an evidence which ascertains the absence of hindrance to the generation of valid knowledge on account of doubt whether knowledge is born of a defective sense. While this sort of test is necessary the absence of such contradictory evidence will help the Sakshi in apprehending its validity. Inference only removes defects in Budhi. Tattva Nirnaya settles this discussion. It is contended here that the absence of defects is ascertained by evidences as it is a powerful evidence which proves the existence of a defect. Never a doubt is entertained in all places wantonly.

Here there is an attempt to prove inferentially that the eye being contacted, would apprehend the contradicted thing or object. Now we must know what is meant by चक्षुस्. Is it the ball in the socket or something else. If it is the ball then there is no evidence like that. Besides there are two evidences to prove that the eye apprehends things duly contacted. One argument is : The eye apprehends an object contacted because it is a sense and it is the nature of a sense to do so

like the sense of smell. Moreover it is an instrument of knowledge. And the instrument of Kuthara does such a work.

In the inference that the eye comprehends the object contacting it because it is a sense and an instrument. But if the eye means the ball only then it is clear that it has no contact with the object. If the eye is some thing other than the ball, then no evidence proves such a thing.

There is an evidence which proves the existance of an eye different from the ball, for the reason that the eye gives the perception of a form. proves the existance of a sense in general. Then that sense is not the eye-ball is also proved by that very reason. For the eye-ball alone without the percieving subtle eye-sight cannot give us perception. Hence some optic sense other than the physical eye is proved. Thus in order to avert the fallacy of violation of concomitance of इत्रियत्वं and सलिलारूपयोगात्मकत्वं In super-sensual knowledge the meaning of contact is made clear. Contact is not physical conjunction or union; but it is in the form of power or pervasiveness or some subtle impression or some property born of the practice of Yoga. This is technically called प्रत्यासत्ति. If it is merely some potential power then why

there not be a perception of things past and future. Besides things hidden by walls also have that potential power and hence one must be able to see through the walls.

If it is argued that the technical Pratyasatti takes for granted that there should be no substance thick in its constituents in between the eye and its object for this subtle contact, then any object behind a thick and yet transparent obstacle may not be seen by us. And an object too far away (beyond the range of vision) or too near should also be visible to the eye as there is no thick obstacle between them.

Then there is some objection from the Baudhas who teach that everything is momentary (lasts for a moment); and from the Sankhyas who propound mutability or Parinama of all things in every moment. At the moment when a thing is to come in to existence, let it be visible to all. For according to him its coming into existence is its eligibility for perception. And when not coming into existence also is the absence of eligibility let it not be visible to all. Thus visibility to some and invisibility to others cannot be explained.

This योग्यतावा leads to other absurdities. For if a thing is to be visible without contact then we

cannot explain clearness and dimness in the perception of a near thing and a thing far away. But in our theory the rays of the eyes are attracted well by the object that is near and are poorly attracted by a distant object and hence the difference in the sight of near and distant objects.

Very wild imagination is at work in finding out the way in which perceptive senses like the eye work. If the rays of the eye contact the object, others suppose that the rays of the sun mix with the eye's rays and bring about the vision. Others still object to the going out of the optical rays. All these objections are critically examined and the general definition of the optical perception is finally settled "as knowledge produced by the contact of the pure sense with its objects."

This perception is of two kinds : one is physical and another is divine and pure consciousness. In Bhagavata it is stated that fire being transformed turn into ten senses, along with Ahankara. All these are eternal in their essential form. But at the time of creation there is creation of the original elements at the time of creation. So, these senses are creations of five

elements and Ahankara. This is the physical form of the senses. The pure senses are of the stuff of consciousness.

Shri Madhva here distinguishes himself from other systematisers. Because the Sankhyas contend that the senses are only physical or material because they are made of the stuff of Ahankara. The Jains think that they are of two kinds : one group is made up of Dravyandriya and the other of Bhavendriya. Raghavendra explains these two. Skin and eye and mind are Dravya senses and smell, liquid, sound and others are perceived by Bhavendriyas. Hence Madhva stands quite different from others in his conception of ज्ञान or perception. Yogateerth refutes the arguments of Kapila and Kanada in proving the senses of perception, like the nose, the eye and so on.

He then illustrates the two divisions of perception : One is pure and that is to be found in God Vishnu and Lakshmi and the released souls. Among the perception is pure consciousness. But the bound souls the perception is physical combined with consciousness. It will be shown how Vishnu and Laxmi and the released souls have perception. That perception cannot be physical. For they have lost all touch of

physical contact. Therefore their consciousness is pure. Smriti and Shruti prove that Sakshi is pure consciousness is completely immune from any such defects. But the bound souls have both pure and physical consciousness. Because the bound also get valid knowledge and in valid knowledge.

Among the best souls the consciousness of Sakshi has unmixed purity, but the middle and lowest class among souls have both defective and pure consciousness are working. For instance, the middle class souls have their physical perception both corrupted and uncorrupted successively, and in the lowest class it is always corrupted.

Again the bound souls who form the middle class should have an actualizing agency to induce them to action. It cannot be pure consciousness; because they do not invariably have valid knowledge. Therefore the material mind will contrive to arrange all cognitional operations there is no necessity of a pure consciousness as Sakshi. But this cannot be. For even these bound souls have the direct experience of joy and grief without the aid of inference. And the only agent that cognises directly grief and joy is Sakshi the pure sense of perception.

Now this pure sense of Sakshi is most powerful and its disposals are never proved false, and hence it must be recognised as the pure agent of apprehension of internal joy and grief. This apprehension is never sublated. Hence it is an unchallenged agency of experience of joy and grief. If Sakshi were to be very powerful instrument of knowledge it must be pure and without any defect. Those whose essential knowledge is always corrupt and erroneous must have this Sakhsis which correctly cognises the subject of cognition along with the mode which is not misunderstood. For instance, a man of erroneous knowledge has the correct knowledge of pleasure and pain with their nature; but he fails to know these pleasure and pain are real and are controlled by God.

After dividing Aksha into material and pure, the material is again subdivided into six varieties. Ear, Eye, Touch, Tongue and nose and mind as the controlling agency of these are six.

In the natural course of thing, after perception inference is taken for consideration and that also is both abstract and instrumental in nature. Inference as abstract knowledge is called अनुमति & inference as instrument is called अनुमान which is

an instrument to arrive at अनुमिति. This अनुमान is called युक्ति. Now युक्ति is also used in the sense of ज्ञाव or abstract knowledge. So Raghavendra gives the derivation of the word. First अनुमा is derived from the root मा with अनु. To this is added the termination क in the sense of abstract noun. Then this क् and अ are deleted and in their place ए is inserted. Thus we have अनुमा.

Now युक्ति is derived from the root यज् and the termination ित् in the sense of abstract noun. Thus we have युक्ति. This word from another derivation यज्यतेअनया we get युक्ति meaning, the inference, as the means to knowledge or inference.

Here a doubt arises. The word युक्ति and उपपत्ति both mean the same thing. Then if निर्दोष has some purpose to serve why not use it here also?

To this the reply is words have two modes of interpretation. One is called main mode and the other is called subordinate or secondary. When उपपत्ति is used (निर्दोषोपपत्तिः अनुमानम्) निर्दोष is added to it because there is one good उपपत्ति and another false उपपत्ति. If the definition should not be applicable to false inference, and real inference alone should be contacted, the word निर्दोष is added on to it. निर्दोष is implied in the word itself. So the main

युक्ति is one which suffers no violation of consistency and hence has निरोध in its very body.

Now अनुमा and युक्ति are not by turns defined and definition. So, अनुमा is not the definition of युक्ति and युक्ति is not the definition of अनुमा. But rather अनुमा is called युक्ति, because deriving युक्ति with an objective derivation (कर्मद्वयत्पत्ति) means an object to be related. So युक्ति is that which gets related with साध्य and hence अनुमा is that which gets related with साध्य. This explanation is suggested by telling us that अनुमा is युक्ति.

There is another purpose to serve by the use of युक्ति after अनुमा. Now different schools adopt different relations between साध्य and साधन. Madhva rejects them as illogical and unwarrented by evidence. And only one regular relationship is maintained and that is युक्ति or व्याप्ति, Concomitance between साधन and साध्य which is invariable. व्याप्ति is विज्ञेषण आस्येव which means साधन is invariably related or found with साध्य and this invariable concomitance is the attribute of व्याप्ति or साधन.

Now व्याप्ति is defined as अविनाशाद् or invariability of concomitance. That without which something cannot establish its existence is related with it and this relation is called व्याप्ति.

The definition of व्याप्ति again in Tarka Tandava is like the following— A certain thing in some place at some time, if not associated with another thing in some place at some time, cannot get its existence. This logical impossibility of existence is called व्याप्तिः or concomitance.

This व्याप्ति is of two kinds. One concomitance is positive and another negative. If साध्य is proved invariably existing with साधन it is अन्वयव्याप्ति or positive concomitance. If on the other hand the absence साध्य is proved to be found with the absence of साधन it is व्यतिरेक व्याप्ति or negative concomitance.

After the division of व्याप्ति into two. We consider the full significance and purpose of the negative concomitance. If केवलव्यतिरेकी is to be derived as केवलः व्यतिरेकः एव व्यस्य one having only negative concomitance, then how can there be association of two non-existing things. It is not fair to say that such association is found. But an explanation for the negative concomitance is to be found elsewhere. When we wanted to infer the existence of a soul in a living body on account of the existence of life, we found the concomitance verified only in a living body and nowhere else. So, if that is doubted how to prove it was the

question. So, we ran to negative concomitance; and with its help we prove the positive concomitance in the living body. And the desired conclusion is arrived at.

The meaning of Vyapti is exhaustively thrashed out. The first meaning of Vyapti as already referred to is that अनुमा or instrumental inference or reason is that which has invariable concomitance with Sadhya. This reason need not necessarily be told as existing in Paksha.

This definition of Reason is taken for consideration. Concomitance is said to be some relation of which reason is one related thing. The other is Sadhya. These two might be two attributes and these two are of two kinds. Some attributes invariably avoid each other. For instance dependence and independence and created and eternal or here एवं is one which has the relationship of concomitance. Here the two might be things qualified with attributes, and then they might be related, one with the other or one of them only related with the other. 'Invariably with the other' means having one kind of relationship with the other. Some others are found one with the other.

Thus व्याप्ति is being divided and subdivided, and is described with those subdivisions. Inspite of all this discussion everyone will not remember how to derive the knowledge of fire from smoke. For the concomitance alone leads us to the inference of fire which is known to us. This व्याप्ति or the लिङ् if it is to be the instrument of inference, must be first known and its concomitance also well understood. In perception, the eye by its very existence, serves as an instrument of knowledge. But in inference the reason or व्याप्ति or लिङ् known and known as invariably concomitant with साक्ष, will lead to inference or अनुमति.

Here different schools like Prabhakara and Tarkika are referred to. And the relative values of their definitions are discussed. Jayateerth uses one against the other and gets rid of him. Thus culminating he ultimately puts forth his own theory and shows its superiority over all.

Finally in Tarkika's opinion it is Vyapti and the knowledge of the Vyapya in a certain thing that go to give us the inference. Thus smoke on the mount gets itself associated with fire through concomitance and these two pieces of knowledge should cooperate and combine to produce the required inference. This third

knowledge also is essential. Without the first two the third alone cannot do any thing.

Now the Sidhanti states his own process of reasoning. It is not necessary to prescribe a standard and universal course of process of inference. Where really at the sight of smoke you are reminded of the Concomitance of smoke with fire, we have no objection to your way of process. But where without the sight of smoke, and with the guidance of elderly people you have gathered the knowledge of vyapti, you are reminded of the vyapti and this combined second knowledge alone will arise as 'this mount has smoke concomitant with fire'. And your three fold knowledge process falls out. For the same happens in the 'recognition' at the contact of eye with the object when it is aided by mental impressions (सोऽप्यदेवदत्तः) without any intermittent knowledge. If the question arises about the cognition of the general concomitance, it can be stated that it arises by perception or inference or verbal testimony as is found suitable on the occasion.

Inference is of two kinds—one is for self and the other, for others. 1) knowledge of reason or व्याप्ति along with the recollection of vyapti without the necessity of expressing it before others while

2) the second type does need expression before others, which is able to create knowledge of vyapya or sign. Thereby he suggests that the necessity of five limbs of syllogistic reasoning is discarded. For when the general concomitance is known and the reason is known to be in the Paksha then what else is necessary to prove a certain thing.

The process is like this—There is a man who knows the fire on the mountain. Another comes to him who has understood the mountain to be without fire and asks him evidence in the existence of fire on the mountain. To him the first man tells the concomitance that where there is smoke there is fire. There is no inconsistency at all. Therefore the enunciation of the concomitance is the expression of the inference to a second man. If this is sufficient to remind the second man of the steps in the reasoning the first man need not unnecessarily go through other steps before the second man.

But it is pleaded that a full fledged syllogism with the five limbs is a logical necessity to remove the doubts that rise up. True but even when the five limbs are used there is no certainty that the second man would be free from doubts When every step is doubted if the first man were to

enunciate the five steps it will be an endless business. So after the concomitance is reminded if the reason is shown and all the doubts are removed, then that much alone is considered the form of inference for the second man. But really speaking as many of the limbs as the second man would require to understand the reasoning, must be supplied to him and those many would constitute the inference for others. The contention is that there is no fixed rule.

If indefectible reasoning is inference we must know the defects in reasoning which are called fallacies. Direct fallacies which affect the reason are only two : contradiction and inconsistency. First we must know in general what defect of reason means. Raghavendra beautifully explains what is stated by Jayatheertha. Some thing that is the reason or Linga has that power (through concomitance) as instrument (smoke) to create knowledge (of fire). But this defect would hinder that power and stop creation of knowledge or that defect would neutralise that natural power and invest it with some perverting power (to vitiate the meaning through doubt or perversion.)

Acharya mentions first Virodha or contradiction because all other fallacies can be included

in this and hence it is the most powerful fallacy. This fallacy is seated in meaning without passing through the word. So Virodha refers to the meaning of yukti or reason (Linga).

Now Virodha is defined by Jayateertha; Because Acharya has left it so that his disciples should gather it themselves from what has been said before. The definition runs like this—Contradiction is that which refutes the possible relationship of Sadhya and Sadhana, which seem to be consistent with each other in meaning as Sadhya and Sadhana, and incapacitates it in its function as Hetu or Reason. Hetu or reason loses its capacity in bringing about syntactical compatibility with sadhya (परस्परं अन्वय योग्यताभाबः)

The other important fallacy is Asangati. It is defined as reason which is not connected with Pratijna or General enunciation as satisfying the querry roused by it. (The instance of virodha is शब्दोनित्यः कृतकर्त्वात् Sound is eternal being created)

Then the different varieties of Virodha and Asangati are considered and vyapti is taken up for general discussion. Some say that the relationship of Vyapti should be free from the

defective contact of Upadhi. But this is not true. For now we are on the verge of absurdity. The knowledge of upadhi is dependent upon the knowledge of vyapti which again is dependent upon the knowledge of upadhi. So we are moving in a circle.

Then how to establish the use of Sadhya and Sadhana ? we may say that we depend upon the possibility of the coming inference. Really speaking that attribute which does not pervade its pervader has no concomitance with it. Before inference, if upadhi arises, as vyapti is yet to be known, and it is considered not pervaded, it goes very hard to establish what is Sadhya and what is Sadhana. Because before Vyapti is known, one cannot ascertain what is Paksha, or Sadhya or Sadhana, and the pervader and the pervaded are not yet marked out as Sadhya and Sadhana. Hence upadhi cannot be recognised as pervading the Sadhya. To this the reply is that the relationship of Sadhya and Sadhana is present in our mind or the possibility of the future inference would supply it.

Now what is upadhi or Condition on which the Sadhya Sadhana relationship is maintained. The definition of upadhi is that it is the pervader

of Sadhya and not pervaded by Sadhana. But is this Vyapti with pure or unqualified upadhi ? If so qualified upadhi is not included. If it is qualified upadhi unqualified and pure upadhi is not included.

Upadhi can be defined without the use of the terms Sadhya and Sadhana. Hence both kinds of upadhi can be included.

After the inference begins its operation there is Satpratipaksha. Because by the very definition of Upadhi it is not concomitant with Sadhana (The inference - there is smoke in the kitchen because there is fire - is affected with upadhi which is आदेष्टसंयोग. Fire under the condition of contact with wet fuel can infer smoke; otherwise not.) Sadhana is fire and the upadi, contact of wet fuel, being not found with fire in the kitchen, removes sadhya or smoke also from the kitchen; because the upadhi is concomitant with sadhya or smoke. Thus when there is no upadhi or contact of wet fuel, there will be no sadhya or smoke. That is how reason is counter balanced by opposite sadhya (सत्प्रतिपक्ष).

Upadhi is साध्य व्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापकत्व (is the pervader of sadhya and yet it is not pervading the sadhana). Is this the general definition

of upadhi or particular definition ? This is not the general definition of upadhi. For take the inference : The inherent relation समवायः resorts to another thing inherently ; (समवेतः) because it is a relation like contact (संयोगः). Here (कृत्सकत्वं) is upadhi in this inference. Then this must pervade the sadhya. But take the universal like घटत्व which resides by the relation of समवाय in घट. Therefore there is समवेतत्व in घटत्व; yet there is no कृत्सकत्व which is upadhi. So it is not pervaded by Sadhya. But it is pervaded by sadhya characterised by sadhana. Nor is it the second. For it is only qualified upadhi that is defined. But you shall have to define pure and uncharacterised upadhi.

When thus questioned the Sidhanti replies that he advocates the general definition of upadhi. This general is inclusive of both qualified and pure upadhi.

Even general expressions in proper context become particular expressions. In a special context 'Bring a man' means the particular man. In the present context we are here discussing the cause of the cessation of the operation of Anumana. One thing to be noted is that Anumana though confronted with a weak evidence, never

stops in its operation of yielding a conclusion. Only more powerful evidence stops its operation.

This is not the only cause. The opposition of evidence especially of self contradiction enfeebles the argument and robs its power of yielding conclusion. Contradiction of statement is of two kinds. One is of superior strength and another of equal strength. self-contradiction is again of two kinds. Apostacy or giving up of one's accepted principle is the first and Jati is the second. Jati is स्वकर्तृकवचने एव व्याहृतिः contradiction in one's own statement. This Jati again is subdivided into three kinds— 1) Contradiction, of one's own statement. 2) of one's own system of reasoning 3) and of one's own action.

Here we must see and appreciate the superb skill of Raghavendra's way of interpretation and elucidation. Now a question of logical division has arisen. The elements that hinder the Hetu or Anumana from creating conclusion are taken into consideration. Avyapti or Vyabhichara was found to be one such cause. After accepting it as a solid rock to base the origination of logical conclusion where is the necessity of Pramana Virodha as a separate cause of such hindrance. For Pramana Virodha ultimately ends in creating

Vyabhichara. This is an objection raised against Acharya's mentioning of Pramana Virodha as a separate cause of hindrance from Avyapti.

Here Jayateerth quotes a Nyaya in philosophical humour, in order to brush aside this objection. That Nyaya is called भिक्षुपाद प्रसरण न्याय. But how this Nyaya helps to raise this objection is not explained. Raghavendra comes to our help. He explains it thus यथा भिक्षुः पादप्रसरणावकाशे सति शनैः शनैः अंतः प्रविहाति तथा स्ववाक्य विरोधार्थं पृथक् प्रतिज्ञाविरोधे अवश्यं बाध्ये प्रमाणविरोधोपि पृथगेव सेत्यति इति वक्षतुं इन्धर्थः A mendicant, if given scope to stretch his legs inside the house, in his encroaching spirit slowly enters into the house. In the same manner in order to recognise the power of contradiction of one's statement as hindering Anumana to operate, we had to recognise its genus प्रतिज्ञाविरोध contradiction of self assertion, and assign a separate place to it. Then automatically its another species प्रमाणविरोध gets sanction for its separate place to hinder the function of reasoning. Now Pratijna Virodha is the genus and it is subdivided in to Swavakya Virodha and Pramana Virodha. A limit viz Swavakya Virodha was given recognition and then bigger limb प्रतिज्ञाविरोध got it; This took its member Pramana Virodha inside and got its recognition.

Raghavendra helps us to understand a particular unit of sadhya right from the beginning with showing the beginning and end of the unit. So long Acharya showed that swavakya virodha has a separate existence and function in counteracting the movements of reasoning. But this assertion alone cannot prove its independent position. Hence Jayateertha goes on explaining away the objection by एतद्वाति जवति. Then Raghavendra explains that when swavakyavirodha is shown the question of Avyapti or Vyabhichara does not arise at all.

For we have made a general assertion either as 'the mountain has fire or has not got fire' But the truth of this statement is not accepted by both sides. Hence none can ascertain that on the mountain where there is no fire, there is smoke in order to prove Vyabhichara.

Next Raghavendra in another context shows both the beginning and end of the unit. The topic begins with एतेन एतद्विषये and ends with अंतर्भवादिति which is a bit longway from the beginning. When thus a unit is marked out it becomes easy for one to follow the argument and get the import correctly.

Here begins the consideration of independent status of Pramana Virodha. The opponent admits

the independent status of Swavakya Virodha but objects to concede the same status to Pramana Virodha. For he contends that when there is a Pramana Virodha to a Hetu, it becomes अपश्चर्त् which is explained by Raghavendra as not existing in the Paksha. Or it becomes अनेकांतिक or suffers Violation of Vyapti as Hetu is found where there is no Sadhya. Now अपश्चर्त् (is explained as) Hetu not existing in the Paksha which is nothing but a Substance with the attribute(Sadhyā)of doubtful existence (because it is yet to be proved). When there is an attribute opposite to Sadhya cognised by an evidence in the Paksha, it is no longer a Paksha. And its attribute हेतु no longer becomes the attribute of Paksha. Hence the Hetu is found in the Paksha where already the evidence has dethroned the former Sadhya and enthroned another in its place. So Hetu, found in Paksha where Sadhya is not existing amounts to Vyabhichara.

When such an objection is raised, a suitable reply is given. In Nyaya Sudha sometimes it becomes very difficult to mark the end of the objection and the beginning of the rejoinder. Raghavendra is there ready to help us. He shows where the objections begin. अव्याप्त्यादौ अंतर्भावं व्यनिश्चित्

तत्रापि इत्यादिना। Then the beginning of the rejoinder
is laconic. एतेन इत्युक्तं ध्यनवित् प्रमाणविरोधस्य इति।

As for the reply, even in (other means like प्रत्यक्ष or perception) Pramana Virodha is accepted as independent defect because it is not found in पक्ष; hence in Anumana also for the very reason let it be considered as independent defect and not subsumed under अव्याप्ति. Let us see if Pramana Virodha would expose अव्याप्ति just at the time when व्याप्ति or general concomitance is being known or when the inferential operation is over. The first alternative is acceptable to us. But the second is unwanted. For Pramana Virodha is the source from which अव्याप्ति derives its support. Under such circumstances we should prefer the basic ground (upajeevya) which is Pramana Virodha to Avyapti or Upajeevaka. Still many more objections are raised against opponent's view of inclusiveness of Pramana Virodha and vigorously maintains independence as against the said inclusiveness of the Pramana Virodha.

So long the flaws or defects or fallacies in Anuman are shown. Now Sidhanti takes for consideration, the reasons for Nigraha. (निग्रहस्थान) This is a significant term. Sthana here means reason (निमित्त as in सान्यस्थान) and Nigraha means

(निग्रहाते एभिः) fallacies sufficient to declare one's defeat. Hence it is fully significant name as it means a flaw in an argument by which a disputant is fit to be declared 'defeated'.

Here Acharya shows that all these are included in virodha and others. But it is not dealt with here as it is dealt with, in other places, or Acharya suggests that there so called reasons for defeat which do not occur in dialectical disputes are no Nigrahasthanas.

This dialectical dispute or katha (कथा) is defined as logical discussion in the form of sentences in which many learned men participate while defining katha Jayateerth uses that word twice. The katha is the word to be defined; and it must be repeated. So one katha is used in its derived meaning while the other is used conventionally. (Acharya introduces katha thus धार्मीजल्यो दितंडेति कथास्ति सोविजानताम् Here another word katha should be repeated.) The word विजानताम् is the genitive plural of the present participle of जानि, and is used in the sense of an agent of action (those who know). Discussion of those who know deeply. It is used in plural in order to include dialectical debate participated by two. This is नातो बहुवचनम् a class name though conveying one

thing signifies many. Construing this with कथा the whole thing means विद्वान्तर्कक्षया Debate conducted by the learned, based on thought. Hence it is not a light talk in which the learned have participated.

Katha or this discussion arranged is of three (types). They are वाद, वितंड, जल्प. we are here face to face with the old way of dialectical bouts, in which learned pandits seeking recognition and reputation, met each other. We read more about ancient Polemical discussions in the टीका on कथालक्षण. But others admit different numbers of varieties under कथा. Boudhas accept only Katha. Shri Harsha contends that they are only वाद and वितंडा. Gauda Naiyayikas admit four types, वाद, जल्प, वादवितंडा, जल्पवितंडा.

Of these वाद is honest and fair discussion for self or for others only with the holy object of determining Reality. Hence it is quite distinct from the other two. But sometimes वितंडा also is adopted in the form of discussion in order to reclaim the good people who are wavering in their loyalty to Vaidika path, being infested with faith killing doubts, by removing doubts. But this variety has other purposes also. वाद on the other hand is started only with the object of deter-

mining reality. Those who enter into वाद are disinterested and unattached and knowing the reality themselves, for enlightning others or for their own enlightening they take to discussion.

On the other hand the pious only enter into this sort of polemical discussion for the sake of showing proficiency in that dialectical art and winning the approbation of the learned public and rich patronage. This is known as जन्म.

But the last variety वित्तंडा is between the believer and the heretic un-believer. The method also is different. For the believer does not expatiate upon his cult and criterian of his faith; but on the other hand he enters into an offensive attack of the non-believer's cult and tries to demolish it.

Here a doubt arises. Raghavendra presents this doubt in all its details and implications. वित्तंडा is to end in the razing of the citadel of his atheistic cult of the unbeliever to the ground without mentioning the principles of one's faith; As for the unbeliever, he should present his case with the proper evidences. For the whole discussion hinges round, the argument put forth by the unbeliever. Then the believer who is the opposer in the discussion should refute it.

But if the non-believer too were to produce no evidence, no discussion would start. The proposer who is the non-believer would establish his own case and also would attack the opposer's argument.

The Querry-makers or the Prashnikas who are the officers appointed to conduct the discussion, have made a rule that after the proposer had argued that the letters are non-eternal, the opposer only should disprove his arguement. Then the proposer reargues his case; and this must be refuted by the opposer. Thus we cannot say that he who enters into वित्तं has not got generally his side. Hence it is said in Brahmatarka पूर्वपक्षग्रहणेता without swerving from his principles. Therefore there is no contradiction of the statements in Brahmatarka.

Only men of equal learning can take part in this discussion. So those who take part in वित्तं must be examined first and then they must be allowed to take part in the discussion. This test must be done by वादकश्च। For in the other two there would not be any test to prove the equality of the two in learning; while in vada you can very fairly judge the superiority and inferiority of a person, in learning. Thus when the equality of the two is established then they

must be allowed to enter into the lists of dialectical feasts.

If on the otherhand one is accepted as of superior learning in the public he need not be subjected to test for eligibility in discussion. If men inspired with emulation and rivalry compete in vada, they indulge in frivolous arguments, arrogant answers, and indecent terms. Hence they are said to be forbidden. But they may be allowed if the officers of the debate like the head of the assembly, the assembly itself and the Querry makers are strictly assertive, For they are able to control them by strictly enforoing the rules on them.

Men desirous of both conquest and quest of truth may engage themselves in वाद् in their test examination. For he can win not only approbation but also some money from the head of the assembly.

Finally it may be summed up that Jalpa and Vitanda may determine the superiority and inferiority or victory. When the equality of the two is established, then will be determined the result of the discussion of the Reality or Truth. But even men of equal qualification seek Jalpa and Vitanda when intent on gaining money

using the frandulant craft of dialectical skill. In the same manner men of unequal ability engaging in Jalpa or Vitanda, the one of superior intellect and hence victorious, gets decisive and determinate knowledge and victory. Still they are tempted to fall into discussion of the type of जल्प or वितंडा. Therefore this is not proper that such discussions of जल्प or वितंडा. Therefore it is not proper that such discussions should be instituted.

But this is not a wholesome argument. For the only fruit of Jalpa or Vitanda is the fraudulent trade of dialectical skill. Other accretions are there; but the main fruit is the foul exhlbtion of dialectical skill shown in the discussion.

If there are no other ways of testing the the ability of the debaters, then discussion is taken recourse to. Then as there are other motives for polemical debaters than delineation of truth, namely wealth, reputation and others, they may enter into jalpa or vitanda.

Here what is the implication of this questioning ? 1) Do you mean to say that the sort of discussion they enter into, may be called jalpa or vitanda ? 2) you intend to say that the said discussion cannot be called vada? 3) It is a

different and new class of debate born of the combination of vada and jalpa? 4) It cannot be called वाद when two reasons stand to give a name?

All these four questions are supposed to be adequately replied to, by this one statement of Acharya " when there are two such reasons for the debate to be named, it is also called jalpa. "

Jayateerth gives an example of such a word. The word तुला is of that type. In the Nyaya Sutra of Jaimini तुलायां प्रमाणप्रमेय शब्दवत्. तुला is used in the sense of प्रमाण and प्रमेय. The तुला is called both Pramana and Prameya. This तुला or balance is a knowable object or Prameya when its correctness is to be judged with the help of another balance. But when the balance is used to weigh gold and ascertain its weight, it is the instrument of knowledge (प्रमाण). Thus there are two reasons inhering in the substance, for the use of two terms.

Now it is implied that though vada can be called Jalpa yet the name वाद is Principle and जल्प is secondary. For the Nimitta for वाद is Superior in strength to the Nimitta for जल्प. This avoids equality between the words वाद and जल्प which are used for debate. This is shown by the explanation of निष्फितजयकारक (brings about decision-

and victory). But this explanation cannot explain the superiority of तत्त्वनिर्णय over जय. For we do not find any standard of measurement to ascertain their respective measurements. If without the standard of measurement, the superiority is to be ascertained even जय or victory stands supreme. But the vivarana has significantly used (तत्त्व)निर्णयिति as the first member of the compound which shows its priority or superiority over the second.

We are aware that the first place in the compound alone cannot assess the value of that member. But when usually it is to be used second, if it be used in the first place, then it invariably signifies superiority. But here we do not find such exceptional preference shown to it. Hence some other reason is being shown here. To settle the priority of use in a Dwandva compound, the number of syllables is the criterian. That which has fewer syllables is used first. So the compound should have been जयनिर्णयित्कारकः. Therefore with a view to give stress to priority of तत्त्वनिर्णय, it is used a first member in the Dwandva Compound. But this rule of fewer syllables (अल्पाच्चतरत्व) is not an invariable rule. Hence this explanation is not satisfactory.

So another explanation is given. The debaters should win the approbation of the members

of the assembly in order to suppress the keen desire to get victory over the opponent. This direction given by Acharya clearly shows that more importance is given to the knowledge of Truth than to the acquisition of fame or victory.

The sub-type of Katha is determined thus openly by the eligibility of the debaters. But inwardly their motive by which they are actuated in the discussion settles the kind of Katha they are going to begin. Therefore again of the three types the Veda Katha is the most important and highly respected Katha. Because in the type of test discussion on some occasions when the examinee makes certain statements only, without any evidences, they are accepted. This may be clearly seen in the discussion in which Yajnavalkya entered with Shakalya. The context is this : "Oh Yajnavalkya, what is the number of gods ?" Thus asked by Shakalya. "Thirty three" replied Yajnavalkya. A bare statement without any evidences. Shakalya did not ask him proof of his statement. He simply said 'अहं इति होवाच' (yes) Thus Shakalya accepted it. That this is a test discussion can be proved by the previous context. Raghavendra quotes the whole of the Upanishad which forms the उपक्रम text in order to prove the nature of the

discussion into which both entered. Such things happen only when the debaters have confidence in each other, regarding their reliability. Such confidence of reliability is shown only in Vada Katha and not in other types.

In the course of description of the ancient system of dialectical discussion, Acharya gives us an idea of the sort of assembly and the head of that assembly and the Querry makers. All these must have faith in the Supreme God Vishnu, they must be free from evil attachment and blind passions. They must be all well initiated into the lores concerned. If the office bearers are sometimes unable to follow the argument, it is the assembly which should decide the merits and drawbacks of those engaged in the discussion.

Even the well qualified office-bearers are sometimes, for extrenious reasons, found unable to follow the argument, on account of in attention misunderstanding and such other reasons. When all these are affected with some sort of disability, even learned men that are absent, may intervene and give their decision regarding the issues in the discussion. Thus fairness and justice, par excellence, should be assured to the debaters.

Some details regarding the conduct of the discussion is given so that the debatres should not go astray, led by their whims and idiosyncrasies. In Vada and Jalpa both proposer and opposer are allowed to establish their own view and to refute the view of the opponent. The really pious, desirous of establishing their favourite view, should put forth evidences from the vedas. The impious non-believers are allowed to use inferences also. If Proposer produces sacred evidences from veda, the opposer if he be a believer in veda should not brush it aside but give it a different interpretation based on the contradiction of perception and other portions of Veda. He should also show that canons of interpretation like उपक्रम and उपसंहार (Beginning and end of the composition) go against his meaning of the Veda. Besides the opposer should also show how these Canons of interpretation go in his favour.

With regard to inference, when it is used to convince or convey some meaning to others, we need not bind ourselves with the number of the limbs of the syllogistic form as having five or three or two limbs. These are useful only to convey meaning to others. So if the other does not require the Scheduled Course of inference

mere Vyapti or general concomitance should be cited.

After finishing अनुमान Acharya goes to verbal testimony. It is defined as flawless sentence or statement. Following Brahma Tarka, Agama is divided into ever lasting and temporary or composed and revealed. Revealed is eternal and composed is non-eternal.

Some like Kanada propound that the word or sentence conveys its import or meaning through a process of inference. To refute this theory the question is analysed into two alternatives; whether Vakya the qualified (with वाक्यत्व) is अनुमान or the attribute वाक्यत्व is Anumana. The first alternative is taken up viz Vakya is Anumana. The form of argument is this: the statement has its meaning. For it is a sentence. So where there is a sentence there is its meaning. Where there is no meaning there is no sentence. The first is Anvaya Vyapti or positive concomitance; and the second is Vyatireka Vyapti or negative Vyapti. These two are spatial concomitances. These are violated in Akasha or the sky. For there is Vakya in the Akasha but there is no meaning in it. In the same manner whenever there is Vakya there is Vakyartha and whenever there is no Vakyartha there is no Vakya. These two are temporal

concomitances positive and negative. They get violated in Time. In the past time when the things of the past time are gone there is Vakya but there is no Vakyarth; for these things are gone. Akasha does not give support to Syntactical arrangement of a sentence. Besides, sentences of Past and future and their meanings belong to different times.

When the sentence directly yields meaning it is useless to infer the meaning from the sentence. But if inference is used only to infer that a sentence has its meaning, then it leads to (giving up one's faith) अपसिद्धांत. For the ancient Naiya-yikas have agreed that Vakya yields its meaning just as a logical sign leads to logical conclusion.

Now Vakya is वाक्यार्थवत् (one having the meaning of a sentence). What is the relation between the sentence and its meaning? It is the relation of reference (प्रतिपाद्यश्रतिपादकभाव) But if it is something different from this, is it identity or contact or inherence. The relationship of identity leads to many logical catastrophies. The word fire when uttered should burn the utterer. The word pot referring to pots of future or past belongs to past or future. So the relationship of identity is

not possible. Shabda according to the Naiyayikas is a Guna and hence Samyoga another Guna cannot reside in it.

Shabda is the Guna of Akasha. Hence it cannot stay else where by Samavaya.

Then Prabhakara defines Pramana as अनुभूतिः in order to exclude स्मृतिः from Pramana. For he does not agree to include memory as a source of valid knowledge (स्मृतिव्यवतिरिक्तं जानं अनुभूतिः). Now the Siddhanti asks him bluntly which is that Smriti which he wants to exclude from the group of Pramanas.

When thus cornered he defines अनुभूतिः as प्रत्यपृष्ठ असाधारणकारणजन्यत्वम् one that is produced by a peculiar cause which is very near(the effect). Raghavendra explains this as follows and brings out every significant point to the notice of the reader. अध्यवस्थितपूर्वकालोत्पत्तं इदियसक्षिकर्णहिलं असाधारणकारणं यस्य तादृशप्रत्ययवत्त्वम्. That sort of knowledge which has for itself a peculiar cause like the contact of the object and the sense, brought about in the very previous moment, without allowing any hindrance in between the two. This is अनुभूतिः and it is distinctly different from स्मृतिः which is not reliable knowledge in his system. For no doubt memory also is produced some time immediately after

the mental impression is created. It is born out of a long collected impression. It is also produced only by the contact of soul and mind which is common contact in all cognitions. Thus to avoid over pervasion into this Smriti or memory, the adjectives like 'immediately born and peculiar cause' are used. Finally it is said to be ज्ञाय or cognition to avoid over pervasion into a piece of cloth which is also invariably born or produced immediately after the peculiar cause of the contact of the threads.

Now Sidhanti asks the fundamental question of why Smriti is not Pramana. For all the adjectives that are added to define अनुभूति and to exclude Smriti from it, cannot disqualify Smriti to be reliable knowledge.

For, is Smriti invalid knowledge ? Or though valid is it different from अनुभूति or experience ? Or for having no contradictory evidence to disprove its invalidity ? Or for having no evidence to prove its validity ? Or has it a contradictory evidence ? These are very searching questions. Hence it is very difficult to give a satisfactory reply. For example there is a contradictory evidence, if Smriti is not accepted as valid. Then we cannot produce any evidences in court. Because when

there is any dispute regarding the past, the witness summoned before the court would cite only what he recollects from memory. If memory itself is invalid no witness can cite his memory; when cited no court can believe it. So the whole of the Legal procedure will be up set.

The objection is that memory is valid in respect of things enjoyed in the past, not independently; but it is valid because it is remembered. Thus through inference what is remembered is considered valid. But when we consult our experience, it denies this round about procedure. If in direct experience you bring in inference even in the perception of a pot by visual contact you shall have to recognise inference as the instrument of the knowledge of pot. For in 'I perceive the pot' it may be inferred that the perceptual vision, is the result of the action of the instrument, for the action (perception) is such that it is produced and has the object. Thus we may infer the cause from the result.

But the recognition of Smriti as valid knowledge necessitates the recognition of mental impression as the special source of knowledge like perception. Then we shall have to give up the theory that instruments of knowledge are three.

This "mental" impression cannot be subsumed under one of these three:

To this objection Acharya replies that this Smriti is born of mental perception and not of mental impression. Therefore the charges that were arraigned against us are baseless. This smriti is actual visualisation by the mind. Just as yogies of extra ordinary vision power see the things of the past and of future as if they are present by means of their mind geared to past and future, charged with spiritual energy, so also the things of the past are enjoyed by the mind by full visualisation. All sacred literature bears testimony to the fact that the mind of the yogies with that esoteric power visualises past and future things.

If without mental impressions of the previously experienced things those things are to be remembered, then let there be remembering of things that are not previously experienced. But this objection is baseless; for mental impression is an essential part of accessories required for memory-vision. This impression serves the purpose of Contact between the forgotten thing that is revived and the mind which then visualises the forgotten thing. "This I had seen before"

thus the mind realises and remembers. Thus the Sakshi cognises. On the strength of the experience of Sakshi memory is raised to the status of perception.

Thus there are three instruments of knowledge, which produce valid knowledge, of these three the vedas alone are capable of being instruments of knowledge in respect of Brahma. For shapeless things like Brahma cannot be the object of perception nor can Brahma be inferred. For inference is based upon invariable concomitance. Once when the Vedas are discarded no Vyapti or concomitance can be established in respect of Brahma. For we can raise upadhi and Pratipaksha in all places. But with the help of Vedas, easily we cannot set aside upadhi and Pratipaksha. We have already established the validity of vedas.

अभिमानिष्पदेशस्तु विज्ञेषानुमनिभ्याम्.

This new Adhikarana consists of two sutras. contrariety against veda, from inference is considered here. If such contradiction of inference were to be considered in every Adhikarana, as these seemingly valid inferences are innumerable, the work will never end. Besides this sort of indulgence affects the very essence of the nature of sutra. Raghavendra explains how.

One of the essential qualities of a sutra is सारांशम् (having the essence) which means 'conveying meaning not obtained anywhere else.' The Sutra loses this quality as every Adhikarana is to treat the subject of contradiction of yukti or inference. If on the other hand the yukti virodha is to be treated by implication, then this Adhikarana need not begin its mission; for the previous Adhikarana has already done that work of refuting all contradictions of inference by implication; and hence individual sutras need not be constructed for this purpose. Or Raghavendra suggests that this sort of indulgence affects another essential quality of Sutra and that is विश्वतोमुख्यम् which not only means the application of a particular rule to similar instances in different branches of the same veda; but it also means the refutation of the many contradictions of inference in many places by implication. So individual refutation is not necessary. By doing so this essential quality of a sutra is affected.

But here some strong uncleared doubt rises up; and hence the present Adhikarana may best be devoted to do this work. Now the opposer's doubt is strongly presented. No doubt opposition of the sort of 'absence of fruit of attempts based on Veda' and opposition by the absence of the

quality of reliable speech are cleared. Yet earth, water, and such insentient things are attributed with knowledge, speech, and hearing powers of sentient beings, in the veda.

Now it is shown how a special doubt is built up. In veda we find such silly statements as 'the earth spoke' 'water spoke'; These take for granted that such inanimate things as earth, water, and fire have consciousness, intelligence and speech. This runs counter to what has been established by invariable concomitance. Hence inference stands opposed to these vedic statements. So the form of the peculiar doubt that has been raised is as follows:- These Earth and water and Fire are said to have the qualities of sentient creatures. These Vedio statements are Contradicted by reason, as the statement 'the sky is blue' is done. (For the sky is supposed to be colourless). When these statements are not reliable and valid, other parts of Veda which state that Narayana is the creator of the world are equally invalid. This we can infer by reason (by the dictum of Jaimini इतरेषुतथात्वम्). This part of the Veda is invalid because it is a vedic statement like the above statement (मृदग्रवीत्). Hence that part of Veda which states that the cause of creation is Narayana is invalid.

This is a serious blow to the theistic conception of Brahman. In the mean while some temporary argument is improvised to set aside the claims of the opposer to disprove the validity of Veda. In the previous Adhikarana (अधिकारण) a reasoning has been set up which retrieves the validity of the Vedas when it was at stake. But that argument is not applicable here. For there it is argued that Veda is invalid because one who does worship according to the rites, laid down in the vedas does not get its fruit. But this is not so sound an argument as the failure to get fruit might be due to inefficiency in the performance of the vedic rites. If on the other hand, invalidity is based upon the eternal nature of the vedas, the failure to get fruit is there to invalidate the Vedas.

That opposition of reason, there in the previous Adhikarana is explained as having no Concomitance and other requisites of inference. But here the opposer's argument is very sound. as it is equipped with all the requisites of inferential reasoning. Hence this opposition of reason is very strong and requires special treatment. Besides the Sidhanti's position is very weak. For 'Mrid यज् cannot speak' is an established and unshakable fact well supported by

concomitance and its denial is attended with opposition from most powerful perception. But it is Veda that tells us something about the ancient earth which is beyond the power of perception. Hence Veda is upajeevya and yukti cannot oppose its own feeding instrument of knowledge. Even this stand is very shaky and only proves the Sidhanti's weakness. For when facts are established by invariable concomitance and other basic accessories, Inference stands invincible and challenges any opposing instrument of knowledge.

Just inferring insentient nature of the earth from its being earth, we then infer that it cannot speak. This inference strongly opposes the vedic statements. Hence the opposer sums up his argument thus :— Vedic statements like 'the Earth spoke' and others being opposed by reason, are proved invalid and other vedic statements like पतो वा भूतानि जायते are also invalid. Hence Brahman is not the cause of creation which was so strenuously proved by showing that Brahman alone was the import of all vedic statements.

Now the Sidhanti begins his counter attack. Mrit is not the earth, but some mysterious and immanent person who is beyond our senses, and

who is conscious and chetana. He has been endowed with miraculous and mystic powers of becoming invisible and others. It is such wonderful Chetana that is referred to in मृदवित् and not the insentient lump of earth, unless and until we admit this esoteric meaning the opposition cannot be reconciled. When मृद refers to a sentient being you do not find the reason or Hetu, viz. the insentient quality Mritva in this. If for the reason of mere word you think that the insentient quality is in Mrit you will be reduced to the awkward position of attributing to Mrid horns and tail because the word शे is used as one of the many names of Mrid. Even if you read insentient Mrid here, still it will not lead to invalidity of veda. For Mrid is taken as the name of that sentient being. It is accepted as a name because Mrid has not got connotative power (प्रवृत्तिनिषिद्ध) to connote sentient being.

But how to explain the use of Mrid to connote sentient being is a difficult problem of semantics. The Sidhanti accepts primary connotation. Because the sentient being has presiding power over insentient Mrid and hence it is primary meaning of the word Mrid. So though the sentient being has not got insentient quality of Mritva in him, yet the sentient being

has controlling power over the insentient Mritva (this is also included in connotative power) Hence the word connotes the sentient being primarily. But this word Mrid also connotes insentient Mrid, but not in contravention of the first meaning, but in a subservient way of being as it were a body to the soul.

Then continues a long discussion over this topic of double connotative power of words. And at last it is concluded that the word Mrid has the primary connotative power to signify the over-lord sentient being of Mrid, and Subordinate to that the insentient Mrid is conveyed by that word. Because the presiding power sustains the existence of the thing presided over. Hence it is subordinate to the presiding power.

Hence Shruti does not merely mention the Chetana Presiding power but it also mentions the Achetana Mrid along with Chetana. If shruti had meant to mention only Chetana then त्रिवृत्करण of Fire and others would not have been mentioned. (Combining three elements at a time). Then insentient things ought—not to have been mentioned in Nigama, Nighantu, and Vyakarana. Therefore along with Chetana power, even Achetana is

mentioned and one cannot reject it. Therefore by higher primary connotation the presiding Chetana alone is conveyed by words like **Mrīḍ** and others. Yet the word तु or but is used to assert that by the ordinary popular power of connotation, the other Achetana also is signified. In instances like तत्तेजेक्षत् (the fire saw) only the Chetana is connotated (in manner) as mentioned in शरीररूपकविन्यस्तगृहीतेः residing in the body of these achetana things, by the word अभिमानि. Thus त्रिवृक्तरण and others are justified. Though Veda ordinarily mentions 'work and deity' तदेव गात्रयोनिः yet that is the higher primary meaning. The word तु in तत्समन्वयात् makes this very suggestion which is made by it here. The higher primary connotation is justified by the controlling power of the chetana, which is signified by अभिमानि which means 'one who controls the subordinate'. The reason for connotation is both controlling power and residence in it. Just as the word जयी gets the full higher connotation fulfilled in the king as he has controlling power over his army. This has been mentioned as the method of signification of higher controlling power of a word.

This big paragraph belongs to Parimala and Raghavendra very liberally provides elucidations

enriching them with learned allusions, deep significations, happy comparisons and enlightning illustrations. He is never stingy of expressions where they are justified by necessity. He marshals the whole of the Shastra which he presses into his service. A single Particle ग has called forth this lengthy explanation and Raghavendra lavishes his rich bounties upon the passage. Then inductively Raghavendra arrives at a general-truth. It is not a sweeping assertion but-well based on data with unchallanged veracity. Here at the end, his generalisation is that in the previous Adhyaya in all the Adhikaranas, it is a rule that the reasons made available and applicable by the Sidhanti against the opponent are of larger implications being more soundly based on invariable concomitances than those, called into service by the opposer.

असदिति चेन्नप्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात्.

The opposer has again an objection against the very beginning of the further course of discussion. For all opposition from reason or inference has been set aside in the previous Adhikaranas. Just in the Abhimanyadhikarana specially strong opposition of reason also is explained away.

To this objection the reply is that the opposer has a point to make, which is not discussed so far. When reason is fortified with a sentence against the statement of veda, how to come to a decision ? This is the doubt raised, by the opposer and the Sidhanti replies that the stronger arguments of Sidhanti would carry the day as reasons or arguments have prominence in the decision of the conclusion.

Here it is suggested by Raghavendra that mere arguments cannot be proved to be stronger and only when they are corroborated by vedic statements they stand unchallanged. On the other hand the opposer's arguments are not corroborated by vedic statements and hence they decline in power.

Thus the arguments in these three Adhikaranas can be arranged in ascending order as opposition from, 1) arguments 2) from stronger arguments 3) from specially strongest arguments beginning from न विलक्षणत्वाधिकरण. When this opposition is ably met with by Sidhanti in this Adhikarana, the announcement made in the Samanvayadhikarana is fully justified on rational grounds. Ultimately this Adhikarana finds a proper place in the long discussion that is going

on; and the present Adhikarana has a unique subject to discuss, as it is not discussed before. Besides, the Agamas that have been summoned by the opposer as evidence are found weaker (liable to different interpretation) than the Agamas of the Sidhanti (not yielding any other meaning). Hence it is very easy to come to a decision.

Now the opposer's yukti or reasoning is put forth. During Pralaya there is the antecedent negation of the things to be created. For before the pot comes into existence there is the antecedent negation or non-being of the pot. So also before creation of Mahat and others there are their respective antecedent non-beings. Though these are many they must be accepted as they are warranted by irrefutable evidences, in preference to God who is single and yet not warranted by evidences.

Besides every reasonable investigator shall have to admit the antecedent non-being of every effect because it is invariably found before the effect and it is not utilized for any other purpose. For that is the cause which is invariably found before the effect and not utilized in producing any other thing. No doubt there is the antecedent

non-being of a destroyed thing; and also there is mutual negation of वट in वट and of वट in वट, and these are non-productive. To avoid the violation of this causal law the antecedent non-being of an effect is qualified by antecedent non-being "of a thing to be produced"; and 'antecedent' which excludes both नाशप्राप्तभाव and अन्योन्याभाव, from this concomitance of antecedent non-being being the cause of the effect.

In the Sutra असदितिचेष्टा नप्रतिषेदमात्रत्वात् असदितिचेत represents the view of the opposer. Then असत् is negation or non-being. But the Sidhant interprets it as something which is the counter Part of some Abhava or negation.

But if the antecedent negation is the Cause of creation, for the same reason God also becomes the cause of creation. The opposer contends that God is not Abhava; but it is Bhava and hence it cannot rise to the status of cause to which Pragabhava has risen being Abhava or negation in nature.

Every effect has its material cause. So the effects like Mahat and others require Pradhana for its material cause. But this argument is not sound. Because, the opposer contends, that God cannot be proved to be existing; and hence

the Pragabhava which is the agent cause of creation becomes material cause also just as in Advaita system Brahma becomes the agent cause of the creation, as well as material cause. Besides that the non-being (असत्) is the cause of the creation is corroborated by statements in the (असतः सदजायत). you cannot object to this interpretation of Veda on the ground that असत् has been attributed some sort of being or सत्. Because Shruti is strongly confronted with infallible reasoning; and becomes ready to forego its apparent meaning why ? You can even attribute some sort of reality even to Asat as it is predicated with आसीत्.

This argument clearly proves the connection between the conclusion of the previous Adhikarana and the beginning of the present Adhikarana in which the opposer sets forth his view of the non-being nature of the cause of creation. That connection or link is an exception (अपवाद) to the conclusion of the previous Adhikarana.

At the end of the first Abhyaya it was argued that Asat meant non-being; and yet non-being subordinate to the will of God means God by the rule 'any meaning subordinate to some other meaning gives place to the superior meaning.'

Thus असत् means Brahman. But in that very Adhyaya this sort of connotation of Brahma by a higher mode of interpretation makes compromise with its primary meaning and allows it for the continuation of verbal communication in the world. (समाक्षरित्). For this primary meaning has been supported by strong reason.

Here Raghavendra reveals a subtlety of interpretation. For the relation of Reason to Revelation will be mutually dependent if Revelation or Veda depends on Reason for conveying primary meaning. Again Reason for its own validity waits for corroboration of Veda. But this is not so. For Reason only vitiates the meaning of Veda like 'Reality alone was there at the beginning'. Reason needs corroboration by Shruti while contradicting this Shruti and not when proving non-being to be the cause of creation. Because that is independently proved.

The opposer now puts the whole argument in a succinct form. Asat or negation is mentioned in Shruti as the agent cause of creation. Even inference deduces the same conclusion. Therefore Abhava or negation is the agent cause of creation. The opposer has thus argued out his case.

Here in the place of Abhava, Asat is used for two reasons 1) Sutra must follow Shruti (असदैव वस्त्रासतोत्) and in Shruti Asat is used. 2) And Asat can be a word which by derivation from the root अस् to be means a positive thing from सत् and नन्. For the reason of being positive (भावत्व) the cause is inferred to be असत् and for the same reason even in Pralaya God is inferred to be existing.

Negative non-being or antecedent negation can never be the agent cause of creation. Because by nature it only negates the existence of some thing.

Raghavendras adds a note to this "The argument ultimately resolves in to this. The antecedent negation of such and such an effect cannot be the agent cause of that effect, or just as Sankhya admits Pradhana, and Advait admits Brahma to be both agent cause and material cause, so also the opposer should say, to be brief, that the antecedent negation is both the agent cause and material cause of creation. Hence the Sidhanti negates causal agency in general in non-being; much less can we posit causal agency of creation in a negative thing. Otherwise it would have been absurd to deny antecedent negation its causal agency of creation, when only antece-

dent negation of each effect is going to be proved the agent cause of that effect.

Besides both in Shruti and Sutra, only singular is used. (That the opposer cannot accept plural will be shown later on). No doubt it is concluded in the previous part of this work, that the respective antecedent negation is the agent cause of the respective effect. This is not in contravention of the first statement. Because the particular conclusion is accepted as a stepping stone to general conclusion. Along with causal agency, the state of material cause also is derived.

Now we must understand what is कर्तृत्व (or doership) Agency or doership presupposes purposeful activity in the form of desire or will and effort. So in वृक्षेणस्थीयते the tree stands, the कर्तृत्व of the tree is only technical and not real.

No one is willing to attribute this sort of purposeful activity to antecedent negation and much less to any negation. Hence it can not be the (कर्ता) of creation.

Now बुद्धिपूर्वकत्व can be interpreted in two ways
 1) Having intelligence for its cause, or invariably concomitant with बुद्धि or intelligence. The second type of concomitant Budhi is not to be found in

antecedent negation. Hence it cannot be the agent cause of creation. Even in God though the first type of purposeful activity cannot be found because it is eternal yet the second type of Budhi (pervading) is to be found.

The opposer again contends that the nature of negation (प्रतिषेधत्व) is not to be found in God who is accepted as the creator of the world. For he is called असत् in Sutra and Shruti. Merely on account of the absence of प्रतिषेध the antecedent negation can be denied कर्तृत्व.

The Sidhanti's reply is that potter and God who are accepted as agent cause, though they are positive, have this form of negation (प्रतिषेध) of the type of mutual negation (which is consistent with its positivity).

Another objection is that potter that is the doer has no negation or प्रतिषेधत्व and mutual negation which is प्रतिषेधस्वरूप has no कर्तृत्व. But the opposer forgets that both potter and mutual negation or भेद (differences) are one and the same in essence and hence there can not be raised any such objection.

Now in the Sutra the doer or creator called असत् is said to be only (आत्म) of the essence of

प्रतिषेध or negation. What is the significance of 'only' or मात्र ? Such adjectives qualifying a Hetu are usually justified on the ground of averting violation of concomitance, or व्याप्ति.

The explanation is that the doer or karta or creator is of the essence of negation, though it is a positive substance. But it is not merely of the essence of negation, because in the Sutra, प्रतिषेधमात्र does not mean mere प्रतिषेध, without the mediation of attributes the substance itself directly being of the essence of प्रतिषेध or negation. This is to be found both in पक्ष and वृष्टांत. For through attribute though it is positive yet the substance is agreed by both to be of the essence of प्रतिषेध or negation.

But how is this found out? It is explained that the word मात्र means 'Totality'. And there is no one thing in which there is total negation. For the other also admits some positive attribute in अभाव which is the form of निषेध. This is the meaning of प्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात्, in which the positive nature is made subordinate to negation. This is made clear in अन्नमात्रं भुख्तं (only rice is eaten). Here मात्र means 'all'. But all that is eaten is not rice alone; for, along with rice condiments also are eaten. Therefore by secondary mode of interpretation अन्नमात्र means, with rice in preponderance

other condiments also are eaten. Therefore by secondary mode of interpretation अन्नमात्र means, rice in preponderance and other condiments in subordination to it. Here also in प्रतिषेध मात्रत्वात् by conventional secondary mode (रूढलक्षणावृत्ति) of interpretation, Negation in preponderance and positiveness in subordination are signified.

If antecedent negation were creator, it cannot be वित्तन or conscious. It need not be doubted that some negative entity, like some positive entity may be conscious. For it is most unreasonable to accept consciousness of negative entity though both of them are unrelated disregarding the naturally related unconsciousness with negative entity. This sort of freedom in thinking leads to such absurdity as to accept smoke and reject fire (though concomitantly both are connected). This is nothing but bidding good bye to all rational thinking. If अस्त् is not accepted as the creator then you shall have to admit (असदितिव्युत्तिच) Asat and Brahma as two different entities. Hence we must say that they are two different names of one entity. But if antecedent negation is accepted as the creator of its respective effect, there will be many negations as there are many effects produced. Hence there will be many entities in प्रलय according to the system of the opposer. Besides

each antecedent negation is destroyed by the production of its effect. So the opposer cannot be said to have admitted only one entity as the creator.

Now Sidhanti accepts Brahma as one entity and as the creator of the world. His argument is that the creator one or many must have single will and effort in the attempt of creation. But many independent entities cannot entertain one will and cannot make one effort which are the necessary pre-requisites of production or creation. Hence Brahma the creator is one entity and not many.

But according to the opposer the antecedent negation of each effect in the world being related as cause only to its effect there won't arise any question of singleness of will and effort before creation. For each antecedent negation of each effect becomes its cause independently of others. Hence there arises no question of one will and one effort of one entity, yet what we have already said must be recollected here.

But this sort of idea that positive things have negative attributes and negative things have positive attributes, leads to promiscuity and confusion in the arrangement of categories.

In logic. No evidence can prove contradictory attribution to substances. Besides no relationship can be established between contradictories. One thing can be attributed to the other only when they are naturally related to each other. Whiteness can be attributed to a piece of cloth because they are naturally related. But unrelated Meru cannot be attributed to Mandara. In the same manner it is impossible to show any relationship between being and non-being, which being contradictory of each other can never be related.

When thus accosted Sidhanti says that attributedness is nothing but qualifiedness; and attribution is qualification. For that which is qualified by an adjective, is its substantive and the qualifying adjective is different from it. Being and non-being have been seen as adjective and substantive. Otherwise you will have no cognition of the type of 'Pot is no piece of cloth' or 'non-being is knowable'. That is knowableness is attributed to 'non being'.

Besides it is not relationship that settles the state of being an adjective to some substantive. Qualifiedness by some adjective is the nature of substantive. There is some relation or connection between 'Pot and a piece of cloth' yet there is no

qualifiedness. Even unrelated (either by contact or inherence) ground and non-existence of pot have qualifiedness.

Contradiction or identity have nothing to do with qualifiedness. Eternity and non eternity have qualifiedness. For the sky is eternal and is the substantive of the adjective 'Sound' which is non-eternal. It is only some special verbal power which brings about this relationship of qualifiedness.

Till at last the Sidhanti admits that inspite of this apparent promiscuity of being and non-being, we can yet have a definite conception of the distinction of these two (Being and non-being). That is being, which is known to us in the first cognition as positive and that is non-being which is known to us in the first cognition as negative.

Now a pot appears both as positive thing (a pot) and as a negative thing (in its antecedent negation). Yet in the multitude of things that which is known in the first cognition as positive pot, is a being or भाव as a pot and that which is known as negative (as antecedent negative) is non-being.

The pot, as a substance, (पूर्ण) is भाव and not on account of quality or घर्म, it is a positive thing

and hence pot is जाति or being. It is conceived as a positive substance, in the first instance. No doubt both substance and quality are identical and yet on account of some intrinsic merit inhering in them they stand separated for the purpose of practical use, and thus they are different, as substance and quality. Thus substance in the first conception stands as positive and not as negation of another thing is a being. But the non-being in the first conception is cognised as the negation of its counter part.

Thus pot is first conceived as pot a solid positive substance and then it is known as the non-cloth. In the same manner the antecedent negation first is known as 'negation' then is known as 'knowable'.

Thus the evidences, the opposer had produced, are shown to be contradicted by stronger evidences. Now this theory of 'creation out of negation' will be shown to be leading to an absurd conclusion of the world being reduced to colourless nullity at the time of Laya or universal destruction. But God and others stand undestroyed at Pralaya. It is not possible to set aside God and attribute creation to some negation or nullity.

अपिती तद्वत् प्रसंगादवसंजसम्

Here a point of grammar has been raised by Jayateerth. Acharya uses in Anuvyakhana प्रतिपत्तिषुनिषेध विधिरूपत्वम्. Knowledge and its objects are considered as support (आधार) and hence locative is used after प्रतिपत्ति (knowledge). This support is both primary and secondary. Here it is primary support that is meant.

When the opposer supports his side with a number of arguments, the proposer or Sidhanti contradicts it with his own argument.

Now this universal destruction cannot contravene the rule of general destruction. General destruction always excludes the destroyer from destruction; hence in Pralaya God is excluded from general destruction. To this argument add one more : No time is without a conscious soul; hence in Pralaya time also a conscious being is inferred to exist, on the analogy of the present time. But time itself may not be questioned if it exists or not. For denying the existence of time is knocking the bottom out of all arguments based on the frame work of time and space.

Both soul and God thus have this existence in Pralaya. Now a rational explanation is given for the existence of soul or Jeevatma. At the

time of Pralaya religious merit and demerit are there. They require support and Jeeva the soul is the only legitimate support of these two. Hence Jeeva as the support of धर्मधर्म must be existing even in Pralaya.

Or this argument argues the existence of God in Pralaya. For God is not a passive support of धर्मधर्म but He is the active controller (अधिकात्) of धर्मधर्म. Because धर्मधर्म are insentient and constitute a cause for some effect. Hence they need some one to guide and control them, as a dagger. In Pralaya the soul is a mere support of these two. But God alone is the controller, or अधिकात् which is defined by Raghavendra as 'one who induces the cause to produce the effect'. Or one who uses it at his Sweet will, or one who is the controller.

Here the final syllogistic form is this: Dharma and Adharma existing at the time of Pralaya, are presided over by some body. For they, constituting cause, are insentient like the dagger.

The logical reason in this inference has two qualifications. Raghavendra justifies the existence of the first qualification viz. 'Constituting a cause'.

Mere insentience is to be found in 'Destruction and absolute negation' which need no controller being mere negation. But they do not constitute a cause. Hence there need be no violation of Vyapti or concomitance of कारणत्वेसत्तिअचेतनत्वं and अप्रकारत्वं. These negations though insentient yet do not constitute any cause.

Pralaya being distant in time, is invisible to the eye, is yet comprehensible through inference and hence acceptable to us.

The series of creations is produced by the constituents of the series which do not make a visible series; because it is a series like the series of (Araneya Santana) of fire begotten of (Arani) fire producing stick.

Here we have a conception of creation which is an endless flow. Raghavendra explains this conception which inevitably leads us to presupposition of Pralaya before creation. Atoms are in a regularised course of combination into two, those again into three and those again into four till there is the last combination which gives the final shape to the finished product. This is the flow of creation when things are reduced to original atoms in the reverse process. This flow is stopped but another flow is there in its place. So, though there is no

identity yet there is continuity as in the current of water. So, when there is a flow just before it there are the component parts of it viz atoms in vast clusters. This is Pralaya. The piece of wood which produces fire by attrition continuously throws out a jet of fire one after another. The same jet is not there. Before one jet disappears there is another occupying its place. Thus there is continuity. This leads to a state when there was no jet of fire. That is its Pralaya.

We must closely follow the argument. Sidhanti pressed the opponent to accept अद्वैत as the cause-general for all effects. This अद्वैत is nothing but शक्ति and अशक्ति. This अद्वैत at the time of Pralaya is the general cause of future creation. It is अद्वैत that proves the existence of Pralaya. So Sidhanti challenges those that do not accept अद्वैत as the cause of creation, to produce evidence to prove the existence of Pralaya.

Then Leelavati Vardhmana tries to prove the existence of Pralaya accepting Paramanuvada or Atomic theory of creation. Creation is a flow or flux coming one after another. Dissolution and creation, dissolution and creation continues eternally. Creation out of atoms and then dissolution into atoms. In this continuous flow

every creation pre-supposes dissolution. Without the assertion of अद्वैत thus Pralaya is proved. In one and the same place at one and the same time there cannot be two flows; hence one course is destroyed and in its place out of the same material another course begins. Hence creation presupposes dissolution.

But Shidhanti does not try to contradict or refute these arguments here. But he puts forth counter arguments based on अद्वैत and proves the existence of Pralaya. No doubt धर्म and अधर्म are Super sensuous and hence cannot be perceived. Yet Devadatta's body is a product of Devadatta's special quality. For it is a product and a means of experiencing pleasure or pain. Now there is speciality in the pleasure and pain of every individual which can be only accounted for, by the अद्वैत of the man. Thus अद्वैत is proved as the cause, as without its presumption the variety in effect cannot be explained.

Again if one performs ज्योतिष्ठोमयाग one gets heaven. If one kills a Brahmin one will go to hell. Yaga and killing happen and perish the next moment. If they do not exist just before the effect is produced (viz. heaven and hell) how can they be connected causally? So Yaga and

killing produce अदृष्ट or पुण्य and पाप which exist till they produce long time afterwards, heaven and hell. Thus अदृष्ट is proved to exist.

Adversaries produce many counter inferences and also have shown loopholes in the inferences that have been launched to prove the existence of Pralaya. So Sishanti does not like to continue with arguments but in such questions that are super-sensuous the only recourse to take to is Verbal testimony which include authorless Vedas, authoritative Smritis and popular Puranas, and itihosas. Already we have shown that the Vedas are valid evidences to prove the existence of 'Beings'. So the existence of अदृष्ट or धर्मधर्म is warranted by verbal testimony. Thus at the time of Pralaya Jeeva or soul as the support of अदृष्ट and Paramatma as the controller of अदृष्ट are proved to exist. So it is far from truth to say that beings in general are not existing in Pralaya. Then Prakriti also is proved as the material cause of so many effects.

In the first Sutra of this Adhikarana an inference was adduced to refute the agency of a negation or non-being. Now also a positive argument to prove that the world is created by a sentient being is adduced with an illustration.

In the world we find an effect like pot having an intelligent agent like a Potter. Accordingly why should we not infer an intelligent agent in the creation of the world ?

When Sidhanti pleads for inference it is supposed that only inference aided by Agama is meant. Unaided inference is powerless to prove conclusively in things beyond the senses. Besides Vedic statements well be ascertained and confirmed by inference or Yukti are infallible.

Thus refuting inferential argument in favour of negation, being the agent and the agency of God, in the work of creation was established through inference only.

But now the Sankhyas come forward and object to the refutation of the theory in which Brahma is said to be the material cause of the world, by the argument that Brahman is different in nature from the world. For they argue that inference is unable to prove or disprove anything as one inference can be pitted against another.

But if the inference is soundly based upon perception or Agama, it cannot be easily dislodged. Sidhanti defends the validity of inference taking his stand on this sound basis. Sutrakara cannot

reasonably condemn rational thinking in general having first proposed to discuss about Brahma through rational investigation, only baseless or wild or wanton arguments are condemned and discouraged. Thoughts deduced from life or revelation are Vehicles of infallible truth.

Thoughts are various no doubt as they come out of different minds. On that account if all thoughts in general are condemned, this thought also Condemning all thoughts, stands Condemned by itself.

Now we come to the last Sutra of this Adhikarana. In the course of the critical review of other systems the Sutrakara, refutes Sankhya and Vaisheshika. Some say that of these Vaisheshika is more violently attacked by Badarayana, in spite of the fact that Vaisheshika is a theist while Sankhya is an atheist. But this is not correct. For the point at issue is that Brahma is the cause of creation. This is the view of the Vedantin. Now who is the greater offender of this truth ? Sankhya does not believe in the existence of Brahma; much less does he believe his being the cause of creation. So Sankhya is unacceptable to the Vedantion. But Vaisheshika is less unacceptable to the Vedantion. Because

Vaisheshika admits the existence of Brahma and also his being the agent cause or efficient cause of creation. He does not admit only Brahman being the material cause of creation. Hence Vaisheshika is less unacceptable to the Vedantion. There may be other reasons that the Sankhya believes in सत्कार्यवाद (a theory that the effect is already existing in the cause) is out of issue. Hence we need not take that into consideration while comparing the relationship of these two systems with the Vedanta.

When this interpretation is not acceptable, we must find the right interpretation. So long the doership of non-being was refuted and now the doership of Jeeva or soul and other theories are condemned. Here doership merely means causal relationship.

भोक्त्रापत्तेरविगच्छेत्स्थालोकवत्

Now begins Bhoktridhikarana. In the last Adhikarana opposition to the theory of Brahman being the cause was set aside by very powerful reason or inference aided by corroboration from Shruti. Here the contradiction is rendered null and void by a reason lent by a combination of Shruties and hence the inference is rendered very powerful. Thereby it is shown that in the previous

Adhikarana the interpretation of the Shruti by Shidhanti is accepted because it is not in contravention of the primary meaning. But in this **Adhikarana** the interpretation of Shruti by the Shidhanti (unity of place and other things) is not to be accepted because the primary meaning shall have to be given up. So it is found that reasoning is more powerful. So the relationship is the counter-illustration. And this is in accordance with the statement in Anuvyakhyana (अनुव्याख्यानः) the Yukti has the corroboration of Shruti, and has the reason lent by the combined Shruti. Thus Yukti is of two types.

It is contended that Bhokta or Jeeva or soul when completely released, becomes one with Brahman. As this is told in Shruti they both (Brahman and Jeeva) are one. Therefore it is not reasonable to say that Brahman is really the cause of creation.

To this contention the Sutrakara replies that this identity is only figurative or formal (as in wordly parlance). This is not essential identity but identity of place or opinion. When water is added to water they are said to be one on account of occupying the same place (identity of place). Men of different opinion, coming to an agreement

are said to be one on account of consensus of opinion. So also Brahma and MuktaJeeva attain the same place and have the same opinion.

But here it is objected that when primary meaning is available it is not good convention to use secondary meaning.

To this, Sidhanti replies that if real identity of Jeeva and Brahma is meant, is it the identity of two that were identical first or of the two not identical. This is not identity of really identical.

Shruti declares the identity (परेष्यपेत्वं एकीभवति) of all with the highest and imperishable. एकीभवति is the verb used. This verb is called in grammar एव form, and is defined by Panini, thus अभूततद्वावे कुभवस्तियोगे संपद्यकर्तरनिवः (अभूत) Formerly they were different (तद्वावे) now they have become one, when this is the sense एव form is used. So here एकीभवति cannot mean the identity of the really identical; because the एव form is used. So एकीभवति does not allow us to say that those that were one first become one.

But one thing distinctly different from another thing can never become one by any means. So Jeeva essentially different from

Brahman can by any means become one with him, even in Mukti.

Pralhad categorically denies the possibility of one entity becoming another by any means.

“परमात्मनोः योगा परमार्थं इतीष्यताम् । मिथ्येतदन्यद् व्रस्य हि नेति तद्रस्यसां यतः ॥” Much less the identity of the soul with Paramatman. That identity is only unreal or illusory. Shri Raghavendra tells us that the verse quoted is from Vishnu Purana. In Katha शुद्धसिद्धं शुद्धं उदकं तादगेष भवति. Pure water added to pure water becomes like that (and not one with that).

स्थाल्लोकवत् (may be possible as in the world) is now interpreted in one way. Now it is interpreted in another way, “In the world no one takes pot to be one with a piece of cloth. Pot is always different from cloth. So, the reasoning of the opposer is not logical. Hence the soul is not one with Brahman; but he is different from him”.

तदनन्यत्वं आरंभणश्चादिभ्यः

Now begins तदनन्यत्वभिकरण. Before this in Bhoktridhikarana the contradiction from inference was refuted by sound inference. And in Asadhadhikarana this inference was strengthened by

corroboration from an irrevocable evidence. This Adhikarana collects a unique group of evidences like reason supplied by Smruti, and reason supplied by many Shruties in war alliance against the coming contradiction.

Just in the previous Adhikarana, the theorist that propagates Brahma undergoes change, contends that the enjoyable world is accepted as identical with its respective material causes not in contravence of the variety due to change. This identity of cause and effect as in pot and its earth is accepted in the world. Then Sankhya theorist argues that if the enjoyer in his natural form (the soul) is proved by Shastra to be identical with Brahma then let the enjoyable thing, which is identical with its material cause Brahman be enjoyer who is identical with Brahma. Those things which are identical with a common thing are identical themselves. But this is not a desirable thing. For foam and waves are each identical with the sea and hence should be identical themselves. But foam is not talked as wave nor a wave is talked as foam in practical life. So the rule above cited is violated. So it was refuted in Bhokhradhikarana. Now cause and effect are different according to the theory of Vaisheshikas, in nature, purpose, and naming in practice. For

example the nature of तंतु is तंतुत्व and the nature of पट is पटत्व which are different. The purpose of पट or piece of cloth is protection from cold. While the threads cannot serve this purpose. One is called ‘पट’ (cloth) and another is called ‘तंतु’. Thus on many counts there is difference between the cause and effect. Hence world cannot be identical with Brahman. This is the gist of the contents of the present Sutra.

Now the present Sutra is explained. The world which is the effect is not different from its cause Brahma; because there are Shrutis like वाचारंभण and others. But Vivartavadi says that he accepts the difference between things that is essential for practical purposes in life. But this difference is practical or phenomenal and not real. Hence really the Brahman, the cause is one with the sky and others that are the effect. For they are never found to exist without Brahman. (This is identity with Brahman) This is known from vedic texts वाचारंभण विकारः.

Now the first interpretation is refuted. One accepting Brahma as the material cause should be made the opposer. But Vaisheshika and others do not belong to this group. So how is it possible to accept identity with Brahman? It is

not even possible to state that the world is identical with Brahman. For do the Vedic texts state directly the identity of Brahman and Jagat? or through the material cause (विकारित्व) which undergoes change becoming identical with effect (विकार)? In the first the lump of earth and other things are mentioned. Hence there cannot be identity. In the second let there be identity between the cause and effect. Between Brahman and Jagat there cannot be identity. For the world is not the changed product of Brahman. Therefore the question that how is the world identical with Brahman stands unsolved.

Another Shruti 'उत्तमादेशमप्राक्ष्यो येनाश्रुतं भवति' is cited to prove the identity of Brahman and world. For the Shruti states that by the knowledge of Brahman, the knowledge of all things is secured. This is not possible if Brahman is not identical with all things.

But this is not so. Because आरंशणशब्द in the Sutra includes only such Vedic texts as are similar in contents. So those that propound causality of the world and identity with the world, should be chosen.

Even if identity is meant let us ascertain what kind of identity is that. Is that identity

the identity between synonyms (like पिक and कीकिल) or is it of the type of cause and effect (मृद् and घट). The identity of the first type, the sutrakara cannot state, nor can shruties propound. For Brahma is changeless and the world is subject to changes. Hence they are not like Pika and Kokila.

Now the second alternative is identity as between cause and effect. This is not possible. Because Jagat is not the effect of Brahman. Hence this causal identity also is forbidden. So the identinty is of some different type viz. subordination. Brahma is master and Jagat is dependent on it. There is the same sort of figurative or formal identity as between the master and the servant.

Now the theory of illusion or Vivritavada is refuted. The Sutrakara does not mean that the effect the world is an illusion. तदनश्च does not mean illusion. Otherwise Brahman also would be an illusion.

True it is that the world cannot subsit without Brahman. This does not mean that it does not exist at all. It exists being dependent on Brahma. If it means absolute non-existence, Jeeva also should have no existence at all. If a qualified thing is denied existence, only the qualifying

adjective is denied its existence. But the substantintive is not negated. A Snataka with dirty clothes should not bathe; means only dirty clothes are forbidden. While Snataka is free to bathe with clean clothes. In the same manner, the statement 'The world has no existence apart from Brahma cannot deny existence to existing world, because existence is warranted by evidences. World as different from Brahma is denied. But world exists as essentially as Brahman.

If the world is illusory (as the illusionist supposes) it shall have to be imposed upon Brahman. To explain this illusion no one says that the world is different from Brahman.

For to explain the super-imposition of silver on a conch shell no one says that silver is different from shell. Thus the Sidhanti goes on scrutinising the theory of illusion. At last he asks a question. Suppose the world is an illusion or it is unreal. Then how can it be non-different (or one with) from Brahman? If the world is not one with Brahman, in any way then there cannot be any other causs (for the world) than Brahman.

In no way can we explain the illusion theory. For there are no sound proofs, to prove it. But the Sutra has supplied the reason like

verbal texts 'वाचारंभण'. Now let us consider how this text explains the illusion of the world. Does that state directly that the world is an illusion or through the effect ? If it is direct, then how is the world illusion produced by Brahma. For there is reference to lump of earth and other things. There is no reference to Brahma-illusion (Brahma appearing as world), in the vedic text. So world illusion cannot be explained in any way. In the second alternative how does the vedic text prove that Brahma appears as world. It is contended that all modification or change is false or illusion. The world is Brahma modified, and hence is false. But this contention also is specious. For in the previous Adhikarana it is proved that world is not the modification of Brahman. How then it is proved that the world is non-different from Brahma ? Raghavendra thus gives the elucidation of the verse कथ्यचतुरन्तयता of Acharya.

Therefore it may be reminded that the bondage is real and without the grace from the Lord it cannot be removed and hence to get the grace of Brahma, we must undergo the discipline of Hearing, thinking and meditating which constitute Jijnasa.

Now the production of pot depends upon another cause which has existence and power,

without depending upon the agent or potter. On the analogy of this, creation of Mahat and others depends upon another independent cause whose existence and power do not depend upon the will of the agent of creation or God. Because it is the action of the agent in respect of the production. Like the creation or production of pot, also it is production. Or Mahat and others attain the state of production depending upon an independent cause other than the agent. For they are effects like pot. And many more such inferences are adduced in favour of an independent cause other than Brahman. Hence these infallible inferences go against the Sutra statement that Brahman has the monopoly of being the independent cause of creation.

In the same manner in the place of 'another cause' you substitute 'locus' (Adhisthana) of illusion. An independent 'locus' will be proved which also runs counter to the Sutra statement that Brahman is the only cause of creation. Raghavendra fully elucidates this point and its implications and respectfully makes a reference to Chandrika where this topic has been fully dealt with.

Even Shruti also supports this series of inferences by stating that Brahman is one of the

causes and does not deny the possibility of another independent cause. Even if Shruti opposes this possibility of another independent cause and has undisputed authority on account of its being authorless, still the inference also is unchallengable and invincible on account of its manifold number that has rallied round its cause.

Trenched behind this powerful argument the opposer propounds that there is an independent cause other than Brahman; based upon sound reasoning which cannot be brushed aside.

Then the Sutrakara contradicts this sally of opposition in this Adhikarana; and categorically denies the possibility of an independent cause for creation other than Brahman. 'What cause is there for creation is not different from Brahman (that)'. Had the Sutrakara simply stated that there is no independent cause for creation then Brahman also would have lost his independence. But by what the Sutrakara states (तदन्यत्वं) it is found that He (Brahman) alone and not another is the cause of creation. Acharya uses एव (because) in order to show that his statement also has the support of evidences while the opposer's point of view stands unsupported by any evidences (मावेच उपलब्धः).

By the shruti वाचारंभण it is stated that there is no cause other than Brahman. But further it is stated that, there are other causes like primordial matter and other things. When these two seemingly contradictory statements are reconciled it means that there is no independent cause other than Brahman. But there are dependent causes other than Brahman in the creation of the world.

What about the inferences that have rallied round the opposers banner to uphold his theory of an independent cause of creation other than Brahman? We do admit that they are many. But they are all spent up(energy) battery as they have no support of Shruti. These inferences are recharged only when they are supported by Shruti. Such aided inferences are on the side of Sutrakara and hence the inferences cited by the opposer are rendered null and void.

These incidental causes like material cause are all dependent on Brahman for their existence and activity. But such causes also are necessary for the creation of the world (सत्त्वान्वयवरस्य). Elemental causes (अभ्यः समूहः) are not stated here as dependent. Yet else where (in द्रव्यं कर्म चकालश्च) all these are stated to be dependent entirely on His sweet will.

It should not be objected that in the Shruti नासदासीत् नोसदासीत् तदनीम् it is stated that both tangible (पूर्ण) and intangible (अपूर्ण) objects were not existing at that time in Pralaya. For independent of Brahman they were not there; but even then there were many that were dependent on him. This is known from the shruti itself. Though in the beginning all things are denied existence yet in another statement Shruti posits the existence of तमस् which is nothing but Prakriti. So the negation at the beginning is not absolute but limited. So independent there was none. Dependent there were many.

Further this supposition that God banks upon the aid of dependent entities like Prakriti and time for his creation, leads to the bankruptcy of the so called unlimited resourcefulness of God. When invariably the aid of Prakriti and time is needed, these cannot be considered as dependent. These strong reasons contradict the theory of the dependence of God on Prakriti and others in his activity of creation. Because it affects unlimited immensity and infinite wisdom and inexhaustible Strength of God.

To this objection Sutrakara replies the dependence on Prakriti and independence of Brahman

can be shown to be compatible, on rational basis. There are also corroborations from other Shrutiies. Previously quoted shruties may yield to diversions of meaning. But the present ones unambiguously state that the creation in which the agent cause is God is the effect of the material cause like Prakriti and others which are dependent on God.

God is the only independent cause. He has the capacity to create the world even without the aid of Prikriti and others. Still it is His sweet will (not enforced by any body) to use Prakriti Kala and others which are fixed and invariably used causes whose existence, activity and knowledge are entirely dependent on Narayana.

But others interpret this Sutra in a different way. In भावेचौपलङ्घः, भाव means both cause and effect; and the sutra means 'If there is cause like' pot and they are one; and vice versa'. (This is the second Sutra in the Adhikarana. The first sutra and its misinterpretation are already noticed and reviewed. So the second sutra and its mis interpretation is taken for critical review.) For this identity of cause and effect the evidence is presumption or Arthapathi (सत्त्वाद्वचावरस्य) अवस्था means 'that which belongs to the later period of

time'. Effect that comes in existence in later period of time is already existing before its production (in its cause). (सर्वेषांयेवम् य आसीत्) Objecting to this सत्कार्यवाद when effect's existence in the cause is doubted the reply is given in असद् व्यपवेशात्. It does not mean that effect was non-existing. Because at the end in the statement you read 'सदासीत्' 'it was existing'. From this we know that the effect is not असत् or non-existing; but it is called non-existing only from the point of view of another attribute.

Now follows the sutra युत्कः शब्दान्तराच्च. Many reasons are adduced. Sankhya reasons are quoted from his Karika:- (असद् अकारणात् उपादानप्रणहणं सर्वसंभवा भावात् । शतकस्य शरण्यकरणात् कारणाभावाच्च सत्कार्यम्) For 1) Non existing cannot produce; 2) The cause is causally related with effect; 3) Because all are not produced by all (one cause is related with one effect). 4) The inherent power of cause, (if that cause is not related with the effect) cannot produce the effect, 5) Cause transmits its nature to effect.

The sougata also presents certain reasons for the existence of the effect in the cause even before the effect is produced. When the effect is different from the cause, if the effect is to reside in the

cause, does that reside in a part of the cause or in the whole of it. In the first alternative we cannot make any parts in the part of a cause. If the effect is to reside in the whole of the cause or thread as there are many threads, there will be many effects. If really there are many effects one for each thread—then when one thread moves the other should not move. The same piece of cloth shall have to be called both moving and not moving which is absurd. For all these reasons the effect is not different from the cause says Saugata. This commentator quotes Vedic texts to substantiate his statements.

Then comes the sutra तत्त्वम् Just as a piece of cloth when folded is unmanifest and when expanded is manifest so also effect is unmanifest in the stage of cause and by the active effort of the agent the effect becomes manifest. Hence cause and effect are one.

Another instance given is vital breath (प्राणादि:) and its varieties. Just as Prana and Apana and others controlled by the discipline of Pranayama recede into the causal substance Prana, only sustain life breath and do not exhibit expansion and contraction. But when that discipline is withdrawn Prana does the work of sustaining life breath as well as expansion and contraction.

Now leaving the work of scrutinising whether the verbal interpretation of the sutras adopted by this commentator is correct or not to the readers, only the consistency of thought is taken up for critical survey. While seeking identity of effect with cause, experience is being flouted, as effect and efficient cause are invariably found to be different in the mundane world. If identity is sought with the material cause it is of no use for the present. What is needed by this commentator is the identity of this mundane world with Brahman. But Brahman is not the material cause. Besides material cause is both identical with and different from the effect. Hence the commentator is foiled in his efforts.

On this a great discussion ensues. At last it is shown how absurd it is to believe that the effect is already there in cause. For all effort to produce the effect and to destroy it is futile. But the opposer argues that in order to explain production and destruction, manifestation and disappearance are accepted. Raghavendra explains at length how this new explanation of manifestation and disappearance also invites the same logical rebuffs.

For people say that a pot comes into existence when that manifestation becomes manifest.

The wheel, rod and all justify their function only when manifestation is manifested. Again after the club destroys the pot there is disappearance of the manifestation; hence the pot does not continue to exist after destruction. The use of the club is justified for the disappearance of the manifestation. When disappearance manifests we say that the pot is destroyed. For disappearance which was existent before, is now manifested. There is no talk of destruction when it is not manifest.

But even this lengthy process of imagination and Card-palace-building topples down at the slightest touch of reasoning. For what we had said about production and destruction will apply to manifestation and disappearance. If they are formerly existing then all our effort is useless. If they are not existing, non-existing things can neither be produced nor destroyed. If again manifestation for the manifestation, disappearance for disappearance are to be imagined, there will be no end to this process and there is the logical fault of endless regress.

But this rebutting can be directed against all theories of causation. For, with all, effect is either existent or non-existent and hence they

will be riding on the same horns of dilemma. Then how to rebut this dilemma? But we pass through the horns of dilemma. Because our birth and destruction do not require manifestation and disappearance. Our manifestation of birth is birth itself. Therefore 'pot is produced' and 'production is manifested' both mean the same thing; it is production itself. This is agreed to by both ancients and modern practical men.

Then again follows a very hot attack and counter attack till the opponent is silenced. A feasible interpretation of the Adhikarana is given which is consistent with the whole trend of thought that runs from beginning to end.

As for the question of God's omnipotence and his dependence on accessories for creation of the world, we do admit the potentiality of Brahman which is unlimited and independent. Hence he has the capacity of creating even dispensing with the accessories of creation. Yet he undertakes creation with the fixed aid of dependent accessories, which subordinately contribute to this huge creation, at his sweet will. This world is quite different from Brahman who is only its agent cause and is different cum non different from the material cause. Men in the

world are like hired servants and are at the mercy of their Master. And they cannot avoid doing the most undesirable and inadvisable thing, being caught in the grip of the master. But Bramhan is not like that. He is able to throw away that which he does not like. Brahman has been bound by this self imposed bondage at his own sweet will before and now, as a manifestation of his own unlimited joy.

Now begins Itara Vyapadesha adhikarana.

Acharya has offered commentary, on the Sutras called Bhashya and then begin a logical elucidation and critical review of other interpretations in the form of Anuvyakhyana. Here Acharya reviews his own Bhashya and reconciles apparent contradictions and inconsistencies.

Here the topic of the soul's freedom of will is taken for discussion. In Bhashya the topic of this Adhikarana is mentioned as the denial of the doctrine of the freedom of will (कर्तृत्व) of Jeeva or soul, though it is propounded in Shruti. But here Kartritva is justified. Hence there is seeming contradiction between the two interpretations.

Sutrakara himself concedes freedom of will to Jeeva (कर्तृशास्त्रार्थवत्वात्). Hence Freedom is

conceded to Jeeva within the bounds of Divine will. But Logic is stern and does not allow this sort of diluted initiation and limited freedom.

Now an attempt is made here to cut the Gordian knot. Acharya accepts the second alternative that Jeeva has limited freedom of will and not unlimited freedom.

The sutra कृत्सनप्रसिद्धिः निरचयत्वशब्दकोषोवा denies categorically Jeeva's freedom of will. For this freedom is co-extensive with the whole power of Jeeva or only with a part of Jeeva. That means wherever there is exercise of will there the whole of Jeeva is engaged. That means Jeeva while even lifting a blade of grass employs his whole of self which is absurd. To avoid this if you just amend it and say only a part of Jeeva is engaged you are falling in another pit. Jeeva is partless but you are committing yourself to a theory that Jeeva has parts which runs counter to Shruti (अथ यः सज्जीवः सनित्यः निरचयः) which declares Jeeva to be partless.

Jeeva is partless and yet he adjusts his essential power to the need of the work on hand. This he is able to do only with the interference of Bhagavan Vishnu who gives Jeeva strength to regulate his essential energy to the need of

the work. Hence in every activity of Jeeva there are two factors which must be clearly recognised; viz the soul's subordination to the will and working of God and the exercise of Freedom of will of man.

Others bring about reconciliation, admitting conditions, or parts, or ignorance in Jeeva and freedom is subjected to one of them. But this is not proper. Naturally partless, atomically integrated, Jeeva is solid and whole. God alone can regulate Jeeva to express his limited energy and effort, not affecting his integrated nature. It was only his miraculous power that works this wonderful feat. Jeeva himself cannot claim this miraculous power.

In the Sutra उत्कृष्टिगत्यागतीनं Jeeva is said to have atomic size. But here the opposer has a secret intention in raising a doubt. Further Jeeva is going to be described as having various forms. But this multiplicity of forms and atomic size of Jeeva, if they are to be compatible presume partfulness and the state of absence of mutually different parts. This presumption squarely meets the opposition raised by the statement "Partlessness of soul or Violation of verbal testimony". Hence freedom of will of Jeeva, which we had relinquished in order to meet this oppo-

sition, may be reclaimed. So we need not dilute that Jeeva's freedom into freedom within the limits of God's will'. This is the intention of the opposer.

As if conniving at this the Sidhanti goes on expatiating on the question of the nature and will of Jeeva. Now Acharya in his Anuvyakhyana has devoted two and half verses to clear this point. "Ordinary products like a piece of cloth have parts; but those parts are different cum non different. For instance one thread of the cloth (which is a part) is different, even non different from another thread (which is another part), as well as from the whole (cloth). But Jeeva is not like this, and is not constituted with parts that are different cum non different. This Jeeva is one integrated whole. But inspite of identity Jeeva maintains Visheshas (a peculiar nature) which suffers variety in forms. Hence Shruti maintains partlessness of Jeevas. Jeeva is constituted with parts that are mutually identical and identical with the whole. So partful Jeevas are yet said to be partless in Shruti.

श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्. A doubt is raised in respect of Divine freedom of will. Even in the case of Brahman we cannot reasonably argue his

agency in the creation of the world. For him also it is not possible to regulate his efforts so as to suit the bulk of work on hand. He is not wise who spends the same amount of energy in producing the egg of an ant as he would spend in the creation of Brahmada. To avoid this difficulty if we agree that he uses a part of his self then we break the integrity of Brahman and offend the Shruti that propagates partlessness of Brahman.

Besides Brahman has no physical set up of body and senses to make him eligible for being creator. If inspite of all these inconsistencies you aver Brahma's agency in creation, then Jeeva also may aspire to be the creator of the world. When Brahman thus cannot be the agent cause, much less can we attribute to him creatorship of all.

In this Adhikarana an attempt is made to clear this doubt. श्रुतेष्वूपाद्यमूलत्वात्. The source of reference regarding Brahman is limited to only revealed testimony. Hence Shruti reveals Brahman to be a wonderful entity beyond the reach of other sources of knowledge. Brahman is extraordinary; and hence laws of thought cannot apply to him. His uncommon powers and extraordinary nature melt down all contradictions into sweet consistencies and coherent harmony.

Hence though devoid of different parts there is no unregulated waste of his whole energy; though only a part is engaged yet there is no contradiction of Shruti which declares partlessness of Brahman.

But others adopt this very stand yet come to a different conclusion. On account of his extraordinary power though he is partless yet the whole of Brahma does not undergo modification and hence he is fit to be the material cause of the world.

This interpretation is unsuitable; for it does not suit the context of this 2nd Adhyaya which is devoted to reconcile the contradictions arising from the tenet that Brahman is quite different from the world consisting of sentient and insentient entities; and is the supreme Lord over these and such allied things. And the topic here is not at all, his being the material cause.

Non-contradiction means reconciliation of contradictions. Now that is the reconciliation of contradictions arising from Brahman's supremacy over all, in the Second Adhyaya. In the first and second Padas directly and in the third and fourth, indirectly, such reconciliation is sought.

Now what is the purpose of reconciliation of two contradictory Shruties? is it merely the settlement of the validity of Shruties ? or is it the settlement of the meaning of Shruties? If the first alternative is accepted then Meemansa will be turned into Nyayashastra, in which only Pramana is considered and not Prameya. If so we cannot explain why reconciliation of contradictory statements about creation and other things, is sought.

There are two statements of which one states उदिते जुहोति and another अनुदितेजुहोति and then there is the process of reasoning (न्यायशास्त्र) that might be started to reconcile contradiction between these two. So also here. In the second alternative it is mere creation alone that is the topic to be considered. For it is of no use. Thus the discussion goes on.

Therefore the topic, the opposer has chosen for the Sutra, does not get inclusion in the second Adhyaya. And hence our interpretation stands justified.

Next Sutra विकरणत्वान्तिचेत्तदुक्तम् nullifies the objection that bodiless God cannot create the world. For already the sutras like आत्मनिचैव विचित्राच हि and others have proved that Brahman is endowed with miraculous power of unlimited measure and hence can be known only from Shruti. No Incon-

sistency or incompatibility stares him in his face. He who has no power directly to move in motion or activity the implements of creation, needs the medium of body to transmit propelling to these implements of production. And he whose knowledge is extraneous, needs the set of senses. In the same manner he who is not able to stand on his own legs, on account of his heavy body, needs the ground to stand upon.

Here another doubt arises namely if already this topic has been thrashed out, why repetition? To give an answer reference is made to epistemology to clear the doubt of tautology. When we discuss the topic of the source of knowledge and the subject of knowledge, we meet with such a situation. Knowledge of a particular subject is already acquired. If we seek again another source to get knowledge of the same subject it is meaningless repetition. But when there is the same source of knowledge with a different subject, there is no repetition. In the same manner when there is the same subject with different source of knowledge, there is no repetition.

Now Raghavendra makes this point clear by giving apt illustrations. In Antasthadhikarana and Akashadadhikarana the source of knowledge

(Pramana) provided by the sutra तद्भावोऽपदेशात् तत्त्वलग्नात् is the unambiguous reason which again sett'es the question in अत एव प्राणः. Here thus the Pramana is one, yet the topics are different. For in the previous Adhikaranas words referring to gods and to elements have their reason of reference primarily (प्रवृत्तिनिमित्त) in God; and in others it is subject to God. Thus it is proved that all words referring to gods and to elements have inherent power of reference to God, (They mean God). This is the topic, while in the Sutra अत एव प्राणः the words like प्राण which constitute reason for reference to life have again their power of reference in Paramatman; while the power of reference in others is subject to God. Thus words like Prana have natural power of reference in God. Hence though Pramana is one, the topics to be understood are different and hence there is no tautology. In the same manner though the topic to be understood is one, yet if the sources are different there will be no repetition. This is made clear in the coming pages.

न प्रयोजनवत्वात्

Acharya has announced that even when there is his commentary or Bhashya on the Sutras yet in order to elucidate what has been

told there, he composed another commentary called post vyakhyana (अनुव्याख्यान). Hence what has been said in Bhashya as सदाप्रवृत्तिः is explained here at length. So an objection is formulated on the Bhasya statement; and this topic itself is called introduction to the topic of the Adhikarana.

God is engaged in a gigantic scheme of creation. But has God some unfulfilled motive behind this creation? If so he is imperfect to that extent. If not so, how can he be the agent of action in this creation without any thing to achieve thereby. This is the stand taken by the opposer.

The Shidhanti in this Adhikarana admits that there is no purpose to serve in the attempt of creation. And yet he is the most successful agent of action by being karta in the huge implementation of the plan of creation.

Now about the wording of the sutra न प्रयोजन कर्त्तवात्. This may be a compound word or it may be a group of separate words. When compounded the phrase means. "The purposiveness which we have for creation is not to be found here." When uncompounded it means 'Brahma has no purpose to fulfil by being the creator Himself' For he is one who has all his desires fulfilled. Just as wind and fire blow-and burn by nature without

being actuated by an unfulfilled motive so also God being one with desires fulfilled, has no extraneous motive in his creation. It is his nature to be employed in such activity.

When a compound word, it means that the creation has no purpose to fulfil. Thus there is no rule that all activities must be motivated. Natural activity is found to be unmotivated, actuated only by the inner urge of nature. Brahman is always engaged in the activity of creation as an expression of His inner joy. Just as an intoxicated man under the influence of wine sings and dances to express his in most pleasure, so also God manifests his delight through his creation. But it may be objected that a man, sober and intelligent, has never engaged himself in futile or purposeless activities. God is all awareness and extremely sober and of unclouded intelligence and cannot waste his time in a thankless task. Jayateerth gives a beautiful illustration of voluntary activities of limbs of the body. A man fully absorbed in talking or speaking, indulges in gesticulations of movement of fingers or other movements of body swayed by the delight of his expression, So also he has a natural proclivity and unintentional tendency towards eternal creation which in no way affects

his natural freedom. Hence Shruti declares that all-covering activity of God is most pure as it is unintentional and expressive of his inner joy.

Raghavendra helps us to construe the Shruti देवस्यैषस्वभावोयं आत्मकामस्य का स्पृहा. But the construction should be from all sorts of defects of limited brains. Here we find repetition of the ugly type viz अय and एषः both meaning 'this' (This is the nature of God ; what must be the intention of one who has all his desires fulfilled)

Jayateertha hence explains the meaning of एषः as इच्छा or desire. Raghavendra supplies the grammatical derivation of एषः to mean इच्छा. The root is इच् in the sense of 'to desire' (इच्छायाम्). In the formation of an abstract noun the termination ध्वं is suffixed. Then there is Guna change (by the rule पुण्त लघूपवस्त्वच) and the final form is एषः meaning 'desire'.

Here some other interpretations are taken for critical review. They are of Advaitins and Ramanujeyas. A king of great exploits indulges in games merely for its pleasure, so also the supreme Brahman who does creation and destruction merely by willing (without any efforts) does it for the sake of pleasure. Thus for some, it is pleasure for others it is enjoyment. These ideas

are treated as the objector's view and they are categorically denied by the statement in Shruti that it is expression of Nature with no purpose behind it.

Again God is said to possess some purpose for his activity; for authorship and purposiveness are intimately associated. One who is the doer or author must have some purpose.

This concomitance of doership and purposiveness (like smoke and fire) is subjected to close scrutiny. Now purposiveness is further analysed into three alternatives. 1) One's own purpose or 2) Other's purpose or 3) Purpose common to both. In the first alternative the concomitance is violated. For men of mercy, are moved to do something for others. Hence even without self purpose doership is found. Now in the question of imposition, there must be concomitance between the imposer and the imposed. Here the activity of the merciful, imposes self purposiveness. This is proved false in the very instance of the merciful. If adversely concluded (He is not self purposive; so let him not be active) the absence of self purposiveness is not concomitant with absence of self purposiveness. This is proved in this very instance.

If it is objected that the merciful have no self-purposiveness as far as life in this world is concerned; yet some Punya accrues to them for their meritorious deeds. Then the examples of beasts are cited to show that beasts are engaged in the activities of feeding their young ones instinctively.

Now in the second alternative, certain voluntary activities of limbs are found with persons engaged in their own activities, and they have no purpose of others to serve.

Thus observed Brahman also, is engaged in creation, not for his selfish interest, but for the good of those who depend upon him.

Therefore the third alternative also is not sound. For in the activities of the merciful and the foolish this rule is violated.

As Brahman is one who has all d'sires fulfilled, he has no selfish purpose behind his cosmic activities. Raghavendra has formed a concomitant rule, like this. God is not engaged in activities inspired by some motive or purpose. For all his purposes are fulfilled. He who has his purposes which are to be achieved by his activities, fulfilled, will not be engaged in those activities, for that purpose, which can be achieved by those efforts.

Those who are well-versed in cosmology are of opinion that "Creation by God depends entirely on his sweet will or desire."

Here some show their unwillingness to accept this theory of cosmology. Of the three functions of mind ज्ञानाति, इच्छाति and करोति cognition, Emotion and volition, only cognition or intellect is enough for the creation of the world. For cognition alone is the uninterrupted flow of creative action in the case of God. This objector denies both emotional activity and volitional activity in God. But others are there who accept both cognition and volition but reject emotion of God in creation. His contention is, what we call doership is nothing but effort which is settled to be the meaning of the termination (of the verb आव्यात). The grammarians also have declared that the terminations (तिङ्ग) coming after the root mean भावना which is nothing but प्रयत्न or effort. (लःकर्मणिचभावेच अकर्मकेभ्यः).

Now this effort requires intellect (cognition) for two purposes. For its production and for the affiliation of object. That which is the object of knowledge or cognition should be the object of volition or effort. That is how the object is affiliated to effort.

Like God, his effort also is eternal and hence it does not need cognition for production. But as shown above for the affiliation of object to effort, cognition is required. For there cannot be any effort without its object. Nor the effort has a tendency of natural association with its object. Then volition or effort would be of the nature of cognition. (Which is naturally associated with its object). Hence as all activities of God can be explained on the basis of cognition and volition there need be no emotion in between. Emotion cannot bring about affiliation of object to effort. For Emotion of itself is not associated with its object. Thus those who reject emotion as a constituent of the cause of creation, explain the Shruti काण्डा as condemning तत्त्वं the whole of it.

To this the rejoinder is that it is a well established fact that God uses the faculty of feeling or desire in creation. For it is warranted by very strong evidences. Now the objection against Divine desire is raised by apostles of Modification, Illusion and such other tenets. In opposition to these the Sidhanti propagates his tenet that it is the divine will or desire that is the cause of creation.

Those who are well versed in cosmogony have come to the conclusion that it is the desire of

God which is the cause of creation. Creation is not modification of Brahman, nor is it the wrong appearance of Brahman (as its locus) as world. Nor again Time and such others have created this world.

World is only the happy resolution of God. Resolution is creation means it is dependent on His resolution. Shruti announces that God's desire is redundant in creation which can be worked out by God by his cognition and volition or effort.

Besides inferences also offer us many syllogisms to prove the existence of desire in God. Every conscious being is endowed with desire, being a soul. In the same manner we can infer desire in God by the existence of knowledge and effort in him. If on the analogy of ordinary beings, desire is inferred in God, misery also can be inferred? But there are evidences to prove that God is not miserable and hence we reject that inference which proves misery in God as unreliable and invalid. In the same manner there is opposition of evidences when desire is rejected in God. Had God been bereft of desire all Vedas would not have God as their main import.

Again to ascertain the existence of desire on its pragmatic utility is putting the cart before the

horse. When a certain thing is proved to exist by other evidences we need not wait for its use to prove its existence.

If every thing is to be accepted depending on its use then even intellect might be denied existence. For God can very well be said to have created the world by innate power. But this is not found true in life, the objector might plead. Then it may well be argued, that we do not find an indifferent (desireless) intelligent man undertaking any work. Nor is it just to accept knowledge (intellect) for the affiliation to the object. For desire also can seek affiliation of its object, as does knowledge. Then again it is no use saying that intellect and desire will have to be accepted as identical. Intellect, if to be different from desire, is found so on account of its nature (बुद्धित्व). If some thing gets related with its object through some medium, and if this fact becomes the creation of its distinction from other objects, then there will be no distinction between desire and effort as both seek their objects through another medium. But really there is difference between the two, because of their intrinsic natures. (इच्छात्म and प्रयत्नत्व).

Again another counter argument was flung in the face of the opposer. That was : " if God is

not endowed with desire let him not be the import of all the Vedas. But this is not based on sound concomitance.

This objection is not sound. For the main intention of Shruti is to provide for the release of the bound. Release is the result of the grace of Bhagavan. Grace can be had at his sweet will. This provides a sound concomitance of Desire and import of the shruti. There are also express Shruties which state the existence of desire. If such desire is not there; how can he be the main import of shruti?

Therefore it is quite essential to accept the theory that God is endowed with desire as stated above. Thus if God has no desire then he will not be a means of our release. He who is no means to Moksha cannot be the topic of Moksha-Shastra. Thus Shruties have no purpose of Moksha and have no subject matter for treatment. Shruties that are accepted as valid evidences shall have to be discarded as invalid.

Here arises a question of Epistemology. A treatise without a topic may really be treated as unreliable instrument of knowledge. But how can such a treatise be invalid on the ground of absence of purpose?

No doubt validity in general is not concomitant with possession of purpose, or purposiveness. But validity of a sentence (a particular type of it) is bound with purposiveness. For a sentence is meaningful when it has words connoting meaning. And in order to prove the validity of the topic of the sentence, Purposiveness is essential. Therefore when we deny purposiveness which is more pervasive, we shall have to deny the validity of the sentence which is less pervasive.

Raghavendra adds a useful note to this. Purposiveness is that which states a purposeful meaning. For it is said that of means that determine the import of a sentence purposiveness is one. (उपक्षेपसंहारावभ्यासोऽपुर्वता फलं । अर्थवादोपपन्नोच्च लिङ् लात्पर्यन्तिंये).

Now take a sentence which apparently states the identity of Brahma and the soul. We must find out whether sentence purports to state identity or wealth of attributes of Braman. We know if before a king a man says that he is a king, he is punished. But if he praises the king mentioning his merits, the king bestows upon him rich gifts. Thus “the sentences which determine the rich attributes of Brahman, are valid”. (This is stated in तदगुणसारत्वाधिकरण.)

In असभवस्तु सतोऽनुपत्ते: a sentence like असतः सवजायत states apparently the fruitless birth of the Lord. So this meaning is rejected; and the meaning of a fruitful birth of Vayu is accepted in its place.

वैष्णवं धृण्ये न सापेक्षात्वात् तथाहि इर्शयित्वा

God has created this world with beings having different bodies, senses and their objects; and pleasures and pains. In this creation of variety does God depend upon the Good deeds and bad deeds of the beings or he does not ? In both the cases, he is not free from blame. And hence he cannot claim to be an all creator. If God creates variety depending upon the objective merit God is not independent. If on the other hand he creates of his own accord then there is favouritism and cruelty accruing to God.

This is the opposer's view. In the former Adhikarana opposition of Reasoning which was pointed out against the result in the form of purposiveness, is now being nullified. Hence this Adhikarana is connected with the previous one sequentially.

The alternative of dependence on the good and bad deeds is accepted; and then the consequential defects are shown to be hollow.

सर्वथमौपपत्तेश्च

On the analogy of ordinary souls having imperfect qualities, and having defects, even the supreme soul Purushottama is suspected of being imperfect in his qualities and of entertaining certain defects, on a smaller or larger scale. This is the opposer's view. This is the topic of this Adhikarana. This shows how this Adhikarana fits in with the present Pada. Shri Raghavendra explains what is meant by 'on a smaller or larger scale', in reference to the topic of this Adhikarana.

"The Supreme Chetana is not endowed with all perfect qualities; because he is a conscious being like the ordinary soul. He has no immunity from defects; because he is a conscious being like a soul". This is an argument on a smaller scale or proportion. "God does not know fully well all things in this world; has no perfect bliss and perfect strength; has no perfect immunity from weariness and fatigue; no perfect immunity from misery. For he is a conscious being like an ordinary soul". This is an argument on a larger scale.

This objection is critically scrutinised in this Adhikarana. Acharya has not made this point clear in his Bhashya. Because there merely a

Shruti is cited as suggested by the word च in the Sutra. No inference or reasoning is adduced. Sutra suggests by the word उपपत्तेः that a reasoning must be adduced.

Now Shidhanti in a preamble offers an explanation to show the hollowness of the opposer's reasoning. For a thing is not obtained due to lack of liberty; or lack of earnest desire. In the same manner a man does not give up a thing because he is not free to do so; or has no desire to give it up.

We know that God has complete liberty in all things, and being wise has earnestness to express joy and to be conscious of being free from defects. Hence it is concluded that he is perfect with attributes of unlimited joy and others and has immaculate immunity from sullying blemishes.

These very thoughts when expressed in formal syllogisms carry the full weight of reasoning and also convince the hollowness of others' counter arguments.

THUS ENDS FIRST PADA OF THE SECOND ADHYAYA

Now the second Pada of second Adhyaya begins. In this Pada other systems of philosophies like sankhya and Vaisheshika are critically

reviewed. For they adversely affect the conclusion arrived at in the first Adhyaya that, all Shrutiies in the highest primary sense connote Vishnu to be Brahman of the sutras, as he is the agent cause of creation, being perfect with all attributes and completely dissociated from all impurity. So the adverse criticism of the Vedantic view is taken for close scrutiny in the Second Pada, in order to reestablish the infallibility of the sources, called forth in the first Adhyaya to conclude Brahman to be the undisputed import of all Shrutiies.

Others give the context in a different manner. An establishment of one's view is made by one's own argument in favour of one's view and contradicting others' views. In the first Adhyaya one's own argument in favour of one's own view is given. Counter arguments against it are nullified in the first Pada of the second Adhyaya. Here one's own view is established and then other's views are surveyed in the Second Pada for refutation. Now contextual reference is not reasonable. The refutation is nothing more than disproving the validity of their sources which were Smriti and others and have been fully refuted in the first Pada. So in that respect there is nothing to be done in the second Pada.

Thus many other such references are to be shown out of tune with the one thought that is running from beginning to the end.

Then Acharya slowly treads the ground and wins it inch by inch as it is keenly contested. He traces opposition from four sources. 1) Smriti 2) Inference 3) Inferences helped by Shrutiies 4) multifarious inferences.

But all these singly or jointly cannot dislodge what has been established in the first Adhyaya, by deriving the meaning of all Shrutiies by higher primary reference, that Brahman is the Chief import of all Shrutiies. Yet the ignorant are easily susceptible to doubts and are carried away by the arguments of Sankhya and others. Hence they doubt.

This sort of Susceptibility in aspirants should not be encouraged. For Shrutiies have solid validity and therefore they should not be doubted. But even then it is pleaded that there is scope for doubt. For there is scope to doubt the decision only when the sources of decisions are susceptible of faults. But the Shrutiies are eternal and hence they cannot be doubted. Then the systems like sankhya and Vaisheshikas also are eternal (अनादि कालतोष्ट्रृताः समयादि प्रवाहृताः). If

shruties are essentially eternal, the systems are continuously eternal as they have suffered breach in the middle. Still continuity is there though broken now-and then. Hence when supported by plausible arguments the systems dislodge the decisions of the ignorant and sway them to the other side. Hence the doubt of the opposer becomes worth consideration. Now Vedavyasa in his Brahmasutras shows that these systems like Sankhya and others are founded on erroneous knowledge and hence they are baseless.

These tenents are not only based upon misconception and misunderstanding, but also there is positive misrepresentation with a motive of deceiving others. Hence it is incumbant upon the Sutrakara to expose the faults and foul game. This was done before in the first pada briefly. Here he undertakes to do it elaborately. So this Second Pada is an elaborate exposition of the first Pada. Enlightning the ignorant is of course a very noble purpose. Against those who believe in vedas and yet differ from Vedanta School, are used sound arguments which invalidate the opposite arguments and not yet assailed by them together with statements from vedas. In some places the sutrakara forces his opponents (if they

do not accept the validity of the vedas) to accept the validity of the vedas.

Still their ill concieved systems have been continued since long; because men of unclouded thinking are few; the mass is ill-informed; the ruling class is fully under the influence of infatuation and through imperfect guidance they are steeped in erroneous knowledge; and a sort of hatred is nourished against highest Reality and often against those who know it. Besides there is the continuous flow of mental impressions and devilish mentality rules supreme. Chiefly prejudice strongly possesses man.

Yet Vedavyasa with hope that pure reasoning backed up by well established rules of concormitance and founded on Vedic texts would disillusion the pious elite, under took this heavy task of disproving the arguments used by the different systems.

Some are eligible for Mukti and some are not. Vedavyasa's aim is to help the pious eligible and not the impious who are incorrigible. The eligible by nature are pure and pious. Therefore the knowledge of Reality which is the mental modification just now achieved, being strengthened by the essential knowledge, dispels extraneous

nescience, though beginningless, and deep rooted with the mental impression; and exterminates it. For nature proves stronger than all other extraneous forces. The inner nature becomes effective only when outside forces join it. Of course these must be aided by divine grace which provides holy knowledge born of sacred Shastras—all these embedded in pure self, shake the firmly rooted nescience in mental impressions and exterminate it. Therefore the refutation of these systems have a purpose to serve.

Now begins the refutation of the systems. First the Sankhya system which has discarded God and accepted only two entities one sentient and another insentient, is taken for consideration. One is called Jeeva and another is Jada.

Sankhya enumerates four varieties viz. 1) Prakriti primordial matter which is cause only 2) While the other is only effect. 3) While the other still is both cause and effect. 4) While the other still is neither cause nor effect. Of these the first is Primordial matter which is nothing but sattva, Rajas and Tamas all in perfect equilibrium. These three remain in their natural unmixed unsubordinated state. This is called Prakriti because it is the material cause undergoing modi-

fication. The next one is called Vikriti because it is the effect. It never becomes material cause for another effect.

At the time of creation the three Gunas as they are called, suffer disturbance. One that is powerful dominates over the weak. Then there is stir and they tend to Change into effects like Mahat and others. Thus continues a series of produced and at the same time producing some effect. From Prakriti comes out Mahat which on its part produces Ahankara which again produces a long series of effects, till the five elements are produced. These are sixteen which along with five elements and the first three become twenty four. Includidg Purusha the catagories amount to twenty five.

The Earth produces again cows and pots and trees; they again produce milk, seeds and other things. But there are not counted as different or additional entities or categories. For both earth and seeds are equally gross substances and are perceived by the same senses. And hence seeds are earth itself and milk is not different from cow and that again is the same as the earth. But as gross and subtle and perception by senses and non-perception-such distinctions are to be found

between the twenty five categories they are counted as separate or distinct.

Now the sentient Purushas and insentient things are considered as innumerable. The Sankhya adduces many reasons for the Purushas being many.

Sankhya accepts the insentient as the independent cause of creation. God is not accepted as the cause of creation. For Sentient being is deduced to be existing because the insentient creation is for some body else to enjoy. So Purush is accepted to justify the creation of insentient things. This other being is Chetana or sentient Purush. In the same manner pleasure and pain require some substratum and that substratum is Chetana Purusha. For pleasure requires one to enjoy and that one is chetana. Thus he adduces many more reasons for the existence of chetana.

But sankhyas are not unanimous in their view about chetana or Purusha. For some say that this chetana is not accepted as doer. Now doer is one who participates in kriya; this kriya means, 1) Vibration 2) Effort or 3) Modification. As chetana is all pervasive he cannot vibrate. 2) chetana has no effort; because that

is the quality of अतःकरण. 3) Nor does he undergo modification; for he is free from modification.

Some others attribute the quality of enjoyer-ship to the conscious soul while still others reject it. Though he is not a doer yet he can be an enjoyer because his nature is susceptible to pain and pleasure.

He is known to experience joy and grief. But it is argued that this soul cannot be an experiencer. Only in common talk he is said to be so. This common talk is of the ignorant mass who cannot distinguish matter from soul.

Now all this lengthy treatment and exposition of the Sankhyas is critically scrutinised. Sutrakara does not follow the order of the Sankhyas. He at once takes up रचना (or independent creation) and shows that it cannot be explained if chetana is not participating in that activity. After thus refuting the Sankhya contention the sutrakara places his own view about creation in the sutra प्रवृत्तेश्च.

The Bhashya has a different order to follow. He contends that the validity of the instrument of knowledge or evidences called forth for proof, is an important part of metaphysics and hence preference is given to exposition of those sources

of knowledge. Thus when one's view is proved, then to strengthen it other's views are refuted. The order here is thus reversed.

So it is told that because God is not accepted as a reality both the contentions of Purush being the enjoyer and not being the enjoyer are not reasonable. For it is found that the production of cloth is according to the desire of the chetana. Hence the creation of Mahat and others, being productions must be after the desire of Purusha.

For the knowledge of the Production of Mahat and others we need not depend upon the Shastra of Sankhya nor upon his arguments. Shruti is there which stands an unfailing guide to enlighten us on the production of Mahat and other things that are beyond five senses.

But desire is only a quality of Anathkarana and not the quality of chetana who does not undergo any change. Thus contends the sankhya.

The Sidhanti will prove that desire is one of the attributes of Purana himself. Here the Sidhanti argues that the production of Mahat and others are subject to the wish of the soul; for it is production like that of a piece of cloth. On this point a long discussion goes on.

Thus having proved that in the creation of Mahat and others, there is the need of the wish of Purusha or Chetana just as in the weaving of cloth there is the need of the weaver. And now in order to tackle the theory of the opponent, the sutrakara begins रचनानुपत्तेः नानुसानम्.

The Sankhya cannot cite any evidences to prove Pradhana to be the independent cause of creation. While the protagonists of Brahman can cite authorless Vedas and composed smritis and Itihasas and inferences also. The Sankhyas at the most can quote their apostles of sankhya system. But they are not reliable because they argue against a mountain of evidences of all varieties especially the Vedas. Another thing to be noted is that there are two Kapilas one is the theist who preached Sankhya lessons about God to Brahma and others, in accordance with Vedio tenets. But there is another Kapila who set at naught all the Vedic tenets and preached atheistic Sankhya system, fully based on illogical and half-baked arguments. Hence we cannot rely upon the doctrines of the Sankhyas. Besides his system is full of self-contradictions and inconsistencies. Such rank self-contradictions do not build any coherent systems. The Sankhya

belongs to the same class of thinkers as the Advaitins who have the privilege of contradicting their own statements with immunity.

But knowledge cognises either a thing as it is; or a thing as it is not. There cannot be any third kind of knowledge. If a third kind of knowledge is recognised it will be subjectless knowledge like an iron bar, which does not cognise any subject.

But Sankhya objects to this argument thus. The instrument of knowledge endowed with merit, which prevents invalidity to be produced, produces valid knowledge, while beset with demerit which prevents validity being produced creates invalid knowledge. No instrument produces both kinds of knowledge or neither kind of knowledge, simultaneously. Hence such absurd position cannot be imposed upon them.

To this the Siddhanti counter-argues that when both kinds of knowledge are not accepted for fear of self contradiction why one should be ready to accept it in the case of instruments ? But some extrinsic factor may aid an instrument to produce both kinds of knowledge. For the seed of a Bamboo produces both a bamboo sprout or a plantain sprout. The eye perceives an object as well as it recognises it. The same eye gives

us good knowledge as well as illusory knowledge. So an instrument can produce contradictory effects.

To this the Sidhanti says that an instrument cannot produce with its intrinsic nature contradictory things. Only with extraneous aid can it produce things of opposite nature. It cannot have inherent nature producing contradictory things.

Again even if aided instruments are agreed to produce things of conflicting nature, then validity will be dependent and not self dependent as already agreed.

The Sankhya concedes that perception may not be an evidence for the Prakriti to be the cause of the world. Let not Agama also be a proof for it. But inference is there to prove that Prakriti is the cause of the world.

The manifold forms have their root cause in the unmanifest (Prakriti) because there is the difference of cause and effect and also there is unity of them. The Tortoise, whose limbs are diffent from its body and yet enter into it and become unmanifest. In the same manner from the lump of earth pots and pans, when created, get themselves distinguished and going

back, the earth gets different from its subtle parts which again are distinguished from Ahankara. This Ahankara is differentiated from Mahat which comes out from the original Avyakta or unmanifest. Thus this unmanifest through a long process of evolution becomes the cause of manifold manifest forms of the world, which ultimately get themselves dissolved in the original Avyakta. The effect, existent in the cause, gets itself distinguished from it and again gets dissolved in it. Each cause possesses some characteristic capacity which produces the effect. This capacity is in the cause itself, and is nothing but the unmanifest effect. Yet the effect is different from cause. For the effects are limited in extent; and they produce pleasure and pain. Hence pleasure and pain must have sattva, Rajas and Tamas in the state of equilibrium as their Avyakta or cause.

All these when reduced to formal syllogisms proves the nature of Avyakta or unmanifest. Yet it is proved as the original cause of the rich variety of creation.

Now all this fuss of inferences proves nothing new. For Pradhana is proved to be the material cause of the world which we have already accepted (शरीररूपकविद्यस्तगृहीतेः).

If on the other hand you prove Pradhana to be the independent cause of creation the Sutrakara refutes it thus :—

रचनानुपत्तेः नानुभानम्.

Sankhya adduces the inference that the effects like Mahat and others depend upon insentient thing like the accepted Pradhana. But this inference is refuted by the Counter inference like; this world is not dependent on the insentient because it is a thing. Pradhana is an instance. When thus counter attacked no inference can prove Pradhana to be independent cause of the world.

Thus as there is opposition from inference as regards independent activity (रचना) it is not warranted by reason (अनुपत्तेः). Hence inference is not a valid proof in that respect. To attribute independent activity to an insentient thing is rank self-contradiction. ‘Therefore let Pradhana be insentient yet it may be independently active’. This sort of logical arrogance lands one into self contradiction which is the most heinous crime before the bar of reasoning. For freedom in activity is the operation of unimpeded will.

Raghavendra here enters into grammar to offer corroboration. Panini defines Kartritva as

स्वतन्त्रः कर्ता॑. But in sentences like वृक्षःतिष्ठति a tree being insentient has no freedom. Therefore the Kartritva of the tree is not real but formal. But in Tarka Tandava in the sentence रथोगच्छति the use of Ratha as subject in the sentence is considered as real and not formal. Seemingly Vyasaraja goes against Sudha. But really here Karta is not Swatantra but only active. There is activity in the Ratha. Hence it is real and not formal. So there is no contradiction between Sudha and Tarka Tandava of Vyasaraja. Raghavendra thus reconciles these two.

Now the Sankhyavadi contends that the Pradhana has no Chaitanya. But he has desire which is the cause of independent activity. This is not sound reasoning. For it is ज्ञान that creates इच्छा. (The series is ज्ञानाति, then इच्छति at last करोति.) Hence where there is desire or wish, it is accompanied with Jnana or consciousness which is chetana. Admitting the effect you cannot deny the cause. For we find both positive and negative concomitance between desire and consciousness in the same soul with the same subject, both of which are related as cause and effect. Thus when you entertain desire in the insentient you shall have to call it sentient. To call insentient sentient is absurdity par excellence.

Again one's own experience goes against such a supposition. 'I desire'. Thus desire is entertained by a Chetana and not achetana. This is the experience of Sakshi and hence you cannot doubt it.

The opponent contends that there is no such experience as 'I desire'; This is only "loose sally of speech". This is due to ignorance which is not able to cognise difference between Atma which undergoes modification and Antahkarana which undergoes no modification. Desire which is modification is the attribute of Anathkarana. As these two are closely associated, it is not possible for an ignorant layman to distinguish desire as attribute of Antahkarana and not of Atma. Antahkarana is insentient and is still called as if it were sentient. This Antahkarana has a sort of formal kartrutva and one wrongly attributes it to soul which is indifferent to it and does not possess it.

This contention of the Sankhya School is preposterous. For the experience 'I desire' is cause of such a talk in the public. And this experience is the self-luminous experience of Sakshi which is infallible and uncontradictable. Denying such self evident experience runs counter to the Sakshi's experience about this experience. For

this talk of the soul with this desire is the product of such experience or knowledge.

Another contention of Sankhya School as already noticed is that, desire or wish, though belonging to Antahkarana, is talked as belonging to Atma is due to ignorance of the difference between the two. But this talk is not due to noncognisance of difference. Otherwise Pot and Pan do not recognise each other's difference. So let pot say that it is flat and round (like pan) and let pan say that it is round like a ball with a mouth up words (like pot).

If it is argued that mere non-cognisance of difference is not the cause of This sort of verbal usage; but non-cognisance of difference along with cognisance of one's own nature is the cause of this usage of words. Pots and Pans being insentient are deprived of self consciousness or awareness. Therefore no such absurdity accrues to the Sankhya.

If so a point must be cleared here. Is this sort of conditioned non-cognizance (as stated above) attributed to the soul or Antahkarana ? This is not an attribute of Antahkarana because it is material and hence insentient and has no self-awareness; If Antahkarana claims it then

why should not Pot and pan claim it ? Then the verbal usage also is possible.

But there is Super-imposition of consciousness on Antabkarana. But a pot or a pan does not claim this. But what is the reason that creates such a distinction between Antahkarana and a Pot and Pan ? It cannot be merely the juxtaposition of the soul to Antahkarana which allows this preferential treatment to it. For this soul being all pervasive has contact with all pots and pans.

It is argued that not mere physical contact but also the sense of beneficence that is required for the superimposition of Atma or soul on Antahkarana; Such specified contact is there between Atma and Antahkarana. For it is said that the contact of these two is mutually beneficent like the contact of lame and a blindman.

If this be so even the Pot has been found to be beneficial to man. Now the other alternative is that the non-cognizance belongs to Atman. Then the verbal usage also is with reference to soul or Antahkarana. The soul remaining unmodified to the last cannot enter into this activity of verbal usage. But if this suits him then why should he not entertain desire or wish ? In the

second alternative non cognisance of difference belongs to another, to one (Atma) while verbal usage belongs to another (Antahkarana). If this is so even a pot may aspire to participate in it.

This goes on till the theory of Sankhya is sacked and searched threadbare. In the course of argumentation the topic of mind and its cognition arise. In that context it is said mind is cognised by Sakshi. For mind has no tangible form and the senses cannot perceive it. When all the senses have ceased to function, the mind is still functioning. Nor reasoning can infer it; For the accessories of reasoning are not to be found with mind (like the sign invariably to be found with mind).

In this context the Naiyayikas offer an inference to prove the existence of mind, as an intermediary between self and the senses to regulate the conveyance of sensations to the self.

Their argument is ingenious and worth knowing. 'Non-Production of simultaneous perceptions' is the reason which proves the existence of an intermediary regulating agency which is Mind. The senses, contacting their different objects, being in touch with self, and sending their simultaneous sensations, is not able to produce simultaneous perceptions. From this

we know that these sensations are properly regulated and get contact with the mind one by one and produce perceptions one by one thus mind's existence is proved by inference.

Some one here objects to this sort of reasoning; because it is faulty. For by attributing such regulating power to the self who controls the sensations and turns them into perceptions one after another you have no necessity of admitting a new entity in between the senses and self.

But such guess work leads us no where. We must base our system on sound experience even a rustic on the road knows that he has a mind. He does not make use of Logical and psychological subtleties to prove his own mind even when the ignorant man does not know that simultaneously many cognitions are produced. On the otherhand he knows that many cognitions are produced simultaneously.

If you think that they have no knowledge of many cognitions produced at one and the same time, then they will think that it is futile to infer successional operation from some other thing though they know it in the eating of a long thing called Shaskuli, that cognitions arise in series one after

another. Eating a thing which is consumed gradually because it is a long piece gives them the direct perceptions coming one after another. Yet according to your contention this series of gradual perceptions ought to have been inferred. But at the birth of direct knowledge no one goes in, for inference of the same thing.

Then another inference is chosen to prove the existence of Mind. Knowledge, pleasure and pain are born of the contact of self and mind. If contact is to be proved two things are necessary and hence (self is existing) mind must be supposed to exist if their contact is essential to prove the birth of pleasure and pain.

This inference proves only the contact of senses with self without proving the existence of mind.

Then on the strength of a statement of Shruti श्रुति or desire is proved to be the form of mind or Antahkarana, we cannot brush aside the statement of Shruti. Hence 'desire' which naturally belongs to mind is supposed to belong to self on account of non-cognition of difference (between mind-and self).

But this objection is explained away by stating that mind also entertains 'desire' and

self also entertains 'desire'. Hence there need not be non-cognition of difference between mind and self, for the appearance of 'desire' in self or Atma. Therefore no ज्ञेय अप्यहि is necessary.

There is no opposition from shruti. Thus Atma has his own desire. So being chetana he can freely enter into activity at his own sweet will. But Pradhana being Achetana or insentient cannot enter into free activity which belongs only to chetana. Hence Pradhana cannot be the independent cause of creation.

Now desire was argued to be of two kinds. Lower type of desire belongs to mind or Antahkarana. Higher type of desire belongs to Atma. It is the higher type of desire that is involved in creation. Hence independent desire which was the cause of creation belongs to Atma and not to Pradhana. Therefore Pradhana cannot be the independent cause of creation.

नानुमानं is a part of the sutra and it is now interpreted differently. Here अनुमान means 'Propogated by a man whose omniscience is proved by an inference' or a statement, made by Sankhyacharya who uses mainly inferences whose validity is proved by inference. All this means 'Pradhana known from the statement

of Sankhyacharya' which is different from the meaning 'Pradhana proved by Anumana'.

Now this Pradhana is not the independent cause of creation; because it is insentient and hence it cannot consistently be independently active. Therefore it cannot be the agent cause of creation.

Independent agency was defined as activity at one's own desire and then because such desire cannot be attributed to insentient Pradhana, it cannot be the independent agent cause of creation. But independent agency only means the state of not being actuated by any one else. Pradhana in its evolution of creation needs no other agent. Hence all the objections so long raised shall have to be withdrawn.

The opposer though vanquished has still some more arrows in his quiver. He will not stop till all those are exhausted. He begins his tirade of arguments. Mahat and other works constitute this world and they must have some original cause because they have extension and other things. Hence it was surmised that Pradhan was the original cause. It need not have another cause to produce it. For it will be an endless business. Hence it must be accepted as uncaused cause. Its freedom means 'Not having any one else a

helping hand in this 'huge work', and not 'not following one's own will'. Its absence of helping hands is proved; because there are no evidences to prove their existence.

If it is objected that insentient things have no first movement of their own; then in nature there is milk which pours out of its own accord so that the calf might get nourishment. Rain pours out from the sky and seeds different fruits in different ways (coconut, and others). River water flows down. Grass grazed turns into milk. Magnet attracts iron.

Those who postulate Brahman to be the cause of the world, do not accept this. Hence Pradhana is the prime cause of creation.

To this objection sutrakara replies :

पर्योद्दृष्टवचेत्तत्रापि.

Milk and water and many such other insentient things cannot be instances to prove that Pradhana is the cause of the world consisting of sentient and insentient things; and they cannot be instances to show the violation of our rule that chetana alone can be one fit to enter into activity according to his will. For there is a Shruti which states that Paramatma is one who actuates the world consisting of sentient and insentient entities, into activity.

Now in the instances like water, milk, and magnet given by the opposer the in-dwelling actuator is God and none else. Shruti says एतस्य च असरस्यप्रशासनं सूर्यचंद्रमस्ती विष्वलौ तिष्ठतः. Hence the statement that Pradhana needs no one else in its cosmic activity is also disproved.

Now Acharya in his explanatory verse says पयोद्बादि चतोपमा। There is आदि which is not found in the Sutra पयोद्बुवचेत्तत्रापि. But this is not an unauthorised addition to the Sutra. For आदि is used to explain the coming sutras like अतिरेकानपेक्षत्वात्. Then the sutra itself should be worded like पयोद्बादिचेत्तत्रापि. Had it been so no next sutra would have been necessary. So this is not an happy explanation. Hence Jayateertha gives another. The word आदि is added as an explanatory note to the sutra पयोद्बुवचेत्तत्रापि.

Acharya in his explanation adds च to what has been used in the sutra. Grammar allows us to use च to combine even words not used. So the opposer had used many reasons to prove that Pradhana was the sole cause of creation. All those are taken here for critical survey. One of these reasons is परिमाणात् which suffers violation (अभिचार). For Prakriti is the state of equilibrium of Sattva Rajas and Tamas. Here there is the

reason Parimana but Sadhya that it is the work of Avyakta is not there. For Prakriti is no other than Avyakta.

There need not be any objection for the thing limited in extension to be Avyakta, or the original cause. For only limited in extent alone can be the cause. Threads are cause of cloth. Besides a thing of unlimited extent, cannot be the cause. For if the whole of it is turned into one effect, then the other effect will have no cause at all. And an unlimited cause produces an unlimited effect. The cause cannot operate in part. For an unlimited thing is partless and cannot act in part.

But in Sridhanta the original Prakriti is unlimited in extent. The three Gunas are limited in extent and they are the first effect. The operation of the unlimited Prakriti is controlled by God in his extraordinary capacity. This Prakriti though unlimited has parts in it. Hence it can behave actively engaging only its part.

Besides the tenet that from unmanifest comes out manifest is untenable. To explain this Sankhya postulates some Shakti or potency which is nothing but unmanifest form of effect in the cause. But this is possible only when he can

prove that the effect involved in the cause is the potency of the cause. To prove this he runs to Satkaryavada (the effect is already existent in the cause) But that is also still pending in decision.

For this very reason his contention 'division and non-division' stands contradicted. Because this contention is entirely dependent on Satkaryavada, which stands still unproved. Things are not proved by mere postulation of some subtle tenets. Rather the other way is true. First we want proved data; then we can build our tenet on the basis of that data.

Others like the Tarkik also has a tenet of his own called विभाग and अविभाग; which he adduces as reason to prove the existence of atoms (परमाणु) in Udayana's Kiranavali. Raghavendra comes to our help to understand this tenet. He quotes Kiranavali (स्थूलकार्यस्य लोष्टादेः अद्यवक्रियाविभागन्यायेन विभज्यभानात्पत्तरतमादि भावात् यसो नाल्पीयः तं परमाणुमाच्छम्हे) and tells us his concept of an atom. "Take a gross thing like a lump of earth. Then go on dividing it as small, smaller, and smallest till you reach a thing, smaller than which, you do not find. That is my atom". Says the Tarkika explaining Vibhaga.

Then again he explains that this division of Part and whole is not an endless series. If it is

endless then the mountain Meru and the tiny seed of mustard would have been the same in size as both of them have an endless series of parts. Hence you shall have to admit an end to this division of parts. This fact explains ~~aswam~~ to effects after some stage.

Using this as his reason, the Tarkika argues that the bunch of atoms is the cause of creation. The Sankhya shall have to admit this causality.

The Sankhya recapitulates the stand-point of the Sidhanti and finds it a chain of illogical inconsistencies. For the Sidhanti said that 'desire' really belongs to Atma and not to insentient Pradhana and cited 'experience' as evidence to prove it. But when Shruti was summoned to refute it, he accepted the theory of two kinds of kama or 'desire'; one was attributed to Atma and another to Antahkarana and thus explained away Shruti contradiction. Then he relinquished the theory that desire was the attribute of Atma only and not of the insentient.

This is compared to the foolish and futile attempt of a man who took to a round about by-road during night to avoid octroi duty collected at the small cottage on the road. But early in the morning inadvertently he came to the very

cottage where duties are collected. This is called घट्कुटी प्रभातन्याय. Raghavendra beautifully explains this Nyaya in a style, simple forcible and charming. ‘यशपाणे किञ्चित् शुल्कं दत्त्वा गंतव्यस्थानं घट्टमुच्यते । तत्रत्यं शुल्कग्राहिणां राजभट्टानां सूक्षमगृहं कुटीयुच्यते । घट्कुटीयिहाय पागांतरेण गंतुं रात्रावृत्तिसानी पागांजानहेतुना घट्कुटीयोप्रभातं उदयं अनुसरति “Ghatta is that place where the travellers have to go having given some tax (शस्क). Kutee is that small place where the servants of the king who collect that tax, reside. (The travellers) they get up at night to go by another road to avoid this toll and not knowing the road come to the same toll when day breaks”.

But there is a reply to the serious objection. Sidhanti says that he concedes two kinds of desires : one is the attribute of Atma and another is modification of mind. For the experience अद्वकामये which is the experience of Sakshi proves irrefutably that Atma is the master of mental 'desire'. Mind is only the material cause for that desire. Just as the crop has for its material cause the field, and yet belongs to the farmer and not to the field, So also Atma is the master of the mental desire.

But this is like the attempt of a man who tries to join one end (to something) and finds the

other end disjoined. For in order to disown doership of the insentient, the Sidhanti agreed to accept the mastery of Atma over desire. If so God is not the Master of the desire of a potter (his desire is the modification of his mind) and hence God is not the creator of the pot. For the potter is the real master over his desire which is the modification of his mind. But elsewhere God is said to be all doer.

Now the question arises whether all-doership belongs to God or not. In respect of such work as the creation of Mahat and others, as it is impossible for Jeeva to create, we may admit God is the creator of such huge tasks. But in the case of pots and pans it is the soul that is found to create them according to our experience and hence God need not be accepted as the creator. Therefore God is not the all-doer in the sense of creator of all small and great things.

When this doubt arises the answer is that if soul is accepted as the doer of all things, experience goes against it, because the soul, of himself cannot achieve his good and avoid his evil. Hence we must accept God as all doer, on account of his inconceivable power. He is an independent

creator and not the soul. Therefore it is proved that God is the all doer.

\$\$\$\$

It is so very easy to prove God's supreme mastery over the 'desires of all'. For man with his limited mastery over his desire can be the doer of his limited work. But God is immanent in every such agent of work. The potter is the master of his mind. Hence he is the creator of the pot. But God also resides in the body of the potter. And by his own desire and knowledge and effort God creates knowledge desire and effort in the mind of the potter. Then God actuates and animates the potter's outside senses and creates pot. The potter gets least mastery over the work. For it is God who lends us knowledge, desire and effort. Thus doership is secondarily in Jeeva while it is primary in God.

Jayateertha quotes Bhagavata to corroborate this truth. Raghavendra elucidates this quotation by offering context, so that the meaning comes home to the mind of the reader. In the Fifth Skanda in the tenth Adhyaya there is a conversation between Jadabharata and king Rahugana. Jadabharata had been forced to bear the Palankeen of king Rahugana. But Jadabharata was the most detached, unassuming, and one completely

surrendered to the will of God. In his detached forgetfulness he did not properly attend to his forced labour. Rahugana roughly took him to task and severely reprimanded him with a warning that he was slighting the presence of his master, the king. So Jadabharata tells him the bitter truth that the relationship of master and servant between man and man is only formal and incidental. Real realtionship of master and servant is to be found between God Hari and man, as God Hari is the real master and eternal master over us, his eternal servants. Jadabharata tells the king bluntly that he is working under an illusion that he is God. And under the influence of that illusion he threatened to punish Jadabharata. So he told the king that absolute mastery over all, is a foolish assumption of the king. That attribute bears real significance only in God. For it is Hari who is to be meditated upon with undivided mind to get Mukti. So Jadabharata concludes that Hari is his real Master and the King is only a preposterous pretender.

Now the Sankhya uses the last missile of argument. All that has been hurled against Sankhya does not amount to a positive and serious flaw in his argument. For what has been agreed to, by

him about Pradhana is in a spirit of benefaction and kindness to those who are in misery. It was argued against Sankhya that if desire belongs to Antahkarana, then the desire of Moksha also belongs to Antahkarana and not to Atma who gets Moksha. This upsets all rules about means and ends. It is a rule that the desire of end, the means applied, and its fulfilment should all be found in one man. Otherwise there is anarchy of the rule of effort and award of fruit. That one is to make efforts and the other is to reap their fruit' is a bad Government.

The Sankhya says that this blame, as everything is done in good spirit, does not amount to serious draw back. For with a good intention, Pradhana assumes independent agency of creation in order that the souls or Purushas might get Moksha. Great men of benevolence are seen to undertake work for the benefit of others.

But we must note that no benefactor tries to bring his own ruin upon himself. For the Moksha of Purusha means the ruin of Prakriti. Besides Purusha does not get any accretions from Antahkarana nor has he any activity. So how does he get benefit from Antahkarana ?

Even this does not convince the Sankhya. He argues that a sentient creature may seek self interest and may avoid self-ruin. But insentient Pradhana, should not be expected to make these nice distinctions.

If it be so then it cannot be expected that Pradhana might seek the interest of Purusha also. If it is the nature of Pradhana to try for the Moksha of Purusha, then Purush should never suffer from bondage.

Thus refuting the atheist Sankhya, Sidhanti now refutes those Sankhyas who advocate doership of Prakriti and yet admit enjoyership of Atma. If thus doership and enjoyership are assigned to different persons, the first thing is that this is not found anywhere. If on the other hand Prakriti is assigned both, then all sacred texts which declare bondage and release or Moksha to Atma, are contradicted. Thus Sankhya is approaching Mayavadin. For they also recognise the soul to be mere consciousness without any attributes like doership or enjoyership and hence very nearly non-existent and assign doership to insentient Avidya. The Sankhya no-doubt recognises multiplicity of souls. Why! Mayavadi also recognises many souls! Those who admit

many Atmas). Hence the Sankhyas also are to be discarded.

(Brahma Sutra 2-2) (अन्यत्राभावाधिकरणम्)

The theist Sankhya says that God has power to favour the material cause Prakriti. He is omniscient, free from misery and the binding of work. That Prakriti has power to become the material cause. Jeeva has power of procreation being favoured with body and a set of senses. Iswara or God stands amidst these like rain. Pradhana has independent power to become the material cause. The Jeeva also is independent in his power. Merely by his presence he sows the seed.

Shri Vedavyasa himself refutes this baseless theory. अन्यत्राभावाच्चन्तृणादिवत्. In Prakriti and Purusha and in the seed there is no independent power of the field or of the seed or sowing the seed. For it is God Hari that animates all those powers. This is very well treated in the shruties.

Then comes the next Sutra अस्युपगमेष्यथाभावत्. Some have interpreted this sutra in a different way. "Formerly it was proved that Pradhana could actuate itself. Now even if its actuation is accepted still it serves no purpose". But this

interpretation is not sound. For had it been correct the Sutra ought to have been only अप्रभावात्

The topic of this Adhikarana is to be introduced here. Charvaka or the Materialist contends that Pradhana being insentient might not be the cause of creation. But, he says, a body is sentient and hence it has every claim to be called the original cause of creation. Hence there is no need of God. This contention of the materialist desires the existence of God and hence knocks the bottom out of theism and theistic philosophy.

Raghavendra derives the word चार्वक. The advocate of materialism is Brahaspati who is famous for his sweet tongue. He easily captures the mind of uneducated mass. The feminine of चार्व, is चार्वी. Add the termination ाक् to it. ई is dropped and we get the form चार्वक the follower or disciple of Brahaspati. The creed of चार्वक is that there is only one instrument of knowledge and that is perception. In respect of pleasure and pain in respect of minutest lines of pots and pans or in respect of any knowable thing the only means of knowledge acknowledged by him is perception.

If any one objects to this perceptual positivism on the ground that certain things are not

manifest to senses, charwaka calmly replies that things are considered as existent only when warranted by evidences and proofs. God for instance is not perceptible; and hence he is not existing. Hence there is no soul other than body. The highest values in life are pleasures and wealth.

But when thus if the Charwaka, impelled by his positivistic zeal, denies all imperceptible entities, it goes hard for this Indian Positivist to move an inch in the field of philosophical discussion. This materialism is a science and requires systematisation, and presentation so as to catch the imagination of the mass. If not what is the use of doctrine-building. Now a systematic science must have an attractive topic and a valuable purpose. The purpose is unrealised so far and is yet to be realised. Such a thing is beyond senses. So the topic also is imperceptible. When the system has no topic to deal with and no purpose to realise no intelligent man pursues it seriously.

Now Atma or soul is distinctly known to be different from the body only by perception. The perception 'my body' proves body to be different from the Atma 'I'.

The materialist comes to agree that Atma is existent and is different from body. Still he

cannot concede the existence of highest values in life other than riches and pleasures and the means to realise them. For there are no evidences to prove their existence. If inferences and Shrutiies are cited as the instruments, the Charvaka does not accept them as valid proofs.

So the Shidhanti, asks him what evidence proves that perception alone is the valid means of knowledge. If Charvaka agrees that inference and verbal testimony which prove the validity of Pralyaksha, are valid; then why does he not agree that inference and verbal testimony also prove the validity of veda ?

Now there is again a side issue that "that which apprehends knowledge also apprehends its validity naturally". This does not mean that Sakshi which apprehends knowledge apprehends it only as valid. If it is so, the Sakshi apprehending knowledge arising from the statements of Budha as valid, will consider Vedas as invalid.

Hence no arguments can be adduced to prove the invalidity of inference and the verbal testimony.

Thus this doctrine has neither purpose nor subject matter. For it does not accept the existence of God and religious merit which are

beyond senses. We must be very indifferent to its propogation.

पुरुषास्त्रवदिति चेत्थापि.

In this Adhikarana the topic for discussion is that some, among atheist sankhyas, expound the theory of creation by Pradhana graced by the presence of Purusha or Atma. Then this ought to have been treated just before Anyatrabhavadhikarana. But this topic is taken for treatment as an extra-doubt. For just as the body with the presence of Atma brings a stone, so also the Pradhana itself with the presence of Atma does the work of creation of Mahat and others. This is the extra doubt, still as Pradhana has no knowledge and desire and effort of its own, being insentient, this system also has the same flaws in the ideas that were shown before in रचनानुपत्ते.

Besides in this theory Atma plays the second fiddle to Pradhana. This is found contrary to our experience. For we find that Atma plays the first fiddle, for he is sentient. And this is a flat refusal to accept universal experience.

But Raghavendra warns us that the Sutra²¹ kara accepts Swatantrya to Jeeva only for the sake of argument. Really speaking Jeeva is dependent and never claims independence. For this point is made clear in the coming Sutras where-

Jeeva has been shown to have no independence in existence, activity or knowledge.

So Jeeva is not the creator. It is Ishwara or God who is independent and hence is the creator.

Next, another School of Sankhyas is taken up for critical survey. They believe that Purusha is the creator; but he is graced with the presence of Prakriti. And this truth was known to them through inference: 'Mahat and other evolutes are evolved by Purusha with the gracious presence of Pradhana; because it is some work like the bringing of stone'. We find some improvement over the previous doctrine in which Prakriti was the creator, with the gracious presence of Purusha. For we find here Purusha playing the main role helped by Prakriti which is warranted by our experience. Purusha can very agreeably be the doer as found in our life. Prakriti is subordinate to him because in the absence of Purusha as in sleep the body lies down without being able to move. When the physical set of senses and body are inactive Purusha alone cannot do any thing; and hence the necessity of the presence of Prakriti. So Iswara is of no use in the creation of the world.

The Sutrakara objects to this theory. For he asks this type of Sankhya a question, whether at any time Purush is independent or not. If the first alternative is accepted then Purusha is the chief doer and Prakriti is subordinate to him and still he is not completely independent, then he shall have to accept one different from these two who is absolutely independent and this is our Paramatman. For this Purusha is not able to actuate and impel Pradhana into creative activity.

Here a very knotty problem arises and demands our close attention. Purusha engages in his work of creation with the presence of Prakriti. This gracious presence of Prakriti is not mere existence or mere physical contact, with Purusha. But it is through instrumentality that Prakriti graces Purusha with her presence. This instrumentality also includes objectiveness and being receptacle. As 'senses' Prakriti is an object. And as body it is a receptacle.

Now the Prakriti in the form of senses must be impelled into activity as instruments. Purusha himself is unable to actuate both the senses and the body. Pradhana itself becomes senses and then like subordinate cause to Purusha actuates the senses. And hence the Sankhya argues that there is no necessity of Paramatma.

But this is not a reasonable stand. It is a rule that a thing not used by the agent cannot be called an instrument. Purusha himself is not able to actuate Prakriti in the form of senses. Hence Prakriti in the form of senses becomes a subordinate cause and animates Purusha. In one actuation one entity itself is the object of actuation and instrument of action. This is contrary to reason. For that entity shall have to exist before itself. This is as impossible as one standing upon his own shoulders. Actuation would transform a thing into an instrument. Then that instrument should actuate it. This requires actuation in actuation. This is explained thus. If Pradhana were to actuate Purush by itself becoming an instrument, it being karana or instrument itself and being used by Purusha, actuation of Pradhana shall have to be before itself. This is an absurd thing.

So we want a Purusha who, independent of Pradhana, should be able to work. Such a Purusha is Iswara or God.

Now by expounding his side as in the first Adhyaya and refuting the side of his adversaries as in the Second Adhyaya, the Sidhanti clearly represents his tenet. Then what is the use of the portion that is written after this? No doubt this

objection is found true, yet we want to show that this atheistic Sankhya tenet is very poor in its conception. Hence we try to expose all its dirty mud before the thinking Public. Further portion reveals most mean type of flaws in his system.

महवीर्वद्वाहृस्यपरिमङ्गलाभ्याम्.

This is Vaisheshikadhikarana. In this Adhikarana the atomic theory of Vaisheshikas is criticised. The Vaisheshikas no doubt admit the existence of God. Still their conception of God is highly objectionable. For they entertain doubt about the qualities of Paramesvara. They believe God has eternal knowledge, will and effort. Besides he has only five more qualities.

Now we come to Vaisheshika's theory of creation. In the great dissolution there remain the eternals to be mentioned here after, and the transient like Adrishta consisting of Papa and Punya. When Brahma has spent his hundred years, Mahesvara entertains strong desire to create the world for enjoyment of souls. The mature Adrista becomes actuated in all the souls. Then the souls coming in contact with the atoms which were divided, make these atoms join in twos. These atoms are of four kinds; atoms of earth, of water, of fire and of wind. Similar atoms alone

come together. Then only they constitute a cause to bring about an effect.

The process of the creation of objects is as follows :— Two atoms of one of the four varieties being impelled as told before, come together and become one binary compound (द्वयनुक). The two atoms, that went to form it, were infinitely small and the result of that combination also was infinite in size. Therefore they are Supersensuous.

Thus when dvyanukas are formed three such binaries of the same variety when adjusted produce a triad (त्रयनुक) and this is the same as the dust mote flying in the sun beam and this is the minimum size required for visibility. Its magnitude is finite or Mahat and finite objects are made out of such triads. Again such four tryanukas of the same class join together and form the chaturanuka and so on and so forth.

There is another School which modifies this process a little and admits the theory that four dvyanukas form a chaturanuka. Thus there is no fixed number of atoms in a chaturanaka.

Then we come to the theory of causality. In the system of Vaisheshikas all positive products have three causes in their production.

One is called Samavayikarana or inseparable cause or material cause. That is the Samavayikarana in which the karya or effect resides with a Samavaya Samandha while being produced. For instance the tryanuka is in dvyanuka with the relationship of Samavaya and hence the dvyanukas are called the material cause of Tryanuka. Second is Asamavayikarana or accidental cause. For instance the contact between the dvyanukas is the accidental cause for the production of Tryanuka. Then there is the third cause which is called Nimittakarana or Agent cause. The desire of God is Nimittakarana in the production of Dvyanuka or Tryanuka,

Now the magnitude of the cause becomes the Asamavayi cause for magnitude of effect. (For any guna or karma in the material cause becomes the Asamavayikarana for guna or karma in the effect). Though this is the accepted tenet in causality yet this is modified in some places. For instance Anutva is of two types, eternal and non-eternal. This eternal Anutva which is also called Parimandilya is to be found in the four types of atoms. Non-eternal Anutva is to be found in dvyanuka. Mahatva again is of two types eternal and non-eternal. Non eternal Mahatva is to be found in Tryanuka and other

effects. Hriswatwa is to be found in Dvyanuka and Deerghatwa in Tryanuka. Some admit Hriswatva also in atoms.

Here we find the disreprency and distinction made. For the magnitude of dvyanuka is not the Asamavayikarana of magnitude of Tryanuka. The magnitude of dvyanuka is Hriswatva and Anutva. While the magnitude of Tryanuka is Mahatva and deerghatva. There cannot be any Asamavayi relationship between two dissimilar qualities.

But the magnitude in Tryanuka is considered the Asamavayikarana of the magnitude in Chaturanuka. Why this distinction ? This objection edis rais by sutrakara in the sutra महदीर्घवद्वा-हृस्वपरिमंडलाभ्याम्.

Sutrakara means to say that though Vaiseshika system is expounded with all its ramifications still there is lurking logical weakness at its very core. That disreprency is already shown. What does Mahat mean? This word is used to show a substance like Mahat born of Prakriti. Here Mahat is used as an abstract noun Mahatva which means परमाण or magnitude.

So the whole argument melts down to this. "The magnitudes of binary and triad are produced

by the magnitudes of their inherent causes or material causes. Because they are magnitudes of effects. The magnitude of chaturanaka is the example. He adduces many more arguments to prove that the magnitude of Tryanuka is produced by the magnitude of Dvyanuka.

Here the opposer counters the Shidhanti that the reason adduced by the Shidhanti is found to be true only under certain conditions. For instance the reason adduced by Shidhanti is कर्मपरिमाणस्यात् because it is magnitude of an effect. Here अनपूर्व is the उपाधि or condition under which the reason comes out to prove the Sadhya. ‘The magnitude of Tryanuka is produced by the magnitude of (Dvyanuka) the material cause of its resort (Tryanuka)’. This is true only in cases where the magnitude is different from अनु or different from a substance of Anu magnitude. Now Raghavendra shows how this is a logical condition or upadhi which is defined as साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाद्यापकर्त्वं उपाधिः. This logical condition is found invariably co-existing with the major (साध्य) but not with the middle (हेतु or साधन). In the present inference the Sadhya or major term is ‘magnitude of the effect being produced by the magnitude of the cause of that effect which is its substrate’. Now the condition अनपूर्व is found in

the Chaturanuk Parimana, because it is (महत्व) different from अणु and it is not existing with साधन because in the magnitude of Dvyanuka which is the substrate for magnitude of effect there is अणुत्व. Thus it can be proved to be upadhi in other inferences also. Sidhanti in a future context shows that his inferences are not obstructed in their operation. Hence the discrepancy shown by sidhanti in the system of Vaisheshika is confirmed.

The Vaisheshika again argues that the fact that magnitude of Tryanuka is the cause of the magnitude of Chaturanuka is reasonable. For causality can be established between similar things (both the magnitudes are Mahat); but the magnitude of Dvyanuka is Anu and Hrisva while that of Tryanuka is Mahat and Deergha. So they are dis similar and cannot be related as cause and effect.

Thus if it is argued that the magnitude of the atom produced the magnitude of the binary which on its part produced the magnitude of triad; for they are all similar in nature, then, the magnitude of all will be infinitesimal and thus even Tryanuka and chaturanuka being Anu will be invisible; which is contradicted by perception.

This argument of the Vaisheshikas forces the Siddhanti to counter argue thus :— Then there is Mahat Parimana in Paramanu. Because there is Mahat in the atom therefore there is mahat in binary also. This cannot be avoided. Beginning from an atom till we reach the final product which has perceptible form and tangibility, we find all shall have the magnitude of Mahatva; and shall have to be perceptible. Or if infinitesimal they shall have to be imperceptible. But you cannot argue otherwise that the atoms should be perceptible and Triads should be imperceptible. Perceptibility and imperceptibility are contradictory of each other and cannot be co-existent

Kanada in his sutra द्रुक्तंतारम् tells us the same thing. But if they are not found in the same place how to explain that of Kuvala, Amalaka, and Bilva fruits the one which comes first is said to be Anutara, more atomic than the one which comes next ? In the same manner how to explain that, of these, the one which comes next is said to be Mahattara than the one which is first ? Of course this is layman's view. Now this sutra tells us that there is only Mahatva and no Anutva just as a piece of cloth, conch shell and crystal are said to be white, more white and most

white and the one that comes next to what comes first is said to be Mahattara and Mahattama; Anutva is used to show only great mahatva and greater mahatva and yet there is no Anutva at all. But there is only Mahatva. So to call them Mahat is of primary significance while the use of Anutva is only secondary. Anutva, is not here as it is found in atom. This is the meaning of this sutra of Kanada.

Perceptibility and inperceptibility can be reconciled with reference to different persons. So also in every thing there is Anutva and Mahatva with reference to different substances. All things have different magnitudes; and hence even an atom has Mahatva.

These two Anutva and Mahatva are relative terms. Hence there is no contrariety between these two; and they can be found co-existing in one place. In the same manner perceptibility and inperceptibility also may be reconciled. Imperceptibility does not depend upon merely the withdrawal of Mahatva; but it also depends upon the defects in the eye sight of man. Because it is so very difficult to prove that such a type of Mahatva is the cause of imperceptibility. Hence we say that, that magnitude of a substance which

enables man to perceive that substance is the cause of perception. Thus we shall set forth, not a general rule; but a particular one different with each case as for as magnitude is concerned. In the same manner when a substance of certain magnitude becomes imperceptible to a particular man, to him that magnitude is the cause of imperceptibility. Thus perceptibility and imperceptibility have reference to particular individuals and no absolute standard can be fixed.

Magnitude is thus graded in all substances. Hence even an atom might be finite or Mahat. There is lower gradation below the magnitude of a substance; and there is upper gradation up the magnitude of the substance. In both these gradations we have limits. There is limit for the lower grade as there is limit for the higher grade, and as reason the magnitude of higher grade substances is adduced, to prove the limit of the lower grade which is atomic (magnitude) and there is no particle, less in magnitude than an atom. The Vaisheshika wants to prove a thing to be atomic in size by saying 'like the magnitude of a higher gradation.'

But the question is how can this prove that the higher grade has a magnitude called Mahat (finiteness). For it proves that there is no

particle, less in magnitude than atomic. So this cannot prove the magnitude of Mahat in things of higher magnitude. Hence there is no stop even in the higher grade; then there cannot be any stop in the lower grade.

Now Mahat in the higher grade has many parts in it. Then only it would be possible to say that God's magnitude is five or six times the magnitude of Mahat.

Now here the word महत्तत्वतः is used. How is the word derived ? Raghavendra gives the derivation. This occurs in the अनुरायान् (नमहत्तत्वगुणतः एतायान् इति हीश्वरः). By referring to the magnitude of महत्तत्व we cannot estimate the demensions of Iswara and others as four fold or five fold of Mahattatva). Now if the members of this compound are महत् and तत्व then the compound should have been Mahatatva, (महत्वंतत्तत्वंच) just like Mahahrid, Because the rule is (आन्महतः समानाधिकरण-जातीययोः) when महत् is followed by a word in the same case or a word meaning a universal, the last syllable is substituted by आ so it becomes महा. For महत् is followed by तत्वं in the same case with महत्वं. And hence त् is changed to आ and (मह+आ) it becomes महा. But here it is महत्तत्वम्.

So the explanation is that the whole (महत्तत्वं) is the name of specialised substance. In the case of names and in the case of Vedic words the wise follow the usage. And to this the corroboration of Vartika is given. In such cases त् is not at all dropped (बहुलंतिण). तण् is a symbol standing for Common nouns and vedic words. When these words are used त् is not dropped. Hence the use of महत्तत्वम् is warranted by grammar.

In महत्तत्वगुणतः the word गुण is repeated here by Tantra, which means once used technically becomes doubled, by Tantra. (सकृदुच्चरितं अनेकोऽप्यकारकं तत्र) So first गुण means magnitude and the second गुण means counting or measuring. So it means that by ascertaining the magnitude of Mahat it is not possible to ascertain the magnitude of God and such others that have great magnitude of infinity. But God is unlimited in extent and magnitude. Hence we cannot measure the magnitude of God with the measuring rod of Mahat's magnitude.

In the same manner the lower grade in magnitude also cannot be fixed in the atom that it is one sixth of a triad or Tryanuka. If still it is persisted that there is a particle possessing infinite number of parts it contradicts experience. For

no where have we come across with such a particle.

Raghavendra recapitulates what has been said so far. In the magnitude of Paramanu or atom there are both higher and lower grade scales. Then a doubt was raised that there is a stop of scale in lower grade in the atom and accordingly there is also a stop or cessation of higher grade in the triad. But this was repudiated by exposing many logical fallacies; and it was established that there is higher scale as well as lower scale in magnitude and in both ways there is no end to them. Now how to prove that there was no end to the higher scale of magnitude ? Three things of positively infinite magnitude (Parama mahat Parimana) are recognised viz God, Time, and sky. Sky is here 'space' or Avyakrita Akasha. Of these time and space are apprehended by Sakshi as having an endless higher grade of scale of magnitude. In the same manner Sakshi apprehends negative infinity of lower grade scale in Time and space. For in the atom Sakshi cognises negative infinity of lower scale of magnitude.

But if this is not agreed to, then what evidence is there to prove that space and time have infinity of higher grade in magnitude.

To this the opposer might pose that inference and not Sakshi, apprehends the endlessness of higher grade in magnitude. But really speaking inference warrants us the cessation of higher grade in magnitude.

If the opposer falls back upon sacred scriptures for evidence in order to oust Sakshi from its position of evidence in this respect, we must scrutinise what this sacred text says. The text begins like this आकाश इति होवाच. The relevant portion is स एष परोबरीयानुग्रीथः स एषोऽनंतः. The pronoun एषः refers to the noun आकाशः in the previous part of it. So आकाश is said to be अनंतः. Raghavendra tells us that this interpretation is that of the Vaisheshika who does not accept the interpretation of the Shidhanti that आकाश in its higher primary sense is Vishnu and not the sky. Another point Raghavendra brings as an objection to our notice is that as the Shidhanti has already asserted that no other pramana than Sakshi apprehends the endless infinity of higher grade in magnitude, it is irrelevant here to quote sacred text as evidence. But the reply is that, as he suggests, it is a temporary concession granted by the Shidhanti for argument's sake, that he might quote Agama as Pramana. Then Jayateerth analyses the whole situation thus (एतदृष्टं भवति).

Agama does not state the endless infinity of space and time; but before Agama sets in to declare it, Sakshi apprehends it, and Agama only repeats what Sakshi has apprehended. Even if Agama is accepted as original in apprehending and declaring the endless infinity, that does not affect the position of the Sidhanti. For there in Agama अकाश is said to be अनंत which only means 'endless' or 'infinite'.

This infinity or अनंत is unqualified and hence refers to both higher scale of magnitude as well as lower scale of magnitude. Hence Agama declares both the grades to be endless in their magnitude. Therefore the lower grade Parimana of Paramanu also does not stop at it but goes on ad infinitum.

If so it is as good as attributing little time and little magnitude to God who is announced as endless in time, space and magnitude. But this objection is no objection at all. For the well versed in the Veda attribute little time and unlimited magnitude to Brahman of infinity. But in Brahman littleness and greatness reside side by side in peaceful alliance.

It is again objected that such incompatibilities and inconsistencies cannot be tolerated in

the all harmonious Brahman. Sutrakara has never even mentioned this. To this the Sidhanti rejoins that contradictions have been reconciled by Sutrakara in the sutra महदीर्घबद्धा. For he has advocated causality between things of dissimilar nature. Atomic magnitude of हृस्वता and परिमाणलय are not similar to the magnitude of Triad viz महत्व and दीर्घत्व. Yet these are produced by हृस्वत्व and परिमाणलय. For instance it is the number of two and three inherent in Paramanu which produces the magnitude of a binary. This is similar to the fact that by compactness (प्रक्षय) which is nothing but, parts coming together in close contact, produces the magnitude of a bundle of cotton. Again in variant locations the higher and lower scales of magnitude of endless infinity are propounded, one in the sky and the other in the atom. Thus in different locations, magnitude realises its higher grade and lower grade infinity. Therefore Acharya has rightly said that Brahman of even higher grade magnitude of infinity is said to have lower grade magnitude like the sky, by the Pandits of Veda.

Besides he who is not existent in a little space and in a little time, cannot be existent in all time and in all space. Not existent in various

parts of time and space amounts to complete non existence, empty vacuum.

Now let us analyse the concept of universality of existence according to Tarkika, 'contact of all material objects is universal existence and not existence in all places'. Because Akasha is Sarvagata and yet does not exist in any Substratum.

Now the parts of things like pots and pans have that magnitude of the space they occupy. But pots cannot have the magnitude of the sky. For the parts and the whole of the pot are different cum identical and not absolutely identical. If time and sky have no existence in small parts of space they are non-existing. This imposition we do accept.

If the Tarkika considers all pervasiveness as contact of all material objects, Sidhaati says he has no objection. But this leads us to the idea of limitedness in higher grade of magnitude. For contact of limited dimensions results in limitedness of magnitude which goes against the creed of Tarkika, who admits unlimitedness in higher grade of magnitude.

Therefore there is no limit to both magnitudes of higher and lower grade. Now Sidhanti takes up the question of higher and lower

magnitude of Time. He asserts that this infinity of magnitude of higher and lower grade is not only to be found in God, Time, and space but it extends to even Prakriti, Mahat and other substances of great magnitude, yet the real infinite or अनंत is Brahma or Vishnu; for he is independent and infinite in all ways. While time and others though infinite are depending upon God. So real infinity or perfectness in respect of Time, space, and quality as said in Geeta Bhashya is to be found only in Brahma and not in other infinite things. (विश्वः कालतःचेत् गुणतश्च त्रिष्णा ततिः).

Raghavendra elucidates the use of च in अनुष्ठान्यान्. First Jayateertha has explained it as अन्वाचय. Raghavendra explains all meanings of च. He says that च has four meanings, (इतरेतरयोग, समाहार, समुच्चय, अन्वाचय) of these he explains अन्वाचय as भिक्षांत्रट पांचआनय(joining one principal and another subordinate) which means 'if during the time of begging you see the cow, bring it; if you do not see, do not' Thus in the present context Acharya says, in his अनुष्ठान्यान्, (सर्वनित्ययुतंसदा) that Brahman is सदानन्दयुतं eternally infinite. Hence temporal infinity is expressed. Such eternal infinity is not to be found in hours, minutes and seconds. This definition of eternal infinity of Brahman excludes these small parts of time, but the whole (being

infinite) is not excluded. Others of infinite magnitude (like space, Prakriti and others) are not excluded. Hence there is अन्वाचय.

Or if the definition of Brahman is taken as 'Independent infinity' or 'infinity in respect of Time, space, and quality', no doubt arises as to overpervasion. But on the strength of the context if infinity is taken as infinity of both higher grade magnitude and lower grade magnitude then the definition of Brahman overpervades parts of time like hours, minutes and seconds. Hence the word सत्ता or eternal is added. Over pervasion in time should be removed by ways as already suggested.

The question of lower grade magnitude as having unlimited infinity is again raked up for critical review. Even an atom, is conceived as having parts which are again divisible into parts ad infinitum. But this conception is considered to be baseless; for atom is the last and smallest magnitude and there is no smaller substance than the atom.

This objection does not hold good. For even the atom is divisible, and its part may be divided and so on and so forth.

But what is the proof for this wild imagination ? Sakshi is the proof. But one may ask why sakshi should at all be accepted as proof ? For one of the accepted proofs like perception and inference might endorse the veracity of knowledge under question. But the truth or validity of pleasure and pain and the sky which are imperceptible is beyond the jurisdiction of such proofs as perception and inference. The opposer is obdurate and becomes ready for the worst consequence of surrendering the validity of cognition and discourse of pots and pans (for the validity of all cognitions is the subject of Sakshi only).

Or he contends that the validity of Perception and others might be proved by a general inference. "The validity of Perception and others is warranted by proof; because it is a thing like pot". Hence there need be no Sakshi a special proof to apprehend the validity of all knowledge.

To this the Sidhanti replies, that just as in the system of Nyaya, the existence of the sky is proved by a general inference first and then by a particular inference; So also Sakshi is proved by प्रसरतप्रतिषेध; The meaning of प्रसरत is if inference proves some other thing in the place of Sakshi,

then there is its प्रतिषेध or refutation of it. For in order to prove the validity of some cognition you require some inference, then in order to prove the validity of this inference, there is another and still another and so on and so forth; and there is infinite regress. This is the प्रतिषेध and hence to avoid this difficulty you shall have to admit Sakshi.

But Sakshi does not require another proof to prove its validity. For it is self-evident. By means of this Sakshi we are going to prove that even Paramanu or atom has parts because it is a substance. Even quality and action are accepted as having parts and hence there is no violation of this rule. In the same manner other logical flaws also can be removed. For instance the triad is perceived by the eye; and is produced by substances of less magnitude. Because it is a production like a pot. Thus a binary is proved to exist. In the same manner if we employ the services of inference we come to know that a binary is formed of minute indivisible particles called atoms. Thus atoms are inferred as eternally partless. Otherwise there will be endless regress. Therefore if atoms are accepted as divisible you offend the validity of that means of knowledge which has proved its existence as a partless substance.

Or as already introduced the magnitude of a Substance at last must be reduced to a least reduction so that no further reduction can be conceived. This place of least reduction of magnitude is the atom. Thus your conception of divisible atom offends the validity of this inference.

But Sakshi of unchallengeable validity perceives the parts of parts to any degree of gradation lower or higher. Hence all these inferences sink into insignificance before Sakshi of exceptional probity.

Again the services of inference have been requisitioned to prove that an atom has parts. For an atom and atomic part contact substances in all directions simultaneously. From this we can easily infer that an atom has parts.

Here Raghavendra goes to analyse the conception of physical contact. This contact is of three types. 1) That contact which is produced by the action inhering in one of the substances contacted. 2) Another contact brought about by actions inhering in both the substances contacted. 3, Contact born of contact.

First earthly atom contacting aquatic atom of dissimilar nature and then contacting another earthly atom of similar nature begins to

produce binary. Then the aquatic atom which had helped earthly atoms to produce the earthly binary gets contacted with the earthly binary. This is called contact with effect and non-effect. This is produced by the contact of earthly atom and aquatic atom and is said to have been produced by cause and no-cause contact. This is just like the contact of the tree and body is being produced by the contact of tree and hand.

But this will not make the point clear that an atom has ten dimensional contacts. Stones and other substances are gross productions made of many parts. They are made up of many atoms forming binary triads and their multiples. This proves that the solid stone has many atoms as its components. Now as atoms occupy space one atom has the contact of many atoms. This the Sakshi apprehends in tangible substances like pots and pans. From this we can infer that the contacts of atoms occupy that space because they are contacts which are found in pots. Hence one atom cannot get itself contacted with many without having many parts however minute they may be. Hence the inference is not purposeless.

Here a doubt arises that if the contact of (the whole) cloth is to be found in thread (part)

one contact is found residing in another and hence let the contact of pot be found in cloth. This is one thing and another thing is if the contact of the whole is to be found in its parts and that again in its parts and that again in its parts so on and so forth, ad infinitum, this endless regress affects the first in the series and dislodges it from its position (मूलोच्छेदप्रसंगः).

All this will be dealt with in detail in a future chapter where the whole and the parts are said to be identical. (अंशाशिनोरभेदेन त्वं जासंयोग एव हि इत्यादिप्रयंथे).

In the atomic theory we now come to the crux of the problem. It is contended that atom or Paramanu is another name for partlessness. Hence 'a Paramanu has parts' is an instance of self contradiction.

To this the reply is that 'Partlessness' is not it for calling a Paramanu, but the reason is 'indivisibility'. 'A Paramanu has parts' and is perceived by Sakehi so we cannot deny it. The reason to call it Paramanu is indivisibility. We admit Parts but its division is not possible. This indivisibility implies that there is no endless regress in division but it has some justifiable cessation in an atom and their divisibility is not in its nature and is accepted as an improbability, at all times.

Or all things or considered to have parts. These parts are not partless; but they too have parts. But it is a rule that parts that exist first become the cause of parts that come into existence afterwards. Hence if Paramanu is a product produced by its constituent parts, those parts again must have been produced by parts existing previously. But as no parts of an atom are existing, the atom could not have come into existence.

This is an objection which is logically sound and hence must be reckoned with. But Siddhanti says that though an atom has parts it is not divisible into parts inclined to be effective. They are divided only when they are not proved to produce an effect. Hence at the time of production an atom is as good as indivisible. Therefore the atom is a non-production and eternal.

Therefore there is no objection for the production and knowledge of the atom. Though it is made up of thousands of parts it is not produced by them. But it itself is the basic cause for the whole of the creation. Hence the parts of a pot are being divided till they rest in atoms. And no division continues after division into atoms.

Again the old objection that if division is endless then there will be an infinite number of

parts which go to constitute a very small mustard and a large mountain. And hence the magnitudes of both these would have to be the same though they are distinctly different.

But here there is some confusion of ideas. For by parts the objector means the parts that constitute them are the parts that produce them. This is sheer misunderstanding. But the parts that go to form the substance are different from the constituent parts which are the causes that bring about the substance as their effect. Therefore your accusation that we have reduced both mustard and mountain to the same magnitude has no value.

Now the controversy enters into very subtle regions of reason. Both agree that there is no further division from an atom. But from the atom there is the binary, triad and so on which constitute the cause of the substance and these are parts of binary triads and so on, which are infinite in number both in the mustard and mountain and hence the contention of the opponent is justified. These infinite parts are those that form the causes.

But this objection also is baseless. For there is no concomitance between the non-cause parts

and infinity. It is only with parts the constitute cause that lead to infinity. Besides in both the infinities of mustard and mountain there are not equal number of cause parts. Hence their magnitudes need not be equal.

If there is no stop to the series of parts of a mustard, then the parts of mustard would occupy the whole world, as no two substances occupy the same space. So the mustard would occupy the whole space of the world. Then there is no space for the world. This is what the opposer forces the siddhanti to agree.

This objection is not right. Because even when the earthly atoms are infinite in number yet there is space for other material substances. The mustard occupies some space and its series of parts occupy the same space. Therefore we have admitted the sky to have a limitless series of parts and particles and the lower grade infinity of parts has no limit at all.

Now we have come to the conclusion that the parts of a substance occupy the same space as is occupied by the whole of the substance. Hence there is no ground to prove that these are the cause parts to produce effects. Hence eternal substances also like Time, space, sky

have endless parts without stop in the lower grade of infinity.

The objector concedes that the cause parts of mustard and mountain like binary and triad may not be equal in number. But when parts continue without stop in both, they may be equal in number. And hence the Sidhanti will be compelled to have the same magnitude for both.

Even this objection is not tenable. For in the infinity which is the net result of both cause parts and non cause parts of both mustard and mountain, the number is not the same. In the same manner the released souls are infinite and the souls in bondage are infinite. And each one of these is less than the net result of both infinities combined. Thus there is inequality to be found in two infinities.

This atomic theory of creation, when it is not apprehended by Sakshi is sure to be invalid and not acceptable. In the same manner if inference takes to prove that which is not warranted by verbal testimony or perception, then it can as well prove the existence of non existing horn of a hare. For a valid inference must have a sound concomitance for its base which is warranted either by perception or verbal

testimony. A concomitance which is not thus warranted has no certainty about its invariability. Hence the inference based upon such a concomitance cannot be proved as valid. Hence inference cannot prove the validity of atomic theory as propounded by the Vaisheshikas.

Now the Sutrakara refutes this theory by other arguments. समवायाऽप्युपगमनच्चसम्यावज्ञस्थिते: The Vaisheshikas accept a peculiar relation between part and whole, quality and qualified, action and one having action, universal and individual and others which are quite different from the others. And this Samavaya also is different from the substance in which it inheres. Hence also they are called inconsistent in speech.

Now the rational consistency of this Samavaya is questioned and it is thrashed fully here.

The Vaisheshika argues like this:- We have a cognition 'In these threads reside the cloth'. This cognition is based on the previous relation (between the two). Because it is cognition not at all contradicted. The instance is jujube fruits in the begging bowl. Here this knowledge is produced by the perception of the relationship of threads and cloth just as the perception of the

contact of jujube fruits with the bowl produces the cognition 'In the bowl jujube fruits'.

So the concomitance must be accepted that the perception 'here is, invariably found with cognition of a relation. So the cognition of 'here' in the case of threads and cloth leads to the idea of relation of Samavaya. But this, the Sidhanti denies and says that the concomitance is contradicted because the rule of Vyapti is violated.

Now the opposer puts the Sidhanti on the horns of dilemma. The Samavaya relation between अ॒ग्नि॑ and अ॒त्॑ is existing or not existing. If it is existing already, what can violation, coming after its existence, do to Samavaya? If it is not existing where do you show the violation? In either case Sidhanti's fallacy of Violation or Vyabhichara does not stand the test.

But the Sidhanti is very clear in his conception. He draws upon the psychological process that is behind the Violation of the rule of Vyapti. Dilemma does not exhaust the alternatives. For there is a middle course. We get an apparent impression of a relation of Samavaya by inference before scrutiny. After scrutiny we shall be convinced of the fallacy of violation of Vyapti.

The judgement or conclusion is arrived at, from defective sources (defective vyapti) and hence the conclusion is found invalid. So we withdraw ourselves from the conclusion of Samavaya as a relation. And without this relation the concomitance is not available. Without concomitance there will be no conclusion of Samavaya as a relation.

This Samavaya is accepted as a relation connecting two different things. Why should they be different? In order that the cognition of 'here' should be valid knowledge, never sublated.

Again the objection is raised that the cognition that here is Samavaya between the threads and cloth, is produced by a cognition of a relation. In this cognition Samavaya is there as relation between threads and cloth and Samavayatva is the mode of the cognition and Samavaya is the object of the cognition and is the cause of the origination of another cognition. Hence there is no Vyabhichara as shown above.

But this is not true. For 'there is Samavaya between threads and cloth'; in this statement threads and cloth form the container and samavaya is the contained. Now the controlling principle of container and contained must again be a different relation. That again requires a relation

of the type of container and contained. Otherwise if a relation in general is meant then in 'here is Samavaya between threads and cloth' the cause is 'the Samavaya between threads and cloth. So also the cognition 'here is contact of a branchless trunk and a hawk', requires another contact of a trunk and a hawk'. But just as there is no other Samavaya for the first cognition so also there is no samavaya in the second cognition.

Hence the conception of Samavaya is unwarranted. Then the perception 'Here This is' no doubt seems unexplainable without the relation of Samavaya. But this very conception that 'here this is' does not require any foreign relation to be conceived. The thing itself in its own nature can contrive to justify its existence without depending upon any extrinsic relation. Because the protagonist of Samavaya at last shall have to depend upon Samavaya as self maintaining. Otherwise he shall have to face infinite Regress. Then why not admit the thing itself as self maintaining?

If a distinction is made that a Samavaya can contrive to justify its existence in its own nature by its power of self maintaining, being a relation; and the substance requires the help of an extrinsic relation like Samavaya for its maintenance, it is not proper.

To reply this objection we shall have to make a thorough investigation of the whole of the problem. One of the cases in which Samavaya conception is essential is the qualified substance and the qualities in it. But the substance and the qualities which rest in it are considered different from each other. And the Vaisheshika was not able to prove that the substance and qualities are connected by an outside relation of Samavaya. For instead of running upto a foreign relation and then admitting it as self maintaining, why not admit the substance itself as selfmaintaining ?

It is contended that Samavaya being a relation is self maintaining. But the substance, not being so is not self-maintaining. Raghavendra defines 'self maintenance' which is nothing but being both 'container and contained'. If this is not so, no relation can be established. Even physical contact being equally a relation shall have to be self maintaining.

But there is a lot of difference between contact and inference. For physical contact being transient cannot have the privilege of maintaining itself; while Samavaya is Nitya or eternal and hence it can be self maintaining.

But 'here this' perception in some places maintains itself without the help of any outside relation and hence 'the qualities here in the substance' also does not require any extraneous relation.

So long it was conceded that qualities are absolutely different from the substance in which they are said to inhere. And it was contended that Samavaya altogether different from the substance was shown not to fit in with the substance. Now Sidhanti according to his theory, postulates that substance and qualities are identical and Samavaya will be shown as unfit to be a relation between two identical things.

Now Samavaya relation is fully scrutinised. As already told Samavaya is said to exist between part and whole, substance and qualities and others. For leaving aside eternal things, between non-eternal and positive things, one resides in another by Samavaya relation. This is what Prashastapada tells us.

But Samavaya residing in Samavaya and not different from Samavaya is not possible. Because Samavaya is not different from it. Hence residence in it is not possible according to the definition of Samavaya (आवारावैयसंबंध). For one

Samavaya is not different from another Samavaya. But Samavaya as dependent may reside in Samavaya. But this dependent one is no Samavaya.

Thus discussing Samavaya to its full length in all its detail, Acharya now proceeds to present another cardinal principle of व्याप्तिः or particularity. So long it was told that unless there is difference between substance and quality there cannot be Samavaya to connect them two. But there is no proof to guarantee the difference between the two; because it is imperceptible. So you must take recourse to inference—“substance and quality are absolutely different because they are called by non-synonymous terms; like pot and cloth. But this ‘called by non-synonymous terms’ is to be in Samavaya and its qualities, though they are identical. Thus there is violation of Vyapti.

Now just as Samavaya, on account of the qualities in it; is called by different names, So also substances like pots and pans on account of many qualities and actions are called by different names though they are one, by virtue of innumerable particularities or Visheshas. (द्रव्यमेव ततोऽनंतविशेषात्मतथा सदा । नानाभ्यवहृतेर्हतुः).

Why this lengthy process of adopting a new entity like विशेष ? When there is really identity

between qualities and qualified substance, you may call the practice of these two as different, to be figurative or due to subjection to erroneous knowledge ? In the first case it is a formal use and in the second it would be a piece of wrong knowledge. But this is no solution to the problem. For formal practice once at least will have a real use. The word is not always used in figurative sense. It has its own real sense. But similar is not the case here. For they are always called by non-synonymous words. Even when to let others know that there is identity between them, Such statements are made as "Form itself is pot" and 'Brahman is consciousness' even then no synonyms are used. For there is no such experience. They are always used in practical discourses as absolutely different. Therefore when actually the things are identical and yet they are talked of as utterly different some reason must be found for this.

But this your concept of Vishesha is self contradictory. Now let us analyse the sort of contradiction introduced here. Is it the contradiction that is direct as in 'my mother is barren' or is it indirect contradiction as in 'the one created is ever lasting'.

Though the substance is one it is talked as Ananta or innumerable; oneness is identity and innumerableness is a particular number. So, as they are dissimilar they do not contradict each other. Now the second one also is not tenable. For there is no such Vyapti as 'where there is अनेकत्व there is एव. For the representative of एव viz विशेष can very well reconcile both अभेद and अनेकत्वहार. Here also Samavaya which is one is allowed to have your innumerable Vyavahar.

The opponent takes a circumspective view of both the systems and comes to the conclusion that Sidhanti inspite of all this fuss and dust raised against the other systems has not gained an inch in the investigation of truth. For Vaisheshika admitting difference between the qualities and the qualified accepts Samavaya to justify or explain such expressions as 'Here it is'. And in order to avoid infinite regress, Samavaya is advocated as self maintaining. While the sidhanti, in order to justify the use of non-synonymous words in reference to qualities and qualified a particularity or Vishesha is accepted. To avoid infinite regress in respect of Vishesha, it is accepted as self maintaining. When we find both the systems are equally balanced, one against the other, what attraction was there in

the Sidhanta Paksha to prefer it to Vaisheshika Paksha. Of course there is a series of attacks and counter attacks on both sides and they do not disturb the equilibrium maintained between the two. So to prefer the side of identity of the Sidhanti between the qualities and the qualified is sheer favouritism.

To this objection of the Vaisheshika, the Shidhanti replies that Vaisheshika accepts seven categories. Of these six are Bhava Padarthas or things and the seventh is Abhava or non-being. The qualities perceived in Samavaya are not different from Samavaya. But they are the particularised nature of the Samavaya itself, known as visheshas. When these are accepted in Samavaya, why should they not be accepted in तत् or substance (Qualities and qualified). This is a shorter course to be adopted in the enumeration of categories.

This lengthy course amounts to prolixity in the expostulation of a system and is condemned. This is explained in another way also. Just as in substance, so in Samavaya also the attributes are to be considered as different and they cannot be subsumed under categories like तत् and hence the rule of Seven categories shall have to be

given up. If you accept ~~sakshi~~ in some places only there will be really a lengthy process

Now if an objection is urged against Vishesha that there is no proof to prove the existence of Vishesha, the Shidhanti replies that perception is the proof. All discourse is maintained only on the strength of Vishesha. With Vishesha all Vyavahara is found rationally justifiable. And without it no Vyavahara is found reasonable.

The opposer contends that even if difference is accepted between the quality and qualified with the help of Samavaya all Vyavahara is maintained reasonably. And difference cum identity will explain Vyavahara better still. Then why these new elements in Epistemology ?

Shidhanti only tells that Vishesha is something warranted by perception, and guaranteed by sakshi. In the course of knowledge and its expression in words it is the proof that will settle the question. Hence Vishesha is accepted.

In respect of non-difference or identity it was alleged that there was no proof. So here proof is introduced. Part and whole are cognised through cause and effect and hence identity is settled. In the same manner quality and qualified are shown identical. At the end it leads to

Abhava or अन्योन्याभाव mutual negation (पटः पटेन्). This peculiar negation is perceived as identical with the thing or substance itself. The Pata Bheda or difference of Pata in Ghata is Ghata itself.

It is Sakshi which perceivers finally that though identical the qualities are cognised as different from the substance and at the same time they are different from one another, by the strength of Vishesha.

Jayateertha goes to explain how Sakshi operates in this context. There are two cognitions: one is the cognition of threads and cloth and the other is the cognition of two different things like pot and cloth. In the cognition of threads and cloth it is quite clear that they are identical (because one is the material out of which the other is made). Sakshi cognises that between these two cognitions there is a lot of difference. And how can any one deny the identity between threads and cloth? Because there is some relation between the two (and a relation is always found between the two that are different from each other), perhaps we may doubt the identity between threads and cloth. Still when minutely observed the relation between two distinct things like bowl and juju fruits is different from the relation between threads and cloth.

But as long as there is the relation of container and the contained between the two, in both the cases there wont be any difference between the two cognitions. A shade of difference is found between the two cognitions because there is inseparability between threads and cloth; while bowl and juju fruits are easily seperable.

But as long as there is the relation of container and contained, inseparability does not create any distinct quality in the cognitions above mentioned. For as long as there is the relation of container and contained, so long the relation is not cut, or the related is not wrenched from it. And this is inseparability. Hence both the cognitions are not even a shade different.

But the experience of Sakshi is that the cognitions are distinctly different. Now how to account for this distinction ? The opponent contends that there is a ground for this difference and it is this. Kunda and Badara, though now inseparable, in future they are going to be seperated for they have the capacity of being separated. Hence no identity be considered necessary for this distinction.

But the sound common-sense of Acharya comes to his rescue. No coming event casts its

shadow on the present perception. Therefore the future separability of Kunda and Badara does not affect the present cognition. Some ground must be found to account for the difference in the two cognitions and that ground is identity between threads and cloth which is not to be found with Ghata or Pata; or Kunda or Badara. Hence Sakshi has rightly cognised the identity of threads and cloth or material cause and its Product.

In the same manner you find grounds justifying identity between the Parts and the whole. Identity is found of these two. When thus the whole is an integrated identical homogeneous substance yet in practice we make difference in them, and that we do so, on the intrinsic Visheshas which inhere in the substance.

And again identity and difference though contradictory of each other yet they settle in one substance on the strength of these Visheshas. When they are actually seen to reside peacefully in the same place and at the same time we need not seek for higher evidences.

Bhagavan Shri Hari and other souls too are identical with their parts and qualities and actions and at same time different from other souls, Prakriti and others. All the attributes and

qualities are co-extensive with Paramatman, and hence identical with him. But in material substances some qualities are not co-extensive but are destroyed before the substance. These are different cum non-different. Because they are found like that.

It is our doctrine that Part and the whole are identical. But it is inconceivable how they can be both different and identical. For those are the different cum identical attributes which perish completely when the substance survives. These substances are different from God Hari and the souls. They are the insentient things (वास).

But one should not suppose that they are different and identical by turns at different times. For instance as long as these attributes are there in the substance they are identical and when the attributes are destroyed leaving the substance intact they are different. They are different cum identical only when they are there in the substance at one and the same time.

But the attribute that is destroyed is now non-existing. And hence difference from it is inopportune. When it is existing it is identical with the substance and hence its destruction is not possible.

This impossible is made possible only by its perception. Again it is said that the whole that is co-extensive with its parts is identical with its parts is identical with them. That whole which does not co-extend with its parts is both different cum identical with them.

Now a question arises : The whole and the parts, as said before, are identical (when co-extensive). If so there is contact of one part with the whole and with other parts. How is this contact executed ? It is a part that seeks contact with the other parts and the whole. For a part has its parts in all directions. Hence a part contacts only a part of another Part. But this leads to logical fallacy. For instance a part A to contact with B, contacts with B's part B₁; and A₁ and not A gets contact with B₁ and not B. A₁ again to contact with B₁ has its part. A₂ to contact with B₂ and so on and so forth. This goes on ad infinitum. So there is infinite Regress.

This partition into parts goes on because a part has been accepted as having endless parts. So this theory that a substance to get contact with another substance seeks contact through their parts, is not acceptable.

But this theory of contact deserves close study. Two substances like pot and pan get

contacted. If we seek this contact through parts only, really that will lead to infinite regress. We do not say that every where the contact of the whole is not through parts. What we said was every time the contact takes place, the contact resides in the part of the substance and hence the contacted substance must have parts. This was our contention in the context of atoms.

Samyoga was divided into three kinds of which the third kind was the contact of the body and the tree through the contact of hand and tree. Here there is no contact of body and tree, other than the contact of hand and tree. For the contact in the hand that is produced by the activity of the hand is the contact of body and the tree, as there is no difference between body and hand. Therefore when there is the touch of impurity to the hand, it is the body that undergoes purification and the hand is purified.

Thus the parts and the whole are identical. Hence in the same manner, Division of division is discarded. Vibhaga is of two kinds. The first kind is cause and non-cause are divided. The second is cause alone is separated. When there

is separation of the hand and the tree there is the separation of Body and the tree. This is the first kind of Division. This is explained as follows. There is activity in the hand and the hand is taken away from the tree. This separation of body and tree. The hand is the cause of the body and the tree is not the cause of the body. Hence this division is division of cause and no cause. The second is the division caused by the cause. A piece of cloth is made up of two threads. When there is activity in one thread it causes separation of one thread from the other. When these two threads are separated there is the loss of contact and there is the division in the piece of cloth. This is the division caused by the cause of the cloth.

The first division is not proper. For there is no other division called division of body and tree other than the division of hand and body. From this division of hand and body is produced the division of body and tree. So the activity of the hand becomes the activity of the body and hand. Because there is identity of hand and body. Hence there is no other division of the whole than the division of parts.

Now the second division too is more illogical than the first. From the very activity of a

thread causes separation or division of another thread from the first as well as from the sky, there is no necessity of following a sequence or series.

The idea of a sequence is this. The thread throbbing with activity is separated from the thread that is inactive. This division is caused by mere cause (second variety) the thread, which activated, causes division of the sky contacting the inactive thread. This is the process.

This idea of process is illogical. Still if you stick to it you will be reduced to committing logical offence. Two fingers contacting, with each other a finger contacting the sky, are not the causes of the formation of a substance. Hence the division of two fingers, or the division of finger and the sky, is the enemy of the contact of two fingers or contact of a finger and the sky that is nonproduced but is not inimical to productive contact. But you shall have to forego enmity in the first instance and friendship in the second instance.

Then the discussion enters into a whirl pool of logical subtleties. At this time without being caught in the vortex of nice distinction let us follow the argument in the investigation of truth.

We also took recourse to, says Sidhanti, to such arguments as we ourselves did not agree with, to refute the arguments of the opponent. Now the Sidhanti takes to arguments which form the bases of his doctrines. That is छल argument in which one uses a statement in one meaning; but it is interpreted in another meaning which is not meant, and then it is contradicted.

In 'As the whole and the part are identical' the Sidhanti argued that if the whole had a contact (with) some thing else it must have that contact with its part. Therefore if the atom gets contacted with another atom the atom must have a part. A partless thing cannot get contacted with another. In this meaning the Sidhanti used the sentence 'अंशतः संयोगो भवति' (gets contacted with its part). But another meaning 'the contact of the whole depends upon the contact of the part' was given and it was shown that it would lead to infinite regress. This is chala argument.

Now a fair argument is taken recourse to. 'The contact of the whole is found residing in its part. And hence there is no infinite regress'. When this is a confirmed fact it cannot lead to infinite regress. Because it does not lead to something that is unacceptable to us.

If the Sidhanti is threatened with the reasoning that 'if the contact of the whole does not reside in the part....(something un toward happens) the opposer must say. But before that we show that the contact of whole resides in its part in the part.

Because we actually perceive it and perception is an accepted proof. When so the Sidhanti argues that if we find increase in the magnitude of the effect (greater magnitude than that of the cause) it is due to increase in the magnitude of cause. Rope is the effect of cotton. If you take two bundles of cotton for making a rope then you find the rope doubled in size.

Let us apply this truth to the present case. If the contact does not reside in a part (of the whole substance) then you cannot explain how two atoms produce Dvyanuka or binary atom of increased magnitude. This is a harmful truth to Vaisheshika. For this is contradiction in logic.

Vaisheshika restricts the application of the rule thus. That increase of magnitude which is born of the magnitude of the cause really increases when there is an increase in the magnitude of the cause. But the magnitude of Dvyanuka is not produced by the magnitude of the cause;

but is born of the number of the cause. Hence there is no increase of magnitude in Dvyanuka.

If so in tryanuka also let there be no increase in magnitude; because the magnitude of tryanuka also may not be produced by the increase in magnitude of Dvyanuka, but by only the numbers of cause. Hence the theory of creation as propounded by Vaisheshika does not appeal to those who are rationalists.

Now the Sidhanti makes clear his theory of relation of identity and identity cum difference between the parts and the whole. In the case of the sky and such others, the whole is co-extensive with its parts and the parts and the whole are identical. In the same manner in the case of cloth and its parts threads, the whole and the parts together are identical. But the whole and a single part are related as identical cum different. All this is apprehended by Perception.

But an objection is raised here. It is not reasonable to say that the whole piece of cloth and its parts (threads) are identical. Because even when the parts or threads are there, the the whole, the piece of cloth is not there. Because in separate things there is the relation of difference cum identity. Just as a single thread is different

cum identical with the whole so also all threads together are different cum identical with the whole. This is corroborated by Brahma tarka which states— “who has seen a piece of cloth different from the threads ? If the whole is identical with the parts how can there be the absence of cloth when there are threads ?

This objection is squarely met with by the Sidhanti. A piece of cloth consists of threads woven together as warp and woof. When threads are there as warp and woof you will not find the absence of cloth. Therefore the threads thus woven together are identical with the piece of cloth. When they are not thus related there is difference cum identity between the parts and the whole. Thus everything is cogent and coherent.

The objector without understanding the meaning of his statement, thinks that the piece of cloth is threads woven as warp and woof only. So he says that the Sidhanti is becoming an apostate as he is approaching the atomic theory of creation from a cluster of atoms.

But the Sidhanti pleads ‘not guilty’ and proves his innocence of apostacy. What the opponent meant by the allegation of the theory of cluster of atoms is this : The Vaisheshikas who

described this theory of atomic clusters as the origin of creation explained that cow, pot, intellect are all but different groups of atoms adjusted into peculiar relations of compressions. Hence they admit only causal parts and do not admit the whole as effect, different from parts. For no whole as different from parts is warranted by evidences. Here also the opponent alleges that the Shidhanti will be forced to admit this kind of atomic theory of creation.

To this objection Shidhanti replies that for argument's sake he would admit that there is identity between the qualified and the qualities. Yet the substance never stands, bereft of qualities. So also peculiarly related threads alone constitute cloth. Yet there is no absence of cloth. Uniquely related threads also are existing and cloth also is existing. But that piece of cloth is not different from the threads.

This has been possible on account of the existence of Vishesha in the substance. It seems that cloth is different from the threads; because it comes into existence after the threads are related as warp and woof. It also seems that one thread does not make a piece of cloth. Because one thread does not give the idea of cloth. Yet it is Pratyaksha or perception never sublated that

warrants us this knowledge of identity of threads and cloth. For the cognition of threads and cloth is apprehended by Sakshi as different from the cognition of begging bowl and juju fruits.

We do not call the relation of warp and woof as cloth, on the other hand that peculiar and final configuration which comes out of the related threads is cloth. Never do we find 'all threads' apart from single threads one by one. There also we find the apprehension of identity. As for a single thread not making a piece of cloth, it only entails the thought of difference between the two, but never denies the identity warranted by perception.

Many more objections are raised against the theory of identity, between the whole and the parts. And these objections are explained away by presenting the theory in the right perspective. Then there is a long discussion on the concepts of 'contact' 'division' 'separateness' and 'number' which are subsumed under the category of 'Quality' in the Vaisheshika system.

For instance the Sidhanti takes the concepts of Samyoga, Vibhaga and Prithaktva. They each reside in one substance and not many. But they all seem to be associated with two objects. Samyoga has two poles- each one contacting one

object. This polar relation of Samyoga has its poles attached to two objects. So is the case with division (Vibhaga) and separateness (Prithaktva).

But really speaking these are not found in two objects. Samyoga relates A with B. Yet Samyoga related to B is in A. And Samyoga related to A resides in B. So Samyoga though joining two things yet resides in one, bringing about the contact of the other. So is the case with division and separateness.

But the objector objects that Prithaktva cannot be explained thus. For the concept of Prithak is like this : cloth is separate from pot and pot is separate from cloth. Thus this concept incorporates cognitions in which each is the counter-entity of the other. This is an instance in which one separateness is recognised as residing in one. And both are separately recognised. But there are such concepts also as—‘These two are different and all these are different’. These multifarious ‘separateness’es reside in many and they are recognised as many. For there is no Proof to say that separateness having a counter entity does not reside in that counter entity.

The rejoinder to this objection is expressed in the following manner;— In the concepts ‘these

are separate' separateness is seen in multitude in the same manner as in the concept- 'These pieces of cloth are white'. In this latter concept 'many pieces of cloth and many whitenesses' are seen. In fair play, this must be admitted. Nor can it be pleaded that one separateness is exhibited as many. For there is no such evidence to prove this peculiar thing. The difference or separateness appears as having two Dharmees (Resorts).

But it is said that it is the opinion of the speaker that settles number and gender of the words. Therefore it is inferred that Bheda is one but has two resorts (Dharmaes). Therefore the Sidhanti cannot plead that the concept which shows many differences having mutual counter entities has many resorts.

The Sidhanti rejoins that the singular number used there does not affect the plurality of difference. Because there are such usages- 'Dinner of Brahmin's. 'Dinner' though singular connotes many dinners. Or the singular number may suggest a group or multitude.

A former objection is refuted in this context. The objection was that 'the whole is one but the parts are many and there cannot be identity

between the whole and the parts. If it were so the parts also would be identical or the whole would be different.

Now the refutation considers the possible alternatives first- 1) Does identity between the whole and the parts imply identity between parts themselves ? 2) Or in the state of being related (as warp and woof) is the identity between the parts meant ? 3) Or at other time ?

The reply runs like this- 'In the first alternative in the case of an eternal entity like the sky where the parts are said to be identical with the whole, really the parts of the eternal sky are identical with each other. In the case of a non-eternal substance like cloth (which is produced) in which condition it was said to be identical with its parts, it is one only. But in the condition of being related as warp and woof, the condition being artificial and created the relation between cloth and threads is difference cum identity. The last alternative is to be explained thus. There is identity between a single thread and the collection of threads. Still we find there is difference also between them. Therefore there is no occasion for identity between themselves.'

Universal and a substance. a particular and universal is a problem in philosophy. It is a question of finding unity in multiplicity. There is the 'cowness' which is said to be residing in all cows. This 'cowness' is called universal or Jati while each cow is a particular or individual. Now it is said that this universal also resides in each individual, just as contact and others were shown to reside in each individual. Because it is its fixed or characteristic quality.

Acharya in his Anuvyakhyana cites नरस्व and others as examples. We know that there are certain qualities which are co-extensive with substances and some others are non-extensive. Now Brahminhood is non-co-extensive quality. Because even when the Brahmin survives his Brahminhood might be lost by the committing of great sins like the murder of a Brahmin. So Brahminhood is not co-extensive with the Brahmin. Hence also each Brahmin is different from the other. So now the opponent cannot press us to accept अभेद or identity between the individuals themselves, when we accept identity or अभेद between the individuals and the Brahmin hood. Because there is the reason of non-coextensiveness between individuals. If one Brahmin

hood is accepted to reside in all Brahmins then the opponent may press the अभेद among individuals. But when Sidhanti clearly explains that Brahminhood in each Brahmin is entirely new, and unique and may disappear even when the Brahmin survives, identity cannot be supposed to exist between such varient members.

Now this discussion terminates with a quotation from Shruti:-“All things stand one different from the other with one's qualities different from other's qualities. The things are identical with their innate qualities and forms. Those adjuncts which perish when their resorts survive are different cum identical with their resorts. The instance for this last variety is the blueness of unbaked earthen pots before they are burnt. Lord Hari is different from all except his own qualities”.

At this stage one Section of Naiyayikas, known as Peelupakavadi raises an objection against the theory of nonco-extensive nature of certain qualities of a substance like pot. He presents a very enticing process of change undergone by a Substance like pot.

When the unbaked earthen pot comes in contact with fire, its constituent atoms have

activity under the impact of fire. This activity produces division or separation among those atoms; and this division gives rise to destruction of contact of the atoms. From the destruction of contact, the structure of the product undergoes wholesale disintegration right from the highest component part to the lowest component part atom. When the disintegration is complete the atom comes in contact with fire. Due to that heat the blueness of the atom is lost. By the next contact of the fire through its heat other qualities, born of heat (baking) appear in the atom. In this romantic process the fate or destiny of the man who is going to enjoy it (to make use of it) is involved. The soul comes in contact with the atom carrying the destiny with him and produces potentiality in it (क्षम). Each atom thus loaded, comes in contact with its own kind and runs its process of chivalrous reconstruction. A binary a triad and then its multiples lead to the final production of the finished structure. In this process the law of causal quality produces the quality in the effects Naiyayika does not understand how the blueness of the unbaked pot is a non-coextensive quality.

This charming story of the process of construction has not got truth behind it. In spite of

the adumbration of proofs offered by the Naiyayika, the fact that the substance survives the destruction of the qualities like form and colour and that some qualities are born due to contact with fire, cannot be denied. A long discussion continues but the factual proof given by the Sidhanti holds its own.

Now a long exposition and argumentation begins on the topic of Jati or Samanya(universal) which was briefly touched before. As Jati plays an import part in Semantics, the case has been taken up for reconsideration.

It was said that Jati according to Naiyayika is one (एक अनेकानुगतं सामान्यं) and is found common in many things. This theory of universality was refuted point blank. But now the Naiyayika raises up the question again. For refutation of the theory that जाति is commonly found in many individuals or particulars faces a strong contradiction. Because if one common property like cowness is not found in all the individual cows, then the knowledge that the word cow connotes the individual cow is not available for use. This is not the only objection. In the same manner law of causality cannot be established. The operation of inference will cease because Vyapti or concurrence cannot be known.

In order to show that the Jati or universal is found common in all particulars, the Tarkika falls back upon its utility in various forms of knowledge. For instance the aids in knowledge are the use of words by the grown up people. Grammar and dictionary are the next sources. But consulting these sources at every stop makes verbal expression boring. On the other hand if the child is instructed that there is 'cowness' in every individual cow, and what that cowness is, the child, at every instance of the presentation of a cow, calls it cow. Because there he finds cowness. He does not call a horse a cow, because there is no cowness in it.

This is a very fascinating process which the Naiyayika has conceived. But Acharya tells us that even without this common and eternal concept of Jati, all verbal expressions and their use can be explained.

For Similarity will do the work of common Jati as an aid in the knowledge of word and its meaning. This Sadrisha is one of the categories. If this similarity serves the purpose of an aid to acquire the knowledge of the word and its meaning, there is no necessity of an additional category like Samanya or Jati. Therefore, it is not

necessary to conceive Jati as commonly existing in many members of its class. The elderly people have accepted Grammar, Similarity, dictionary, the instruction of a reliable man, the use of words in the particular meaning and many others as aids to understand the meaning of a word.

The statement 'this is a cow' does not refer to only one cow; but it refers to this and to similar cows. For they are all fit to be called by the word cow. The one who wishes to know, not only knows that the animal before him is to be called 'a cow'; but also he knows that others are to be called by the word 'cow' because they are similar to this. He knows a rule of concomitance that whatever is like this is to be called a cow. By this process the Sidhanti has achieved something distinct in the knowledge of the word and its meaning. He need not admit that there is one eternal common thing called Jati residing in all objects which come under that class. But Sidhanti makes use of the sense of similarity which is already accepted as a category.

But how can similarity lead us to the meaning of a word? For if this similarity resides commonly in all things to be called by that word, why should Jati be rejected? If similarity is not

common to all objects how will it be useful in giving knowledde of all objects to be called by that word ? For the objects like 'cows' that are far away from the knower cannot be known by him. And they all belong to the class of cows and are fit to be called cows. So the knower cannot form a comprehensive point of similarity existing in all objects called by that name.

We must be very clear about the sense of similarity. The Sidhanti does not accept similarity in the field of simanties as the sense or meaning of the word or the reason for the use of the word. He has accepted similarity only as a sign for the use of the word. For instance earth is defined as 'giving out smell'. But this 'smellingness' (गृष्णत्व) is not the etymological meaning of the word earth. Nor is it the reason to call earth by the word earth. But it is accepted only as a 'sign' which helps the knower to call the object having 'earthness' by the name 'earth'.

Shri Raghavendra quotes here Tarka Tandava, In दंडीचंद्रः शुभलः पटः पाचको याजकः (Chaitra has a stick-the cloth is white; the cook is a worshipper.) the words दंडी and others (शुभलः and पाचक) are to be derived. There is not one thing common to all. For stick is a substance, white is a quality and

cooking is action. Still these words are used to refer to their respective objects. In the same manner even if Samanya were to be found uniquely different in each object still the word can connote the sense and the word can be used to refer to that object.

In the same manner similarity though not common to all similar things yet it can be used as a sign to use a particular word in a particular sense. Hence it was stated before that 'this is a cow' means "this object that is before you and other similar objects are called by the word 'cow'" when the use of a particular word is repeated we derive a universal rule or concomitance that wherever the similarity is found the word is used.

Thus without admitting a common Jati, the use of a word referring to a particular individual is explained on the principle of similarity which is uniquely different in every object.

The Sidhanti then exposes the flaws in the reasoning of the Naiyayika who admits, a common Jati in the use of words. The Naiyayika at last takes resort to the nature or essence of every object which, he thinks, must be common to all objects belonging to that class.

But this admission of essence being common to all objects of that class leads to infinite regress. For in order to call that essence, 'Essence', Essenceness must be admitted in essence. Even that Essenceness must have another essence common to all essenceness and so on and so forth. So this search for Jati common to all individuals is a wild goose chase.

After this Samavaya is taken for critical survey and its unity, universality, and eternity, are refuted. Now the Shidhanti explains his conception of a qualified thing which is used in both sacred and secular speech and writing.

This qualified thing is neither the qualifying word or Visheshana, nor is it the relation. But it is the thing qualified. In our (shidhanti) system it is not mere thing or substantive. The qualified substantive is characterised in two ways. The configuration of qualifiedness lasts till the qualified substantive lasts. Or it is not co-extensive with the substantive. The first type is that the qualified is closely identical with the substantive. For instance God is omniscient. This configuration of Divine omniscience involves the close identity of God and omniscience because omniscience is the very essence of God. If the relation of the

adjective is co-extensive with the substantive, then the qualified configuration is identical with the substantive. Such is the concept 'God is omniscient'.

In the second type the qualified is different cum identical with the substantive. The instance is a mountain with fire. The mountain aided by the contact of fire ends in a different configuration. The relation of identity cum difference that exists between the Vishesha and Vishista is also the essence of the Vishesha or substance. Yet by the strength of Vishesha the defect of promiscuity is avoided.

This qualified configuration is sometimes non-being though the substantive is positive or being. For instance 'the pot does not understand'. When the adjective is negative the qualified substantive also becomes negative in character. Sometimes the substantive being non-being when qualified becomes being or positive in character. The instance is 'Negation or Abbava is' or Negation is conceivable.

Thus in this wonderful world we find a positive thing endowed with negative qualities and negative thing qualified with positive attributes. We cannot deny the existence of these

things as they are warranted by perception with infallible veracity. When thus we find that all positive things possess negative attributes and all negative things posses positive attributes and as we admit that qualified thing is identical with qualifying attributes we conclude that all positive things are negative and all negative things are positive.

But this will not lead to epistemological anarchy. For that is being which is the object of first affirmation and that is non-being which is the object of first negation. There is nothing wrong in a negative thing having a positive attributes or predication or vice versa. Hence we use such statements as— “Destruction is, Negation is.”.

The nature of mutual negation and difference are further discussed. Mutual negation (अन्योन्याभाव) is of the following type, घटः परोन्. Pot is not cloth. It was stated before that a non-being (अभाव) will have positive attributes, and vice versa. So the objector now objects that though mutual negation has positive attributes, still the negation is not of the nature of Dharmi, it is different in nature from positive thing. Hence your statement that Bhava is Abhava in nature is not borne out here.

Even if it is pleaded by Shidhanti that this mutual negation is nothing but difference (परः परात् भिन्नः) or Bheda and Bheda is nothing but the essence of the substance (that is said to be different), Still mutual negation is different from essential difference (स्वरूपभेद). Because this essential difference is to be found in all things like substance or Dravya and others. But mutual negation is limited to certain places only. For mutual negation is not to be found in non-being. If it is argued so it leads to infinite regress. Hence we must admit, says the opponent, that mutual negation is different from essential difference. It was argued separateness was to be in Abhava or non-being, on the ground that if Abhava is not separate from other things then there will be promiscuity. But the opponent says that Abhava stands distinguished from other things. by its own nature.

Now Sidhanti comes forward with his own concept of Bheda which subsumes Prithaktva and mutual negation and calls these as synonyms conveying the same meaning 'difference'. To form different concepts of indistinguishable things is carrying coals to New castle. For these words are used both in sacred and secular literature as synonyms.

At this stage Mayavadi contends that what the Sidhanti propounded so long was not acceptable to him. The Sidhanti said that mutual negation and separateness connote nothing more than essential difference, and hence they are in nature both positive and negative. But Mayavadi contends that this contention of the Sidhanti is not warranted by evidence. Because difference cannot constitute the essence or core of a thing. To form the concept of Bheda or difference Mayavadi takes recourse to the etymological meaning of Bheda. भेद is derived from the root भिन्न which means (विभाजन), rending or splitting up. This form भेद is instrumental in sense. Hence Bheda signifies means of splitting into two parts.

Hence Mayavadi contends that Bheda cannot be of the nature of the thing. If it is of the positive nature of a thing even that thing shall have to undergo splitting. Then the part that is split also is of the nature of Bheda and then that also will be split. This endless splitting lands us on complete Vacuum or emptiness.

The Mayavadi follows another method to arrive at the same conclusion. If difference is the nature of every thing you cannot have the idea of unity or oneness with reference to any

thing. For Bheda is incompatible with oneness which is always found with Abheda its contradictory term. Hence Bheda and Abheda cannot be found in one thing at one and the same time. For oneness not finding a place in any thing will drive away multitude also from that thing. Because manyness is the collection of oneness; or it is the production of oneness. Where There is no oneness and no multitude there is surely emptiness.

Besides, the nature or essence of a thing is self dependent and hence it does not require the help of any counter entity. But if the Bheda is the essence or nature of a thing it should not require the help of a counter entity. So it goes very hard for the Shidhanti to say that Bheda is of the nature of a thing. The mayavadi contends that he should come to grips with facts. 'पट' is different from पट, and in this statement difference along with its counter entity (पटप्रतियोगिक वेर) difference from पट is seen in पट) is said to be of the nature of घट or substance. Mayavadi contended that Shidhanti is treading on a very trecherous ground in holding this view. Because every thing different from Brahma will be easily proved to be of the nature of Brahma; and easily Advaitavada is proved in its highest truth.

Now begins the tirade of arguments of the Sidhanti to refute all the above mentioned minor objections. If difference assumes the form of essence of a thing to be differentiated, it is wonder that it will lead to emptiness. Difference is said to be of the nature of splitting. It does not split pot. There is pot; this pot is not split; but the pot is split from cloth its counter entity. But it does not split pot by means of cloth (as if it were a club to break that pot). This sort of Vidarana or splitting does not lead to emptiness. Sidhanti has accepted Bheda in its abstract sense (भाव) and not in its instrumental sense, still Vidarana does not tear itself but tears its object. But even if it cuts itself to pieces it goes on decreasing in magnitude. It will never exhaust itself in cutting.

Besides Bheda is not of the nature of splitting. But if it is accepted then Bheda or Vidarana only means division or Vibhaga. This is one meaning of Bheda. Difference is another meaning which is the very nature of the substance. Now no one finds any objection against व्यक्तिभेद.

Here Sidhanti takes up the question of the number of attribute of God Hari. Naiyayika thinks God to have eight qualities. This arbitrasy

number is highly insulting to those who think that He has infinite number of qualities. In Bhagavata Tatparya it is stated that he has not only infinite number of attributes; but each attribute is infinite.

Now what is the kind of knowledge Brahman Possesses ? It is a knowledge characterised with innumerable objects to prove his all-knowing nature. Really speaking if God's knowledge is uncharacterised by the relation of object then God cannot claim, omniscience or all knowledge. This is a serious loss to God.

Some Vaisheshikas think that God's knowledge, desire, and effort are not marred by any characterisation of their objects. But it was now shown that knowledge without its object does not prove his omniscience. In the same manner his desire and effort also without being related to their objects do not prove the unlimited nature of God's desire and effort.

But this contention of the Vaisheshikas is not logically sound. For if his knowledge is not characterised by its innumerable objects it becomes very difficult to explain the omniscience nature of God. In the same manner if his desire and efforts are colourless and are not marked by

all objects (of desire and effort) he cannot be proved to be the doer of all deeds (सर्वकर्ता) But we have accepted the theory of his all knowing and doing nature. Hence we cannot plead for unmarked or uncharacterised knowledge of God.

Vaisheshika pleads for conditioned demarcation of knowledge (but pure by nature). He contends that His knowledge is pure knowledge. But when it is conditioned by pot or pan, then it is said to be knowledge of pot or pan. In the same manner his desire is homogenous and integrated; but at the time of creation God's desire is said to be 'desire to create'. Same is the case with his effort. So though his knowledge and other things are not marked by any speciality (विशेष) yet on account of certain conditions (उपाधि) they become specialised (सर्वविशेष) and hence his all knowing and doing (सर्वज्ञत्व and सर्वकर्तृत्व) become justified.

But this is no justification, Sidhanti argues that natural or conditional, the speciality, in knowledge or desire or effort, does exist. Then touched by it knowledge cannot remain pure and is bereft of any mark or speciality. If, on the otherhand Vishesha or speciality does not exist his omniscience cannot be justified. Thus the theory of

Vaisheshika's pure knowledge pure desire and pure effort is not reasonable.

In this very context Vaisheshika's theory of knowledge is further scrutinised. He does not admit self luminosity of God's knowledge and yet he argues that God is omniscient. But Vaisheshika does not admit one knowledge which apprehends both himself and all other things. He first apprehends all objects outside him self. Then in the second he apprehends the knowledge of the first knowledge. There are two cognitions and not one incorporating both. These two cognitions combined form his omniscience.

But if this is the process of God's knowledge in your theory, you are committed to acknowledge self luminousness of knowledge. Because the second knowledge must cognise itself also. If not you shall have to recognise a third knowledge to cognise the second and so on and so forth. Thus you are committed to infinite Regress, says the Sidhanti. Hence he presses that one knowledge not only apprehends its objects, but apprehends itself also. That is self luminousness.

Sidhanti sums up what he wants to say about God. Shruti alone tells us about the nature and

qualities of God. No other means of knowledge apprehends God. Now Shruti describes Hari as one full of auspicious qualities. Hence any inference trying prove God to be miserable is foiled in its attempt; because Shruti which alone has the capacity to apprehend God is opposed to all such inferences. Hence God is proved to be full of untarnished and auspicious qualities each one unlimited in its application and reference and completely perfect in its nature. Shruti thus stands infallible instrument of knowledge of God, challenging the validity of other instruments that try to vilify God.

The Sutrakara wants to expose another flaw in the theory of creation which runs counter to reason. The Vaisheshikas and some others like him accept that in eternal time there is the period known as time of creation and again there is time known as time of destruction. The atoms are there and they form into binaries and triads and so on. Thus the five elements come into existence. But this theory of creation is not consistent with their other parts of theory.

For according to their doctrine, even before there is desire of God for creation, let their be creation. Because all the pre-requisites for

creation are there ready. The atoms are ready always. And they constitute the material cause of world creation. And the efficient cause, the desire of God also is eternal. Religious merit and demerit which is Adrista is non-eternal, yet it is accepted by the Vaisheshika to be present at the time of dissolution of the world. The temperament or inclination towards creation depends upon God's desire and hence, as His desire is eternal it might be taken as present.

Thus when all the pre-requisites that constitute cause are present, the effect will, of its own accord, come into existence. Hence creation must be found even when it is not expected. And hence let this creation be present even at the time of universal destruction; or at all times. In the same manner universal destruction also, is possible at all times in his theory.

The great defect in his theory is that he does not admit of parts in time to conform to creation and destruction. But the Sidhanti admits of natural parts in the eternal time. And hence we can very well explain and adjust creation and destruction so as to conform to their bounds of time.

But these parts of time must be either eternal or non eternal. If those parts are eternal then

the question of possibility of creation at all times cannot be averted. All the attempts to divide Kalu or time is futile. If the parts non eternal then the cause for the partition must be found out.

Yes we do accept all these conditions. The material cause, in the Sidhanti's system, is Prakriti no doubt. The efficient cause is the parts of time that are always at the disposal of God's will. These parts are flowing in incessant current. Shruti is the instrument that warrants the constant flow of temporal parts.

The three entities, God Hari, time and space are self existent yet time and space are eternally dependent on God Hari.

Another, flaw, is exposed in the Vaisheshika system. The atom has form, flavour, and touch and hence it is concluded that it is non-eternal. Then he reviews all the various syllogisms which are offered to prove four kinds of different atoms to be non-eternal. But these syllogisms should not like boomerang come back and hit the one that has hurled them.

But Shidhanti clears his position. No doubt he too has admitted subtle elemental parts which are eternal. But the atoms are not the subtle elemental parts. Those atoms are the accretions

(उपचय) of Tamas Ahankara and its effects. And these serve the purpose of subtle elemental parts to form the nucleus for creation. Hence they are deformed in this original form and they are effects and hence non eternal. So these atoms are quite different in nature from those which Sidhanti has accepted as subtle elemental parts which are eternal.

Besides this system is not at all acceptable to those who believe in vedas. Hence the Sidhanta is in no way harmed by the tenets of this system.

Now begins the scrutiny of the Sourgat system or Boudha system. Raghavendra adds a note that after a rationalist aheretic is examined. These Bandhas are of four types : they are Vaibhashikas Santrantikas Madhyamikas, and yoga charas. Now Vaisheshikas were taken for scrutiny and in their system world was accepted as real and produced from atoms. Now Vaibhashikas and Santrantikas also have a similar doctrine and hence they are called for review. Avaidika heretic is a more powerful enemy than a Vaidika heretic. Hence these two are selected for critical study.

The Vaibhashikas say that every thing is momentary. This does not require any extra-

necous cause to destroy a thing every moment. But by its own nature a thing stands for a moment and is destroyed. Really speaking sticks and others do not destroy a thing. They merely produce broken parts out of a pot.

But this theory of momentariness of every thing does not help a cause to produce an effect but becomes a hindrance to the production. For the cause coming in contact with action must produce the effect as its result. Then the effect again will be a cause for the next effect. Where is scope for momentariness?

To this the protagonist of momentariness replies that it is only the group of atoms that is called pot. There is no whole other than the group of parts. Hence momentariness never comes in the way of the cause producing the effect. Budha ought to have said that Pot is only atoms. But an atom is one and a pot is big so as to be perceived.

In order to get rid of the contradiction of perception, Budha uses the word 'group'. Because though atom singly is not perceptible and is not big yet the group is perceptible and is big.

To this an objection is raised that grouping of the atoms requires an agent who groups. Then Budha shall have to accept a god like us.

To this the Budha rejoins that काल and कर्म (Time and past कर्म accumulated action) are the real causes of action. Under their influence the grouping is made into different effects. Then what is the use of a god? Or where is the necessity of a whole different from its parts. The Sidhanti also must admit this कर्म. The joining goes on according to the magnitude of the object.

Momentariness is not limited to only non-soul world. Even the soul world is subject to its influence. The whole of existence is declared momentary; as the soul also exists it must be also momentary.

But if every thing is momentary; how will there be recognition? Recognition is reduced and limited to the flow of atoms. And Santanam or flow is beyond the pale of existence. It is also beyond the influence of momentariness.

Now the Saugata takes to division. The tree of existence has five branches. Of these five skandas Samskara Skanda is one. Then there is Rupaskanda consisting of atoms in the form of figure, flavour, smell, touch, and sound. Indeterminate knowledge is Vijnana Skanda. Determinate knowledge is Samjna Skanda. Painful sensation is Vedana Skanda. Rupaskanda

is an outside thing. The other four belong to inward world. There are things which are not subsumed under these five. For instance pleasure is one such thing and it is the negation of Pain, and is included in Vedana Skanda. Atma is nothing more than a flow of consciousness. Besieging Atma with objects (of pleasure and pain) is its worldliness. Bareft of any form and devoid of objects (of pleasure or pain) is Atma's Moksha. Hence the grouping into five Skandas need not be violated.

Thus here the Sutrakara has summarised, the tenets common to both Vaibhashika and Sautrantika; the other details are taken up whenever and wherever they are necessary and will be critically reviewed.

Now the distinct finished products like cow and pot are mere distinct groups of atoms. Besides these, there is no separate whole. This is the topic Sutrakara first takes up for review in this Sutra (समुदाय उभयहेतुकेऽपि तदप्राप्तः) The whole which has been apprehended as cow and pot, is either made up of one atom or many atoms. It cannot consist of one atom for the whole is never made up of one part. One tree cannot make a group of trees. Call it a part; no necessity of conceiving a whole.

Even the second alternative is consistent. Now even if the whole is made up of many atoms are the atoms grouped together, or are they kept asunder? If atoms make up a pot, even not grouped, anywhere it should be cognised by us as a pot. Because ungrouped atoms are to be found every where. Even the second alternative of the whole being grouped atoms, also is not consistent. Because the collected manifoldness depends upon collection; and without manifoldness collection is impossible. This mutual dependence spoils this theory of creation.

Here Raghavendra elucidates the theory of grouping, that must be understood by the word एवं. Sounds produced at one and the same time form a grouping in respect of a point of time. Many trees and many soldiers form grouping into a forest or army in respect of space. The stick and the wheel of the potter are collected in respect of a product of a pot. The letters are collected into words, sentences and paragraphs in respect of object of knowledge. The whole of the essay is collected [as propounding import of one meaning.]

Besides what is this collection? Is it merely the contact of atoms or is it numerical manifoldness, or is it a separate entity altogether. The

first two alternatives are not accepted. Even if it is accepted, contact and manifoldness residing in imperceptible atoms cannot be perceived. The third alternative is a different entity and that is the whole which we pressed him to accept.

But this pressure to accept a separate entity 'whole' is not proper; because it is openly contradicted. The whole cannot be said to reside in each part completely, or to reside in part. In the first alternative as there are many parts and as in each part the whole fully resides there will be many wholes and not one whole. If in each part it partially resides then there is no other whole than the part.

When there is this confusion created if a separate whole is accepted it will not be found consistent.

To this the Sutrakara rejoins. The Sutrakara first allows the opponent to be more clear and then refutes him point blank.

The opponent contends that the conception of the whole should be enlarged. Then there will be no scope for mutual dependence. The collection is not occasional; but is constant. If so there will be no distinct period of creation and destruction.

To this the Saugata replies that though collection goes on forever its knowledge is occasional. On this we can distinguish creation from destruction. For the knowledge of constant flow depends upon the proximity of atoms. Because the knowlengen of collection requires the related knowledge of atoms which results in the knowledge of proximity of atoms.

But a person himself is knowledge or consciousness. Even then there are two kinds of knowledges one is called Pravritti and another Alaya. Now Alaya is man himself. For it gives scope to activity, pain and other things. Pravritti is the cognition of collecion. Hence there is no contradiction at all.

Saugata explains his atomic theory which he proves to be compatible with his conception of momentariness of every thing existing. Collection is nothing but a multitude of atoms. This multiplicity is there in the atoms whether they are collected or separated. But there is no constant knowledge of this collection. Knowledge of collection depends upon the related knowledge of all atoms. For multiplicity is born of relatedness. But this related knowledge is not possible when

the atoms are separate and distant one from the other. We cannot have a related knowledge of trees one in Mathura and another in Pataliputra. When there is nearness then there is cognition of manyness and oneness. Therefore there is nothing wrong with his theory.

The Sidhanti now replies. The cause always produces Similar effect; or dissimilar effect or effect of both kinds; or of no kind. If the first type is accepted, then the cause which is not the object of senses and which consists of scattered atoms must produce effect which is similar to the cause and never can it produce effect sensible and collected. And when similarity is pushed forward the ridiculous nature of this supposition would be exposed. In both cases the cognition of collection cannot be shown to be occasional. Both the cases, Raghavendra explains as 1) From scattered atoms are produced the closely attracted atoms which become apprehended through the knowledge of relatedness. This reveals universal multiplicity which is collection or 2) The scattered atoms when compressed produce collection. This is expressed and it is suggested that in both these cases the knowledge of collection is not occasional. Had it been so then there would have been a fixed and separate arrangement

of creation and destruction. In the case of scattered atoms, dissimilar and gathered atoms cannot be created and knowledge of collection is not possible and hence its occasionality is far from being accepted.

Then the Sidhanti shows how this theory leads to absurdity. If the second alternative is accepted the cause produces dissimilar effect; then in the process of production of a pot, from its very stage of half part of pot in all the moments of the process of creation there will be no form of pot. Then the moment of pot will produce the moment of an elephant and that again will give rise to the moment of an ass. In the same manner the moment of blue will produce the moment of yellow. And thus there is no continuity of blue. If the third alternative is accepted then there are both contradicting each other and there will be moment of nothing. After thrashing this point fully the Sidhantakara comes to the conclusion that there will be no effect coming into existence similar to the cause. On account of dissimilarity between cause and effect the pot will be the cause of an elephant.

Saugata's theory of collection is shown untenable and his theory of momentariness also,

will be shown shaky. The Sibhanti's objection is that there is no proof to warrant its existence. For perception only perceives present existence and not the past nor the future. Then the very concept of momentariness is analysed. Momentariness may mean Existence associated with a moment. Or is it production and destruction in one moment only? 'Association with a moment with dissociation with the next moment'. The first alternative is acceptable to Sibhanti also. For a thing of long standing also has its existence in a moment.

The second and the third alternatives are severely criticised. Production and destruction cannot both be confirmed to one moment. Besides perception apprehends only the existence in the present moment. Dissociation also from the next moment is not possible. Thus it becomes impossible to prove momentariness of a thing.

Besides recognition also is impossible. For in order to explain recognition, the Sougata accepted the eternality of atoms which enables him to prove the long standing nature of things. Or did he accept eternality in pots ? It is of no use to accept eternality of atoms. For atoms are imperceptible. Hence the thing recognised

cannot be perceptible. Even the second alternative removes the difficulty. For he shall have to consider recognition to be wrong knowledge.

If Saugata considers that moments of cause leave impressions on moments of effect. so the self of the prior moment will leave the impression of the first moment on the self of the second moment. And hence the self can think and reason. Now this theory is refuted in the sutra उत्तरोत्त्वादेच पूर्वं निरोपात्.

Atma is momentary and hence it cannot leave any impression on the second self. Besides the self is not proved to be momentary by any evidence. Self is proved to have continuous existence by recognition.

Besides if the Atma were to leave impressions on the next Atma, the self can do so by being connected with the second self. But these two moments cannot be connected. And hence one self cannot leave its impression upon the Second Self.

This point is made more clear by further elucidation. Cause and effect must reside in one and the same moment. Then only the cause can leave its impression, through contact. And with-

out this impression how can this self (existing for a moment) can think or infer ?

But the Saugata offers an explanation for causality. He thinks he can divide the moment in three parts. The cause getting its existence in the first part of the moment, in the middle part produces effect and in the last part stamps its impression upon it and then dies.

To this the answer is that the smallest part of time is called कर्ता and as it has neither the former part nor the latter part, there cannot be the middle part between these two.

Saugata maintains that existence is purposefulness (अर्थक्रियाकारित्वम्). It is said to be found when concomitant with two alternatives. As they are exhaustive there is no third alternative. Now this is not possible if momentariness is admitted. For the effect produced from a momentary existence (cause) has the cause existing in the previous moment. It means the effect and cause are contemporaneous; or the effect is posthumous coming into existence after the death of the cause.

Now in the first alternative, the effect and cause will be coming into existence simultaneously. For cause is momentary and if effect is existing contemporary then they both will be coming

into existence simultaneously. It is already stated that a moment is indivisible. Hence the continuous flux of effect also by the same rule will be reduced to simultaneity. This runs counter to what actually we perceive.

In the second alternative the effect is not produced from the cause. Otherwise (if cause and effect are not connected) there will be anarchy in the Kingdom of cause and effect; for any effect will be coming from any cause.

Mere succession will not settle causality. If so an effect will be coming out of the ashes of the cause. In both these alternatives thus we find the effect not serving any purpose and hence not existing.

It may be argued that every moment an effect is coming into existence. An effect always requires a cause to produce it. This will prove the constant nature of cause or its non-existence. Hence in both the cases the effect is not coming into existence.

Now begins the refutation of Madhyamika School of Saugatas. The procedure of curiosity is more acceptable than that of text. Hence the discussion of Shunyatavada is taken up first.

Madhyamika says that Shunya or emptiness or void is the truth. The whole world consisting of five branches or Pancha Skandas is mere void and nothing more. This Shunya is not warranted by any proof. For it is Swayam Bhata which does not mean 'self illuminating' but only means 'not illuminated by others'. Other proofs do not illuminate Shunya because it does not possess any attributes. A proof apprehends a thing with attributes. Because perception apprehends things with grossness. But a thing without any distinction (attributiveness) cannot be apprehended.

On the otherhand the concept Shunya is not colourless. For Shunya is said to possess 'Relatedness oldage, death, misery and others'. But there is much difference of opinion regarding the nature of Shunya. One must meditate 'I am Shunya' and attain to the stage of Shunyate. And that is the final stage of Moksha.

A verse from the Shunyavada is quoted.
 प्रदीप्त्येवनिर्बाणं दिमोक्तः तस्य ताप्तिः Having shown so far inconsistency in their theory, now the Sidhant shows his conception of means and end. Every-day the meditation 'I am Shunya' goes on. Then Shunya is visualised. Then this will lead the aspirant to the stage of immunity from attach-

ment and hatred. This is the extinguishing of the lamp Shri Raghavendra elucidates the verse thus— ‘the worldly life that is of the nature of illusion of doership and enjoyership is a continuity like a lamp. And extinguishing of this lamp is Moksha. Here Raghavendra discusses different readings. In the place तायनः there is another reading आविनः. Some accepting this reading interpret it as ‘of Atma which has entertained the idea of Shunya’. Still others have accepted a third reading ताप्तः and interpret it as ‘of Atma that is a yogin or sage’.

Now this Shunya is being enveloped by Samvriti or Ajnana or Nescience. By instrumental derivation Samvriti means that which hides or conceals. This nescience becomes the means of hiding Shunya. This Samvriti is beginningless. The world consisting of variety is the illusionary effect of super imposition of nescience on Shunya. But world is not Shunya. This apparent world has illusionary truth. Hence there is nothing wrong if it appears as true.

But there is transcendental truth which stands unsublated. World’s reality is not of that type; it is only empirical truth. Hence world is as good as unreal. Then how to explain world’s

serviceability (serving of purpose). All business of giving and taking being itself illusory and unreal goes on like the movements in the dream. Transcendental truth alone contradicts the mundane business. For it denies all actions and activities.

But all this runs counter to conception of creation and destruction. For there is creation. Shunya without any activity cannot participate in creation that is full of activity. But Shunya in contact with this primordial nescience engages itself in creation.

Now the Sutrakara begins this Adhikarana to refute this system. Of this the present sutra takes a critical notice of the doctrine that the world is born of empty void or Shunya.

In the first place Shunya cannot be non-being. Because the world appears a being. But it appears so on account of its being super imposed by being. It is non-being or Asat because it has no transcendental reality. That which is never sublated is trascendental reality. All the business of the world is the activity of dreamland.

But all this is untenable. For the world being a positive thing cannot come out of empty void. A non-being is not characterised by any pecu-

arity; and hence it is as good as a sky-flower (a thing never in existence,) Such uncharacte-
rised thing cannot produce a highly coloured
world rich in variety.

But the protagonist of Shunyavada says that the evidence vouch-safed by the Shidhanti for what he propounds is perception, that being the basic evidence of both inference and verbal testimony. But this perception is not available. Hence the Shunyavadi is strong in this position. As there is no perception to disprove being coming from non-being, there is no inference also based on the perception. As for verbal testimony, the Sidhanti does not believe in the one offered by the Shunyavadi. Hence the absence of any proof for what the Sidhanti contends is confirmed.

To this the Sutrakara replies that if the Shunyavadi contends that some positive being comes out of complete empty void, then even the hords of a cat must be able to gore a man to death, just as the horse or a bull can do. In the same manner an indifferent thing which is neither acceptable nor unacceptable, like the seventh flavour (only six are existing) nourishing a man, must be found useful. In the same manner a weaver in order to get a peice of cloth will not go

in search of real yarn. For unreal yarn can be woven into a useful piece of cloth.

Then a great confusion would arise from the theory of Shunya and every one would be at his wit's end. But the Shunyavadi contends that only at the first creation there is creation from Shunya; while on other future occasions real agents of action, instruments of action are procured for production. Sidhanti makes use of the ground prepared by the Shunyavadi. If at the later period a work requires real agent and instruments of action, then at the first creation also you can just infer a real cause for a real world.

The Shunyavadi objects that all the objections raised against him can with equal force be raised against the Shidhanti. Of these first the Shidhanti refutes the theory that nothing is the cause of creation. (ना भाव उपलब्धः). The Shidhanti shows that the world is seen and found to be real and hence if it is accepted as unreal experience it is set at nought.

But the Shunyavadi contends that just as an elephant or a snake in a dream or illusion, though unreal yet seem to be real, so also this unreal world seems to be real. That is why he calls

Shunya to be the cause of the world. So even though the world is found by perception to be real yet it cannot be proved to be real. He says that he need not commit himself to accept the locus of illusion and the illuded agent and the flaws of the instruments to maintain the world illusion. For he has accepted one Samvriti which has the power to reveal the unreal and to maintain that unreality. The Samvrita reality or empirical truth and its expression is perceptible to every one. On the basis of this empirical truth all worldly business can be conducted. And hence there is no necessity of calling forth the aid of transcendental reality.

As a reply to this contention the Sutra वैष्णविनाशक स्वप्नादित् is cited. The world experience as a reality is not an illusion of the type of conch shell-silver or Rope-Snake. For the experience of the world is not sublated. If on the ground that it is apprehension, world-apprehension is to be sublated, even this apprehension of sublation being a piece of sublation is to be sublated and so on.

The Siddhanti contends that the Shunyavadi argues in a reverse process. For His contention amounts to that the world process warranted by all proofs is to be considered as 'illusion or

erroneous apprehension and its appearance as reality is considered to be sublated. Shunya not apprehended by any means of knowledge is considered as an object of non-erroneous knowledge and its reality is considered as never to be sublated. For it is the rule of common consent that what is warranted by proofs is nonillusory and if something unwarrented by proofs is accepted it is erroneous knowledge. But Shunyavadi's contention is as good as saying: "the cow has been seen to have horns and hence they are illusory and the hare has not been seen to have horns and hence they are not illusionary."

But this is not the way of the world and in understanding the things too we usually follow the ways of the world. Why discuss much? It is enough if we say that it is being as shown by a proof and hence it deserves to be the cause. Any objection raised to disprove it is only a poor semblance of flaw in the reasoning.

Raghavendra writes an unusually long note on अनुपरच्चि आभासभूतेव (objection is a semblance). Shunyavadi has alleged that if a being is the cause then the threads should go to form a pot. This allegation is only a poor semblance of a flaw in reasoning. Some interpret the above words like

this. Some others interpret it as exposing a general concomitance both positive and negative. That which is a being, is not a cause and that which is a cause is not a being. The third still interpret it that the allegation of irrationality is a reasoning to prove impossibility of cause & effect in the case of causes that are positive or being

By 'the said method' means that the Lord Hari who is completely and perfectly independent in all his ways collects easily the materials that are entirely dependent on Hari and create the worlds, though He is capable of doing and undoing as He likes. All this has been treated in detail before in तदन्यवाचिकरण.

Now to prove the illusory nature of the world the Saugata put forth many inferences. They are now being scrutinised. One such inference is as follows :— The sky under dispute is illusory because it is seen like a dream. Thus when illusory nature is proved no one can claim this world to be real.

In this context apart from the illusory nature of the world the inference which has been pushed forth to prove this, itself is either unreal or real. If it is unreal then visibility not existing in word might prove the word to be non-eternal. Then

again in the second alternative also its absurdity is exposed by further investigation.

Then it was proved to the hilt that the world is not illusory as the present experience of its reality is not denied by any later experiences. Now some of the evidences the opposer presents to prove the falsity of the world are critically reviewed. The Saugata who is the exponent of Samvrita Vada argues thus— If the world is not illusory then the perception also would not be available. Because the world is desired to be full of variety. If that difference or variety is not perceptible then the world also is not perceptible. For if the world is perceived without variety in it then the world is one uniform non-entity or empty void.

Now the question arises whether Bheda is perceptible or not. Many reasons are adduced to prove its imperceptible nature. But the Siddhanti argues that Bheda is not something apart from the thing itself. So when the thing is perceived the difference of other things also is found in it. Difference is not found different from the essence of the thing.

Why Bheda should be accepted as the thing itself or essence of the thing? But this question is quite superfluous with him who does not accept

Bheda itself, like the question of a merchant of garlic, for the availability of a conveyance when he has no commodity of it at all.

But the Saugata objects that when the pot is seen, we need not necessarily have seen the pan as different from it, and hence the difference from pan is not the essence of pot, as it is not understood when the pot is seen.

For there is concomitance that, that which is not un-understood when the pot is understood is not different from that pot. The form of the pot is the instance. In this manner difference is pot itself or its essence. For when pot is understood this difference stands not un-understood. This is the syllogistic form supplied by Shri Raghavendra. This is a special concomitance. A general concomitance also will serve the purpose.

When under both the syllogisms there is no fear of violation of Vyapti by Vyabhichara, then why preference to the special Vyapti over the general Vyapti? The answer is for quicker understanding. For the special type brings home to our mind the proposition that difference is nothing more than the essence of pot.

Here a doubt is raised. Now a statement should be made regarding both pot and difference,

and their non-difference should be proved by the reason that when one of them is known the other is suggested. When a man-with-a stick is known, no doubt the stick is suggested. But when a stick is known the person with the stick is not suggested.

But all this would have been right had difference been apprehended at the same time when the pot is apprehended. Really speaking, just after the apprehension of the pot the difference enters into our consciousness. In an unqualified bare cognition, a mere thing is cognised. And difference is cognised only after remembering the counter-entity (the pan in the cognition of the pot.)

This objection is met with the reply that if difference does not form a topic in the cognition of a pot, then even afterwards the cognition that pan is different from pot also will not arise. Therefore in the very apprehension of a thing, difference is brought to our awareness, and here Bheda is the very essence of a thing.

Apart from the question of difference being of the nature of a thing or not, the Sidhanti does not agree that simultaneous apprehension depends upon the cognition of another thing. Thus Bheda must be accepted as the thing itself.

Now Shunyavadi considers Shunya to be the cause of the world; Mayavadi considers it to be Brahman. But it was adduced that by refuting the arguments of Shunyavada in its theory of creation, Mayavadi's arguments also are automatically refuted. A rule can not be said to be extended in its application to things that are dissimilar to the original case.

To this the Sidhanti replies that similarity or dissimilarity between two things is settled by the sameness or otherwise of their definitions. The definitions of Shunya and Brahman agree in all respects. For both are accepted as having no Visheshas.

Though from the point of view of absence of Visheshas there is sameness between Shunya and Brahman, yet Brahman is said to be intrinsically different from Shunya as he is said to be of the nature of 'Being, consciousness, infinity, and Bliss'. But Shunyavadi does not posit this kind of nature in respect of Shunya.

But Mayavadin accepts these attributes as only eliminations of the opposites of these intrinsic attributes, as for instance Satya or being denies only nonbeing in the nature of Brahman. Besides this meaning of detraction of

the opposite qualities from Brahman those attributes of Satya, Jnana, Ananta and Ananda can have no other meaning compatible with the nature of Brahman. For the positive qualities of Satyatva and Jnanatva and others are derogatory to the nature of homogeneity of Brahman; and if found with Brahman would impair his undivided and indistinguishable nature. Raghavendra to corroborate this statement quotes a verse from Shri Shankara, the Bhashyakara's Murarishataka. And Shunyavadi also agrees that his Shunya is not false (अनृत). Hence both Brahman and Shunya are one and the same. Hence the extension of the rule is quite justified.

Now even Shunyavadi admits the illusory nature of what is being seen, and what is illusory or unreal cannot be a means to anything. But this is an easy thing to understand and hence Sutrakara has taken trouble to mention it.

Now the Sutrakara subjects Yogaohara's system to critical survey. These are the exponents of knowledge, which alone is real in their system; while other branches considered it as unreal. Knowledge alone assumes the form of the knowable object; and it has no separate existence from that of knowledge itself.

His another doctrine is that knowledge is known to us. On the strength of this Yogachara concludes that what is known is knowledge; and hence, blueness and pot and pan are all known and hence they are of the nature of knowledge. Or we cognise both blueness and knowledge together. And hence there is no difference (one and the same) between the nature of both.

Raghavendra illustrates this truth with the example. By pressing the eye with a finger, you see two moons. The false moon is invariably seen along with the real moon, and it is also found that both knowledge and the real moon are one and the same. But knowledge is eternal and external while its objects are internal. Hence oneness of knowledge and its object cannot be justified. For both are distinctly related.

But he objects that the relation of difference between the object and its knowledge, difference between the flaws and such other differences are all mere illusory and unreal. Therefore he says "difference is mere illusion as it is found between the real and the unreal moon."

This system is refuted in the Sutra न मात्रो अनुप च वे Jayateertha explains the Sutra thus—"there is no experience (मात्र) of the world; मात्र and अनुभाव

are one and the same in meaning. Prepositions like अनु before roots only reveal the hidden meaning of the root.

Raghavendra here introduces us to many interpretations of 'अंतिमभेदपदेनसंवंचः' means the relation of the last word भेद according to some. Others hold different views. In अंतिम भेद the Sandhi is dissolved as अभेद and then interpreted as 'the absence of भेद' by some others. Otherwise it would have been that the absence of भेद might be accepted and the topic of the discussion would not have been refuted. Therefore the next अंतिमभेद is taken to mean 'difference from the one that is in the mind or from the one understood.' अंतिमभेदः should be dissolved as both भेद and अभेद. Some more still contend that the absence of भेद is not unreal; for it is of the nature of विज्ञान or knowledge. If further it is said that it is illusory it wont be accepted. Therefore it must be dissolved as अभेद and its relation is meant. Thus Raghavendra, when there are different interpreters of either Nyaya Sudha or Anuvyakhana, introduces us liberally to all those interpretations, without passing any remark against any one them.

An explanation is called forth. The object of knowledge is a non-being in essence

and is yet superimposed upon Vijnana or knowledge and therefore it is said to be of the nature of Vijnana. Or the object is transcendantly real and hence it is said to be of the nature of knowledge. But the difference between the object and knowledge is false.

But this is highly offensive to actual experience and to internal Sakshi which is always awake to external experience.

Now begins the logical attack of the Jaina System (नक्षिमसंभवात्) Though 'the seven variety' method is to be attacked yet in order to give a correct perspective an outline of the system is drawn here especially to intiate the aspirant into the system, for comparative and critical study.

The whole world is divided into two categories— one is Jeeva or the conscious and another is Ajeeva or the unconscious. No Ishwara or God is conceived in this system. They are again divided into six substances. Kala or time, Akash, Dharma, Adharma, Pudgala (maltar), and Jeeva.

Of these Jeeva is an important category. It is what is animate and is of three kinds; showing different levels of intellectual development— 1) Badhas or Bound down, 2) not accomplished in Yoga, 3) and unreleased.

Now the Ajeevas are five— Dharma is the principle of motion and Adharma is the principle of stability. Pudgal is matter and it is a substance possessing colour, flavour, odour and touch. It is of two kinds : one is atomic and another is aggregate. Time is atomic and yet infinite and it is the principle of settlement of time as past, present and future. Sky is one space and infinite. It is of two kinds : Loka Akasha where movement is possible and Alokakasha where movement is not possible.

The substances excepting time which is atomic are called Astikayas, for they are found existing in many places. They are जीवास्तिकाय, धर्मास्तिकाय, वंशस्तिकाय, पुण्डलास्तिकाय and आकाशास्तिकाय.

Now seven things are conceived as useful for Moksha. Jeeva, Ajeeva, Bandha, Nirjara, Samvara and Moksha.

Jeeva is endowed with intelligence, cognition, pleasure and power. Ajeeva is the collection of all things meant to be enjoyed by Jeeva. Asrava is the collection of his instruments of enjoyment. Bandha is of two types : one is Ghataka which is the principle of obscuring the qualities of Jeeva like intelligence and others. The second is the principle of body's anatomy, of its presidency, of

its stability, and of its pleasure and pain. Nirjaras is austerity conducive to Moksha. Samvara is the control over senses, (self control) and Moksha is the manifestation of one's own innate nature. Means to Moksha consists of right knowledge, right faith and right conduct, which are called three gems.

Now this world is of seven types, or Sapta-Bhangi. The first type or mode is being (सत्). The second is non-being (असत्). The third is both being and non-being; the fourth is neither both but inexpressible (अव्यप्त) The fifth is being and inexpressible; the sixth is non-being and inexpressible. And the seventh is being and non-being and is inexpressible.

Raghavendra tells us that this seven variety method is fully treated in Chandrika. Each represents a view-point and each view-point tells us a different story of the reality (अनेकांतवाद). These different view points constitute the different aspects of things constantly. Not only in the manner stated from the aspect of being but also from many more aspects of eternity and non-eternity, different and non-different.

Now the present Sutra नेकस्वरूपवात् is devoted to refute this सप्तभंगित्ववाद. The whole system is

against reasoning. Because the system that the world is of seven varieties in every thing is not tenable; for it runs counter to all evidences and testimonies. For all things are existing in their own places and not existing in other places. All things in their own essence are beings while in respect of other essences they are non-beings. They are substances eternal; but their passing stages are changing.

Therefore this system upsets the whole arrangement and runs counter to perception which warrants constancy in arrangement. This perception cannot be considered to be false or fallacious as no such evidence is coming forth to prove its erroneous nature.

Besides what is the basic truth on which this seven variety system is based ? For there are no other system builders who propound this theory of existence. If it is mere possibility why stop at seven only. Possibility has as extensive field as number itself. If all the seven varieties are to be accepted. The first two together is no way different from the third which is merely the combination of the two.

This system is reduced to absurdity only when one and the same thing is alleged to be of

seven varieties at all times and in all its forms. For at different times and in different forms a thing can be found to be different in its existence. This is accepted by all. Thus in accepting all contradicting varieties of a thing one lands in self contradiction. By accepting such a system the whole field of philosophication is turned into a mess of confusion, resulting in complete anarchy of thinking.

After the refutation of this method of seven varieties the Shidhanti proceeds to review his other doctrines. The Kshapanaka or the Jain says that the soul in the body is self-luminous and is coextensive with the body. Here this is the topic. The self spreads through out the body keeping touch with all parts of the body. This is the point over which keen difference of opinion has been expressed.

The Jains contend that Devadatta's self resides only in his body and in all parts of his body; For the self is found as the substratum of the peculiar quality in the same body and everywhere in that body. He who is found as the substratum for the peculiar quality in the place everywhere, is there in that place and everywhere in that place; just like the brilliant lamp in the house of Devadatta, everywhere

spreading its peculiar quality, brilliant light. So is the self of Devadatta; and therefore it is so. Otherwise one would not feel the full happiness (some physical feeling spread over the body) of the close embrace of a young beautiful girl all over the body. In the same manner there would not have arisen horripilation all over the body.

This theory of the self, spreading all over the inside of the body is refuted by the Sutra एव चात्मा कात्सन्धंम्. This is not possible because sometimes the self would not occupy the whole of the body. For the self in the ant being limited to its body, after transmigration to the body of an elephant will not be able to occupy the whole of the body of the elephant.

But if it is supposed that the self adjusts its volume to the dimensions of the body it enters, then it is liable to नचपर्यादप्यविरोधोविकारादिभ्यः critical position; for the self transmigrating from bodies to bodies of different sizes, shall have to undergo modifications to adjust to the dimension of the body; This modification is not restricted to dimensions alone, but it extends to the self also as both are not different from each other. If modification of the self also is accepted then the self would be as transient as the body itself.

The Jain considers that the same allegations may be made against the Sidhanti's soul. For he also has accepted higher and lower stages to the soul in respect of pain and pleasure. Raghavendra explains higher stage (उच्चत्व) as expansion or spreading of the parts which have become loose like the gross body on account of pleasure. and नीचत्व or lower stage is explained as contraction of the parts as in the case of dry gram (by pain). The body undergoing modifications has become transient and hence the Jain contends, that the soul of the Sidhanti also can as well be subjected to transiency on account of modification.

The Sidhanti explains the situation as under : Transiency is caused only by modifications, that terminate the very nature of a substance and not by ordinary modifications. This sort of rule leads to absurdity. For a body in sleep losing its nature of activity shall have to be fully perished. But not the collapse of ordinary nature of thing causes transiency; only special nature of a thing, if subverted causes transiency. This sort of subversion is not caused in sentient substances. Hence no change brings about transiency of the soul of the Sidhanti.

To put the thing in brief the peculiar nature of a thing which is coextensive with the thing, if

mortally impaired when undergoing change, brings about transience of that thing. Consciousness of the soul is its such quality. And it is never injured so as to jeopardize the existence of the soul.

Again any form leading to transiency is material. Hence the soul of Sidhanti having no material form is not liable to be transient.

Another doctrine of the Jaina is tackled now. Raghavendra presents his doctrine of Mukti neatly. Incessant ascension is called Mukti, by him. This is refuted in the Sutra अंत्यावस्थितेषोभय नित्यवत्वादविक्षेपात्. The soul is accepted to have its size of the body in which it resides. Now the soul is in its last stage of reaching Mukti. Hence in Mukti the soul would have that size of the previous body. Now if the soul is accompanied with that body then the body will be a permanent asset of the soul and it would be everlasting. So a perishable body in the worldly life rises to be an eternal thing like the soul itself.

Now the Jains consider that the soul ever ascends higher and higher into the celestial light from the terrestrial world. Therefore the soul has attained a different stage altogether and thus the soul is liable to be impermanent. This is the last stage. If the soul is permanent then the body also should be permanent.

Again the Jain has accepted that immovable things have no souls. The Jain was afraid that if modifications lead to impermanency, then Atma would be impermanent, and so he is accepted that immovable things like trees had no souls. This is not reasonable. For then whatever thing has body, it has a soul. Then in all the bodies like that of elephant and others the soul would undergo modifications. For the soul when being born is only as long as a span and while the body becomes young the soul attains big size. Because we need not make any distinction between movable and immovable things; the soul would equally undergo modifications.

o o o o

Now begins the refutation of the school which is the heretic school within the orbit of the Vaidika school. This is a group of four schools all agreeing in accepting Mahadeva as the supreme god. They are Shaivas, Pashupatas, Kalamukhas and Mahavratas. No doubt these differ widely in details. Yet they all hold tenets which are categorically different from Vaidika tenets.

They propound Mahadeva to be omniscient and full of good qualities and immune from any blemish and hence the creator of this world rich in variety. As this runs directly against the

Vaidika principle that Brahman is the creator of the universe, this has been taken up for review.

Mahadeva cannot be accepted as the creator; for this goes against many Vedic hymns which sing the glory of Brahman as the creator of the universe.

So many hymns are taken for discussion, and their liturgical interpretation. After that, Shidhanti and Pashupatas come to grips. A plain question is asked by the Shidhanti; whether he holds his theory on the strength of reasoning and Pashupatashastra or on the strength of Shruti. If he depends merely on reasoning & Pashupatashastra then he shall have to accept that Shiva has no body, which leads to unreasonableness of his being a creator. If he depends for his theory on Shruti, then there will be no more opposition from the school of Vedanta.

To this the Shidhanti replies that in the first place as all Shruties invariably signify only Vishnu as the supreme God Shiva is not supported by Shruties as the creator of the world. But apart from it, the creatorship is incompatible with his bodilessness. For knowledge is found only with bodied souls. But it is objected that God Shiva is eternally endowed with knowledge and hence

he need have no body. For a body is required only for the generation of knowledge.

Shidhanti then says that desire is required only for the birth of 'effort'; In a god with eternal effort no 'desire' is necessary and so on and so forth. This leads to absurdity.

Again the Pashupata objects that on the analogy of a potter Shiva need not be endowed with a body. Because the potter as a soul cannot apply his effort to the wheel without the mediation of his body. But God Shiva can apply his effort directly to the material cause to produce the world. Therefore he is sung as Viswamurti.

To this objection the reply is given in the Sutra करणवक्त्रेनभोगादिभ्यः. If the set of senses of Shiva are the medium of his effort, then they will be the sources of his pleasure and pain. For we find that our body which is the medium of our effort is also the source of our pleasure and pain. Hence this theory leads to the conclusion that Shiva will be subjected to pleasure and pain.

Here an objection is raised. In the Sutra अंतवत्वं is mentioned first as a necessary sequence of embodied state (of Shiva). For अंतवत्वं means मरणवत्वं liable to death or mortality; And then

असर्वंज्ञतावा as the sequence of bodilessness is placed afterwards. So here देहश्चेत् which is mentioned last, should be placed first following the sequence of the text. Then in contravention of that sequence how अदेहश्च is mentioned first by Acharya in अनुव्याख्यान ?

To this the reply is that the sequence of meaning is more significant than the sequence of text. Ragbavendra explains the situation very clearly. First a great drawback was shown in the alternative of the theory of bodilessness in the two Sutras where the incompatibility of relation and that of substratum is shown. In order to get rid of this drawback or flaw if the opponent is agreed to have a body and a set of senses (for Shiva) then the undesirable consequence was shown. So first the incompatibility of substratum should be doubted and cleared. And the incompatibility of the bodied state should then be cleared. This is the sequence of meaning and it is more important. So in contravention of the sequence of the Sutra, the sequence of the meaning is accepted and अंतवत्त्व is first elucidated by देहश्चेत्.

At last Puranas are cited as evidences. It is but natural for Vishnu Puranas to uphold the

supremacy of Vaishnu and for Shaiva Puranas to uphold the supremacy of Shiva. Hence, Brahma Puranas are quoted. For they are unaligned with any party. And the Shiva Puranas run counter to these and hence lose the status of evidences to prove the supremacy of Shiva.

o o o o

Now the system of the Shakta's is taken for critical review. No doubt much of it has already been refuted along with Pashupatas still it has something special with it which must be completely contradicted. Hence a separate review is instituted. Great Goddess is the supreme in the Shakta system. She is the cause of creation. She is endowed with omniscience and free from all blemishes. She is known by many names like Bhairavi and others. These Shaktas are of three types; Mahavamas, Madhyavamas and Anuvamas. The doctrine of the first is reviewed. Here creation means the birth of children and not mere creation. Such procreation is seen by joint effort of male & female and not by single effort of either of them. Now from Shakti is born Shiva. Hence Shakti alone cannot give birth to any child. Hence the Sutrakara says that the birth of the child is not possible by Shakti alone (female) (उत्पत्यसंभवात्).

The Madhyama Vamas on the other hand think that Shakti with Shiva procreates the progeny. To refute this, the Sutrakara says that Shiva has no body (अकरणस्वतः). Hence he cannot help Shakti in creation. The third type of अण्वामवाद is very popular. In this system Shiva is endowed with all qualities like omniscience and others. And he has no necessity of a body with all senses. For sportively he can assume a body and senses and hence can very well manage creation with Shakti as his companion. This sort of amended Shakta Vada is only Shaiva system in another name. Besides no अपौरुषेयवेद corroborates this view.

Shaiva system has already been dealt with in the previous Adhikarana of Pashupata system.

END OF II ADHYAYA II PADA

III PADA

Now begins the third Pada of the second Adhyaya. In this Pada the conflict of Vedic statements is reconciled. The topic of the Adhyaya is the removal of the contradictions that assail on all sides, the Vaidika system of Brahman-vada. Mutual conflict of Vedic statements also comes within the purview of contradictions to be removed. First the attack of reason or inference is of primary importance and hence it was first attended to. Next in importance is Samaya Virodha or opposition from different systems. Hence it was next treated. Then it is now quite opportune to treat the mutual contradictions of Vedic statements in this third Pada.

But the subject matter of the fourth Pada also is the same. Hence there will be no distinction in the subject matter of both the Padas. This objection is not sound; because in the third Pada only topical statements (in Veda) in which gods

are referred to, are treated; while in the fourth Pada the statements in which the soul is referred to is treated.

नवियदश्चुते: in the Shruti Atma means Paramatma. He is taken up here. Atma is said to create all which includes Prakriti also.

To understand the meaning of the Sutra we must know the background. All Shastras signify as their main import Bhagavan Vishnu. He was then found to be the creator of the world. But when the Shruties are found mutually conflicting they were invalid as instruments of knowledge; Then the Shruties that propound Vishnu to be the creator also was equally invalid. Hence nothing can be proved to be created by Vishnu. So Viyat also cannot be proved to be created. In this Sutra, Viyat or material sky, the eternal sky, and their presiding deities cannot be said to be not created. For there are no Shruties to prove their un-createdness.

Here again Viyat does not merely mean Akasba; But it includes all things like Prakriti, Atma, Kala and such others except Paramatma. Prakriti is insentient; it also includes its presiding deity. All these are created; but their creation is not uncontested.

But one thing must be clearly understood. Prakriti and others of this type have no full-fledged creation like a pot [assumption of that which was not before]. Creation of Prakriti and others means simply a peculiar type of subordination, which they enjoy without any modification as that of a pot.

If there is accretion of special feature which was not before, then there will be a special form which was not before. But this special form is not different from the nature of the thing. So new form is nothing but the natural form of the thing.

Raghavendra adds that birth does not mean something gross coming into existence. A fruit is born only when it has turned into yellow. Milk is born only when it is turned into curds. But this is the point under dispute.

Now if disputed kind of birth is accepted in the case of Viyat or Akasha, then what is the meaning of Akasha? is it mere hollowness? If so how to account for its production? For if it is produced then it must have some material cause. Now what is the material cause of this hollowness? Brahman cannot be the material cause. For Brahman cannot be the material cause of any thing. Besides, that which is produced cannot

exist before its production. Akasha cannot have its Abhava or non-existence, at any time. For there is no substratum for the appearance of Abhava or absence of Akasha. आकाशोनीलिमोदेतिनप्रदेशः Akasha is elemental sky and is born blue; but the Pradesha is mere hollow vacum and is unborn. Akasha is described as having form and hence it is described as having form and hence it is created and Pradesha is formless and hence it is not created and eternal.

Now the conflict of its being born and not being born in the Shruti statements should be reconciled by considering Akasha in the Shruties like अत्मनः आकाशः संभूतः as both elemental Akasha and Pradesha Akasha. Both these must be considered as having birth. And in the Shruti अनादिर्वा अयं आकाशः Akasha has both these meanings. अनादित्व or birthlessness refers to Bhutakasha in a secondary sense, as in छात्रिणोयति. Or it refers to Bhutakasha in a subordinate sense of lasting for long period. Or applying to things other than Bhutakasha in a subordinate sense. But here it is said that आत्मनः आकाशः संभूतः refers to only Bhutakasha. And अनादिर्वायं आकाशः refers to Pradesha or अवकाश. The doubt as how to reconcile these two is expressed. Raghavendra has put forth

this doubt so clearly. Then he himself clears the doubt in the following way:-

The word Akasha, in both the Shruties that refer to its birth and its birthlessness, means both kind of Akasha and their presiding deities. So the Shruti that states Utpatti or birth refers to all things in the primary sense. The Shruties that state birthlessness refer to things other than Bhutakasha, only in the subordinate sense. Thus this is one way of reconciling both the contradictory Shruties. Both the Shruties have different objects to be referred to, one is white sky and the other is blue. This is another way of reconciling Shruties.

Raghavendra states that all this is made clear in the Nyayavivarana. Of these the first is adopted both by Bhashya and Tika. The last is explained here. Chandrika discloses the secret of two ways of reconciliation not being mentioned in Tika.

Here in अतेनमातरिस्त्रा व्याख्यातः a doubt of the same type is raised and cleared. In the previous Adhikarana two Shruties one stating Viyat to be created while another not to be created, were found in conflict with each other and were

reconciled by some arrangement. (White Akasha not to be created and blue Akasha to be created.)

Now Vayu is the topic under dispute. तेजो वशानि आकाशः, In this they are said to be transient, while Vayu is said to be eternal in वायुवर्ति नित्यः. Now Akasha which is said to be non eternal in Shruti is classed under non-eternal and Vayu, under eternal. Even the presiding deity Vinayaka of Akasha and Vayu cannot be explained as eternal in their nature while as embodied they are non-eternal. So real अनृत्यप्ति birthlessness alone should be stated. This is the opposer's view. The explanation and arrangement is the same as before. [Viyat was said to be both born and unborn]. Though having no body he has knowledge which is mental yet replenished by the wealth of Ycya practice. By such knowledge he apprehends the past and the future also. Hence he is said to be equal to eternal. For the reason of getting body he is non-eternal. [He is subordinated in a special way; hence he has body]. This is the arrangement made.

As stated above, the sky and wind have not even the probability os being created, were stated to be created. On the strength of this statement a doubt is raised (गत्समवस्तु सतोनुपचत्तेः). There is a

Shruti सदजायत in which Sat or Brahman is said to be born. Though he has no real birth, yet a figurative birth like that of subordination to others is possible as in the case of Akasha and Vayu.

This doubt is baseless in the case of Brahman who is perfectly independent. If he is not independent it will lead to infinite Regress; and absurdity. This point is explained at length.

(पृथगुपदेशात्) Beginning right from the first Sutra to व्यतिरेको गंधवत् (previous Sutra) the difference between Jeeva and Brahma is proved to be real to the hilt, by evidences from perception and others. And hence even hundreds of quotations like तत्त्वमसि cannot prove it otherwise. Thus when the matter stands, the Sutra defends real difference (आत्मतिक मद) which Ragavendra defines (as to distinguish it from the concept of difference of advaitin.) (1) Difference which does not tolerate oneness or identity. (2) Unsublated or transcendental difference. (3) difference which is not controverted even at the stage of Mukti. This concept of difference is quite distinct from that of Advaitin.

Now the opposite view is built up. In spite of all this argumentation to defend difference yet

Jeeva is identical with Paramatman. For अहं हरिः tells us that Jeeva is identical with a conscious being. इदं सर्वं जनार्दनः proclaims identity with the insentient world. Then there is Smriti also, which is quoted above in addition to evidences like तत्त्वमसि from Upanishads. These cannot be reduced to yield subordinate meaning. For the canons of interpretation uphold identity unambiguously. Quotations upholding difference may be adjusted to yield unreal difference.

This being a very strong opposition must be tackled squarely. The Sutra flouts all the arguments. First a conclusive and decisive evidence is quoted. Having referred to the whole world it is stated that it is led by Prajna or Brahman. This relation of the leader and the led is not mere illusion. For it survives in the world of Mukti. (प्रज्ञानेत्रोलोकः) Here अलोक or even मुक्त is said to be प्रज्ञानेत्र. For अलोक is one who is disembodied.

Then many Shruties are freely quoted to prove that this same difference is maintained in Mukti. After that, syllogistic arguments put forth by the unmolested opposition party are reviewed. The opponent first tries to prove difference to be illusory, when that is successful automatically

identity stands infallible and unchallenged. This is the hope of the Advaitin.

If difference is illusory, this illusoriness must be real. But if illusoriness is real, that which is illusory also will be real. It never happens that an attribute is existing, and the attributed substance is not existing. Hence difference itself is going to be real which is most undesirable to advaitin.

Advaitin slips away from this grip. For he contends that illusoriness is nothing but absolute negation of a thing (counter entity). The reality of illusoriness only means the existence of negation as far as it is the object of cognition. For it is admitted that we can conceive even the most absolute negation. So the existence is only conceptual in the case of negation. Thus illusoriness exists means the negation of its counterentity (difference) is existing. [Hence there is no conflict at all.

Or this illusoriness is not existing at all (Asat). This is the second alternative. The third is both sat and Asat and the fourth is the denial of both. Now the first three alternatives cannot be accepted by the Advaitin; for he will be led to apostasy. As for the fourth altenative, it is not warranted by evidences.

Raghavendra, in the second and the third alternative, clarifies the issues with further examples. According to both the systems (Dwaita and Adwaita) the illustration is without Sadhana or Hetu. For in the Adwaita system, the difference between the moon (the real) and the unreal moon is indescribable. It is neither Asat nor Sadasat. And in the Sidhanta it is unreal. In the fourth alternative in the Sidhanta or Dwaitavada indescribable difference is never accepted. Hence the illustration is without Sadhya.

Here another objection is raised. Even if any of the alternatives do not stand the test still the argument is yet sound. For instance when we argue 'mountain has fire; because there is smoke' it is asked if that smoke is blue or non-blue and when we cannot prove either kind of smoke, we need not give up the argument; but instead of simple smoke, we must say 'smoke, not characterised as blue or non-blue, but common to both kinds of smoke'. So also 'illusariness' is not characterised by Sat or Asat but common to all these. But you must note that in all these four alternatives (like Sat, Asat and others) you do not find any common भेदत्व about which you have stated that it is illusory. Had it been

so, like शून्यता in all kinds of चूम then it would have been the Hetu,

'The disputed is indescribable for it is going to be sublated'. By such inferences the shell-silver is proved to be indescribable. Here also bringing in the same alternatives whether 'indescribable' is Sat or Asat or others you can foil the argument to prove its indescribability.

If 'indescribability' is said to be unknown Adwaitin quotes Shruti 'नासदासोत् नो सदासीत्'. His contention is that there was something which was neither Sat nor Asat and that was Anirvachya or indescribable. But Sidhanti says that the Shruti says that there was something which was neither Sat, nor Asat. It never tells us that there is a thing which is indescribable. Besides the import of a sentence is nothing more than the syntactically connected meanings of words adjusted to the needs of constructional requisites like Juxtaposition and others' Presumption and others do not count in settling the import of a sentence. Otherwise presumption which is counted as separate and independent instrument of knowledge shall have to be included in verbal testimony.

Raghavendra supplies the real meaning of the Shruti by quoting a verse from Geeta

Tatparya. "The thing (that existed in Pralaya) was neither tangible nor intangible. (मूर्त ओ अमूर्त). Hence it is called neither Sat nor Asat. This Murta is Sat because it can be known, and it is Asat because it cannot be known Lord Vishnu is imperishable and he is different from both Sat and Asat." The same thing is corroborated by quoting Geeta. "Beginningless ParaBrahma is called neither Sat nor Asat". Then Raghavendra explains the whole of Vishwakarma Sukta in which this hymn occurs.

Then the Sidhanti says that for Adwaitin there is no occasion for presumption. For presumption operates only when there is some dislocation of meaning, which, to be set right, requires presuming some unexpressed meaning in a sentence. Here in this Sukta there is no dislocation of meaning and hence no necessity of presumption of new meaning which is Anirvachya too.

Adwaitin contends that there is the dislocation of meaning. For, he says that because it is going to be sublated, it is not Sat. And because it is perceptible it is not Asat. Thus these inferences go against the statement. Or had it been sat it would not have been sublated; had it been Asat it would not have been perceived.

Thus there is the opposition of two Tarkas: When there is the opposition of these two then presumption operates. But it requires an invariable concomitance between Sat and absence of sublation and Asat and absence of imperceptibility. No such Vyapti is to be found.

It is difficult to follow the logical meandering which may probably lead us into confusion. Hence it is better to keep in mind the trend of reasoning adopted here. First the Adwaiti started with the syllogism (विभूतो भेदः मिथ्या भेदस्त्वात् चंद्रभेदचर्त्). The disputed difference is illusory; because it is difference as in the case of two moons (appearing when one eye is pressed with the thumb.) This inference is one of the evidences marshalled to prove the illusory nature of difference. The other evidences are perception, verbal testimony, presumption and others.

To show the hollowness of the above reasoning the Sadhya, Mithya, was analysed and it was shown to be neither Sat nor Asat and other combinations of these two. The last alternative was सदसद्विलक्षणं 'neither Sad nor Asad'. Mithya was said to belong to this class of things. But unfortunately nothing is found to belong to this class.

Now what is the meaning of Mithya itself? Does Mithya mean unreal or indescribable? The Adwaitin does not agree to say that Mithya is Asat, or unreal. And there is in this world nothing which can be described as अनिर्वचनीय — scribable. It is either real or unreal.

In the same manner the reason or Hetu in the inference above given is मेदत्वात् ‘on account of difference’. What is this मेदत्व? Is it real or unreal both or neither? This last alternative is also called अनिर्वचनीय. All these four alternatives are similarly to be contradicted.

Now this अनिर्वच्य is not borne out by any evidence. But the Adwaitin contends that this Anirvachyatwa can be proved by inference— विमतं अनिर्वाच्यं बाध्यत्वात्. Now the appearance of silver in the shell is proved as Anirvachya on the strength of this inference. For the silver in shell knowledge will be sublated later on, that it is no silver but it is a shell. But the weakness of this inference is sufficiently exposed already in Jijnasadhikarana. It need not be thrashed again. The Adwaitin quotes Agama as evidence, which was also thoroughly examined and the real meaning of Nasadeeya Sukta has been already stated.

Then Arthapatti or presumption also was forced into service but it was shown to prove

nothing for want of Vyapti. Thus one by one all the other evidences like 'Resemblance' and 'Absence' are shown to be of no avail in respect of proving Anivachyatva.

Now a general flaw in Adwaitin's argument is being shown. The same inference is taken for review—our own perception tells us that the sky and other things are real and shell-silver is unreal. It is the experience of all that the unreal shell-silver appeared to them. Hence no inference can prove अनिवाच्यत्व of shell-silver.

Then he takes the inference—the difference between soul and God is unreal; because it is difference. For perception proves something contrary to your inference. Then Adwaitin argues that the Sidhanti's reasoning is a castle of cards. For God whose difference is now being considered is beyond the reach of perception. It is agreed God is known only through Shashtra. One may know one self through Sakshi. But other souls are closed books to him. Difference of imperceptible things cannot be perceptible. And its reality is far away from our reach. So the whole argument collapses like a palace of cards.

This is a stunning blow; but Sidhanti is above and beyond its effect. Calmly he argues

that he has already made the point clear. It is not one differences that resides in all things separately that he contends. On the other hand it is the difference of one residing in another that is cherished by him. For its perceptibility it is enough if the thing containing difference is perceptible. The counter-entity of difference should only be known. This is what we find in our daily experience. We cannot perceive the difference residing in God and other soul; For they are not perceived. But I can perceive the difference of God residing in me; for I am known to myself. And I have the knowledge of God through Shastras. This is the experience of all. This experience being the experience of oneself or Sakshi cannot be brushed aside. This internal perception possesses uncontested infallibility and any instrument running counter to it stands self condemned. Because it is the source from which all other instruments derive their validity (उपजीव्य).

Now why the उपजीव्य प्रमाण the source instrument should contradict the उपजीवक प्रमाण the derived instrument and why not vice-versa? So long the perception and inference based on it were pitted against Shruti and inference based on it. It was decided that उपजीव्य was stronger than उपजीवक and hence Bheda or difference was proved

to be valid against identity. If on the other hand the Adwaiti contends that the evidences which guarantee the validity of Bheda, like Shruti and perception, are invalid, then there will be no evidences to prove the existence of either God or soul. Then the Shruties like तत्त्वमसि cannot prove the identity of God and soul. For both of them stand unproved and are as good as unreal. Hence the Shruti तत्त्वमसि cannot stand as adversary to perception which proves Bheda.

It is explained, says Raghavendra, that the perception which proves Bheda only suggests it, but does not create it, as the potter creates a pot. Therefore if that evidence is proved invalid then God and soul stand unproved and their identity cannot be proved.

A controversy is raised in the interpretation of Anuvyakhyana in this context. Raghavendra places before the readers those different interpretations. Then he offers his own explanation, which is lucid and convincing. The context is Agama and Pratyaksha have proved difference between God and soul. If Adwaitin proves that these two evidences are invalid, then God and soul themselves, objects of those two evidences stand unproved. Then identity without having any

containers (like God and soul) stands hanging in the air.

If this is the interpretation then the reply is that the evidence proving the identity of God and soul does not affect the existence of God and soul. For that evidence simply suggests the identity of these two. It is not empowered to create those two objects. That evidence merely cognises and not creates those two objects. So those two objects stand undelineated and unsettled. When the objects themselves are not settled in their description how can their identity be proved by those statements? This is the real explanation.

Raghavendra offers another explanation. There is the scorpion or crab which procreates off-springs. Hence the mother is the उपजीव्य (source) and the progeny is उपजीवक (produced or derived) the mother dies and the progeny comes out of her body. So उपजीव्य here also may be contradicted by उपजीवक. This is the contention of Adwaiti. Sidhanti replies that the Bheda given by Upajeevya is only suggested and not created by it. Had it been created the analogy of scorpion would have been applicable and Upajeevya would have been contradicted by Upajeevaka.

Again the Adwaitin contends that the Shruti like यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित् in a secondary and derivative way suggests only pure and absolute consciousness and establishes identity; Hence this cannot be contradicted by the experience of one self as ignorant and incapable.

To this the Sidhanti rejoins that in literature the secondary meaning always presupposes the primary meaning of the same expression. The primary meaning सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित् is omniscience and omnipotence and it must have been proved to exist somewhere else if not here. Then the difference between little knowing soul and all knowing God is clear and hence the statement of identity is directly contradicted.

Many varieties of उपजीव्य and उपजीवक relations are explained and their different ways of contradictions are presented. Thus it is proved that Pratyaksha of the experience of Sakshi which directly cognises the object being stronger in validity contradicts the Shruti which states identity of categorically different objects like God and soul.

o o o o o

Again the soul is said to be an अंश or particle of Paramatman. Then the relation between the

two will be different cum identical. For a part can in no other way be related to the whole. Between the original form of Paramatman and His Avatara forms the Sidhanti also has agreed that there is identity between them.

To this objection the Sidhanti says that अंशत्व is not a physical part of non-material Paramatman. So it is only a technical or figurative part of Paramatman. The soul is similar to Paramatman as a part is similar to the whole. Also the soul is subordinate to Paramatman. For the existence and activity and knowledge of the soul depends upon God.

Already this subject has been tackled, but not fully. Hence it is treated again. For in that context it was argued by the opponent that the soul does not consist of consciousness and bliss as it is not found so now. But really speaking the soul consists of those things, they are not manifest now. Just as the child has all the potential qualities of a male or female (the sex that performs the fecundating function) only in unmanifest form, and when the child attains youth, sex functions will be manifested; So also the soul has these consciousness and bliss but they are not manifest and in Mukti they are manifested. But there in that context the soul's relationship

of similarity and dependence are not shown. And they are shown here.

One thing should be noted, says Raghavendra, that his Avatars consist of the main or the same elements of Paramatman, while the soul consists of different elements hence similar elements of Paramatman. In one respect (namely existence) even Jeeva has the main element of existence as that of Paramatman. But in respect of consciousness and bliss. Paramatman has unlimited abundance of them while Jeeva has a meagre element of these two ending only in similarity in respect of name but not in quantity or quality:

ENDS THE 3RD PADA OF II ADHYAYA

IV PADA OF II ADHYAYA

Nyaya Sudha is very short on IV Pada of the II Adhyaya and Parimala has not exceeded the volume of Sudha. Raghavendra has not shown the discourteous Prolixity by transgressing the limit of the volume of the original. It was shown at the beginning of the 3rd Pada of this Adhyaya that it was devoted to the reconciliation of the contradictory Shruties propounding the nature of Jeeva and Paramatman in divine and material interpretational ways. While it was suggested that here in the fourth Pada the reconciliation of contradictory Shruties is sought in a spiritual interpretational way. This is one way of distinguishing the third Pada from this fourth Pada. Another way also is suggested here. Acharya in his Anuvyakhana says "the contradiction of the meaning of the Shruties".

Jayateerth explains that the word 'meaning' is purposely added to show that this Pada forms a part of Meemamsa Shastra. Raghavendra explains it clearly that Memamsa is devoted to correctness of interpretation, and not to prove the validity which is the jurisdiction of Tarka-Shastra. Hence Acharya had added the word 'meaning' (अन्तर्याम्).

THE END OF II ADHYAYA

III ADHAYA

The theme of this Adhaya is the discussion of means (for Moksha). Jayateertha composes a beautiful verse to make an auspicious beginning. At the same time the verse is deeply significant as it is pregnant with suggestive meaning.

कृपिताहि फणच्छाया समीकृत्यापरं सुखं
सेवन्ते यत्पदं श्रीरास्तंभजेवलभंश्रियः ॥

I seek the abode of the Lord of Shree which, the spiritually courageous seek having equated the sensual pleasures with the shadow of the hood of an indignant serpent.

Raghavendra draws out the deep meaning of the words perhaps from his own experience of his inner life. सेवन्ते [seek] is explained as 'Visualise through direct knowledge (अपरोक्ष) gained by a devoted course of hearing, thinking & meditating. 'Abode' is explained as 'Nature of God' or essential form of God.

A grammatical doubt is raised according to the rule छायाबाहुत्ये, छाया becomes छाय as in the

compound इषुद्वाय. But this shortening is conditional. Only when many shadows are meant [बहुत्य] then it is shortened. Here there are no many hoods as in the case of many sugar canes which throw the shadow. Only one hood throws the shadow. It is made clear that बहुत्य refers to the world that comes before the word द्वाय.

Now the theme of this Pada is Vairagya or detachment from all worldly concerns. Attachment to God Shri Hari or मक्ति is made deep only by the first kind of detachment. This is suggested in the first verse.

That a man should develop a sort of aversion towards worldly life, the miseries of coming and going (birth and death) are described in this Pada. So that being disgusted with these dirty events man should seek a life beyond birth and death. As usual first the opponent's view is built up and then the statements of Sidhanti are given.

Raghavendra takes pains to give the reasoning of the opponent and that of Sidhanti for each Sutra in the Pada. At last the question of coming back into life is referred to, in the last Sutra. The soul comes in contact with corn and through it enters into the semen of the male and

through it reaches the womb of the female. In the usual course of things when the soul is dragged back into life by his destiny, this is the path followed. In exceptional cases, say of men of penance or wisdom, or special practices of Yoga, different ways of birth also are found.

END OF I PADA OF III ADHAYA

II PADA OF III ADHYAYA

The theme of the Pada is Bhakti or devotion to God. Raghavendra gives a synopsis of the Pada, as he has been giving in some of the previous Padas. He goes on summarising each Adhikarana in a few words. In the first Adhikarana Shurti tells that there is creation (of God) even in dream. After wards it is not seen. For God is capable of doing impossible things. The second Adhikarana tells us that bondage and release are at his will and not by ignorance and knowledge, though they are the cause of them. So also in the case of dream and wakefullness, it is Paramatma who causes them though they are caused by the unconsciousness and consciousness of out ward things. The third Adhikarana describes that the state of wakefulness also is caused by the consciousness of one self (अस्मात्); still this wakefulness, as the dream state, is caused by his desire and not by time, which is not independent. The fourth Adhikarana states that the Stage of sleep also is caused by Vishnu when he enters the Shushamna Nadi. For then he is able to enjoy

happiness. We know from the fifth that wakefulness from that sleep also is caused by God Hari and so on and so fourth. Raghavendras summarises all the Adhikaranas of this Pada, Succinctly some times with very terse expressions.

Jayateertha in Nyayasudha treats the subject of Dream Phenomena in a masterly manner and brings to bear all Shastra references in its explanation and exposition. Raghavendra adds his notes for further elucidation wherever they are found necessary.

The stuff out of which dreams are woven is mental and not material. They are mental impressions called वाचा or after-effects of experiences, which have been running in a beginningless, series. Raghavendra explains here the concept of beginninglessness which is, as he says, in reference to the long series. though every individual in that series has its own beginning. The mental impression— though each one is born and has a beginning—in their series is beginningless. Because the experiences that originate them are beginningless in their series though individually they are born.

Now these mental impressions are contained in the mind and not Atma or soul. For the soul is spiritual while the impressions are formed of the stuff of Sattva, Rajasa and Tamasa. That mind

also which contains these impressions is beginningless, and continues to stay with the soul in all its sojourns, at all times till the soul gets its Mukti. In Mukti the soul is nakedly pure bereft of all its paraphernalia of transmigration. So mind gets itself dissociated from soul or Jeeva after a long service of the soul.

Jayateertha raises certain logical discrepancies in the arguments of Adwaitin. In the course of arguments it was proved by the Sidhanti that it is Sakshi that warrants the validity of all knowledge and means of knowledge. Otherwise in the course of ascertaining the validity, in the absence of Sakshi there will be infinite Regress. Therefore even the validity of inference is ascertained by Sakshi.

But if the validity is known by Sakshi, before Sakshi operates, the rule of validity that is stated, might be violated. Sometimes wrong means or proofs might be accepted as right ones. Thus there will be no confident step taken with cock surity.

This is no objection. For what is wrong proof, if rightly understood, is not the work of Sakshi. For Sakshi is unfailing source of validity. It is the mischief of the mind. So this erroneous

knowledge, if sublated, does not affect the infallibility of Sashki.

The mechanism of understanding validity of knowledge is this. Sakshi apprehends all knowledge. But if afterwards this knowledge is sublated then it is invalid. Otherwise it is valid. Sakshi apprehends thus its validity also. If one is deeply interested in the knowledge, then one will be curious to know its validity. Closely following the test or verification, one ascertains its validity or invalidity. If one is not much interested in the knowledge, one remains indifferent to its test.

At this critical time mind, clouded with passions, ventures with a test of a kind, settles its validity or otherwise. That validity if apprehended by Sakshi is not sublated. If apprehended by mind it is sublated. For Sakshi is acknowledged to be always a reliable source of validity. Hence a rule is made that a Hetu which is usually found concomitant with Sadhya barring exceptional cases; and is not concomitant with Sadhya in exceptional cases, is still a valid instrument.

For mere concomitance of Hetu with Sadhya is not conducive to validity of inference. But that Hetu must not be limited by any Upadhi or condition. In the same manner violation of

concomitance also must be free from any condition to prove the incapacity of Hetu. Inconceivability is not invariably concomitant by nature. There is some other factor for the violation of concomitance. If on the other hand Hetu is naturally and invariably concomitant with Sadhya and if on account of some condition of the Hetu, it gets itself dissociated with Sadhya, this violation does not conduce to invalidity of the inference.

Another topic of logical discrepancy is the concomitance of two things found in different places. If concomitance is agreed to between dissociated things then we may infer transience of the soul on account of the blackness of the crow. So a Hetu not found in the same place with Sadhya cannot be a valid instrument of reasoning.

But the Sidhanti says that when concomitance is assured this difference of place does not count at all in conducting to validity. Then certain concrete examples are given. At the sight of the inundation of the river here, one may very well infer rainfall above this place.

This does not prove the difference of place of Hetu and Sadhya. For the place or receptacle is the river itself. So the river has inundation

because it has rainfall in its upper part. Strictly its syllogistic form would be 'The river is a place connected with its upper part which had heavy rainfall, for it has inundation'. Thus for both rainfall and inundation there is only one substratum namely river. So there is no Vyadhi-karana or difference of place for both Hetu and Sadhya.

If in this way Vyadhikaranata is warded off and Samanadhikaranya (finding in one place) is sought, then really Vyadhikaranata can nowhere be a flaw in logical reasoning.

Now Vyapti is nothing but 'one not to be found without the other' (अविनाशाद्). This is found in some places, where both are found to take resort to the same substratum. For 'being created' is found with 'transiteriness'. But in some other places both of them are in different places, as in the case of smoke and fire. For these two are not found inhering in the same substance, nor by contact in the same substance. Fire is found in the lower region while smoke occupies higher region. It is no use arguing that the mountain has the contact both of fire and smoke. If so we cannot explain the conduct of man who directly goes to a particular place for fire.

Jayatheertha enters into still greater details and proves conclusively that difference of locality of Sadhya and Hetu need not affect the validity of the inference.

Now another still, logical discrepancy is taken for consideration. Even when the adjunct of Sadhya is not proved, the inference does not lose its validity. Let us analyse the situation. Why should this amount to a logical fallacy? 1] If unproven Sadhya is not accepted as logical fallacy, then such inferences as "the world is some thing different from Sat and Asat; for it is sublated." shall have to be accepted as valid. 2] or if Sadhya is unknown there cannot be any doubt about it. Then you cannot have a Paksha containing Sadhya of doubtful existence. When there is no Paksha, you cannot have a Hetu residing in Prakash which is the key stone of the arch of inference. or 3] If Sadhya is unknown we cannot establish the concomitance of Hetu with Sadhya (smoke and fire). or 4) the general enunciation (प्रतिज्ञा) [the mountain has fire] contains a word of (unknown meaning does not become intelligible.

One by one these alternatives are taken up for critical assessment and evalution. 1] The

first alternative is an instance where an undesirable and illogical syllogism shall have to be accepted as valid. But the Sidhanti argues that the invalidity of such an argument can be proved as invalid for other reasons. It is an instance of self contradiction. Raghavendra, here enlightens us on the particular kind of self contradictions by introducing all five varieties of self contradiction. 1] One's own word is contradicted [स्ववचन विरोधः] as in 'The mountain has fire; and has no fire.' 2] one's own rule is violated. ' You are a thief; for you are a man.' For every man being a thief is violated in himself [सत्यायविरोधः]. Otherwise he also will be a thief". 3] 'I am dumb' is an instance of disproving his own action [स्वक्रियाविरोधः]

So already the inference is affected with self-contradiction and can not be [an instance] of unknown Sadhya. [साध्याप्रसिद्धि]. Thus he goes on with the other alternatives. [In the course of that he takes up the third alternative. The Sidhanti contends that in inferences like 'God is all knowing because he is all doing, merely on the strength of negative concomitance the inference is found valid. Thus even when Sadhya [सर्वज्ञत्व] is not known still the concomitance [negative] is established. That is known when the negation of

Sadhyā (the absence of all knowing) is found concomitant with the negation of Sadhana (absence of all doing) as in ordinary souls.

Here is one consideration. An inference based on negative concomitance alone, is said to be valid instrument of knowledge. Because there is that concomitance and its knowledge also.

But where is that negative concomitance? And who knows it? Why! it is known in the Paksha itself negatively. The negation of Sadhyā is found concomitant with the negation of Hetu. For instance, Raghavendra illustrates, in pots and pans absence of souls is found concomitant with absence of life. Knowing this, relying upon Vyapti or by the advice of a reliable friend, we know in a living body the concomitance of possession of life and soul. But we are not able to show others who are doubting that one possessing life, possesses the soul. Then we prove that possession of life is concomitant with possession of soul; because the absence of soul is found concomitant with the absence of life as in the inference of Fire from the fact of smoke. You need not object that the place of the positive substances is different (living body) from the place of their negatives (pot and pan). We have

already proved that Vyadhikaranata or difference in the places does not affect the validity of the inference. If required the sameness of the place can be easily sought.

o o o

another logical topic is taken for critical study. Inference is Anumana. But Tarka is Reduction to absurdity. यदिवन्हि: नस्यात् चाहिष्यमोपि नस्यात्; If 'Fire' is not accepted, then let smoke also be unacceptable. This is तर्क. अस्तित्र धूमः अतः वहिमान्. Thus Tarka is a good aid to inference proper.

But the Jains think this Tarka to be an independent instrument of knowledge. Others still object that this sort of reduction to absurdity is not valid at all. For Tarka is nothing but reduction to undesirable absurdity.

Sidhanti considers this sort of Tarka as a logical aid to inference. Jayateertha first shows how helpful is this Tarka in helping ordinary inference or other proofs to reach the conclusion when they are found in troubled waters. For instance the eye is unable to prove the absence of a pot on the ground, when it is muddled with a doubt [why should there not be a pot on the ground?] Then this Tarka comes to our help. 'Had there

been pot here it would have been seen by the eye as the ground is seen. Because the same accessories required for seeing the ground are required to see the pot. This is the Tarka; but it is not able to remove the doubt. It only cuts short what others desire and prove the probability of the absence of the pot. But perception with this much of aid settles its conclusion. In the same manner, the inference subjected to fear of violation of Vyapti or of some other defect, will stop from concluding that the mountain has fire though its smoke is seen. Then Tarka begins its course and revives the Vyapti from its Inactivity and on the strength of settled concomitance determines the presence of fire on the mountain without any doubt.

The function of this Tarka is to create some undesirability in supplying some Upadhi or condition to Hetu or in the violation of Vyapti; and thus cuts the root of illogical desire.

In the same manner in statements of Veda some doubts would be raised to encourage the wrong meaning. Then Tarka would remove that doubt and help the natural import to rise above all these obstacles by the canons of interpretation.

One instance of Vedic injunction is taken. ‘one desirous of heaven should perform sacrifice’

[स्वर्गं काशो यजेत्]. In this statement the verb is पञ्चेत potential form of the root यज्. According to शीमांसा the root meaning is Yaga or sacrifice and the meaning of the termination (तिङ्क) is technically called भावना [should]. Raghavendra defines भावना as आंतरादःयः प्रयत्न विशेषः. It is a peculiar effort other than internal. This Bhavana being transitive [कार्मिक] required some object [भावय]. Then a doubt arises whether that object is Yaga [sacrifice] the meaning of the root, or heaven [स्वर्ग]. Then by the law of association Yaga is determined to be Bhavya. Then the meaning of the injunction is : sacrifice should be performed or Heaven should be got. The injunction or the statement becomes silent over the matter.

Then the Tarka comes to the rescue. It begins its operation thus. there is the root and the verbal termination (तिङ्क) Lit, whole meaning is 'Bhavana' and Yaga the meaning of the root is the object of Bhavana as they are both used together. Swarga or heaven is intervened by another word. As it is associated with another word, Swarga is outside the pale of the import of the sentence and comes late into connection. Hence it cannot be the object of Bhavana. This is the opposer's view.

If the root meaning [Yaga] is Bhavya, then the supposition that the injunction states means of realising one's desire [Swarga] is proved false. The consideration that Vedic injunction or Bhavana expresses that meaning is denied. He who has stated this, is no longer considered a reliable man (आप्त). Then no wise man would take interest in this Vedic injunction. When this sort of Tarka would remove the doubt, then the injunction would clearly state that Bhavya is Swarga or heaven and not Yaga as was doubted. Thus you must yourself know how this Tarka would help the establishment of Sadhya in Anumana.

Raghavendra adds a note here. The above discussion comes under Swarga Kamadhikarana. Thus whenever doubts arise in Vedic statements and drag us to contrary (or wrong) meaning, then Tarka will be suggested to us in the respective Adhikaranas depending upon the right meaning or import of those Vedic statements.

For example in injunctions like 'विश्वजितायज्ञेत्' had there been no expression of teleological content like सर्वकामः then there would be no object for Bhavana of the sacrificer expressed by विश्व. Another example given by Raghavendra is उद्धुदा

यजेत्. Had उद्भिद् been no name of an Yaga; then no such meaning as 'one should perform the Yaga called Udbhid' would come out. This is the type of Tarka in verbal Texts.

Now in the case of perception, one would come to know that a pot is a substance when a doubt as to its being non-substance is removed by such a Tarka as 'Had the pot been no substance, then it would have been no substratum for attributes or qualities.

So there will be Tarka as long as there is a doubt and there is a doubt till it is blocked by Vyaghata or contradiction (व्यावर्ताविराजकात्कः शंका विर्मतः) Raghavendra explains that such a doubt as would land us on self contradiction should not be raised. In the inference of fire by seeing smoke if accepting smoke, fire is not accepted there would be contradiction of one's own action. For Fire and smoke are admitted as cause and effect. And one is seen taking interest in the cause in order to secure the effect. Hence the Tarkika says that a doubt causing self contradiction should not be raised. And Tarka is used as long as a doubt is raised.

After this meandering in the field of logic Jayateertha offering us an interesting diversion

showed many allied points logically sound. He conclusively released Inference from all its alleged weak points. The topic on hand is the dream world created by God. Many Shruti-s have been cited by Acharya in his Bhashya to show the reality of dreams.

This dream is similar to wakeful creation in its transience, modification, and dependence. But dream is not illusory as the Adwaitins suppose. So it is not going to be sublated by knowledge.

Now Adwitin contends that dream is indescribable and neither Sat nor Asat. Hence there is no fear of self contradiction. But this indescribability or Anirvachyavatva is exactly coinciding with Sadasyavilakshanatva. Hence this is an instance of self contradiction, as it contradicts his own action.

Shidhanti argues that dream is Mayamatra or is going to be sublated. For it is not fully manifested. It is entirely dependent.

Now dream is said to be different from Sat which is Brahma. This means Sat does not contain Brahmavatva. For Brahma has no attributes at all. Hence you cannot conceive of Brahmavatva which is a quality in Brahma and which you want to deny in the dream.

But if there is distinction between dream and Brahman and that distinction is Mithya or false, then it means that there is non-difference between them. So it means there is difference only. For one is Mithya and another is Satya and hence there is difference only.

But inspite of difference there is some thing common also. For though one pot is different from another pot yet there is the common quality of earthiness between the two earthen pots.

Now another objection is raised. Difference of a dream from Brahman means Brahman is the counter entity to the difference (Pratiyogi) and dream is the substrate for it (Anuyogi). Now if you deny Pratiyogitva in Brahman, then Brahman will be Anuyogi. For it is a rule that of the two, Pratiyogitva and Anuyogitva, on hand, if one is not there, another will creep in. Hence there will be either Pratiyogitva or Anuyogitva in Brahman, which is against its nature.

But this Pratiyogitva or Anuyogitva] in Brahman is Mithya or false, contends Advaitin. Sibanti replies that if Pratiyogitva is Mithya, then will be no Vailakshanya between Brahman and the dreamland. When even that Vailakshanya

becomes true, Adwaitin is not ready for this logical consequence; for it leads to apostacy.

But Brahman is to be thought over, meditated upon (जिज्ञास्य). Then Brahman cannot afford to be devoid of attributes. There are Shruties to prove that Brahman is all knowing.

Now all-knowing is a relative term as it depends upon 'all'; and this all is the object of wrong knowledge or illusion. In the same manner even such attributes as 'invisible' also are all false and cannot be really found to exist in Brahman. But Advtitin accepts attributes negative in nature and rejects positive attributes.

Sarvajnatva and others, he rejects on other grounds also. 'All-knowing' and such other attributes depend upon 'All'. Hence such dependent attributes are rejected in Brahman. If so 'Invisible' also is dependent attribute as it depends upon 'Visible'; so it should also be rejected in Brahman.

The same topic of attributelessness of Brahman is followed up with all the vigour of reasoning and evidences from Agama or Veda. If Brahman is attributeless, he cannot be the subject of thought and reasoning (Meemansa). He cannot be even the import of Shastra.

Thus you cannot impose false attributes on Brahman. If Brahman is attributeless by nature verbal statements of Veda will be invalid. Hence one cannot stand for Brahman's attributelessness.

o o o o

In order to prove the false nature of 'All-knowing' and other attributes of Brahman, the whole world is said to be false or illusory. But mere assertion would not achieve anything. Evidence must be produced. As for perception, it warrants the real nature of the world. And the inference also that the disputed is illusory because it is visible is already refuted. As for Agama Geeta condemns out-right those who propound unreal naurte (असत्यत्व) of the world. Hence contradicted and confutad, the evidences of Advaitin by superior evidences, lose all strength and allow the reality of the world.

Advaltin cannot argue that Agama is more powerful evidence than perception and hence perception shall have to adjust its findings to those of Agama which declares the falsity or unreality of the world. For the validity of all evidences whether perception or inference or Agama depends upon perception not external but internal or Sakshi. Because Sakshi is of the nature of Chaitanya and self luminous. Hence

it is very well qualified to apprehend validity of other evidences and of itself. Thus Sakshi is apprehending the validity of the Agama or Veda; is Upajeevya or feeding agent and the Agama depending upon Sakshi for its validity is subordinate to it. Therefore Agama propounding falsity of the world runs counter to Sakshi and invalidates itself. Next it is proved that Sakshi apprehends things not only of today but of yesterday and of tomorrow. Then Manasa Pratyaksha, which is the cause of memory, is also said to apprehend things of the past.

Thus the origin and development of dreams is explained on psychological basis; and they are said to be as real as the wakeful creation. Then not only projection of dreams is attributed to God but even their withdrawal is said to be God's activity.

The absence of dreams is said to be sleep. In that state the soul retires into Paramatma through Puritata Nadi and waking up from sleep is also caused by God. In the same way Moha or unconsciousness or fainting is brought on man by God. The soul only half enters into Paramatman. For the other states of full entrance, near residence and distant departure bring about other stages (sleep, dream, wakefulness).

In all beings and in all places (of the body) the same Paramatman with all his wealth of essential attributes exists.

In the Sutra अतः एव सूर्यं कादिवत् the soul is said to be the reflection of Paramatman and hence is different from Him as the sun is different from his reflection. Here Raghavendra discusses a reading 'एतदेवति' in Sudha. The word अतः in the Sutra is derived from एतद्. From एतदोशिति after एतद् the termination ऋषित् comes and then there is the change to अतः. Then we get the form अतः. So the correct reading is 'एतद्वादेवति' and 'एतद्वादेवति' is not correct. It is due to the slip of the writer. Raghavendra tells us how some defends, this reading of 'एतद्वादेवति' by dissolving the compound as अप्य असी शब्दात् एव वादः. So the word अतः is accepted here. The reflection of the sun means the rainbow where reflection is not through some medium other than itself. (इत्थापोरकेष्वपि). Through all these examples it is mere similarity that is stressed.

But it is objected that Brahman is different cum identical with the soul. That the difference between soul and Brahman is accepted by Siddhantia and Identity is warranted by the inference. The soul is identical with Brahman

for it is the part of the whole Brahman. A part is one with the whole. Just as his Avatara like Matsya is one with the whole Paramatman.

To this objection the Sutrakara replies अत एव चोपमा सूर्यकादिवस्. This अत is taken in many meanings. Now अत is used in Geeta where Paramatman is said to be superior to both (अत) soul and (अत) Laxmi. This अत cannot mean Swarupa or essence of Brahman. For then Brahman will not be superior to soul if it is of the nature of Brahman.

Jeeva is the reflection of Brahman so as not to be dependent on the medium of reflection. Raghavendra quotes a verse to the effect that reflections are of two types. One is with medium and another is without medium. The reflectability between Paramatman and the soul is without medium like that between the sun and the rainbow. Hence अतएव उदयः is taken in the sense of आभास. Hence the argument is soul is not one with Brahman, for it is merely the appearance or semblance (आभास) of Brahman. The real thing and its semblance cannot be one or identical, like the sun and its reflection. This semblance is nothing but its dependence.

It is again argued that the soul is different from Brahman; because they contain contrary

qualities like immunity from defects, and harbouring defects.

But if this contrariety is due to certain extraneous conditions, then both the substances might be identical. Raghavendra explains this with an instance. A crystal in contact with a red flower assumes redness in contrast to its original whiteness. Inspite of these two different qualities crystal is identical with itself. Thus the difference of qualities in the soul and Brahman being due to conditions conditioning the soul does not affect the original identity between them.

In the investigation of identity of soul and Brahman, Sivanti goes deeper and finds out the real cause of identity. Where there is ascribing of the experience of pleasure and pain as his own, (अनुसंधान) there is identity. The soul never ascribes to himself, the experience of Brahman's attributes; nor does Brahman attributes to himself the painful misery of the soul as his own.

Raghavendra puts the whole thing in formal syllogistic form so as to enable us to find out the logical flaw in the Advaitin's argument, which runs like this— "The soul and Brahman are mutually identical; for they are consciousness or Chetan and they are related as part and whole". Here Badha is not the only flaw; but conditioned

reasoning also. Ascribing to oneself the experience of pain and pleasure as his own is the condition under which the argument comes out to be true. Here the sort of concord is 'that which has no such अनुसंधान of oneself has no identity'. But this Vyapti is restricted to the field of 'Chetanas' only and it does not extend to Achetanas'. So a counter argument can be set forth 'to that of Advaitin: The soul and Brahman are not mutually identical. For they have no mutual ascription of experience of one self.

Thus the argument goes on in a very interesting and intelligent manner till at last the harbour is reached when the utter difference between Brahman and Jeeva is established.

Then the topic of form of Paramatma is taken for discussion. Contradictory statements about form or formlessness are reconciled into 'extra-ordinary form'. But what exactly this extra-ordinary form means and for what purpose it is described must be known. So it is said that Paramatman's form is not material; it is of the same stiff as his joy and consciousness. Really we do not find words to describe this wonderful form. Yet we may say that it is some splendour extra-ordinary and wonderful. This is needed for worship and meditation.

END OF II PADA OF III ADHYAYA

III PADA OF III ADHYAYA

A discriminative scrutiny of worthy and worthless things leads to detachment from worthless things. This detachment should be the result of dispassionate consideration. But detachment which is found in man before such consideration is due to natural inclination (शर्वा) will not be conducive to firmness of devotion.

The topic of this Adhyaya is, means to Moksha. Real means to Moksha is the grace of Bhagavan. And means to that grace are four detachment, devotion, dedication or worship, and visualisation. Vairagya or detachment leads to intensity of devotion with which the aspirant follows worshipful meditation. Thus pleased Bhagavan becomes visible to him. Vairagya was treated in the first, devotion in the second, Now in the third Upasana or worship is treated.

Now we must know how Jijnas enjoined in the first Sutra plays its part in granting Moksha. Moksha is not the direct result of Jijnasa. On the other hand Jijnasa gives us that Bhagavan is the

best thing in the world. When Bhagavan is known as par excellent he is pleased and grants us Moksha. For this we must know Bhagavan to be the creator of the world. That Bhagavan alone is the creator is settled by Shastras. Vedas, deliver Narayana as the creator of the world, as their chief import. This knowledge of Narayana as the chief import of the Vedas is to be settled by the use of canons of interpretations like Upakarma or beginning and Upasamhara or end. But this is a huge task impossible and man is short lived and limited in knowledge.

All the branches of the Vedas deliver the same sort of knowledge about Brahman. So they all invariably declare Brahman to be the creator of the world. But how to know and who is to know that all branches yield the same import ? It is the Sutrakara who assures us that in his unlimited knowledge, all the Vedas are but a tiny particle and hence they are easily understood by him.

Hence in this Samanyava study Chaturmukha or four faced Brahma alone is the most eligible man. Yet ordinary people also have eligibility of some kind. At first the mind of an ordinary man does not enter into this complex problem.

But once attached to it, the mind slowly enters into it, and grasps it according to his ability.

As usual Raghavendra summarises each Adhikarana of this Pada giving both opponent's argument and Sidhanti's reply.

Then comes the question of what Shakha or branch of Veda to choose for our study—our own or of others. The aspirants are to start their Dhyana and Upasana. The natural answer is one's own branch should be studied. Now Upasana is enjoined according to one's own capacity and hence the study of one's own Shakha is meant.

To this objection the Sutrakara gives a fitting reply. No doubt there is clear injunction that the whole of the Veda along with its secrets must be studied by a Brahman. The Study of all Vedas is in general. Adhyayana means the knowledge of meaning. But Raghavendra explains Adhyayana as winning capacity to recite at one's own will the group of letters by course of repeating after the Guru has recited. Then by the direction given by Guru, if one understands the meaning it is called Shravana or Hearing. And Manana is applying reasons to or rationalising, what you have understood.

Hence it is the study of the whole of the Vedas and not a branch of it that is meant by the

injunction. The study of a branch is meant only for the weak and the incapacitated.

The gist of the whole discussion is this. For aspirants in general it is enjoined that for the sake of meditation of Brahman they should study all the Vedas and get the knowledge of Brahman. But in the case of those who are incapable to study all the Vedas and know Brahman, they should know according to their capacity. But this will not jeopardise his spiritual efforts creating a doubt whether in other parts of the Vedas Brahman is described otherwise. For in all branches the general trend of the import is the same though other details many vary. Otherwise Vedas themselves lose their validity for making contradictory statements in different parts of the same book. So his study might be limited to his capacity though it must be liberal enough to catch the spirit of Vedas. Hence the study of all the Vedas is enjoined in general.

Here another objection is raised. The injunction that one's own Shakha should be studied is not in respect of one's study; but it is in respect of teaching [the Vedas that one is enjoined to study. [For there is no man for whom the study is enjoined. When there is no man for

whom the injunction is meant as in स्वर्गकामो यजेत् the injunction is proved futile. Nor can you supply such an intended person as in विश्वजीता यजेत्. Raghavendra adds an explanatory note here. Here no mention has been made of the Phala or motive of this Yaga. For in विश्वजीता यजेत् there are no words which convey the motive of this Yaga. So, as we find in स्वर्गकामो यजेत् a motive of Swarga which actuates one to perform the Yaga, in विश्वजीता यजेत् there is no motive mentioned. And the Vedic statement producing full import does not necessitate any thing to be understood. Without any motive no man can be actuated to action. So the injunction is rendered futile. Hence that statement becomes invalid.

When such objections arise, under stress of a syntactical crisis like this, the injunction, having no motivation, collapses into non-performance of the Yaga. So inorder to justify the performance of the Yaga, a motive like the desire of Heaven must be taken for understood.

But to come to the point on hand “तमध्यापयोत्”, one must teach him whose thread ceremony is performed when he is eight years old. In this injunction teaching is not possible without study and repeating what has been studied will not

amount to injunction. So it is not proper to suppose 'some motive' as there is no ground for it.

But one can suppose that the motive is 'desirous of becoming a teacher'. There is also a word in the statement, to suggest this supposition. आचार्यकरण् is making oneself fit to be Acharya or teacher. In उपनयित् there is the root नीड् and there is Atmanepada termination. This suggests that in order to qualify himself to be a teacher he should carry near him a Brahman of eight years. In the absence of a desire, there is no means to fulfil that desire. As he applies means to be an Acharya it means that he has desire to become an Acharya and this is the motive. In the same manner there is also motive to study the Vedas as there is motive to teach them.

So long a specimen of Meemansa discussion was given. This shows the mastery of Raghavendra in the discipline of Memansa. This is no wonder in Raghavendra who is the author of a lucid commentary on Jaimini Sutras (Bhatta Sangraha) which is the source book of Memansa.

The last Nyaya or reason is given for the study of all the Vedas. Brahman is to be meditated as endowed with the qualities mentioned in all the Vedas, bereft of all blemishes. But there

are the first rate meditators who ascribe rich qualities to Brahman while there are mediocre who are limited to some qualities. And the least qualified, attribute a very few qualities to Brahman while meditating. Thus there is limitation of Study of Vedas according to the capacity of the aspirant.

Now begins an enquiry of Bhakti or devotion which gives a name to this Pada. Yaga has eight stages of which Yama is one. And Yama is nothing but—as Raghavendra defines—means of Upasana without the restrictions of solitude of place, holiness of time and purity of mind which constitute Niyama. Bhakti or devotion is of this very nature. Hence it is called Yama.

But Yama is defined in Tantrasara as ‘Non-violence, Truthfulness, Absence of Stealthiness, continence and absence of Possession or property (destitution). Yoganushasana counts these as constituting Yama.

But how this Yama is related to Upasana? The Purvapakshi or the opposer contends that meditation is found in a spirit of hatred and enmity also. And Chaidya and others are noted for approaching in a spirit of haterd,

A reply is given by Sutrakar अनुबंधा is भक्ति. Raghavendra quotes Tantrasara fully. यमः शोचतः

तुष्ठिः स्वाध्यायो हरिपूजनं. Yama consists of purity, penance, contentment study of the Vedas and worship of Hari. We accept the aid of Yama in creating Upasana. Incessant meditation is not possible if the mind is distracted by other attractions. As for enmity and hatred as the ingraediant of Upasana, there is no reason for hating God. But Chaldaya and others had the contact of Asura Jeeva; and hence there was hatred. But meditation through the spirit of hatred does not conduce to visualisation of God. Meditation based upon Yamas alone wins the gracious presence of Bhagavan. These must have been immune to all sorts of impurities and hatred is one of them. These impurities constitute the strongest impediments in the path of Moksha and how can such hatred be the means of it ?

Raghavendra quotes Shruti—Geeta from Bhagavat 'जहि अजां अजित दोष गृहीतयुग्मः. The soul has innate qualities like bliss and others which are covered by such impurities as pain and misery, through the influence of Avidya which must be abandoned. Hence it is clear that meditation prompted by hatred is of no use in the path of realisation.

Absence of Bhakti constitutes an impurity or drawback in self realisation and visualisation

of Bhagavan. And these impurities in greater or smaller measureo are to be found in all-young children, men, and mad persons. A verse is quoted here in proof of this from Bhagavatam IV Skandha, in 29th Adhyaya. लिङं न दृश्यते यूनः, कुरुक्षेत्रं चंद्रमसो यथा. Raghavendra explains it fully. Linga is the cause of ascribing every thing to one self, egotism; and that indicates its cause, Kama or desire. So it is called Linga. This desire is also to be found in childhood, not in abundance; and therefore it is called Tanu Linga (small Linga). Therefore then it is not clearly manifest. But in youth this Ling is clearly manifest through mind and five organs of senses and five organs of action. For in the case of those of sharp senses, due to intensity of attachment, this egotism or self love becomes acute. Just as the form of the moon who enters in the orb of the sun, on the first day is not seen as on the new moon day. But gradually from the second day and from the eighth day, the form of the moon gathering its eleven digits becomes fully manifest.

Now another question is raised (ऋजवः). The so called Rijus which is a spiritually privileged class claiming the status of Brahma Pada, is still bound in Samasara and desire to be released. But these are said to be immune to blemishes.

Otherwise they cannot be called Rijus. So the general rule that Moksha requires freedom from draw backs is violated here.

Sidhanti says that even Rijus have a drawback and that is avoidance of long sustained efforts. Otherwise you cannot explain why Moksha is withheld for some time. Raghavendra explains this problem thus. When one is graced with Divine vision there is eligibility for Moksha which is detained because he has not yet exhausted the Karma he has now begun to enjoy. So this exhaustion of Prarabdha is sufficient to detain Moksha. Why again you require the absence of Dosha or drawback for the detention of Moksha? There is the possibility of Karma being enfeebled and defunct.

A short resume is given by Jayatheertha. Attachment to sensual pleasures and scarcity of devotion to Vishnu amount to a solid defect. These should be abandoned by him who cherishes Moksha. For they are injurious impediments to Moksha. Whatever is an impediment to it should be cleverly averted by one who seeks it, just as unwholesome thing injurious to health is avoided by one who seeks health. So this proves that devotion to God Vishnu and other means should be practiced. For only by the practice of the

positive thing, its negative is avoided and by no other way.

Next another question is raised. Upasana or constant meditation to propitiate God Vishnu and to visualise him is vain. The object of visualisation is Moksha. But the Charvakas do not believe in Moksha. His Purushartha, or aim in life is Bhoga or enjoyment of pleasures. 'Eat, drink, and be merry'. Besides there is no evidence to warrant the existence of Moksha a state of Bliss. If it is of others we do not know, if ours, we have not yet.

But Moksha can be proved by the super-sensuous experience of those who have attained it. Though directly we cannot perceive the mind of others, yet we can hear their words which express their super-sensuous experience and thus prove Moksha beyond doubt.

But the masters of Atheism cannot claim any such extra-ordinary vision, as any sort of penance is repugnant to them. Therefore they cannot have any perception of the absence of Moksha.

Then different conceptions of Moksha as conceived by the Jains and Tarkikas and the Vaisheshikas are taken for consideration. For instance Tarkika considers Moksha to be the

destruction of all peculiar qualities of soul
This is not accepted by Sidhant!

In the same manner the Tarkika considers Moksha to be the cessation of the continuity of misery; he infers that the chain of misery comes to a stop, as any continuity would, like that of the flame of a lamp. Here are all the Jeevas whose misery is to be proved that it is going to discontinue? If so there are some souls who are eternally involved in the cycle of Samsara; and they are the instance where the rule is contradicted. For their misery will continue forever. Thus many logical flaws are exposed and the argument is shown logically unsound.

In the same manner Vaisheshika, who expounds that Moksha is only destruction of misery, also is exposed as immature in thought and his idea of Moksha is discarded. His argument is— Devadatta is the reseptacle of the destruction of misery. This destruction is contemporaneous with any attribute which does not belong to Devadatta; and which is not a reseptacle of any real thing belonging to Devadatta.

This is a very subtle argument and a subtler fallacy Badha is shown in illustration ‘the destruction of misery of Yajnadatta, the Hetu, being absent in it, on the basis of the rule ‘the absence

of the qualified is sought by the absence of the adjective'.

Thus the Jaina's Moksha also is condemned. For the absence of misery cannot be equated with positive happiness. This topic leads to the investigation of the nature of happiness. The contention that happiness is merely the absence of misery and hence is negative in nature, is discarded as baseless.

That happiness is positive in nature is known by the fact that happiness allowed gradation in itself. Sakshi is summoned as witness to prove that fact that happiness is graded in its intensity.

But the Jain argues that it is not happiness that is graded; but it is the positive misery that is graded and happiness is its negation. As misery receds, it is felt as happiness. The gradation that is seen in happiness is contingent on the gradation of its conterent entity misery and hence it cannot be real. Man's attempt for a higher quality of happiness is only for the withdrawal of the grater type of misery.

But the very conception that happiness is non-being in nature is not a proved fact. Sakshi the infallible instrument of knowledge cognises happiness as positive and hence all the super structure collaps as a palace of cards.

Then comes in turn the idea of Moksha of the Boudhas. Shunya or vacuum is their cardinal principle. How then that Shunya is related to Moksha? Shunya is the ultimate reality on which this mundane world is only super-imposed. By the knowledge of reality the illusion receds, and that is Moksha.

But inspite of the real knawledge of Shunya the mundane world is not seen receding in the next moment. It ought to do so, as darkness is dispelled immediately after the light is brought in that area. But it does not do so. This fact is accepted by Shunyavadi.

In the same manner the Vijnavadi also cannot maintaiu his idea of Moksha. Thus all those who are hereties are scrutinised. Then those who follow and believe Veda are also reviewed.

At last in his masterly resume Jayatheertha declares that there is Moksha and there is a course of discipline prescribed to realise it. One must first get his mind purified by going through the series of duties presoribed by Veda in a spirit of selfless dedioation. Then the aspirant should shed attraction and repulsion after which the heart manifests the innate devotion. Then

through a course of hearing, thinking and meditating he reaches the acme of devotion and through divine grace visualises Him. Then the Lord Hari removes all the hindrances of Karma to Moksha. But he makes this realised soul to wait in order that he should propagate Bhagavata religion in this world and as a ground for his stay here, He keeps some Prabdhakarmas in balance. The claimant for Moksha waits here till he exhausts those Karmas by enjoying them fully. Then they are also rendered ineffective and the gifted man is released for ever.

Then as the permanent gradation of souls is stated which is true both in bound life and released life. Raghavendra offers very illuminating comments on these portions. The other Manus are Swarochisha, Uttama, Raivata, Chakshusha, Savarni, Brahma Savarni, Rudra Savarni, Veda Savarni, Indra Savarni, Daksha Savarni, Dharma Savarni. Thus there are eleven.

Then in the gradation come Devatas who are hundred. These Gods are said to be nine crores (90 million) of whom only one hundred are entitled to drink Soma. Of these Agni, Rudra and chief Vayu are already mentioned. So the others mean, other than those that are already

mentioned. Raghavendra still makes the point clear. They are Vasu, Rudra, Marudganasa, Brihaspati Ribhu, Dyava Prithivee, Aswinees, Vishwadevas, (three) and Pitrus. All these are included in the selected hundred.

Now Vishnu is not included, because the gradation was restricted to those who are the worshippers. And Vishnu being one to be worshipped, was included in twelve Adityas. So Vishnu being left out, Adityas would be only eleven.

In winding up the topic of Bhakthi as means attain Moksha, it is said that Bhakthi is the unrivalled means and not Paramatma to get Moksha. For Yekalavya, devotion to Guru alone procured the lore of archery and not Guru.

But this is only an exaggerated statement. Among the means to attain Moksha or Paramatma, Bhakthi is superior and yet it cannot supercede Paramatman. Paramatma also may be counted as means to attain Mukthi. Hence it is contended that Bhakthi may rise superior, to Bhagavan.

Now the whole point is made clear beyond doubt. To attain Mukti or to get Visnulisation of Bhagavan, Bhakti rises superior to other means except Paramatman.

Entering in to the core of Bhakti you will realise that Bhakti is real when it is dedicated to Bhagavan alone; but devotion to others is in accordance to the scale of gradation at the acme of which stands Bhagavan. There is no super succession of merit in this eternal scale by any interference. Hence the aspirant should not grudge the unshared superiority of Paramatman. In the same manner he should not avoid devotional loyalty to his followers in the order of the spiritual scale.

Raghavendra sums up thus : undisputed sovereignty to be recognised in Hari and loyalty to his followers in the order of their spiritual scale is real devotion to Paramatman. Its unfailing efficiency is recognised in spiritual realisation,

END OF III PADA OF III ADHYAYA

IV PADA OF III ADHYAYA

It is now acknowledged that knowledge independent of Karma is the means to Moksha. Here this knowledge has also by-products in other things. No doubt the aspirant acquires knowledge only for the sake of Moksha. But knowledge also produces these by-products through its inherent nature. Just as fire is produced to burn; yet by its own nature also produces light. In this Pada the by-products of knowledge are enumerated.

Through Upasana the aspirant visualises Bhagavan. Jnana is this visualisation or Sakshat-kara. This super-sensuous perception is visualisation. This visualisation has also power to realise other values in life.

Some object to this extolling of knowledge to the skies. It is Karma alone that secures us Swarga. Knowledge simply in collaboration with Karma adds some glaze to the product. Hence it is called means to other products.

But Sidhanti emphatically asserts the unique nature of knowledge and its power to produce

other emoluments of life, in addition to Moksha which is its main function. But Jaimini's contradiction of this theory must be taken into account. So an attempt is made to reconcile the contradiction.

Jaimini's theory that Karma being helped by Jnana alone conduces to the attainment of Swarga and others. Raghavendra clarifies the issues. This theory of Jaimini holds good only in the case of human knowledge.

Even others have thought that it is Karma, alone and unaided that secures heaven and other things. These and others make a common cause; because all of them believe that knowledge alone cannot be the cause of heaven and others.

Human beings, as they are of three types, (high class, middle class, and low class) may entertain different ideas about the same subject. For instance, Jaimini's opinion that Karma with the aid of knowledge conduces to the obtaining of heaven, belongs to the high class people. Heaven and such other things are secured only by Karma; while knowledge which is only the cause of Moksha, will not be of any use in bringing about worldly or heavenly happiness. This theory is of the middle class people while the lower class has

accepted the theory that knowledge originates the invisible and is not able to secure the visible things of this world.

Now the Sutrakara gives his decision over this discussion. Knowledge in general is the means to get all desired objects and not knowledge of a particular person. Therefore one theory is general in aspect while others are particular; and hence there is no contradiction between them, though they differ from one another.

The Sutrakar stated in general that knowledge is the means to secure all sorts of happiness in life. But Jaimini and others contend that when there is great hindrance in the force of Karma, knowledge single handed is not able to secure for the aspirant, the highest bliss of life like Swarga and others. Therefore Sutrakara states only the case of a person unhindered by Karma, who secures his Purushartha by means of Jnana.

This does not run counter to the tenet of Jaimini who advocates Karma as an aid to Jnana to secure him his desired object. But sometimes when there is strong hindrance even Karma might not help him to get Swarga and others. Hence Jaimini's opinion has no context here. But there is no rule that which is a hindrance to Jnana, is

also a hindrance to Karma. Our experience of the world proves something contrary. For a man having a hindrance to the generation of knowledge is found to enjoy the layout of a garden and the building of a big mansion, which is the fruit of his Karma.

Besides Jaimini does not mean that Karma necessarily bears fruit. But even taking this for granted, the arrangement that Sutrakara opines that knowledge when unhindered yields all fruit; and that hindered knowledge requires the aid of Karma is the opinion of Jaimini; and it runs counter to the arrangement that the statement of Jaimini refers to men. For among men there are those who have unhindered knowledge and among gods there are those who have hindered knowledge. Therefore they also come under the purview of Sutrakara's opinion and Jaimini's opinion.

So a clarification is given on the previous arrangement to avoid such an overlapping. The clarified statement melts down to this, that Sutrakara's view refers to gods of unhindered knowledge; and that Jaimini's view refers to gods of hindered knowledge. Thus among gods alone a distinction in respect of hindered and unhindered knowledge should be made to reconcile Sutra-

kara's view with that of Jaimini's view. Now this arrangement is not incompatible with the previous order that Jaimini's view refers to men while Sutrakara's view refers to gods. Otherwise then arises conflict between both the orders.

This is the gist of an exposition of Adhikarana. The subject is philosophically interesting exhibiting intellectual flashes of high order. Now the further Adhikaranas in this Pada must be studied.

In the next Adhikarana the topic is very interesting. A man of god-vision, some times does an evil act. An ignorant man suffers a lot for a sinful deed. Thus then god-visioned man also must be affected by evil deeds. But a man graced with god-vision is not said to be affected with sin anywhere in sacred literature. If there is no affectation then, how there is distinct effect on the pious man of god-vision by good & bad deeds?

But by such lapses god-visioned man shall have to forego a part of highest bliss in Mukti. This is called loss of merit and it is different from affectation or contagion. Some like Brahma (four-faced) is an exception to this rule.

But it is said that no God loses a part of his merit-value which is permanently assigned to him, by such occasional sinful deeds. These two

statements, Contradictory of each other, are reconciled in to a modified statement. Jayatheertha supplies that modification. स्वयोग्यपरिपूर्तये यावत् साधनमनुष्ठेयं ततोत्तिरिक्तेन साधनेनानुष्ठेन पदानंदादिकं प्रसवत् सस्याभावो भवेत्. One has a limited capacity for Ananda in mukti. That in no way is affected in quantity or quality by sinful acts. But sometimes the aspirant plausibly exerts more than is required for this limited Anand. It is this excess of Ananda which cannot be added to his limited capacity, and hence is lost by such sinful deeds, so that he enjoys in Mukti his own limit of Ananda.

Then again it is said that the effect of Prarabdha Karma is extenuated by god-vision. But it is enjoined that by suffering alone the cruel Prarabdha Karma (Karma that is begun to be enjoyed) is exhausted, and not till then. In order to be consistant with this statement it is through the effect of this Karma that extenuation to a little extent is sought and complete exhaustion of Karma is to be found only by enjoyment or suffering. As a general rule one mutely submits to the effect of Prarabhda Karma; but as an exception god-vision causes a partial extenuation of the effect of that Karma.

But some think that Prarabdha Karma also is exhausted completely by god-vision as aprarabdha is done; And the statement that Prarabdha is not exhausted without enjoying or suffering from its effects, refers to the ignorant men who have no vision of God.

This view is not tenable. For if this view is correct then all God-visioned people should shed their mortal coil and immediately become released. But even after God-vision those who have Prarabdha remain in this world till that Karma is exhausted by enjoyment.

Here Raghavendra quotes legendary history to prove this statement. The contention is that even God-vision or Brahma realisation is not enough, without suffering or enjoyment to exhaust Prarabdha. Had it been so they would have no reason to stay here on the earth. Only to render some service to the world they come and stay here is a lame excuse. For they are thrust down to this earth through curse and other causes. Examples are many and Raghavendra quotes them. Indra and others through the curse of Durvasas, lost their wealth and sovereignty. Through the curse of Brahma Mudgala and others had the connection with women of best order. Mandavya and others had to suffer scaffolding for they sought

equality with Vashistha. Among kings Kalmasha Pada, through the curse of Vashishtha, became a demon. Such and many other stories are heard in Bharata and in other Puranas.

An objection is raised here. The killing of a Brahman ripens into a Prarabdha whose bitter fruit is the disease of Tuberculosis. But by undergoing penitential purificatory rites of Brahma hatya, he gets himself cured of the disease. Thus there is extenuation of the fruit or effect of Prarabdha, by suitable means.

To this objection there is the rejoinder. What is your contention? Do you mean to say that the penitentiary act is not the cause of the cure of the disease; But enjoyment alone is the cause of exhaustion of Karma? Then all the prescription of penitentiary acts are vain. Because they are not calculated to cure disease.

But if it is objected that penitentiary acts are the causes of destruction of Karma which provides the disease, then the penitentiary acts are not useless; for penitentiary acts are not constant rites; but they are occasional or incidental as the Istisara in the context of the burning of the house.

Raghavendra explains this Meemansa instance. If the sacrificial house is being burnt

it is enjoined that an Isti consisting of materials like Astakapala and Purodasha, and having Agni for its deity, should be performed. But it is also enjoined that one should perform sacrifice when there is breakage or falling down of a pot or Kapala. The second enjoiment is not useless or redundant. For it is meant to expiate the sin caused by that reason of breaking or falling of the pot or to serve some other purpose. Therefore the second enjoiment is not futile.

But once the enjoiment of pententiary acts is made to cure the disease it is improper to think that they should serve some other purpose. Besides in the alternative of some other purpose when there is the disease, the desire of cure comes after it and the attempt to fulfil that desire is made after it. This fact proves that they are not simultaneous; and that they have the only purpose of curing the disease. Or because the penitentiary acts are invariably followed by the cure of disease and hence it is not proper to think of another purpose for these acts.

Hence the word काम्य is used with विधि, (काम्य विधिः voluntary ordaining.) Because the significance of the word काम्य is that the cure of the disease comes after the performance of penitentiary act. For the diseased man with a desire to get

the disease cured performs penitentiary act. Therefore penitentiary act and cure of the disease are invariably sequential and not simultaneous (This is the explanation added by Raghavendra).

We do agree that penitentiary act has the purpose of curing the disease. For there is the ordaining to that effect. But in the case of vision of Brahma there is no such ordaining, to the effect that Karma is extenuated by it.

Yet it is heard as the result of vision of Brahma. Raghavendra makes it clear. We read in Shruti (इमसात्मानमभिपश्य उपमृद्युपुर्वं च पापं च) "having seen Paramatman and having destroyed both Punya and Papa." The extenuation of Punya and Papa is the result of the vision of Brahman. This leads us to think that he who wishes to extenuate his own Punya and Papa should see him. For if some thing is not mentained as the effect of some other thing, that some other thing cannot be enjoined to get that some thing.

o o o o

Then comes the question of gradation of Ananda enjoyed right from man to God Brahma (four faced), in the state of Mukti. In Taittareeya Shruti we hear this gradation. It is contended that this gradation is of the Muktas and not of Samesarins or unreleased from physical bondage. For there are two adjectives used to qualify the

persons concerned. They are श्रोतियस्य and अकामहतस्य
Now श्रोतिः means यस्यश्रुतिफलंप्राप्तं सश्रोतिः he who has
attained the object mentioned in Shruti.

Now this adjective suits only Muktas and also अकामहत which is explained as कामेन उद्गतो हि काम
हतत्वं तदभावः अकामहतता. Besieged by desires man becomes perplexed, in worldly life. But in released life he is free from this torture. Because all his desires are fulfilled, (आप्तकामः) he is not tortured by desires. It is said in Shruti that the released soul enjoys all desires (objectes of desires) in company with four faced Brahma. Though the Mukta has no mind or heart to cherish desires fulfilled. Hence this gradation of Ananda belongs to Muktas, for their अवृज्जिनत्वं.

Then the Taittareeya Shruti is further explained. This man is said to be ever young, which is possible only in the Mukta stage.

Then some other interpretations are taken for review. To confirm the correctness of his interpretation the Sidhanti shows some defects and drawbacks in their interhretations. But he shows clearly that in kanya Shruti, the Chakra varti, Pitru, Gandharva, are taken for consideration. Of these the latter is hundred times greater in Ananda than the former. But in Taittareeya Shruti the king, man, Gandharva and Pitru are enumerated. of these the latter is

hundred times greater in Ananda than the former. In Brihadbhashya expecting a contra, diction from Taittareeyaka शत before different words means Ayuta, Dashlaskha and so on and so forth. So the manushya gandharvas are hundred times greater than the sovereigns. Form them the Deva Gandharvas are Ayuta times greater than they and Pitrus are ten-lax times greater than those. The same gradation of Ananda is being now considered rationally. So long only Shruti texts were considered referring to this gradation.

The reason that supports this gradation is that the gods have a superior type of joy to that of men (gods and men are kinds to be found in the soul world and not in physical life). For in the stage of an aspirant the effort they make is far superior to that of man. It is a rule that greater effort is crowned with greater success. This rule is borne out in instances like the effort of a farmer, a merchant and an officer of the king. And in religious field, in the holy fires constantly kept up, this rule holds good. If on the other hand for greater effort there is no compensatory greater success in the end, an intelligent man does not feel the urge for greater effort at all. But an intelligent man is impelled

to make greater effort with an instinctive belief that it yields uncommon output.

Reverse is the case with men; because their efforts are less. Their ultimate fruit they achieve in their released state is less than that of the gods.

Then there is some discussion on the word दशकल्पं Raghavendra puts a grammatical note on the use of accusative case of this world. The grammar rule is कालाध्वनोरत्यंतसंयोगे द्वितीया Raghavendra first explains words in the rule. अंत means विराम cessation or terminus, अंतं अतिक्रान्तः सच्च असी संयोग when time and path are meant to have contact with qualities and action incessantly, accusative is used. Here the accusative has the same use as मासं अधीते (he studies for a month) क्षोशकुटिषाः नदी the river is zigzag for two miles. In दशकल्प it means that during ten kalpas: there is not a single moment passed without penance.

But this statement of gradation is contradicted by Shruti which declares equality among all released (सर्वसाध्य मुर्ष्टि) this apparent meaning is contradicted by many shruties supported by Shmrities. For Geeta declares a peculiar moksha for those that are gifted with divine wealth देवी संपदविमोक्षाय.

"Getting all the fulfilment of their eyes and ears in good comradeship of one another, with extrao-rdinary alertness of mind, they were yet not equal in knowledge and bliss, Some are sunk in neoter to their mouth. While others are enjoying sports in the forests of Swetadveepa, thus they were blessed with the presence of Paramatman".

All these statements conclusively prove that there is gradation in means applied and end achieved. If there is gradation in means and yet uniformity in the end Paramatman will be liable to favouritism and nepotism which defects are categoricatlly denied to exist in Bhagavan. (वैषम्य नैघण्येन सापेक्षत्वात्)

Reghavendra quotes a Smriti of similar meaning श्रुत्वाविष्णुं कर्णकलं प्राप्तत्वात् कर्णसंयुताः । अक्षण्वंतोदर्श नाच्चविष्णोः मुक्ताइचयेगणाः ॥ तारतयमंच तेषांच श्रुतावुदितमंजसा । क्षीरसागर दधनास्तुकेचित्तिष्ठंतिमुक्तिगणाः ॥ उपस्थिता ब्रह्मवनं केचिदश्वत्य मंडलं । एरेहृदे केचिदपि देवा एव सदाहरिं ॥

Thus accepting variety in the means adopted with a refusal to accept the same variety in the end leads to logical fallacies of very serious nature of self contradiction.

Now a moral objection is raised. If even in Mukti there is gradation due to knowladge and

bliss then there arise hatred and jealousy among liberated souls. For we find a rule in worldly life that those who are graded as high and low are found bitterly jealous of one another.

But this is a hasty assertion. For in worldly life the reason for jealousy and hatred is not gradation but it is affected sight and affected mental outlook. Here in the released state the soul has shed all such affectations and has stood in naked purity. Hence there is no scope for any such doubt of jealousy and hatred.

Raghavendra puts this in a syllogistic form. The opponent should have recourse to Tarka thus Had the released been liable to gradation then they would also be liable to hatred and jealousy But this Tarka is based upon the general rule of Vyapti above mentioned. This general rule is found conditioned by an upadhi. Gradation is found leading to jealousy and hatred only when that gradation is conditioned by affected nature. But in Mukti there is no scope for being affected with any defect physical or moral. Hence there cannot be any reason for jealousy.

Now another argument is adduced to prove gradation in Mukti. The liberated souls also are graded according to those conditions then available, because they are conscious souls like the

unreleased souls in worldly life. Grading is being superior to some and inferior to some other. No logical flaws like Badha, Sidhasadhanata, Sadhyavaikalya and vyabhichara can be expressed now.

Raghavendra makes this statement clear. we must remember that gradation is adduced with reference to Mukta (Mukta is Paksha). Hence Badha or falsification has no scope. Sidha Sadhana or proving what is already proved is also a logical falacy. That is not possible here because gradation is qualified with, 'according to conditions then available' and 'according to former gradation among them' are used. Something new is proved and hence it is no Sidha Sadhana. In the instance of unreleased souls the gradation of souls in worldly life continues even in the state of Mukti and hence this sylogism cannot be accused of 'absence of Sadhya' as Sadhya or gradation is in the samsari souls 'One is superior to the others' and not to Hari who is superior to all. Hence you cannot show the violation of the rule in Hari.

Gradation means either being superior to some one or being inferior to some one else.

But this gives scope to misapprehension. For if gradation means being inferior to some one then the rule is violated in Hari who is chetana and yet is not inferior to some one. If gradation means being superior to some one, then Pratijna means one released soul is superior to another released soul. But the instance is unreleased soul which cannot be superior to Mnkta soul. So the instance cannot have Sadhya in it which is a great logical defect.

Raghavendra therefore clarifies the conception of gradation by defining gradation both as inferiority, and superiority of a certain thing in respect to some other things. Thus when gradation is defined in general so as to be applicable to both kinds of gradations (of superiority and of inferiority) if taking only one variety, it is condemned as defective. Every syllogism may thus be condemned and logical reasoning itself will have to be declared unfit to be the instrument of knowladge. So it is unwise always to condemn the general truth by scrutinising critically the particulars of it.

Now by gradation accepting both the varieties, a new definition of gradation is offered. The released soul just a moment after

the release he was just as he was before release to some he was inferior and to some he was superior in his essential or spiritual nature. The concomitance rule must be stated in general terms. The same released soul in his released condition is the soul in spiritual status as he was in his unreleased condition.

This leads us to the eternal order of gradation from beginningless time. When thus eternity is proved then gradation is proved to exist even in the released state of the soul.

This gradation has at the lowest rung kali and at the highest rung has the husband of Saraswatee or fourfaced Brahman.

Of the three instruments of knowledge Agama is of infallible applicability in unknowable things. But it is liable to different interpretations. Hence to prove that the four faced Brahma is at the acme of gradation, inference is used.

All have agreed that in the present time the four faced Brahma is at the highest rung of the ladder of gradation. Thus then in the past period of time and in the future also he must be similarly at the highest rung. Because they are also periods of time like the present one. This Brahma

even when he was not in the status of Brahma was at the highest rung. This proves the yogyata of Brahma in the past and future and its eternal nature.

Many Shruties also are quoted to prove the eternity of yogyata. Hence it is proved that right from kali the lowest Spirit to Brahma the highest spirit the yogyata of the soul is unassail-able and eternal.

Here again the question of immunity from defects of Bhagavan is raised for critical survey. For we can have an immaculately pure vision of Bhagavan only when he is proved to be immune to defects. Raghavendra explains this more clearly. The knowledge that Brahma is free from defects conduces to Moksha. Hence the four-faced Brahma knew Brahma to be defect less.

The highest reality Para Brahman is one integrated whole. There are no parts in it so that one part cannot be pitted against another part of it to institute internal difference in the integrated Reality. Every part of a Brahman is the whole of Brahman. So perception and inference, based upon perception, cannot apprehend difference amongst the conceived parts of Brahman.

What is the judgement of Agama on this moot point? Agama also does not concede this internal difference in an integrated whole. Before that let us know the context of this topic. It was propounded that Rama, Krishna and such incarnations of Bhagavan are not different from Bhagavan.

But Rama and Krishna were seen as different by people living in their days yet they were not accepted as embodied. Difference between two persons entirely depends upon their embodiment. Thus there is no scope at all. Besides if these incarnations are different from independent Paramptman, they are dependent and they will be liable to all defects to which dependence is heir to. Raghavendra mentions them as seeking favour from others, birth and death and such others. And all these incarnations being different from independent Vishnu are liable to all defects just as ordinary souls are.

In order to refute this argument based on perception Agama is quoted in the case of ordinary pots and pans, there is mutual difference between them besides their multiplicity in number. But in Vishnu and his Avatars, there is multiplicity but no mutual difference. Vishnu is seen

distinctly different from others yet not different from himself.

Now this is explained with reference to gods, men and demons. By their nature the souls are of three kinds— Gods men and demons. The perception of gods does not apprehend the difference between one Avatar and another or between Avatar and the original form of Paramman. The best souls recognise that Avatar is Paramatman. The Pauranik instance is that of Jambuvan who recognised Krishna to be the same as Rama.

But multiplicity among objects is invariably found with difference among them. Therefore recognition of sameness is not compatible with multiplicity:

But there will be a doubt if multiplicity in the forms of Bhagavan is due to difference or to an innate capacity or Vishesha in Bhagavan which makes unity and multiplicity in Bhagavan possible. When both are possible decisive Vedio statements prove beyond doubt that Bhagavan is indisputably one appearing in many forms not in contravention of its uniformity or unity or better still its identity. This is corroborated by the internal perception of the best souls.

Now middle class souls do not recognise the sameness of paramatman in all his various forms, yet they do not find differences among them. The reason for non recognition of sameness is the fact that his vision is clouded, at the sweet will of paramatman. But he apprehends difference of other objects from Bhagavan and difference among pots and pans.

It is only the last and condemned class of souls by nature that find difference among the Lord. So the evidence of eminent souls of class one testify to the unity and undivided nature of Paramatman in spite of multiplicity of forms. The best evidence is the statement of Bheeshma which expresses his conviction. "God created all animals and entered their hearts. So is Krishna free from all blemishes "I am completely disillusioned, lost all faith in difference in respect of Paramatman and found him solidly integrated and one, just as the Sun situated in the eye of everyone as the internal controller and guide is found divided and yet recognised as one and the same.

Then begins a long discussion about the validity of knowledge which is of two kinds. One is mental modification and another is self

luminous self itself. Now if validity of knowledge is ascertained through test, there will be no end to the test and without is ascertainment of validity no one inclined to undertake any activity. But on wrong assumption we are now proceeding and falling into logical pit. For test is not required in every case of knowledge. Only when a doubt arises test is found essential and not when there is undoubted certainty. Only in the case of mentally modified cognitions there is scope for doubt. With my eyes or even with my touch when I know there is water, I may doubt its veracity. For it is mind's modification. After I drink water there is pleasure of quenching my thirst. This pleasure is felt by self luminous self or Jeeva or Sakshi and no one doubts it.

Now all knowledge at the first stage is without its validity ascertained. Ascertained or verified validity is from a feeling of invalidity. Sakshi with due test ascertains validity. But when there is no defect Sakshi in the usual way apprehends common validity at the first instance. When there is curiosity there is test and then there is verified validity. In all cases of knowledge of mental modification usually man entertains a doubt and there is a test and Sakshi apprehends validity after verification. But in

the case of knowledge apprehended by Sakshi no necessity of test is felt and there is the immediate apprehension of validity.

Now in the case of multiplicity of diviner forms difference is apprehended by perception but Agama or verbal testimony testifies to the fact of identity of these forms. One is allowed to contradict the other after knowing which is basic and which is dependent. In respect of Vishnu and his forms Agama alone is the real source of knowledge and hence it is basic or उपजीव्य while perception is dependent on Agama and hence it is dependent or उपजीवक. The basic knowledge contradicts the conflicting notion which is based on it. Thus Agama which recognises the identity of forms of Vishnu contradicts perception which apprehends the apparent difference of forms.

So long gradation was treated in respect of means of Moksha and consequently of the end Moksha. Now the persons whose destiny of Moksha is assured on account of the divine vision will do good deeds and avoid bad deeds. If Brahma and other souls are not graded in Moksha they need not do good deeds after divine vision as their Moksha is sure and certain.

But Agama declares that post-vision good deed add to the intensity of Ananda or ecstatic delight enjoyed by released souls in Moksha.

But it is objected by Advaitin against the principle of the basic instrument being contradictory of the dependet principle. For this would nullify the Advaita Shruti. It cannot be settled as final for the statement of omniscience is basic and तत्त्वमसि being dependent. It cannot be said that the statement of omniscience provides us with the substance and hence it is upajeevya and then comes the upajeevaka उपजीवक to nullify it. For then 'this is Silver' coming first will be upajeevya and will sublate the uppjeevaka 'this is shell' which comes next. But this is not so.

This contention of Advaitin is not sound For upajeevaka is that which is well tested. 'This is silver, is not well tested Hence it is not upjeevya या सर्वज्ञ The statements of god being omniscient and jeeva being miserable are well tested and hence they are upajeevya and contradict तत्त्वमसि which is upajeevaka.

Advaitin again contends that mere unqualified essence of Brahman is the upajeevya and not the one qualified with attributes of

ommissione. This is not sublated at all by next coming statement of तत्त्वमसि.

But the Advaitin cannot parry the blow of the upanishadic contradiction with the instance of silver-shell sublation. For sublating statement न देवरजते 'this is not silver' refers to mere unattributed substance this' and not the substance attributed with silverness. But not so is the statement तत्त्वमसि. For तत् or that (Brahman with omniscience) is identified with त्वं (you or Jeeva with misery and others you, which is most illogical).

To avert this blow if it is contended that unattributed essential consciousness is identified with unattributed consciousness shedding the attributes of omniscience and misery in both the cases, then it is not the identity of Brahman and soul but the identity of pure unattributed consciousness which is harmless, because it is as good as saying 'the thing is identical with itself'.

Now Advaitin's Brahman cannot be even consciousness or चेतनात्मा. For according to his dictum 'what is dependent is not real and चेतनात्मा is nothing but ज्ञात्वा or knowerness. or ज्ञातक्रियाप्रति कर्तृत्वं ज्ञात्वं active agency in the activity of knowing. Raghavendra gives a grammatical explanation of ज्ञात्वं. Now this knowerness is dependent upon

the object of knowledge or ज्ञेय and in the same manner it also depends upon knowingness. Hence these will form attributes of Brahman विकृष्ट and Brahman will be सविशेष or attributed which is not acceptable to Advaitin.

Now Advaitin cannot contend that Brahman is स्वरूपमात्र His mere self or essence. For even his own self or essence depends upon other things for understanding स्वरूपं स्वरूपं; रूपform or essence is common to both one self and the other. And this is used in the case of स्वं by meemansic rule of exclusion or परिसंख्या excludes it from पर. Hence the dependency of स्वं on पर.

Raghavendra fully explains this rule of exclusion in Meemansa Shastra. When certain rituals are going on certain Mantras are recited. Are they meant to express their verbal meaning? or they are not meant to express their meaning. But they are recited only to produce some high religious merit capable of yielding celestial fruit. When thus a doubt arises the shastra replies that the contents of the Mantras are already expressed by some Brahmana statements. Hence Mantras used in rituals are merely meant to produce Adrista or religious merit. Only the blind are led by others and not those that

are well-sighted. Objection is raised in the Sutra तदर्थशास्त्रात् and then in the sutra परिसंख्या a suitable reply is given. इमा अग्रस्पष्टन् रशनामृतस्य is the Mantra cited. A Brahmana vakya also is there but its meaning is not the same. Had it been so then this mantra quoted here would not have been significant with meaning. But it would have been used merely for its effect like a Mantra used as an antidote to snake-bite.

Really speaking Brahmana Vakya has a significant purpose to serve. It is used for परिसंख्या exclusion. For Chayana sacrifice bricks are required to be brought in a cart drawn by both a horse and an ass whose reins are to be taken in the hands. This is the meaning expressed by Mantra. Brahmana Vakya by Parisankya means that an ass should not be yoked with its rein in the hand. So Brahmana is not vainly used. So Mantras are fully significant in meaning when used in rituals. परिसंख्या means when a thing is applicable in both the places, using it in one place with an exclusion of it in another place.

The Advaitin adduces that there is the evidence of Agama to prove the unreality of the world. वेहनानाभित्किञ्चन proves the unreality of the world according to his interpretation of this

Shruti. To this the Sidhanti gives a subtle reply "we do not deny the existence of this Shruti, nor do we deny the interpretation of it. We only deny this import of sentence that the world is illusory or unreal. The import is settled after finding out that it does not run counter to the rationale of the whole theme.

In the Sutra पृथ्वी तः कन्दात् Jnana was said to be the means to the end of Moksha. In this context it was stated that Jnana was proportioned to Karma ; and Moksha was in proportion to Jnana. In this Shastra wherever you meet with a statement that Jnana is the means to Moksha you must understand that Jnana means Bhakti' Jnana is only a part of Bhakti which is defined as devotional attachment to a reality knowing its greatness. It is this relation which by secondary implication settles the whole 'Bhakti' when 'a part' 'Jnana' is mentioned. A part implying a whole is seen in such usages as 'दशमात्रदत्त' Raghavendra explaines this as medical usage. In medicine the word बाट means a part of the medicine. In दशमात्र part used for the whole of the medicine. Others explain it differently accepting a different reading दशमात्र. दशा means the end of piece of cloth, When it is said that दशमात्र दत्त it means a small piece of cloth with its end, in practice. Others still explain it differ-

ently. दशा means a wick दशामात्र इति then means wick dipped in oil.

'And others' includes an instance from Meemansa sutra. वैश्वदेवेनयज्ञेत, Here Vaishvadeva is a part of chaturmasya and it implies a group of sacrifices known as वैश्वदेवाष्ठकयागः These are the instances to show how a part implies the whole. So also Jnana is a part of Bhakti and wherever it is cited as means to Moksha it means Bhakti, hence it is said ज्ञानीप्रियं तमोमे A man of knowledge is most dear to me.

We must also treat the devotees of Hari with devotion. Gods are Hari's devotees and hence we must know the gradation of gods, the scale of their spiritual capacity in order to realise Mukti. Because we shall have to base our devotion on this scale of spiritual capacity. Then only our devotion conduces to Mukti. Accordingly the fruit of papa and Punya of an individual goes to demons and gods respectively. The Punya is distributed among gods according to their spiritual capacity or yogyata. So Brahma (four faced) and Vanee his consort get more than half of it. In the same manner the Guru who instructs, gets more than half of religions merit of instruction.

THUS ENDS THE FOURTH PADA OF
THIRD ADHYAYA

IV ADHYAYA I PADA

In order that the object might be achieved
I shall bow to that Kamalapati who bestows
Mukti on us when propitiated with the (accepted
means.

In this Adhyaya we read the fruit of all our spiritual efforts. The first two Adhyayas samanvaya and Avirodha delivered us the accomplished form of Brahman the third Adhyaya afforded means to realise this Brahman. Then arose the occasion to present the fruit of all those efforts.

First the destruction of Karma as the effect of Spiritual attempts is treated. Before this, sincere and honest effort is stressed again as in the III Adhyaya. For in spiritual life it is the practice, not much the theory of a principle that bears fruit. Constant and devoted dedication alone is called efficacy in spiritual progress.

In the course of discussion we come across a Sutra नहाद्विष्टस्तप्ति where it is stated that Vishnu should be meditated upon as perfect with infinite number of qualities. Now in the previous Sutra the word प्रतीक or image is present and usually the

word that is present near at hand is construed. But this insults the import of the sentence. For then both image and substance would be identical which is highly objectionable, Some word which is compatible in sense shall have to be chosen. And that is Atma. This Atma who is Vishnu should be meditated as Brahma; because he is perfect. Besides the meditation that the image is Brahman a thought of identity which is contradicted. Hence it is an erroneous meditation which is strictly prohibited. There is also an implied suggestion that it is not mere अनंतर्य or juxtaposition that settles the syntactical construing in a sentence but it is योग्यता or compatibility of sense that settles the construction as is made clear in the Jaimini Sutra अनंतर्य अचोदना juxtaposition does not (prove the construing). Even if there is intervention of word or two syntactical construing is settled by the compatibility of sense or import.

Now here is an instance of refuting a commentary. The interpretation of the Sutra that the image should be thought as Brahma is not right. It is enjoined that the image should not be worshipped as Brahman. For the image is not Brahman. The reasoning is that a thing should not be worshipped as some thing when both are not identical and the same. This reasoning is not a pre-

sumption. For in the previous Sutra this commentator himself has shown that the image should not be worshipped as Atma, otherwise there also this reasoning would not have prevailed over the objection. The Advaitin cannot contend that there is identity between the image and Brahma. Because one is imaginary and the other is real. But there is no transcendently real difference between the two. Though image and Brahma are empirically different transcendently or ultimately they are one. If this is so then between जीव and प्रतीक also there is transcendental identity and no absence of it. Non-existence of identity is the Hetu and that is not found in jeeva and Prateeka.

But for the non performance of meditation the reason is not mere absence of identity. The thing worshipped should not be benefitted by excellence. The image when worshipped as Brahma is really benefitted by excellence. Hence even in the absence of identity there is worship of the image as Brahman.

If then accepting a qualified Hetu, the image though not a Brahma is accepted as fit to be worshipped as Brahma then only because there is the benefit of excellence similary then the image should be accepted as fit to be meditated as Atma (which the Advaitin does not do).

Here Raghavendra comments that the proposition that image should not be worshipped as Atma though it is to be worshipped as Brahma is opposed by reason. To this must be added another logical flaw namely Atiprasanga. Similiarly when qualified hetu is accepted, one cannot deny the same privilege to Prateeka when worshipped as Atma (नप्रतीके नहिसः).

One more doubt is raised that Karma anterior and posterior to God vision, does not allow Moksha to be realised by the soul. Hence the Sutrakara emphatically stresses one of the effects of God vision to be the destruction of Karma.

II PADA OF IV ADHYAYA

Acharya at the beginning of Anuvyakhyana justifies the composition of it even after the elucidation of Bhashya is in existence. For Anuvyakhyana explains in greater detail what has been briefly stated in Bhashya.

According to Bhashya the theme of this Pada has been related as the account of Moksha and emergence, from their bodies, of gods. If so the Moksha and emergence of other embodied souls remains to be treated. It must have been treated somewhere else or if not treated at least the reason must be stated.

An answer is framed to cover all these objections. The answer is all comprehensive. This fourth Adhyaya is devoted to the fruit (of all efforts), which is designated as Moksha. This Moksha is made up of four parts. Of these four constituents the first is the destruction of Karma, which includes riddance of evil for good, and security of good. These four occur one after another. After god vision comes the destruction of

Karma which is followed by Emergence. Emerging from the body the soul follows the path fit for him and reaches the destiny which is Brahma. Then comes enjoyment. These four are treated accordingly in the four Padas of the Adhaya.

As for the objections raised on Bhashya the explanation is this. The destruction of Karma is common to both gods and men. Emergence of this second Pada and the Marga of the third Pada do not belong to gods. So Marga of the Seekers excluding gods and Moksha of all are treated in the third Pada.

A note here will clarify the issue. Gods are shining in their bodies and have their destruction of Karma by god-vision and enjoyment. Moksha of gods means only entrance into their superiors and their bodies merge in the bodies of their superiors. Hence there is no Utkranti and emergence from their body and access to Brahma as in the case of other souls.

Thus the topic of this Pada is Moksha of gods only and emergence of men only. Yet there is one common topic of this Pada. and it is the fruit in the form of abandonment of body of both gods and men.

The procedure how one attains the most coveted state of ecstatic joy is related, gathering

it from different sources by Jayatheertha. Gods, by the vision of Vishnu and by experience exhaust the hindrance of Karma, enter into the bodies of their superiors, and have their bodies merged in the bodies of the superiors. While beings other than gods emerge from their bodies along with Brahanadi. Thus both get rid of their bodies. Men alone traverse the path that is fit for them and enter into four faced Brahma. Their subtle symbolic body is broken to pieces. Thus getting rid of the last touch of material existence and standing in pure and radiant and noble soul form with divine qualities like bliss and joy and worshipping the Lord Vishnu in his nearest vicinity, enjoy divine niceties, remaining in their essential form or assuming bodies at their sweet will. Never does he return to this filthy life of the world. This is the nature of the life in Moksha.

But different people of different spiritual stuff have different experiences of the highest state of life. Variety in the conception of Moksha is attributed to the spiritual fabric of the soul which enjoys it. Men of pure soul fabric never fail to recognise the right conception of Moksha. But men of coloured fabric have contaminated conceptions which run counter to Vedio conception of Mukti. They are caught in their own mess of

diabolrc conception and attain nothing but eternal misery and abysmal ignorance.

Here Acharya reviews critically different conceptions of Mayavadin, Jain and Shunyavadin. For instance the Shunyavadin argues— Mere soul without the physical body and set of senses, does not become a source of misery. Similarly the body with a set of senses, but without the soul does not become a source of misery and hence one should renounce both the soul and the body with a set of senses. Therefore our aim in life is the extinction both of body and soul.

But Mayavadin refutes this argument by stating that Shruti tells us that disembodyment and merger of the soul in Brahman is beatification, and denies jurisdiction to inference in the case of Moksha. For Shruti alone can deliver the goods.

But Mayavadin cannot cite Shruti as evidence in the case of Moksha, says Sidhanti. For Mayavadin has robbed the Shruti of its capacity of instrtumentality in respect of knowledge. His attempt to divide Shruti into two sectors— 1) one of Vidhi and Nishedha, which has no capacity to inform us of what reality is 2) another known as Vedanta which is really

capacitated to enlighten us on the nature of reality has been proved to be futile in this respect. For how can Veda help us to know the reality bereft of all attributes?

The conception of Moksha in Vijnanavada is taken up for review. In that system also, the jeeva loses his individuality and attains the state of vijnana. It is also the same as Advaitavada.

In one souled theory, Mukti is the state of Brahma, or Shunya, which is one without second. But as time is eternal even when one soul is released, there is samsara with reference to another soul, or other souls.

Thus exposing defects in every system the Sutra Kara, comes to the theory of Moksha of Tarkikas, and many others. He proves that their theories of Moksha are ill-conceived. It is human to err. But the system builders claim extra ordinary powers of conception and imagination. Even if such persons had erred in some side-topic which is not the point at issue they might have been forgiven. But these so called men of vision and genius grievously mis-understand the main topic of the sutras.

namely Moksha. Through delusion and perversion they have approached the topic of Moksha and consequently their idea of Moksha is a travesty of truth.

They have not understood the barest outline of Moksha much less then the inner secrets of it which is the common stock of knowledge of men ranging from cowherd to crowned prince. For in this world ordinary men of practical outlook without any sublime motivation think that they should be happy. 'I must be happy' is the haunting dream of everyman. But no one cherishes the idea that he should not be happy. Hence those who advocate self-effacement and loss of individuality in Moksha range lower in intelligence than those ordinary men. Hence Sutrakara took so much trouble in disproving the theories of Moksha which are the ill-conceived products of cynical tendency and perverted imagination.

Finally the Sutrakara discusses the question of laya or absorption of one in another. This Laya has reference to gods. Because their Mukti is nothing but absorption into their superiors.

In this context two conflicting Shruti-s come before us. अत्यन्तौ सर्वे देवात्मीयंते and चतुरषुदेवाविलोक्यंते So the question arises whether all gods merge into fire only or in the five elements (earth, water, fire, wind, ether or sky). Fire-Shruti is unambiguous while elements-Shruti is ambiguous. So the objector puts the case thus. All gods enter into wind and wind is absorbed into the sky. Thus the word 'elements' in plural number is justified.

To this objection Sidhanti rejoins that all gods do not merge into one Agni or fire. But into all five elements. Ribhus enter into earth and Aswins into water. In fire enter fires. In vayu enter Indra, Soma, Aditya and Brahaspati. Sadhyas merge in Akasha.

Here the elements stand for deities presiding over them. other gods will not be entering into their superiors. Indra and others do not enter into physical Vayu; but into Mukhya Vayu, who is their superior. Because he is the Abhimanee of the element of Vayu. Even chief Vayu is called a Bhuta or element.

Then the whole Schema of absorption is chalked out in detail. Gods entering in chief

Vayu are said to enter into Mahavishnu. But this entrance is not direct. Therefore a detailed arrangement of final entrance is worked out referring to many sources of Vedic texts. Then the question of exit after entrance into their superiors is discussed.

Then the rule of Laya is quite the reverse of the rule of creation or Srishti. The rule of Laya is that one is absorbed in another of whom the one is born, generally when there is no exception. Again he in whom one is absorbed is the Bimba (original) for the other who is Pratibimba (image).

THUS ENDS II PADA OF IV ADHYAYA

III PADA OF IV ADHYAYA

This is the Shortest Pada in Sudha and Parimala. In this Pada the topic is the Path way to God chosen by men after emerging from their bodies. The destination is Bhagavan Vishnu. Being free from the bondage of Karma and emerging from the body men march towards their destination.

IV PADA OF IV ADHYAYA

In this pada the last topic, enjoyment of one's essential happiness, is treated. When the souls enter into the four faced Brahma, they all attain Param jyoti. The soul being himself after his release remains different from that Para Brahma. With the four faced Brahma they enjoy their own essential happiness and they have access to all worlds in this state of Mukti. Many more details also about the released souls are worked on the basis of those Shruties profusely quoted. Then other elucidations of Shruties all amounting to identity of souls with

Para Brahman are shown to be not based upon canons of interpretation. The Muktas thus acknowledge the undisputed sovereignty of Lord Narayana and enjoy happiness at his gracious suffrage.

Acharya at the end bows down to Shri Hari the abode of many perfections. In order to show that one's own realisation is as essential as god vision and realisation of Paramatma Acharya reveals his own place in the hierarchical scale as Vayndeva. Then his three incarnation and the last incarnation as Madhva was declared to the world. It is this Madhva who wrote this work in order to extol his unsurpassed and unsurpassable sovereignty.

Then Jayateertha in submissive gratitud offers this garland of chosen flowers to be worn by Kamalapati round his neck.

Then he discloses the noble motive with which he was inspired to write this work Nyay Sudha. It is not under the delusion of his erudition, nor under the evil intention of professing his mastery over vocabulary, nor instigated by malignity, nor incited by playfulness, wantonness, that I was geared to write this

unreserved dedication that prompted me to undertake this heavy work.

Raghavendra explains the propriety of offering a garland to Kamalapati. Just as in this world a beggar gathering flowers from different gardens and wreathing them into a garland offers it, to a kind person, who might receive it, so also may this Kamalapati accept this garland of words offered by me and wear it on his breast, approving it as the best one. One is attracted by a garland of flowers only when one is accompanied with a lady. Hence japa-ateertha offers it to Kamalapati.

Raghavendra then dedicates his work of Parimala to Kamalalaya confessing that he took to this work only at the impelling of the Lord of Prana who immanently actuates all senses (of all living beings).

Then he addresses those that are interested in the study of Nyaya Sudha. Those learned pandits who know the art of appreciation, and who earnestly desire to drink the nectar of Nyaya Sudha, will do well first to enjoy the fragrance of Nyaya Sudha and then study Nyaya Sudha.

When the ocean of knowledge itself acknowledges his own error, what wonder is there if there is error in my writings. Let the learned forgive it.

THUS ENDS THE FOURTH PADA OF THE FOURTH ADHYAYA.

Silent submission to the will of God is the only prayer of one like me, at the end of the difficult task undertaken.

समाप्त्य तुष्टरेत् भवति पूर्वता प्राप्तवारः
न तुष्टरेत् तदपि भवति प्रभासे द्वचक्षिप्या ॥
प्रवेशो दत्तोभाव दिव्य सदने कुमुमिनपे
कृतं वा प्राप्तस्य अकृतमपि दत्तं प्राप्तेन सुखम् ॥३॥

If satisfied with the end, (of this work) Madhva (who has Madhava as his Guru) will be really pleased; if not satisfied even that will redound to the fame of such (men) as are poorly equipped with intelligence. For any how the entranceto a heaven given to the heavenly mansion full of flowers, (Parimala) whether recognised with respect or not. At least the pleasure of the sight (of Pari-mala) was granted.